Women's Activism in South Africa: Working Across Divides by Britton, Hannah E. et al.
Working Across Divides
i
Women’s Activism in South Africa
Working Across Divides
EDITED BY
HANNAH BRITTON, JENNIFER FISH AND SHEILA MEINTJES
ii
Published in 2008 by






© 2008 University of KwaZulu-Natal
All rights reserved. No part of  this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or
by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information
storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.
ISBN: 978-1-86914-146-2




Cover designer: Flying Ant Designs
Printed and bound by Pinetown Printers
iii
Contents
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
1 Engendering Civil Society in Democratic South Africa . . . . . . . . 1
Hannah Britton and Jennifer Fish
2 Citizenship, Gender and Civil Society in South Africa . . . . . . . . . 43
Denise Walsh
3 Gender Equality by Design: The Case of the Commission
on Gender Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Sheila Meintjes
4 Women’s Sport as a Site for Challenging Racial and
Gender Inequalities in Post-apartheid South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Cynthia Fabrizio Pelak
5 Organising from Private Spaces: Domestic Labour in
South African Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Jennifer Fish
6 Sexual Violence, Civil Society and the New Constitution . . . . . 155
Helen Moffett
7 Race, Gender and Feminist Practice: Lessons from
Rape Crisis Cape Town . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Benita Moolman
iv
8 Activating Children’s Citizenship: The Politics of
the Girl Child in Democratic South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Christina Nomdo and Shaamela Cassiem
9 Crafting Spaces for Women’s Voices: The Case of
Refugee Women in KwaZulu-Natal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Janine Hicks
10 Transgressive African Feminism: The Possibilities of
Global Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
M. Bahati Kuumba
Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
v
Abbreviations
AAWC All African Women’s Conference
ANC African National Congress
ANCWL African National Congress Women’s League
ASA Advertising Standards Authority
AZASO Azanian Students Organisation
CBO community-based organisation
CBU Children’s Budget Unit (within IDASA)
CDC Centers for Disease Control
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
CGE Commission on Gender Equality
COSAS Congress of South African Students
COSATU Congress of  South African Trade Unions
DICAG Disabled Children’s Action Group
DP Democratic Party
FOSATU Federation of  South African Trade Unions
FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FSAW; FEDSAW Federation of  South African Women
GAPA Grandmothers Against Poverty and AIDS
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GMAC-UIF Gender Monitoring and Advocacy Coalition for the
Unemployment Insurance Fund
HIV/AIDS human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune
deficiency syndrome
vi
HSRC Human Sciences Research Council
IDASA Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
JCC Junior City Council (city of  Cape Town)
JMC Joint Monitoring Committee
KZN KwaZulu-Natal
LHR Lawyers for Human Rights
MCC Mennonite Central Committee
MK Umkhonto we Sizwe
MP member of parliament
NCHRE National Center for Human Rights Education
NEC National Executive Council
NGO non-governmental organisation
NIH National Institutes of Health
NP National Party
NSA Netball South Africa
NUSAS National Union of South African Students
OSW Office on the Status of  Women
PWN Positive Women’s Network
RCCT Rape Crisis Cape Town
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme
RWM Rural Women’s Movement
SACP South African Communist Party
SADF South African Defence Force
SADSAWU South African Domestic Service and Allied Workers
Union
SADWU South African Domestic Workers’ Union
SAFA South African Football Association
SAHRC South African Human Rights Commission
SAPS South African Police Services
SAYCO South African Youth Congress
SEWU Self-Employed Women’s Union
SISA Sport Information and Science Agency
SWAA Society for Women and AIDS in Africa
vii
TAC Treatment Action Campaign
TAP Township AIDS Project
UCT University of  Cape Town
UDF United Democratic Front
UIF Unemployment Insurance Fund
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
URW Union of  Refugee Women
WASSA Women and Sport South Africa
WHARP Women’s HIV/AIDS Resources Project
WNC Women’s National Coalition
YDP Youth Development Programme (of  Cape Town)
viii
Engendering Civil Society in Democratic South Africa 1
1
CHAPTER ONE
Engendering Civil Society in
Democratic South Africa
HANNAH BRITTON AND JENNIFER FISH
SOUTH AFRICA’S NEGOTIATED transition and 1994 democratic elections
promised significant gains for gender equality, as women acquired one-third
of the seats in the national parliament, secured constitutional protection and
began an extensive process of  legislative reform. These significant transforma-
tions at the national governance level continue to characterise South Africa
as one of  the most lauded states in terms of  women’s access to public positions
of  power and the protection of  social rights. Women composed 32 per cent
of the national parliament by the third democratic election, while the new
Constitution is recognised as having one of the broadest and most inclusive
anti-discrimination clauses internationally. These victories extend from
decades of  women’s activism in the struggle to end apartheid and assure
gender rights in the creation of a new nation. In this process, a record number
of  women moved directly from the anti-apartheid struggle, political exile,
labour movements or political imprisonment to positions of power within
both parliament and the civil service. These macro-level changes, coupled
with the experiences of activism shared by those entering public positions of
power, placed enormous hope on the women who took national office.
Characterised by the overarching climate of optimism central to the 1994
transition, the end of  the apartheid struggle created new opportunities for
women to rebuild South Africa by centralising gender rights in order to improve
the quality of  life and status for all women in the country.
2 Women’s Activism in South Africa
The process of  rebuilding society in the aftermath of  violent conflict also
affords vital opportunities to transform gender relations (see Meintjes 2001
and Powley 2003). Since the end of  apartheid, South African women have
continued to redefine leadership, feminism and power on their own terms
and in their own cultural contexts. Yet for every significant gain women have
made in the national political arena, there remains a parallel obstacle that is
often most evident outside of  the formal public structures of  governance.
Changing the nature of social relations and ameliorating the underpinning
causes of gender inequality continue to constitute the most daunting challenges
to assuring the protective rights central to South Africa’s new democracy. As
a result, even though women are in powerful positions in the public sphere,
‘the struggle continues’ in the movement to alleviate gender inequalities in
prevailing systems that have not yet transformed in accordance with the public
commitment to gender rights. In families, households, communities and social
institutions, women continue to face extreme marginalisation, as evidenced
by the severe forms of  gender-based violence throughout South Africa. We
suggest that in the existing context, the negotiation of  these deep contra-
dictions in gender rights takes place in civil society organisations, where women
continue to confront pervasive gender inequalities on a daily basis, while at
the same time acting as powerful individual and collective agents of social
change.
This book explores these spaces where women are actively reconstituting
society by engendering democracy in ways that are central to assuring the
long-term transformation of  South Africa. In this collection, we situate civil
society organisations as our central lens in analysing gender progress in the
context of  South Africa’s ongoing process of  social change and democrat-
isation. Through case studies drawn from a broad collection of  women’s
organisations within South African society, each of  the chapters evaluates
how women in South Africa are navigating the contested terrains of  ethnicity,
social position and/or the national movement to democratisation. By ex-
ploring women’s engagement within competitive sports, domestic-violence
services, national unions, rights-based activism and political organisations,
this collection expands the notion of political involvement and illustrates
how South African women are constructing new forms of  activism within
the context of  contemporary state structures that assure only a partial form
of  gender equality.
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The cases in this text demonstrate the agency of and the obstacles for
women within civil society in the face of patriarchal power relations and in
relation to the post-apartheid state. This collection is intended to take part in
the dialogue that assesses the complementarity as well as the potential conflicts
between women’s ability to advocate for gender rights through powerful roles
in public positions of state governance and as agents of social change in civil
society. First, a central theme of  our collection is that the state is both an
avenue for change for women and is hostile to women’s activism at the same
time. Several authors in this collection explore the potential of the state for
improving the status of women, while others point out the limitations of the
state for transforming social norms and patriarchal patterns. Second, the case
studies in this text point to the dual impacts of  women’s roles in civil society.
While some assessments show that civil society is an important avenue for
women’s activism, others demonstrate that this sphere may be more hostile
to women than the state has been. The complexities of these analyses challenge
the notion of  ‘gender victory’ that has been central to South Africa’s transition
by illustrating that public measures to assure women’s representation have
not yet materialised in ways that change the daily life circumstances for the
majority of  South African women. Finally, a unique contribution of  this
collection is the specific organisational ethnographies that focus on a range
of  women’s groups and networks. These ethnographies map the ongoing
processes of  navigating the intersections of  gender, sexuality, race and
geography in the continually changing landscape of post-1994 South Africa.
The contributors in this volume are an embodiment of a key goal of the
text: working across divides. This collection is intended, both in content and
process, to be a bridge not only between South African and international
authors but also between social activists and academic scholars. Several of
the contributors are activists and practitioners in civil society organisations
dealing with the rights of  women on a daily basis. Others are academics whose
scholarly work has been linked to the intellectual and political projects of
advancing the rights of  women and challenging patriarchal norms and systems.
In joining this project, each of the contributors recognises the value of
engaging in a dialogue across methodologies, strategies, disciplines and fields.
We situate these studies within a larger conversation on transnational solidarity
in order to contribute to the broader assessment of the relationships among
local, continental and global gender politics. As Mama (2005) states:
4 Women’s Activism in South Africa
[T]he experiences of  women’s networks show additional challenges arising
from the uneven levels of  development among women’s movements across
the continent. This has meant that pan-continental mobilisation has struggled
to be properly and evenly representative across and within nations that have
remained deeply divided between urban and rural locations, and socially
stratified along class, ethnic and religious lines, as well as by gender inequalities.
(3)
Drawing from the South African experience, the voices in this collection
vividly illustrate these challenges and demonstrate the importance of building
a global feminist conversation that advances support for women’s activism
within the context of neo-liberal globalisation. The transnational nature of
the anti-apartheid struggle and the international women’s movement created
the networks and mechanisms through which we bring scholar-activists and
activist-scholars into an international conversation about systems of op-
pression, opportunities for transformation and possibilities of  connection.
Through the wide diversity of experiences and methodologies included in
this text, we invite the reader into this conversation as a starting point for
understanding how women’s organising is created, sustained and international-
ised.
To set the context for the variety of  gender case studies explored in each
chapter of  this text, we begin with an overview of  women’s collective or-
ganising during the apartheid era. Next, drawing from both the historical and
contemporary contexts, this chapter explores the relationship between gender
and civil society by focusing on how these theoretical fields would benefit
from the development of shared conversations and analyses, rather than
working in isolation from one another, as has been the case in these distinct
bodies of  enquiry. We foreground the case studies with a conceptual meaning
of gender, followed by elaboration on the contested meaning of feminism in
the South African context. Drawing from the contemporary dialogue on
transformative feminist practice, we then posit a new situational analysis
that synthesises the findings from this collection: pragmatic feminism. We offer
these condensed theoretical and applied backgrounds to situate the foundation
from which we analyse women’s engagement in civil society in the post-1994
South African context. Our intent here is to provide a framing structure that
will enhance readers’ understanding of each of the diverse case studies in the
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collection. In setting up these various conceptual pieces, however, we do not
suggest that any of  these condensed summaries of  central historical move-
ments or complex theoretical debates is comprehensive in its scope. Rather,
we hope that the context we establish in this introduction grounds the readers
in ways that enhance the main focus of  this book: women’s activism in South
African civil society organisations.
Women’s organising during apartheid
Because women are often not able to access membership in institutions of
state power, historically, women have found that civil society is a primary
locus for crafting policy agendas and mobilising for political change. As we
will discuss below, drawing on feminist theory and social movement theory,
we posit a dynamic understanding of civil society that rejects an artificial
separation of a public sphere from a private sphere. While civil society
occupies the space between the state and the household, it also overlaps with
each of  these spaces. Civil society encompasses the household, issue-based
networks and organisations working to engage the state and influence change
at the micro-level of  social relations. This fluidity of  boundaries is central to
the potential that civil society holds for transforming social relations at the
micro-, organisational and structural levels.
Within civil society, women have been able to gather the collective
strength necessary to influence, cajole and even threaten state entities and
political leaders to provide legislation and resources for the advancement of
women’s rights and status. Civil society is a location for an endless array of
gender-based organisations and, at times, women have been much more
successful in entering this level of the public space to demand their rights,
work towards their common interests and create networks and associations
for support. This was certainly the case in South Africa during the apartheid
struggle, particularly because the state remained completely closed to the
participation of  the majority of  South Africans. Yet, as Denise Walsh points
out in Chapter 2 of this collection, this pattern has changed. The recent
attention of South African feminists on state institutions and electoral politics
has shifted the focus of  women’s movements in post-apartheid civil society,
providing a valuable opportunity to explore the multiple layers of gender-
based activism during periods of rapid social change.
6 Women’s Activism in South Africa
Each chapter in this collection highlights the connections between
women’s activism during the liberation struggle and the meaning of  collective
agency in the ongoing process of  democratisation. The legacy of  women’s
social and political activism in South Africa cannot be separated from the
history of apartheid and its requisite systems of racial, class and gender
oppression. Women’s organising during apartheid was marked by a tension
between moments when women worked across racial divides and moments
when power asymmetries sharply divided activists along race and class lines.
One strategy some women used to organise across divides involved adopting
traditional identities, such as the ‘motherist’ ideology, and using those identities
to promote progressive change (Wells 1993; Britton 2005). Many women
often worked in radical, even militant, ways to oppose racial or gender
hierarchies of oppression, yet this militancy was ensconced in claims of
preserving and upholding traditional gender roles. For example, women
organised around a maternal identity and fought to save the nation ‘for their
children’; many women embraced the ideal of becoming the ‘mothers of the
nation’ for nationalistic struggles in African and Afrikaner communities. While
not the only form of  women’s activism present during the struggle, this
‘motherist’ approach and other conservative identities were double-edged
swords. They enabled women to propel issues from the ‘private’ sphere into
the highly visible ‘public’ sphere. Such approaches to activism also gave women
a valorised and respected identity, which in turn afforded them legitimacy in
the eyes of  their male partners and leaders. Yet it also reinforced a gender
hierarchy that essentialised maternal roles while maintaining women’s
subordination and secondary status (Walker 1982; Meintjes 1998; Geisler
2004). These contradictions capture the complexities of  women’s mobilisation
in both the apartheid and post-1994 eras, as the authors take up throughout
the collection.
Wells (1993) presents one example of  this type of  conservative militancy
in her analysis of  the pass laws protests. Women’s protests against the pass
laws comprised some of the first national mass-action campaigns, drawing
women from all races to these protests and propelling women into the sphere
of  national politics. Publicly and strategically, women stated that they opposed
the pass laws because they interfered with their domestic roles as mothers
and wives and deterred black women’s entry into the labour market as domestic
workers in white homes. Through these protests, they were successful in
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opposing the imposition of the pass laws for decades longer than black men
were able to do. Wells asserts that by employing the strategy of  protest from
within traditional identities, women crafted a successful platform to foster
change while maintaining a position of  power within traditional identities.
This same pattern, combined with the lessons drawn from socialist
ideology, shaped the consumer boycotts of  the 1950s. Women used their
traditional roles as household consumers to fight against multiple industries
and oppose their labour practices. While the leaders of  many consumer
boycotts were men, those responsible for envisioning and implementing the
boycotts were often women. By the 1980s, consumer boycotts had changed
to much more oppositional and internationally visible forms. Men and women
in the movement used their purchasing power in combination with mass-
action and national protests to challenge apartheid where it was most
vulnerable: at its economic foundation (Terborg-Penn 1990; Mangaliso 1997).
In this way, women activists applied their collective agency by drawing upon
traditional roles to implement mass action in the service of  economically
revolutionary goals.
Even women’s roles as militants and soldiers were at times informed by
this concept of  revolutionary female consciousness. Cock’s (1991) examination
of gender and militancy underscores that women used their maternal identity
to justify radical action and even the potential to enact revolutionary violence.
Women were trained and acted as freedom fighters in order to ‘save the nation
for their children’. Goldblatt and Meintjes (1998) have found that women’s
roles as ‘mothers in the struggle’ gave them the legitimacy to challenge
apartheid laws and state violence, even through their own potential enactment
of violence.1
But it is important to remember that this strategy of  conservative militancy
could also work to reinforce the division among women. Even before the
advent of  formal apartheid, the white South African women’s movement for
suffrage also was marked by this idea of  conservative militancy. As with
most suffrage movements of  the time, white South African women’s actions
did little to assist black women’s quest for political recognition and in many
ways harmed the movement for racial equality (Walker 1982; Hassim 2006).
Even though white English-speaking women have been recognised to be at
the front of  the movement for white women’s suffrage (Walker 1990),
Afrikaner women were able to use Afrikaner ideology to convince National
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Party (NP) leaders to expand voting rights to women along racial lines, at the
expense of any limited voting rights that black South African men had
achieved in the Cape area. Vincent (1999) asserts that Afrikaner women in
the suffrage movement strategically expanded the idea of Afrikaner mother-
hood (volksmoeder, or ‘mother of the nation’) to make their case for the vote.
They claimed that it was important to the nation to have their voice politically
reinforce Afrikaner ideals in order to minimise the political voice of the black
population. In their campaign, they used the language of home-making and
motherhood to justify their quest for enfranchisement.
Other ideologies guided women’s activism in labour unions and opposition
movements. In the labour sector, union activism by women started as early as
the 1920s and 1930s, and gained significant traction in the 1950s (Berger
1983, 1987; Mangaliso 1997). Infused with socialist ideology, union organising
during this period was nurtured by international networks and allies. Even
though much of  women’s labour activity was restricted to certain industries,
women received invaluable training in negotiation skills, mobilisation tech-
niques and mass-action strategies through their work in the labour unions.
This socialist ideology also worked within opposition movements that func-
tioned in the country until the 1960s. Notably, the politics of  protest – which
focused not only on altering the political system but also on changing the
entire economic structure – distinctly influenced these forms of  women’s
activism. South African women also formed several notable national women’s
organisations during the apartheid period, many of which were racially
inclusive. Keeping in mind the important, but limited, involvement of white
South Africans in the liberation struggle, in general, white women were more
active in the movement than white men (Cock 1991). The African National
Congress Women’s League (ANCWL) and the Federation of  South African
Women (originally FSAW and in the 1990s FEDSAW) emerged as two of  the
key organisations at the time. Hassim (2006) discusses how these organisations
were invested in two defining and often competing ideologies: feminism and
nationalism. While not wishing to subordinate the quest for women’s rights,
both of  these organisations did acknowledge the immediacy, if  not the primacy,
of  the struggle for national liberation. For example, the ANCWL presents a
complex history of  gender inclusion and activism. Originally, women were
denied full membership in the African National Congress (ANC) and served
only a supporting role to the male leadership through membership in the Bantu
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Women’s League (Geisler 2004). However, as women’s roles in anti-apartheid
protests expanded, the ANC was forced to incorporate a more independent
and meaningful role for the League. The ANCWL was formally revitalised in
the 1940s. Emerging at the same time as the ANC Youth League in 1943, it
effectively became a new organisation (Walker 1982; Hassim 2006).
The FSAW symbolised the movement towards women’s alignment across
organisations to mobilise strategically in the anti-apartheid struggle. Formed
out of the recognition that women needed more autonomy than they were
given as auxiliary groups, the federation comprised a number of different
organisations (Walker 1982; Geisler 2004). By engaging as women activists
against racialised state oppression, FSAW members worked strategically to
fight the discriminatory apartheid laws, such as the pass laws, the Group
Areas Act, the Population Registration Act and the Bantu Education Act
(Mompati 1991; Joseph 1991; Klugman 1994; Kemp et al. 1995). Although
an autonomous organisation, the FSAW recognised the need to fight for the
end of apartheid while working to convince male comrades of the importance
of  overcoming all forms of  oppression, not just racial discrimination. Thus,
FSAW captures the tension women activists faced in integrating gender as a
site of collective mobilisation.
After the period of violent, hegemonic repression by the apartheid state
in the 1960s, which banned opposition movements (Berger 1983), many
activists were forced into exile to continue their international mobilisation,
military education and political training. A dramatic impact on resistance
politics inside South Africa characterised this period. While the ANC, the
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and socialist parties all faced government bans,
FSAW was never banned, yet its members frequently faced banning. Following
this invasive measure of state bans, it took a decade for the internal opposition
to reorient itself and craft new ways of organising and alternative strategies
of resistance. This period constituted a new and different phase for the internal
opposition, which consisted of  a new generation of  activists in the struggle.
While often in the background of  these resistance groups, women’s experiences
were invaluable in creating the foundation for a larger women’s movement
and vital to the formative structures of  other national and regional resistance
coalitions (Walker 1982; Hassim 2006).
Union activism formed a central component of  women’s engagement and
political resistance under the apartheid regime. In the 1970s, a new form of
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assertive union activity emerged in Natal, under the umbrella organisation
the Trade Union Advisory and Co-ordinating Council, which later became
the basis of  the Federation of  South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). Women
remained active in this federation, as well as in the General Union Movement.
Regardless of sector, ideological orientation or region, women found avenues
of  participation and activism within their union identity. A strong continuum
of  women’s involvement from the 1970s to the 1980s characterised this area
of activism, as women gained regional and sometimes national recognition
for their work in the union movement. The Congress of  South African Trade
Unions (COSATU), founded in 1985, coordinated mass action and remained
at the forefront of  the resistance movement. Working within the twin
frameworks of nationalism and feminism, women in COSATU organised to
address issues of sexual harassment, maternity leave and night shifts that
would affect parents’ ability to care for their families (Mangaliso 1997). As
Walsh discusses in the next chapter, while women found effective means to
mobilise through the socialist ideologies of  COSATU, they also experienced
severe internal marginalisation as a result of patriarchal leadership within the
organisational structure of  COSATU, which illustrates the striking contra-
dictions that characterise women’s experience in their efforts to access power
and advocate for gender equality.
Internal resistance to apartheid in the 1980s took on new heights as the
liberation movement, which had been forced underground in the 1960s, began
more direct confrontation with the apartheid state. Following the massacre
of students in Soweto in 1976 and the subsequent student uprisings across
the country, youth organisations launched national protests and increased
radical mass action. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new generation of
youth leaders and coalition politics challenged the more conciliatory and
reformist politics of  previous generations. The South African Youth Congress
(SAYCO), the Congress of  South African Students (COSAS), the Azanian
Students Organisation (AZASO) and the National Union of South African
Students (NUSAS) constituted just a few of the main national coalitions that
mobilised a generation of youth, which had been excluded from the educational
system, faced high levels of unemployment and had been raised in a distinct
overarching climate of  protest politics. The youth movement set the stage
for identity politics throughout South Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle, which
provided an ideological and pragmatic connection to the women’s movement.
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Opposition groups in the 1980s began coordinated national campaigns to
overthrow apartheid. While this full-scale assault remained remarkably non-
violent, the apartheid state met each protest with increasing violence.
Consumer boycotts in the 1980s again began to shake the foundations of the
economy and coalition politics thrived. The United Democratic Front (UDF),
organised in 1983, initially brought together over 400 civic, religious, youth,
women and labour organisations. The UDF drew nearly three million members
by 1985, with 700 affiliated organisations by 1987 working simultaneously at
the local, regional and national levels. The organisation challenged military
conscription, organised consumer and rent boycotts and supported youth
protests of  schools. COSATU, the UDF and the youth organisations were just a
few of the numerous resistance coalitions that brought the apartheid state to
its knees.
Because of the dynamics of organisational politics during these tumultuous
times, often women did not occupy political leadership during the 1970s and
1980s. Yet women in exile received advanced educational degrees, political
training and military service that led them to top positions within the political
parties. Inside South Africa, women sustained a deep involvement in resistance
politics, through both women’s associations as well as groups organising
underground to topple apartheid. Nationally, women’s organisations remained
central to the success of  the UDF and youth coalitions. On a local level,
women worked within religious organisations, funeral societies, savings groups,
social organisations and economic enterprises, and often used their
involvement in these associations to further their anti-apartheid networking.
In each of these sectors, women attained valuable networking skills, individual
growth opportunities and often small-scale economic empowerment. Their
work in these groups also instituted a framework from which to create positive
change in their immediate lives and communities. This demonstrates the
positions of power that women are able to establish within deeply patriarchal
and racially discriminatory systems in order to actively alter their environment.
As Seidman (1993) argues, the forces of urbanisation and capitalism destroyed
the indigenous subsistence systems, and many women entered the labour
force for the first time in the 1970s and 1980s. Women harnessed the power
they achieved within these activities to challenge not only the apartheid state
but also the pressures of capitalism.
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National and regional women’s organisations also radicalised during the
1980s. Infused with ideologies of  black consciousness, socialism and radical
feminism, women focused on local and indigenous processes of collective
mobilisation. Kaplan (1996) marks a change in ideologies guiding women’s
activism during this period from one of a ‘female consciousness’ to one framed
by larger, nationalist struggles organised around ‘social citizenship’ and linking
women’s rights to the human rights discourse of  economic and social justice.
The Black Sash, for example, moved from working primarily on voting rights
and human rights to work on forced resettlement and legal assistance for the
families of  political prisoners. While initially using the white leadership of
the organisation as a challenge to the apartheid government’s claim that all
whites supported their policies, the Sash shifted its composition to include
black and coloured South Africans. This ideological shift in Sash politics began
in the 1960s and was solidly in place by the 1980s (Klugman 1994). During
this same span of  critical activism, organisations such as the Black Women’s
Federation (formed in 1975), Rape Crisis (1976), the United Women’s
Organisation (1980), the Natal Organisation of  Women (1983) and Women
Against Repression (1986) are but a handful of the examples of the ways in
which women in this time period worked collectively through organisations
to challenge the broader hierarchies of  class, race and gender inequality. These
organisations infused collective action in a broad scope of gender issues: to
secure women’s access to clean water and health care, to ensure freedom
from state and gender-based violence, and to fight the oppression of women
in the household and in the state. They also challenged the androcentric norms
and values within the UDF – refusing to be seen as caterers and demanding
respect as political equals.
Outside of South Africa in the 1980s, resistance to apartheid had become
a transnational movement. The apartheid system created the context for
political exile, which in many cases strengthened the capacity for women’s
mobilisation against the system of injustice. Exile gave women in the ANC
the opportunity to form international networks and learn from women in
other countries key lessons about the challenges and opportunities for
organising in a post-conflict setting (Cock 1991). As apartheid drew near to
its close in the 1990s, the composition of  all the formal political structures
and processes was under negotiation. In theory, the national agenda created
space to discuss women’s rights; however, women had to force their way into
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the negotiating process. These critical negotiations created a context for
returning women exiles to ally with women activists in the country, enter the
process of democratic nation building and solidify alliances in support of
race and gender justice.
Women leaders from within South Africa worked with women returning
from exile to create the umbrella organisation of  the Women’s National
Coalition (WNC). Drawing from the rich experience of coalition politics in
the 1980s, the WNC brought together more than 90 women’s organisations,
women’s branches of  political parties, religious organisations, civic
organisations and youth organisations in 1992. The WNC’s main goals were to
pressure for constitutional mandates for gender equality and measures to
advance women into political office. As well as bringing in the full range of
women’s organisational foundations, the WNC straddled deep political and
religious divides, prevailing cultural and ethnic fractures, and pronounced
rural-urban divisions. Women leaders seized this unique moment, recognising
that the end of apartheid created a rare and pivotal opportunity to move
issues of gender onto the national agenda.
As Hassim (2006) argues, throughout the apartheid era, women’s
organisations and movement politics continually faced ideologies of nation-
alism and feminism that were at times both competing and complementary.
Some women utilised conservative, traditional identities to push militantly
for societal transformation. As a result, women’s historic activism in South
Africa remains marked by uneven periods of coalition building and activism:
‘Many of their protests have been sporadic, varied in content, and characterised
by an upsurge of political mobilisation around a specific campaign, followed
by a decline’ (Hassim 2006, 21). Furthermore, as we see throughout the
struggle to end apartheid, women often faced a conflict of  allegiances in
terms of  their efforts to end severe racial injustice and their competing invest-
ment in advocating for gender equality. Predominantly, however, women’s
mobilisation centred on a notion that the system of apartheid needed to be
dismantled before fully addressing gender injustice, yet the call for women’s
rights was never abandoned. Furthermore, much like national liberation
struggles throughout the global context, such circumstances placed gender
priorities as secondary (Beckwith 2000). In the South African case, women
continually confronted the dilemma of ‘choosing’ between race and gender
justice. Yet, even as early as the 1950s, a clear agenda of  promoting the
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public role of women through the use of a ‘gendered’ discourse characterised
organisational politics. This could be seen as a form of  feminist activism,
since women were making demands to meet women’s needs and interests
and to provide equal rights.
These qualities of  women’s mobilisation continue to resurface in gender
activism within the post-apartheid context. As our collection repeatedly
illustrates through each distinct chapter, the struggle among race, class and
gender priorities turns up again and again in the ongoing process of nation
building. Yet the transformation of  state structures also provides new op-
portunities to draw from the foundation of  women’s activism during the
struggle to end apartheid. The case studies throughout this text elucidate
these paradoxical relationships within civil society – where women are both
confined by former systems of  power and actively drawing from the strength
of historical activism to respond to new demands in the rebuilding of a
democratic South Africa.
By the end of  the first decade of  democracy, most of  the legislative aspects
of  apartheid were formally defeated. Yet pressing issues continue to burden
women disproportionately and threaten their health, safety and welfare. From
HIV infection rates to epidemic levels of gender-based violence, the legacy
of apartheid continues to leave its mark on persisting systems of gender,
class and racial inequality. In the rebuilding of  South Africa, we contend that
civil society organisations are situated in central positions to move the country
into the next level of  development. Women’s roles within these organisations
emerge from nearly fifty years of  struggle, defined by the tension between
advocacy for racial parity and for gender equality. Even though women have
now attained important victories in government leadership, new forms of
civil society organisation struggle to achieve congruence between South
Africa’s representation of  gender rights at the public level and the realities of
everyday social relations, where historical systems of  inequality, culture and
tradition continue to marginalise women. Analysis of this interplay between
gender priorities at the governance level and the daily gender inequalities
that prevail across divides provides an important framework for understanding
the complexities of democratisation in South Africa. In capturing this particular
moment in South African women’s activism, we see a shared structure–agency
dialectic that emerges in each of the case studies within this collection.
Drawing from the experiences of women across a wide variety of sectors,
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this text illustrates both significant progress realised by civil society
organisations and the ongoing barriers to accessing the promises of democracy
for women who remain severely marginalised by systems of intersecting
inequalities of gender, race, class and geographic location.
Engendering a theory of  civil society
Scholarship and theorising about the intersections between civil society and
gender remain limited. Howell (2005) posits that this limitation stems from
the fact that scholars interested in civil society are not likely to consider
gender theory and often exclude the private sphere of  the family. Studies of
civil society focus primarily on examinations of organisational activity in the
public realm, which excludes an analysis of gender relations, sexual practices
and familial arrangements. Such frameworks reinforce pervasive notions of  a
public/private division between the state (public) and non-state (private)
activities. This division more often emphasises public life, which is visible
and external to personal relationships, and therefore devalues the private
sphere, which would include family life, social networks and gender relations
(Sapiro 1995).
Feminist theorists have established a long tradition of  critiquing these
power asymmetries suggested by the inherent division between a ‘public’
sphere and a ‘private’ sphere created in the foundations of  Western political
thought and sustained through contemporary formations of  political life
(Elshtain 1974; Okin 1979, 1991; Pateman 1988; Phillips 1991; Runyan 1992;
Brennan and Pateman 1979). According to Howell (2005), this conceptual
weakness is found also in more contemporary political theorists, including
Adam Ferguson, Alexis de Tocqueville, Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, who
‘in turn discursively reinforced the separation of the political economy . . .
from the household economy, thereby masking the structural interrelations
between the domestic sphere, civil society and capitalist economy’ (4). These
theories and ideas structure much of  contemporary political life and,
regrettably, continue to influence social and public norms. Howell (2005)
asserts that such intellectual blinders have limited the explanatory potential
of civil society theorists:
[T]he silence on gender and civil society suggests a more pervasive hegemonic
framing that acquiesces rather than challenges the gendered relations of civil
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society. Civil society is discussed as though gender is irrelevant. Such a
perspective implicitly reinforces the notion that the public is the natural domain
of the male and the family that of the female . . . Had civil society theorists
engaged more with the feminist problematisation of the public/private divide,
they might have been better equipped conceptually to explore how the family
shapes norms and practices in the sphere of  civil society, and how gendered
power relations pervade the spheres of  state, market, civil society and family.
(4)
If gender theory is successful in exploding the artificial boundary between
the so-called public and private spheres, then we can use that process and
knowledge to see that there are diverse interconnections among the state,
civil society, social relations and gendered practices. Given the limitations
placed on studies of  civil society, it is often challenging for scholars to examine
the layers of  identities that may influence organisational behaviour and agendas.
It is these very layers that most often enliven feminist research. An
understanding of  sexuality, race, ethnicity, gender, ability and nationality guide
many feminist scholars to examine how organisations operate and negotiate
structures of  power and control. Blurring this binary construction of  the
private/public spheres provides the opportunity to look at the inter-
connections between multiple layers of  society. As Ling (2002) posits, political
spheres embody an inherent mutuality such that ‘what pertains within the
individual/household/nation contributes to the community/state/world, just
as what happens in the world/state/community affects us as a nation/
household/individual’ (67). Drawing on this central notion of the mutuality
of spheres, analysis of civil society organisations provides a more nuanced
understanding of the particular nature of the interconnected levels of South
Africa’s broader political transition.
While civil society theorists have often ignored the role of gender, the
rich body of social movement scholarship has consistently used the lens of
gender for understanding women’s political mobilisation. Through its
exploration of how women organise for their rights and engage in mass-based
action, social movement theory elucidates important aspects of understanding
the politics within civil society. We draw on the notion of  mutuality to suggest
that the framework provided in social movement scholarship be applied to
multiple forms of  political life in ways that prioritise gender as a central
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component of  analysis. In doing so, we integrate civil society as a vital social
sphere, rather than an isolated context that bears little impact on the state,
household relations or national political transitions. While this collection
focuses on civil society organisations and issue-based networks, we believe
in the elasticity of social movement politics and civil society organising within
the larger movement for women’s equality in South Africa. Our intent is to
provide a collection that focuses on the South African case to map how issues
and ideas cut across institutional levels – from the state, to society, to a wide
variety of societal institutions that shape the context of gender relations
(Howell and Mulligan 2005).
One of the central features of the civil society debate in South Africa,
and in the broader African continent, focuses on the unfulfilled promise of
civil society activism and the inadequacies of  gender machineries. As Mama
(2005) states:
Feminists have often preferred to work outside state bureaucracies and party
machines, concentrating their efforts at community level. This accumulated
experience of community activism has left us with few illusions about civil
society, rural transformations, or traditional systems of  governance. African
women’s ongoing experience in all these spheres has been, at the very least,
cautionary. We have witnessed first-hand the deep conservatism of  many of
Africa’s local cultures and production systems, and the deeply pervasive impact
of  capitalist development at even the most peripheral of  locations. (4)
It is precisely because of the obstacles faced in civil society that South African
gender activists and feminist theorists have turned towards a new type of
agenda that blurs the lines between civil society and the state, between the
public and the private, and instead fosters a new form of  activism that works
within the state and outside the state simultaneously. Even as these new
alliances face the challenges of global neo-liberal constraints, this type of
civil society activism has been fostered by the post-apartheid context, where
former friends and allies have entered the halls of  parliament and opened the
possibility for interaction in the ongoing development of  South Africa’s
democracy.
Within this collection, we focus on women’s organisations in civil society
that defy a public/private split. As Walsh makes clear in the next chapter, the
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selection of cases illustrates our conceptualisation of civil society as inclusive
of organisations, movements, trade unions, civics, parties and associations
that hold a transformative agenda. These groups have come together with
the intent of bringing about change in the public realm, in the state, in
institutions and in private social norms and practices. The selections in this
book represent contemporary examples of  these boundary-crossing categories.
Through these cases, we see both the power of  women’s collective organising
to rebuild South Africa in the aftermath of  apartheid and the prevailing barriers
to realising democracy in everyday life.
The policing of  women’s personal lives and the boundaries of  human
rights are still seen throughout much of  civil society, including within the
private sphere. Sadly, the new catchphrase ‘Democracy stops at my front
door’ demonstrates the outer limits of  the South African transformation. This
is yet another geographic limitation to public political rights, which have not
yet extended to the spheres of  the household, familial relations and sexuality.
Helen Moffett’s discussion in Chapter 6 acutely reminds us that sexual violence
continues to be used as a horrifically effective tool of social control, which
both shames women and works to limit their freedom of movement, their
physical safety and their full empowerment. The epidemic levels of  sexual
violence and domestic abuse in South Africa impose a sharp warning to women
that even though they have attained a place in national politics, they tread
dangerous waters in seeking equitable positions of power in their personal,
private and even familial roles. This pattern shows an ironic inversion of  the
public/private divide in South Africa. Publicly, women have obtained equality
in their political rights and increasingly within political office. However, in
the private realm, women’s lives are confined within systems of  patriarchy
that are often reinforced by both physical and structural violence.
Jennifer Fish’s (2006) work with domestic workers also examines the
limitations of  public political rights. The heavy footprint of  economic and
geographic apartheid is perhaps at its most visible in South Africa’s domestic
labour sector, which continues to be the largest sector of working black women
in the waged economy. The position of  contemporary domestic workers
remains marked by racialised and class-based asymmetries of power between
women employers and employees. Many domestic workers continue to live
in geographic separation from their own homes and families, and from one
another. This geographic isolation severely limits their mobilisation and ability
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to transcend former apartheid structures. Despite obstacles to collective
action, Fish demonstrates in Chapter 5 of this collection that domestic workers
have realised victories in crafting public policy rights that regulate and
standardise the private domain inhabited by domestic workers. For example,
the South African Domestic Service and Allied Workers Union (SADSAWU)
realised success in securing domestic workers’ access to critical social security
rights through the national Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF). Yet this
was only a first step in protecting one of the most vulnerable sectors of the
working women’s population – and it again shows that if  change was going
to be realised, it would most likely need to come from domestic workers
themselves, rather than from the top-down levels of government. The domestic
workers’ sector will perhaps become the litmus test for how authentic South
African’s public rights discourse truly is, for until public political rights are
realised for domestic workers, the rhetoric of  transformation will remain
hollow.
A continuum of women’s activism and definitions of feminism
As is the case in most countries, in South Africa the term ‘feminism’ has
incited deep divides and fractious debates. In the particular contexts of  both
apartheid and democratic nation building, feminism remains a hotly contested
term for important ideological and political reasons. Steyn (1998) outlines
the criticism of feminism within South Africa as part of cultural imperialism,
imported from the West, and often in direct competition to the goals of  the
liberation struggle: ‘Those women who have called themselves feminist have
been, for the most part, white middle-class, left-wing intellectuals . . . and
their tendency to speak on behalf of Black women has been resented’ (43).
Ginwala (1991) and Hendricks and Lewis (1994) outline the ethnocentric
and imperialistic problems with a singularly focused feminism to the exclusion
of  an intersectional approach that centres issues of  women’s power within
hierarchies of  race, ethnicity, social position, class, sexuality and nationality.
While broadly, the term feminism could be synonymous with women’s strategic
and practical needs, it became associated with a fracturing politics of placing
gender above race or class identities in the strategies of  the liberation struggle.
Given the hegemonic power of apartheid, it is clear that race could not come
second to gender in South Africa’s liberation movement. At times, feminism
was seen as divisive to the liberation struggle, and women would often
voluntarily place gender equality second to issues of ending apartheid.
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This collection explores first-hand accounts, scholarly research and
organisational ethnographies that depict these debates within the broad
continuum of  women’s activism in this particular phase of  South Africa’s
transition. We encouraged each of  the authors to frame their chapters within
their own understanding of gender, feminism and womanist politics to depict
these central diversities of  experiences. As a collection, these chapters give
substance to these national debates. While some authors are uncomfortable
with the terms feminism or womanist politics, a unifying theme of  this book
is that the authors are exploring how organisations are working to improve
the quality of  life and status of  women. In this way, the authors are investigating
the full range of  ‘feminism’ and the continuum of  women’s activism within
South Africa. We situate this collection within the vibrant contemporary
discourse that theorises the original forms of  women’s activism emerging
from the very landscape of  South Africa’s rapidly shifting terrain.
Through her extensive analysis of gender and civil society organisations,
Hassim (2005) posits two main forms of  feminist activism in women’s
organisations after 1990: inclusionary and transformational feminism. The
strand of  inclusionary feminism is focused on gaining access to state structures
and expanding representation within decision-making bodies, similar to what
is also known as liberal feminism, state feminism or equality feminism. The
idea is that by gaining access to institutions of power and influence, women
will be able to bring about larger social or cultural change. Transformational
feminism, on the other hand, is focused on women’s strategic power and
attempts to redress former power asymmetries in women’s status and social
position within all aspects of  society. This includes policing and transforming
the private sphere where male power predominates. Salo (2005) has critiqued
Hassim’s separation by arguing: ‘The distinction that Hassim makes between
inclusionary and transformational feminist strategies fails to take fully into
account the complex and multiple terrains of  gendered struggles, as well as
the diversity of gendered movements in present-day post-apartheid South
Africa’ (1).
Drawing from the rich evidence within this collection, we propose that
women’s organisations are integrally involved in complex, multi-layered
activities, sometimes engaging the state and sometimes opposing it.
Furthermore, South Africa represents the dynamic interplay between collective
action and the shifting nature of  social structures. As we see in the changing
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landscape of activism throughout apartheid, the negotiated transition and
the post-1994 democratisation processes, periodisation and context are central
to analysing activism and civil society organisations. What can be said of
women’s mobilisation in the early 1990s no longer holds, as gender organ-
isations are now dealing with a completely different state structure. The
collection of cases in this text underscores the importance of understanding
how the South African context has changed, and as a result civil society
organisations are continually responding to and placing new demands on state
structures. Thus, we support the analyses of  gender politics posited by both
Salo and Hassim. Our intention is to enliven these debates by providing rich
case studies that illustrate the complexities of  women’s activism within civil
society organisations at this critical juncture in South Africa’s ongoing political
and social transition. What we hope to represent through this text is that
South African women’s organisations are not mere ventriloquists of  the feminist
agendas of liberal or radical feminism. Instead, the cases in this collection
show that South African women’s organisations are actively crafting strategies
that are simultaneously and necessarily inclusionary and transformative, and
this is part of the working for change in a post-liberation context.
Pragmatic feminism in the post-apartheid era
During the transition period in the 1990s, the entire legislative structure was
under negotiation, and a diverse group of civil society organisations became
active and powerful voices in crafting the Constitution, the electoral system
and the structure of  parliamentary life (Adler and Webster 1995; Eades 1999;
Britton 2002; Croucher 2002). The initial goals of  the women’s movements
in post-apartheid South Africa focused on state structures for women’s
participation in public and political life through the creation of the national
machinery for gender equality, in line with Hassim’s notion of  inclusionary
feminism. This approach centred on putting institutions in place first, to create
access points for civil society groups and citizens and to begin to work within
the democratic government – in order to replace a climate of fear with a
culture of  trust. While prioritising the top-down structures of  change, the
intention was that these institutions would be places for activists and
organisations in civil society to articulate their needs and interests. By creating
actual institutions for political change, this strategy – it was hoped – assured
the added benefit that gender structures would outlast individual women
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leaders. Thus, once created, these institutions were intended to ensure a lasting
change. Ironically, then, women’s post-apartheid activism focused on state
structures and attention shifted away from civil society – the place where
historically, South African women had been most active and the sphere in
which most women live and work.
The artificiality of boundaries between the state and civil society became
apparent at the negotiation table, and many hoped that there would be
continued exchange, dialogue and collaboration within the new dispensation.
Historically, parliament had assumed a predominant role as merely a rubber-
stamp body, implementing the discriminatory and draconian policies of
apartheid leaders. When members of  unions and the anti-apartheid struggle
moved into the halls of parliament after the 1994 election, they brought with
them the possibility that the state would be an ally of citizens and perhaps an
extension of  the needs and interests of  civil society. While the apartheid era
saw leaders attempting to implement racial, gender and class hierarchies from
the top down, the new era promised to demonstrate that social and political
identities flowed across spheres of  society and that structures of  power were
not bounded by institutional norms.
Because of  this particular context, nearly ten years after the formal
transition to democracy, women’s groups in South Africa were still able to
utilise strategically what was perhaps a limited moment within which to pursue
both transformative and inclusionary strategies for change. This attempt to
capitalise upon the existing elasticity in the relationship between the state
and civil society was not a symptom of naivety on the part of women activists
who harboured false beliefs in the transformative potential of  the state; rather,
it reflected a conscious, pragmatic attempt to utilise the old friendships,
alliances and radical rhetoric of many political parties to pressure for change:
[T]he South African state cannot be conceptualised as monolithic. We are
only a decade into our transition, and the bonds of friendship and allegiance
forged in anti-apartheid women’s movements still hold between some women
activists and women parliamentarians. These links are able to mitigate the
socio-economic divides to a degree. So while women’s organisations may
apparently be engaging in inclusionary rather than transformational feminist
strategies, women’s shared identities as erstwhile comrades, their consciousness
of  the transformations required to make radical changes in ordinary women’s
lives, as well as the geopolitical location of the South African state as part of
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the indebted group of nations, all mean that action that began as inclusionary
feminist strategy may also come to contain elements of  transformational
strategy. (Salo 2005, 4)
Salo points to the possibility that women activists utilised a particular path
for change that combined both inclusionary and transformational feminisms.
The time period for taking this path may be brief, because the longer women
are in office the more assimilated into parliamentary life they will become.
This was certainly the case in other democratic transitions in eastern Europe
and Latin America (Waylen 1994). Yet in the South African case, we posit a
third organisational strategy that complements the particular period of  trans-
ition. Stemming from the grounded analyses within this text, this third path
reflects what we see as a form of  pragmatic feminism on the part of  South African
women activists, who have worked across the transformative/inclusionary
boundary to utilise all possible means of  securing positive change in women’s
private and public lives. As the euphoria of  the 1994 transition faded to
South Africa’s integration in global systems of  power, we suggest that women’s
activism took on a particular pragmatic form that overcame the divisions of
transformative and inclusionary gender politics to maximise the possibility
of  engendering long-term change within the shifting broader contexts. This
pragmatic feminist approach engages effectively within the rapidly changing
landscape of  social and political life, drawing on both the victories of  women’s
public representation and the grounded history of  women’s activism in civil
society.
The chapters in this collection elucidate this pragmatic feminism, building
on the elasticity between the state and civil society. What the cases demon-
strate is that while the state itself may not be a panacea, it still represents a
key source of power and the primary locus of vital resources, including the
rights of  citizenship, access to basic needs and the promise of  protection
from gender-based violence. Yet our authors are all keenly aware of  the
limitations of  the state for social transformation, and many have come face
to face with the problems of maintaining the momentum for a progressive
feminist agenda once it becomes institutionalised in parliament or in national
machinery. Accordingly, many of  the authors in this text echo the limits of
inclusionary feminism found by Tamale (1999, 2000) in Uganda, Mama (2000)
in Ghana, and Gouws (2004) and Seidman (2003) in South Africa.
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Walsh examines the juxtaposition of  state and civil society as a foreground
to the collection. The laudable attention on state institutions for feminist
change was necessary and important in the post-apartheid era. Yet, as the
women’s movement progressed into the halls of  parliament and government,
it left civil society to ‘return to politics as usual’, with continued gender
subordination and inequality stretching across women’s lives. Walsh therefore
calls on feminists to develop a new theory of civil society – one that ensures
women’s access to decision making and influence in these non-state spaces
of  power. Interestingly, Walsh asserts that feminists must demand that the
South African state be responsible for ensuring democratic spaces for women’s
participation in civil society – reversing the usual direction of social move-
ments calling for change within the state. If feminists are able to re-envision
the boundaries between the state and civil society, the state can be used to
challenge existing discrimination in the private sphere and to promote women’s
agency within civil society. Democracy must be a broader lived experience,
not merely an electoral system or a group of  state agencies.
One such state institution designed to bridge the boundary between state
and civil society is the Commission on Gender Equality (CGE). Sheila Meintjes,
a former member of  the CGE, evaluates the role of  this critical component of
South Africa’s ‘gender machinery’ in making public policy align with the gender
priorities central to the rights-based approach to democratisation. Often cited
as a model of centralising gender concerns within top levels of public
governance, the CGE maintains a powerful position with both national and
provincial offices that create national and regional gender programmes, monitor
government and private sector operations and promote change in social and
cultural practices. Meintjes’s analysis is guided by a central question that
interrogates the extent to which an independent statutory body can make a
difference in a highly patriarchal and tradition-bound society. As the CGE
was one of the key institutions designed to bring gender issues to the front of
the national agenda, Meintjes’s findings demonstrate the potential pitfalls of
relying on public agencies for societal transformation, herein extending the
work by Gouws (2004) and Seidman (2003). Many feminist consultants
advised creating such institutions first, believing changes in social norms
would follow. However, Meintjes notes that the institution itself  is limited in
its scope and its activist potential because it continues to operate within a
society governed by norms, parties and rulers that have not actualised a
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commitment to gender equality. Meintjes explores the very problems associated
with focusing primarily on an inclusionary feminist agenda, in place of or
prior to a transformational feminist agenda. Granted, most saw this machinery
and state feminism as a step towards a more radical change in gender relations.
Yet, as Meintjes shows, once women had the strategic power of  decision
making, the institutionalisation of  a women’s movement into state structures
inherently limited or diluted the radical and transformational aspects of  their
agenda. So, while inclusion in institutions of  state power often appears to be
a necessary first step, it may also become an obstacle in and of  itself.
Thus, both Walsh and Meintjes note the current limitations of  pursuing
inclusionary feminism in isolation, and both embrace the idea of simul-
taneously pursuing a transformative agenda within this inclusionary strategy
of state feminism. As Mama (2005) asserts:
[W]hile women are right to be deeply sceptical of the extent to which the
patriarchal nation-state can support the liberation of women, feminists are
nonetheless continually engaging with the state, demanding rights as citizens in
ways that continuously push for redefinitions of  the political, and of  citizenship,
and of culture . . . they are also challenging the manifestations of patriarchal
power relations in all aspects of  our lives and social institutions. (4)
Both Walsh and Meintjes call on feminists to focus on the larger structural
inequalities that persist in society as a whole and affect the institutions of the
state, family and civic life. These structural inequalities are in fact residuals
of the apartheid system. The footprint of the political economy of apartheid
continues to mar South Africa through pervasive class, race and gender
hierarchies. As the cases in this volume demonstrate, civil society organisations
continue to organise against these structures, all the while existing within
them.
Residual apartheid
As several of  the cases in this text demonstrate, women’s organisations are
often a mirror for the limits of  transformation in South Africa. Specifically,
the new levels of  political openness have not been matched by transformation
of  the geography or economy of  apartheid. Political democracy has created
new spaces for gender-based organising. Between 1994 and 2004, South Africa
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experienced a virtual explosion in the number of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs). Each group
had its own specific agenda or cause, and most groups were identified as
issue-based rather than ascriptive. For example, issue-based groups mobilised
around a specific women’s issue – such as women and health, ending gender-
based violence or developing women’s economic potential. The ascriptive-
based groups organised women as women, and attacked a broad range of
women’s issues or the inherent gender structure of  society. These ascriptive
groups were often short-lived because of the divisions within the membership
along class or racial lines. Even though these groups often demonstrated
effective means of working across race and class divides, many of the groups
that had been vital during the transition, such as the WNC, either ceased to
exist or faced enormous challenges to their viability following the 1994
transition (Britton 2005).
Merely opening the political space for all of these organisations to exist
did not require a shift in economic power structures – just as we have seen in
the larger South African society. Women’s groups have mirrored the latent
economic and geographic inequalities of  the broader post-apartheid society.
The work of  Benita Moolman of  Rape Crisis Cape Town (RCCT) clearly
illustrates this point within one of the most dynamic sectors of civil society
organisations. In Chapter 7 of  this collection, Moolman explores how the
political leadership and decision-making structures of  the RCCT have changed,
while a steady fight resists altering the persistent structures of  economic and
geographic apartheid within the organisation. Prior to 1994, the RCCT
established their main offices in the white areas of Rondebosch, Rosebank
and eventually Observatory. Women who did not live in the white areas,
which would have included over 90 per cent of  the women in the Cape Town
region, had to travel great distances and at substantial costs to receive the
RCCT’s services. Following the end of  apartheid, the RCCT opened branches in
the former black township of  Khayelitsha (1993) and in Heideveld (1997)
on the Cape Flats, demonstrating progress in terms of  the shifting political
ideology of  the organisation. Yet latent economic inequalities continue to
pose formidable barriers to women’s ability to access these vital services, as
is strikingly evident in the physical structures and embedded organisational
practices. So, while the availability of  services expands geographically to
respond to a much wider population of women, in some ways this
Engendering Civil Society in Democratic South Africa 27
organisational growth has also reproduced the prevailing idea of the second-
and third-class citizenship of  today’s politically free, but economically
disadvantaged, black and coloured townships. In many ways, the RCCT
represents a microcosm of  the limits of  political transformation. This
economic and geographic inequality remains the vulnerable underbelly of
South Africa’s lingering ‘social apartheid’. As we see throughout this collection,
women pay a particular price for these incomplete transitions.
Within the context of  women’s sports, Cynthia Fabrizio Pelak reveals in
Chapter 4 a similar disjuncture between the political liberation of post-
apartheid South Africa and the economic and racial limits of civil society
transformation. As a symbol of  identity and power, the politics of  sports
were always important in the apartheid struggle, both nationally and globally.
International exclusion of South Africa from sporting competitions, such as
the Olympics, starting in 1964, served as yet another way to demonstrate
condemnation of racial oppression and to isolate the racist apartheid govern-
ment from the global community. Since the advent of  democracy, sports have
continued to mark a central location of  struggle, yet in the post-1994 context,
the identities being negotiated present distinctly gendered as well as racially
charged meanings. Through an innovative contrast between two competitive
women’s sports, netball and soccer, Fabrizio Pelak reveals how these sports
function as important spaces in civil society for women to operate as political
actors. Netball, a sport closely related to basketball, was historically constructed
as a women-only sport and was controlled in South Africa by white Afrikaans-
speaking women. Soccer was historically constructed as a men-only sport
and was dominated by black men in South Africa. On netball courts and
soccer fields today, women are now able to challenge, on the one hand, male
domination in sports and, on the other hand, racial domination within women’s
sports.
Since the transition, these hierarchies have been disrupted, but not without
a price. Women’s quest for leadership within male-dominated soccer led to
instances of personal intimidation, sexual harassment and even physical
violence. Similarly, within the historically white-controlled sport of  netball,
government intervention was necessary to mediate the intense racial conflicts
in the sport. As Fabrizio Pelak demonstrates, remarkable change has taken
place in both sports, but some inequalities remain. For example, all women
were welcome to serve in administrative positions; however, white women
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often had more time and more resources to participate as unpaid volunteer
administrators. With the shifting political landscape of  South African sports,
however, new resources have been secured to assist women in transportation
to the meetings, in recognition of the continued economic apartheid that
limits many women’s full participation in civic life. Here again we see that
the patrolling of  the racial, class and gendered limits of  South Africa’s ongoing
transformation is located deep within everyday social practices that take place
in civil society, extending even to soccer fields and netball courts.
South African women’s activism within the global political economy
The South African case must also be situated within a broader continental
movement in which the continual restructuring of  post-colonial African states
is integrally linked to gender (Mama 2005). This promise of  the transformation
of  civil society through the use of  state institutions is a pattern for women’s
organisations in Africa in general. Increasingly, there is an expectation of
mutual collaboration and dependency between civil society groups and
members of the state – a mutuality that was not seen in apartheid South
Africa. Prior to the 1990s, women’s groups in Africa were most frequently
associated with development activities or with an affiliation to a male-
dominated political party (Tripp 2005). The diversity and autonomy of
women’s organisations were quite low during this period, and the groups were
used ‘to contain women’s political activity within these designated women’s
organisations, which meant that few women ever worked outside the bounds
of these organisations to involve themselves in the actual [political] parties’
(Tripp 2005, 82). Even if  women had been involved in military struggles,
they were more often than not re-subordinated following the end of the
conflict, as seen in Mozambique (Sheldon 1994), Zimbabwe (Ranchod-
Nilsson 1994) and Angola (Scott 1994).
In the 1990s, African women’s activism and methods of  organising began
to shift rapidly, both across the continent and within South Africa, as Walsh
discusses in the next chapter. International conferences, new communication
technologies and increased economic linkages have further stimulated regional
and continent-wide women’s organisations that are able to support and foster
national strategies for change (as seen in South Africa, as discussed in Meintjes’s
chapter in this volume as well as in the previous research of Seidman (1999)
Engendering Civil Society in Democratic South Africa 29
and Britton (2005); in Eritrea by Connell (1997) and Hale (2001); and in
Uganda by Byanyima (1992) and Tripp (2000)). Through this international
networking, African women’s groups started to cultivate new spaces created
within post-conflict environments, where the gender rules and social norms
had been disrupted, creating new possibilities for networks. During war and
conflict, women often occupy traditionally male roles of leadership in the
labour sector, as heads of households, and as soldiers during the conflict. In
the 1990s, the training, education and experiences these women received
during the conflicts have afforded women in Africa more broadly the ability
to make claims of their legitimacy as political leaders at the end of conflicts
(Cock 1991; Meintjes 2001; Hale 2001). The advent of multi-party political
systems and the move away from military-ruled governments produced more
opportunities for autonomous women’s organisations within African countries,
as women’s political groups were no longer restricted to their position as
branches of  male-dominated parties. Additionally, donor agencies’ new
emphasis on women’s rights, not just women’s socio-economic development,
has also fostered diversity in the nature and direction of  women’s groups
throughout the continent (Tripp 2005).
It is here that our collection again coincides with the work of  Salo’s (2005)
delineation of  the multiple layers of  women’s activism occurring at the local,
national and global levels. Increasingly, in the context of  globalisation, women’s
groups in post-apartheid South Africa struggle to meet women’s needs in
their private lives, to face the challenges of national democratic consolidation
and to fulfil the demands of international donors and global feminist networks:
More importantly, the re-insertion of  South Africa into the global arena has
meant that women’s organisations have had to take account of  local, national
and international power relations. In grappling with issues of  donor funding
or resisting the corrosive effects of economic globalisation, we have had to
consider forging alliances with both local and international organisations. The
organisational work required at multiple coalfaces, both at home and abroad,
calls for inclusionary and transformational feminist strategies to be deployed
both simultaneously and serially. (Salo 2005, 1)
As Salo argues, women’s activism in civil society can no longer be assessed
without consideration of the transnational processes that shape organisations,
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as well as the populations they serve. The vast and dangerously persistent
socio-economic inequalities that are found within South Africa are both part
of the residual nature of apartheid and a result of the dictates of the
international development regime and the global political economy. The civil
society organisations in this collection certainly face these challenges of
navigating the demands of local populations, while working within the context
of  global funding agendas that often prioritise donor agendas. This corres-
ponds to the curtailment of feminist organising and progressive agendas across
the continent following donor demands and the post-9/11 political climate
(Lazreg 2004).
Reinforcing Ling’s theory of  the mutuality of  spheres, this pattern is
evident throughout the continent. Pereira (2002) found that women’s activism
in Nigeria has by necessity occurred at the local, national and international
levels. Because of  the impact of  structural adjustment policies on the
economic priorities of local and national governments, women in Nigeria
have had to combine their strategies to secure basic rights, freedom from
violence and access to social welfare with a struggle against the international
development regime, transnational corporations and oil-extractive industries.
Nigerian women’s strategies include creating alternative economies and social
networks that delink from the economy, as well as expanding human rights
discourse and definitions of  development to be more inclusive of  women’s
needs.
Bahati Kuumba’s contribution to this collection (see Chapter 10) provides
an analysis of this impact of transnational networking and demonstrates that
women’s groups and women’s networks in South Africa have had to be both
inclusionary and transformative, working to make change using state structures
while at the same time advocating for radical change within social norms and
society at large. Kuumba demonstrates that the activities and organisations
within South Africa cannot, and ought not to, be seen in isolation from the
larger, continent-wide movement for women’s rights and gender activism,
extending the ideas of Salo (2005) discussed above. By exploring historical
foundations for African and intercontinental linkages, Kuumba illustrates how
new patterns of relationships are available within the context of globalisation
that provide particular spaces where women are able to align around specific
issues of  concern, such as women’s health. In this chapter, we see how African
diasporic women of  Cape Town and Atlanta mobilised around their shared
Engendering Civil Society in Democratic South Africa 31
experiences with HIV/AIDS activism, creating powerful linkages in the fight
against this global pandemic. As Kuumba’s chapter summarises, a recurrent
theme through-out this text depicts how the historical processes morph into
contemporary events that reinforce the possibility and meaning of trans-
national feminist networks. The shared legacy of  fighting colonialism and
imperialism, the growing linkages created within global capitalist structures
and the recent trends towards regional organisations, such as the African
Union, all create a framework for moving beyond national struggles and
towards African women’s networks that support continent-wide action and
foster transnational identities.
The timing of the South African transition created an ironic tension
between pushing for women’s inclusion in the state while at the same time
constraining women’s socio-economic progress through a neo-liberal agenda
(Basu 2005). While many networks and organisations have to work (in an
inclusionary fashion) with the state to meet women’s basic needs, they must
simultaneously struggle (in a transformative fashion) to challenge an inter-
national neo-liberal economic system that deprioritises state involvement in
land rights, health and safety and general welfare. As Salo (2005) states:
[T]he dictates of  global institutions such as the World Trade Organization,
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have constrained the
state’s ability to deliver more substantive socio-economic rights to all its citizens,
even as it granted them formal political rights. As these current global power
relations impact the local context, the socio-economic divide between rich
and poor has deepened, and is reflected in the fragmentary, diverse nature of
the South African women’s movement today. (2)
South Africa is not alone in this multi-level struggle. There are calls to develop
alternatives to the current trends of privatisation and liberalisation throughout
Africa. Lazreg (2004) asks African countries and activist networks in general
to delink from donor-driven development initiatives and develop a ‘gender
fund’ through private contributions and a percentage of revenues from natural
resources. This gender fund could provide autonomous, self-sustaining re-
sources for change. Feminist scholars and activists in this collection are calling
for precisely this type of alternative thinking to confront the power of state
and transnational structures that continue to embed pervasive asymmetries
of  gender power.
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One of the most vibrant grassroots networks in South Africa that
demonstrates this local–international combination is seen in the social
movements challenging neo-liberal globalisation and simultaneously organising
for socio-economic rights domestically. For example, Miraftab’s (2006) analysis
of the anti-eviction campaign in South Africa demonstrates how movements
have strategically challenged the binary of invited spaces and invented spaces
of  citizenship, where invited spaces are sanctioned and governed by the state
and international donor agencies and invented spaces of resistance and change
that expand notions of citizenship are criminalised. Since many of the invited
spaces have not included the priorities and basic needs of many in South
Africa, grassroots movements and issue-based networks are now inventing
spaces and expanding the boundaries of what has been prioritised by a state
constricted by the global push towards neo-liberalism. The work of the anti-
eviction campaigners expands definitions of what constitutes civil society in
South Africa, and indeed globally, by challenging limitations imposed by
invited spaces and by crafting alternative visions of ‘inclusive citizenship
and just cities’ (Miraftab and Wills 2005, 200).
The post-apartheid state has fallen far short of the promises of the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) for widespread land
reform, access to housing and a secure social safety net, in part because of
the donor-driven shift towards the market-based national Growth, Employ-
ment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan that offloaded much of the obligation
for social welfare and development into the private sphere of the household.
This in turn has further disadvantaged women, who continue to be responsible
for the maintenance of  their families’ social well-being. Furthermore, with
the enormous burden of  HIV/AIDS in South Africa, women carry an extra-
ordinary portion of  the labour of  caretaking and family survival given the
absence of state support for such expenditures and limited international donor
funds. Civil society organisations, such as Cape Town’s Grandmothers Against
Poverty and AIDS (GAPA), are again stepping in to fill the notable gap between
needs and services. Social movements and grassroots networks including the
anti-eviction campaign, the landless movement and the movement against
neo-liberal globalisation have fostered new forms of  insurgent citizenship
that challenge global restructuring as ‘an ideology that claims to equalise
through the promotion of  formal political and civil rights yet, through its
privatization of life spaces, criminalized citizens based on their consumption
abilities’ (Miraftab and Wills 2005, 202).
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This body of work highlights the collective activism of new groups within
civil society that were not immediately obvious for inclusion in the newly
democratic South Africa, and demonstrates how emerging social groups must
invent innovative and expanded notions of citizenship and justice (Miraftab
2006). For example, Christina Nomdo and Shaamela Cassiem’s work with
girl children (see Chapter 8) and Janine Hicks’s work with immigrant women
(Chapter 9) demonstrate that South Africa’s democratisation has led to the
creation of  barriers in terms of  accessing citizenship status. Both of  these
groups have struggled as a result of  their pervasive marginalisation within
the public rights discourse, which has in cases rendered the rights of the girl
child and immigrant women invisible in key debates. The inability of  certain
groups of women to access protective measures encapsulates the material
implications of the intersections of social inequality – where young/vulnerable
and ‘other’ women face distinct forms of  discrimination on the basis of  the
simultaneous interactions of  race, class, gender, nationality, age and citizenship
status. Such prevailing systems of  domination create sharp divides among
women who experience gender oppression in very different forms. Yet in
both examples, the new fissures created by South Africa’s transition to
democracy have enabled these groups to demand a place for their collective
voice, thereby mandating a broader conceptualisation of gender rights and
citizenship in the context of  South Africa’s emerging democracy.
Nomdo and Cassiem have worked with girls in South Africa to develop a
public voice so that they may be better able to pressure government agencies
for their inclusion in protective rights. Working within the NGO sector, Nomdo
and Cassiem have seen how the democratisation process in South Africa has
primarily focused on the needs and issues of adult citizens, thereby silencing
and often ignoring the very real and uniquely situated needs of children,
especially girl children. Through the creation of  the Children’s Budget, these
children have learnt how to monitor government spending and set goals for
meaningful and resourced priorities. While it is evident that gender priorities
shift over a lifespan, Nomdo and Cassiem advocate that age should inform a
more complex understanding of gender and citizenship and demonstrate that
challenging patriarchal norms must begin at the earliest stages of  girls’
socialisation and identity formation. If  girl children are to become equal
citizens, they must have access to education, health care and decision making
during their time as ‘child citizens’. Nomdo and Cassiem’s work underscores
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the importance of  recognising democratisation as a long-term project. While
the Constitution, electoral system and political institutions were a necessary
first step, achieving sustainable democracy requires that girl children also see
themselves as political actors and learn about the key ingredients of civic
life, including participation, advocacy, budget analysis and leadership. As civil
society organisations take up this work focusing on the needs of the girl
child, they engage in both inclusive and transformative gender politics: training
girls to work within a structured government system and simultaneously
instilling the capacity to mobilise and resist through fostering girls’ abilities
to claim their democratic rights and collectively realise long-term
transformation.
Similarly, Hicks’s work centres on the quest for rights by refugee women,
a group that does not qualify for the category of ‘citizen’, yet is increasingly
in need of support from and recognition by the South African government.
Organising through the Union of  Refugee Women (URW), activists have
aligned across ethnic and national identities to create survival strategies and
support networks while they attempt to make themselves visible to policy
makers and other civil society organisations. Arriving in South Africa after
fleeing political violence or poverty in other countries, refugees hold expecta-
tions that South Africa is a place of democracy and opportunity on the
continent. Most often, refugee women come face to face with the realities of
the new progressive government, a government that is overwhelmed by the
demands and expectations of its own citizens, that often chooses to exclude
refugees from assistance and rights and that reifies national boundaries in an
attempt to prioritise domestic development. Most striking in the context of
everyday life, however, refugee woman must negotiate the extreme manifesta-
tions of xenophobic ideologies that limit day-to-day movement and pose
severe risks of violence, displacement and even death, as we have seen in the
2008 wave of attacks on so-called foreigners living in South Africa.
The context of  globalisation is characterised by more permeable boundaries
and transnational linkages that lessen the role of the nation state (Marchand
and Runyan 2002; Sassen 1998). In sub-Saharan Africa, such cross-border
flows are often motivated by political strife and severely limiting economic
conditions, rather than the oft-lauded flexibility of people and capital central
to the contemporary nature of globalisation. Within the increasingly hostile
climate of xenophobia and anti-immigration in South Africa, the quest of
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refugee women to access the state or national resources is not only criminalised
but also vilified and demonised – and the women themselves deported. Yet
refugee women continue to work within invited spaces of citizenship through
the court system to make radical demands for their inclusion and access to
public rights beyond the limited space that has been given them. The response
of the government to this group of women raises provocative questions about
the depth and meaning of claims of transnational sisterhood and international
solidarity. The clear limits to the possibility of  democracy crossing borders are
delineated with particular focus by Hicks in Chapter 9. Yet Kuumba asserts
in the final chapter of this volume that if South African women return to
their legacy of organising networks and coalitions, they may be able to
transgress these boundaries and perhaps create a more fully democratic civil
society. In the work of  Kuumba and Hicks, we see most vividly the intimate
nature of  globalisation, as it takes form in defining everyday life and women’s
ability to access protective rights assured by both the state and the ideological
notion of  universal human rights.
An introduction to the collection
The grounded analyses in this book illustrate important parallels between
women’s agency in both public structures of  government and civil society
organisations. As each chapter portrays, in the aftermath of  apartheid,
women’s organisations in civil society continue to struggle to redefine their
mission, secure effective leadership and utilise new methods of activism.
The national transition that shifted women’s leadership from activists to public
officials created distinct complexities. For example, while being comfortable
with direct confrontation with the former apartheid regime, many of  these
women’s groups are now struggling to work with the democratic government
while simultaneously monitoring and challenging it. In addition, groups with
long historical roots in the anti-apartheid movement are currently trying to
build a mandate, attract a new membership and recreate feminist priorities in
the ongoing process of  nation building. In surveying the broad range of  case
studies within this text, we find that the shifting landscape of post-1994
democratisation creates new patterns of affiliations, challenges and possibilities
for women as they work within former structures and simultaneously carve
out innovative spaces to carry forward the gender priorities of  South Africa’s
massive political transition.
36 Women’s Activism in South Africa
One of  the key tensions facing South Africa’s commitment to gender
equality is the struggle between the broad public sphere, which was valorised
in the first ten years of democracy for the advancement of women, and the
private sphere, which continues to be marked by high levels of gender-based
inequality as a result of the lingering vestiges of patriarchal power and
marginalisation. The continuation of  South Africa’s gender progress must
now move beyond the public sphere to the greater challenge to reshape gender
relations in everyday social life. Many civil society organisations are focused
on the idea of democratising everyday social relations in a broad variety of
‘spaces’, such as netball courts, private houses, rape clinics, refugee networks
and health centres. This collection takes us into the everyday lives of  organ-
isations that are actively reshaping South Africa as a direct result of  women’s
activism. The select cases in this book examine the ways in which democracy
may be extended through the use of public institutions, organisational mobilisa-
tion and transnational activism. As new strategies are formed to continue the
progress of  South Africa’s gender rights campaign, we find that civil society
organisations are working within these margins – using both inclusive and
transformative gender politics to form a new pragmatic feminism to mobilise
across divides.
The process of  national transformation has created new fissures, and within
these fissures we find emerging spaces for new participants in the democratic
process. For example, many organisations have welcomed (or have been forced
to include) multiple women’s voices in their decision making and in their
membership. One outcome of  this new abundance of  women’s perspectives
has been a shifting vision of  feminism and of  masculinity. For example, in
Moolman’s work with the RCCT, the inclusion of  black and coloured South
African women’s voices has meant that the organisation can no longer operate
with limited visions of  masculinity. Because of  the shared history of  struggle
against apartheid held by black men and women, the inclusion of black
women’s voices in the movement to end gender-based violence disrupts the
idea of  all men as perpetrators, and especially disrupts racist stereotypes linking
black masculinity with violence and danger. In her rich discussion of  the
prevailing ideologies that fuel South Africa’s escalating rates of  gender-based
violence, Moffett similarly advocates for a disruption in the extreme
monolithic constructions of  rapists as predominantly black men. By expanding
the visions of masculinity to include men as comrades, partners and activists,
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these two chapters illustrate how the negotiated terrains of political activism
are creating new spaces for men in the fight to end gender-based violence.
In this collection, we intend to move beyond static notions of a monolithic
state towards Gouws’ (2004) vision that the ‘state is a locale where women
participate in the construction of  citizenship for women through being
involved in discursive struggles surrounding legislation and policy. Accepting
this moves us from citizenship as a right to the inclusion of the relations
between structures, discourse and agency’ (2). We envision that the most
meaningful contributions of this collection will emerge at this intersection of
structure, discourse and agency. Each chapter depicts distinct relational
processes that define the diverse forms of  women’s activism nearly fifteen
years after the political transformation of  state structures. The chapters demon-
strate the internal struggles of  women to challenge the residual apartheid
within their organisations, while at the same time assuring the continued
advancement of  gender rights in the long-term project of  democratising social
institutions and everyday relations.
The organisations, cases and issues we have chosen for this collection
depict key aspects of the transition and are representative of the broader
national patterns of civil society–state relations in the consolidation of
democracy in South Africa. These cases are not meant to be an exhaustive
account of  the wide variety of  women’s groups in South Africa. Rather, the
networks and institutions reflected in this text are emblematic of the boundary
crossings from public to private spheres, where important examples of the
multiple intersections of  gender and civil society can and do occur. As women
activists transcend divides at the juncture of  transformative and inclusionary
activism, we suggest that they are forming a new and distinctly South African
form of  pragmatic feminist politics. This book features the diverse representa-
tion of spaces where women are acting as individual and collective agents
through civil society organisations. It is our hope that this collection encourages
a continued dialogue that includes key sectoral spaces outside the scope of
this collection – such as HIV/AIDS organising, gay and lesbian activism, land
movements and the collective action surrounding post-apartheid forgiveness
and reconciliation.
We bring together the voices of  South African women who explain in
their own words how they achieved or continue to fight for their particular
strategic needs or practical gender issues in efforts to contribute to the long-
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term attainment of  the vision of  a ‘new South Africa’ held so closely in the
transitional period of  the early 1990s. The perspectives contained in this
volume embody the ideology of  transnational scholar-activism because the
contributors are diversely situated in relation to South Africa’s process of
democratisation. As scholar-activists working within South Africa, we carry
an ideological commitment to supporting the fullest possible realisation of
the democracy envisioned by the generations of activists who assured the
‘miracle’ of  a new nation. Transformation is broader than the borders between
academics and activists, between civil society groups and government institu-
tions and between South Africa and the world. We hope that the voices in
this text capture and celebrate this unique period of  women’s activism, as the
spaces portrayed in this collection illustrate the centrality of gender within
the landscape of  South Africa’s emerging democracy.
Note
1. While women were active in the resistance forces of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and were
members of  the white government’s South African Defence Force (SADF), their numbers
were small. Cock (1991) reported that in 1989, women made up only 14 per cent of the SADF
and only 20 per cent of MK.
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CHAPTER TWO
Citizenship, Gender and Civil Society
in South Africa
DENISE WALSH
CIVIL SOCIETY IS a celebrated arena for democratic politics. Its value is
recognised across the globe and the political spectrum: from eastern Europe
to Latin America and Africa, neo-liberals, liberals, socialists and radicals have
embraced participation in voluntary associations, organisations and social
movements. They argue that participation strengthens democracy by offering
citizens the opportunity to build social capital, develop social trust and
enhance state accountability, thereby enabling citizens to contribute to the
collective life of  a community. Through civil society, citizens discover, define
and express their interests; discuss what ought to be done; publicly criticise
existing practices and institutions; and influence public opinion and state
policy (Young 2000, 164). These activities define full citizenship and are
clearly central to democracy.
Feminists, however, have long noted that the ability to participate in civil
society is not equally shared. Indeed, civil society has historically been defined
by women’s absence (Pateman 1988; Landes 1988).1 Women, morality,
particularism, the body and reproductive labour have defined the character
and concerns of the private sphere, while the public sphere – comprising civil
society and the state – has been idealised as a realm of reason, law and
productivity run by a fraternal order of  ‘universal’ men. As a result, women’s
power in modern public life has been indirect, ignored, associated with social
constructions of  femininity or realised selectively through private associations,
such as kinship ties. Women have thus been constituted as a marginalised
44 Women’s Activism in South Africa
group in civic and political life. Furthermore, as the chapters throughout this
collection depict, differences among women, such as race, class, sexuality,
nation, language and religion, distinctly shape and often intensify the particular
nature of  women’s marginalisation.
A number of feminist scholars investigating the division of the public
and the private have established that a gendered division of labour persists in
contemporary civil society (Weldon 2005; Molyneux 2001; Tripp 1994).
Women tend to congregate in associations that target survival and social
interests, while civic and political associations pursuing public interests are
frequently claimed as the domain of men. Civic and political associations
operate according to fraternal norms in established liberal democracies, while
patriarchal norms flourish in ‘traditional’ African communities (Tripp 2005;
Tripp 1994), creating a dual barrier to women’s participation in the public
sphere.2 In short, men dominate civic affairs and political decision making.
So it is no surprise that South African civil society and the state have been
highly segregated not only by race and class but also by sex.
Yet, South African democratisation during the 1990s did not follow the
typical pattern of  women’s relegation to the private sphere. Indeed, feminists
and women made impressive advances in the 1990s.3 First, they extracted
commitments of non-sexism from the African National Congress (ANC). Then,
prying open the transition negotiations, women and feminists secured a gender
equality clause in the Constitution and a tri-levelled gender machinery in the
state. Finally, women gained impressive numbers in parliament and helped
secure a series of  legislative victories, including the 1996 Choice of  Termina-
tion of Pregnancy Act and the 2000 Promotion of Equality and Prevention
of Unfair Discrimination Act.
This large representation of women in politics and their unusual accom-
plishments in advancing gender equity offer feminist scholars a unique
opportunity to investigate anew classic controversies over the importance of
civil society, its boundaries and women’s uneven marginalisation in the public
sphere. In the first section of  this chapter, I offer a transformative feminist
approach to civil society, explaining the purpose of  civil society for women;
the relation of civil society to the state, market and family; and the relative
‘friendliness’ of civil society as opposed to the state. That approach embraces
full citizenship, insists on open and inclusive communication in sectors that
directly inform public opinion and policy making, and, in cases where state
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institutions are more friendly and accessible to women than mainstream civil
society organisations, harnesses inclusion to promote greater openness and
access for all women in civil society.
Next, I offer a framework for assessing women’s power and influence in
civil society, attending to class, racial and geographic differences among
women.4 While South Africans are familiar with quotas and state-mandated
strategies increasing women’s presence, I go beyond such tactics. Like many
inclusionary feminists, I believe that women must participate not only in the
state but also in civil society.5 However, all political engagement at this level
is not equal. Women’s participation in private associations, such as burial
societies and grocery clubs, is not critical for achieving full citizenship, although
these organisations do enhance members’ ability to survive and develop social
networks, which can lead to public activism. Civic and political associations,
however, are explicitly oriented towards formulating interests and expressing
them in public with the aim of shaping public opinion and political decision
making. They are also vehicles for publicly confirming one’s community
membership and for defining that community. If  all women are to have the
opportunity to be full citizens and exercise these forms of  public power and
influence, they require access, voice and the capacity for contestation through-
out civil society. Thus, I advocate an institutionalisation of  participatory norms
to transform power relations within civic and political society.
The second half  of  the chapter assesses women’s agency in South African
civil society from 1990 to 2005. The evidence presented here confirms that
feminists have been right to focus attention on the interdependence of the
public and private spheres and, more significantly, that despite an array of
South African women’s counter-publics and women’s significant numerical
presence in parliament, women’s power and influence in civic and political
civil society has remained quite limited, with poor, rural black women
experiencing the deepest forms of  marginalisation.6 I conclude with a brief
discussion of how the South African state might have promoted more open
and inclusive public debate in civil society.
Theorising gender and civil society
While feminist critiques of the public and private spheres have been wide-
ranging and influential, less work has been done to theorise gender and civil
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society.7 This is not to suggest that feminists have ignored women in civil
society. On the contrary, a classic feminist strategy is to build a constituency
of  women who can mobilise in civil society. Such accounts of  feminist civil
society and historical women’s movements dominate the field (Arneil 2006;
Weldon 2005; Beckwith 2005b). Feminists have also analysed how women
(or feminists) in civil society can work with women (or feminists) in the state
to advance their mutual goals (Hassim 2005; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Htun
2003; Weldon 2002). While this has led feminist scholars to critique inequality
in civil society, identify its threats to women’s autonomy, and analyse the
resistance of  political parties and mainstream civil society to women’s
participation (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Phillips 2002; Molyneux 1998),
feminist work on civil society continues to be dominated by a desire to enhance
women’s influence on public policy, revealing a relatively narrow, statist,
instrumentalist approach to citizenship.8
A focus on women’s movements and policy advocacy neglects other forms
of  public debate and opinion formation in civil society that may not be directed
towards the state nor emanate from women’s organisations or social move-
ments.9 Few feminist scholars treat civil society (which is more comprehensive
than women’s movements and organisations) as a significant ‘organising
category’, valuing it because it enables participants to exercise full citizenship
(Dean as cited in Phillips 2002, 72; Howell 2005).10 As a result, feminist
analyses of civil society and gender are incomplete. Given the limited influence
of feminist scholarship on mainstream social science, it is not surprising that
theorists of civil society (including those in South Africa) have often neglected
gender.11 Hence theorising on gender and civil society is underdeveloped.
A transformative feminist approach to civil society looks for ways to
enhance women’s full citizenship. I argue that women’s inclusion in civic and
political associations is insufficient to achieve this goal. All members must
also have the opportunity to exercise power and influence in those associations.
This necessitates attentiveness to the ways in which social constructions of
gender inequality, particularly the sexual division of  labour, limit women’s
agency in select sectors of  civil society. Overcoming such barriers may entail
state action to promote women’s access, voice and capacity for contestation
throughout civil society.
The most direct routes to full citizenship in civil society are through civic
and political groups. Molyneux (2001) convincingly makes this point in her
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study of  women’s mobilisation in Nicaragua, when she argues that some
women’s organisations, associations and social movements pursue practical
interests, while others pursue strategic interests. Although the difference has
been overdrawn, and pursuit of  both in poor women’s organisations is common,
Molyneux distinguishes practical gender interests (the necessities women must
supply for daily survival) from strategic interests (those that directly challenge
gender subordination).12
Molyneux’s analysis focuses on the activities and objectives of  associations
and organisations, and thus shares an affinity with the functionalist theory of
civil society provided by Young (2000). Young identifies three different levels
of associational activity and objectives: private associations (groups that
address ‘basic matters of life, death, need, and pleasure’); civic associations
(groups directed towards serving the community); and political associations
(focused on ‘what is to be done’), such as a political party (2000, 160–3).
The first level is a form of  social activity, such as a stokvel (informal savings
association), that creates a select social network of friends and companions,
and addresses practical interests. Neighbourhood associations are an example
of the second level. They also provide social networks, but are more inclusive
in membership and aim to enhance community life. Young’s first and second
levels of  association are thus where women’s practical interests dominate.
Young’s third level refers to organisations such as political parties. Like the
first two, this level enhances social networks. It may also support second-
level associations. Its primary aim, however, is to engage in discussion and
debate about the common good, shaping popular opinion and public policy.
Young’s third level of  associations, like women pursuing their strategic
interests, offers far greater and direct opportunities for public influence and
power than does a stokvel or neighbourhood association.13 The insights of
Molyneux and Young suggest that participating in political associations,
organisations and social movements offers the most direct means to public
power, with civic membership offering those opportunities only occasionally
and private associations potentially undermining civic engagement.14
Feminist analyses of  poor women’s survivalist organising have underscored
the potential of these efforts to promote strategic gender interests and political
transformation (Rowbotham and Linkogle 2001; Tripp 2000). However, data
on South African civil society support Young’s distinction. While women
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were active members in a number of organisations throughout the transition
and post-apartheid eras – such as church groups, burial societies and grocery
clubs that provided opportunities to enhance survival options and social
networks – few of these groups pursued a public agenda.
In post-apartheid South Africa, analysts found that political associations,
such as political parties and unions, most significantly increased members’
trust in government, political interest, intention to vote and readiness to act
and participate in collective action (Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier 2001,
126). Civic associations, such as neighbourhood committees, ranked close
behind.15 Church organisations, burial societies and stokvels had the lowest
effects on members’ political involvement. As the South African case dovetails
with the claims of  Young and Molyneux, in this chapter I use the term ‘civil
society’ to refer to publicly oriented women’s movements and organisations,
mainstream civic associations, trade unions, political parties and social move-
ments.16
Because the full exercise of democratic citizenship includes the capacity
to define and express one’s interests, discuss what ought to be done, publicly
criticise existing practices and institutions, and influence public opinion and
state policy, all citizens must have power and influence across publicly oriented
civic and political associations. This requires open and inclusive com-
munication.
As I have argued elsewhere, ensuring women’s agency in the public sphere
requires three things: access, voice and the capacity for contestation (Walsh
2006). Access means that diverse women are present across and within the
full spectrum of  civil society. While women’s access is crucial, it is not,
however, sufficient. Voice is also required. Access without voice suggests
the worst kind of tokenism: woman as audience, not participant. By voice, I
mean that a wide range of women at all levels of the group must be able to
convey their interests through a variety of  communicative styles.17 Voice is a
necessary condition because it ensures that ‘assumptions that were previously
exempt from contestation will have to be publicly argued out’ (Fraser 1996,
124). Together, access and voice establish presence and a wide-ranging
agenda, ensuring that a variety of women can introduce marginalised and
repressed ideas.
Beyond voice, women must also have the ability to contest and successfully
challenge the exclusionary rules of  the game – for example, practices about
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professionalisation, outreach, programme content, assessment, accountability
and promotion. Not only should all women be able to make challenges to
these practices, sometimes those challenges should succeed, indicating that
women’s voices are being heard and that institutions are being transformed.
If civil society is open and inclusive, we will know it: a diverse range of
women will be present at all levels and will speak with a variety of commun-
icative styles, freely discussing and shaping objectives, questioning the way
‘things are usually done’.
Widespread access, voice and contestation extended to all women in civil
society are formidable ideals. But endorsing presence without attention to
voice and contestation will sustain inequalities among women, as those who
gain access to the upper echelons of power have little incentive to challenge
the system. ‘Getting women in’ may promote a friendlier environment with
less overt sexism, but is unlikely to generate resistance towards inequitable
forms of  assimilation. Voice and contestation, however, are not without risks.
Not all women will support feminist goals, so demanding that each be offered
voice and the capacity for contestation could thwart feminist objectives. But
this offers more opportunity than risk, as voice and contestation require the
space for all citizens to make counter-arguments. As feminists rarely have an
equitable hearing and are frequently stigmatised and misrepresented, just
debate is not a threat, but a real chance to advocate gender justice. This
model thus goes beyond inclusionary feminism, insisting on voice and
contestation as a means to transform power relations within existing civil
society.
Access, voice and contestation serve as signposts for assessing women’s
transformative power and influence, as Figure 2.1 illustrates.
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The box in the centre highlights the criteria for evaluating women’s agency.
The box on the right illustrates that their agency is rated on a spectrum from
limited to excellent. A limited ranking indicates that women are present, but
likely to be observers and followers rather than leaders. Women’s presence
will typically be symbolic (for example, tokenism), functional (for example,
serving tea) or supportive (for example, as assistants to others), and their
physical presence and voice will conform to ritualised responses; segregation
is common. Women’s aspirations for enhanced power and influence will most
often be expressed indirectly, discreetly.
A ranking of good means that women are not only physically present, but
have an active, unscripted role and are actors. They are becoming integrated
as equals across sectors and positions, participate in debate, raise new issues
of concern and are no longer merely offering their tacit consent. Indeed, many
will be protagonists, shape decision making, challenge the status quo and
demand more power. Finally, an excellent rating reflects a diversity of  women
speaking with a variety of  communicative styles. Deliberating freely on all
issues, they question the rules of  the game and have the confidence that their
challenges will be heard, seriously considered and sometimes successful. This
framework thus demands much more than presence and never conflates
numbers with agency. Instead, the focus is on women’s role as political actors
with interests, providing feminists with high standards for measuring women’s
influence and power.
Where will the enforcement and institutionalisation of these participatory
norms come from? Theorists of  civil society have entertained the idea that
the state might promote marginalised groups in civil society, although they
posit different strategies about how to do so (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002).18
Social democrats hope that state exhortations of  affirmation for weak groups,
along with liberal and substantive rights, will foster inclusion and equality.
Walzer, in his discussion of  this approach, argues this is how the state can
maximise full citizenship (2002, 45). Speaking on behalf of critical theorists,
Chambers also endorses liberal and substantive rights, but advocates new
institutions for democratic debate so that associations, organisations and
social movements might speak more effectively for themselves, as opposed
to having the state speak for them (2002, 103–5). She thus pursues a more
inclusive civil society, and also hopes to enhance its capacity for voice and
contestation.
Citizenship, Gender and Civil Society in South Africa 51
Inclusionary feminists, such as Phillips, agree with social democrats that
the state is a potential ally in the struggle to protect and extend individual
equality (2002, 81). However, inclusionary feminists marginally favour civil
society over the state, assuming civil society is more accessible and contest-
able, providing a base for women’s and feminist movements, consciousness-
raising and a venue for shaping public opinion (78–9). Social democrats and
inclusionary feminists are more willing to use the state than critical theorists,
but like critical theorists, inclusionary feminists believe the limits of con-
temporary civil society are more likely to be resolved – and will be resolved
better – by civil society, not the state.
The feminist claim about the relative friendliness of  civil society, and
critical theory’s insistence that organisations must speak for themselves, appear
democratic and logical, given women’s historical marginalisation in the state
and the impressive history of  women’s movements. Feminists’ modestly
successful targeting of the state legislatures and new bureaucratic institutions
since the 1990s, however, presents the possibility that an unwavering
privileging of  civil society is imprudent. Is it still appropriate to claim that
civil society’s wide-ranging, diffuse array of  groups is ‘friendlier’ – more
accessible, contestable and transformable – than the contained, hierarchical
and rule-bound state? Must state intervention distort the communicative
capacity of  civil society? The next section of  the chapter suggests that theorists
have overstated the friendliness of civil society and the intransigence of all
state institutions. The South African case reveals the potential of  constitu-
tional principles and legislatures to improve women’s access, voice and
contestation within existing civil society.
Assessing South African civil society
To evaluate women’s agency in civic and political society in South Africa
from 1990 to 2005, I begin with women’s counter-publics: the Women’s
National Coalition (WNC) and women’s strategic organisations.19 Undoubtedly,
the WNC catapulted a wide array of  women’s interests to national attention
during the transition negotiations. That it managed to be internally open and
inclusive, and also successful at broadening public debate, denotes a unique
accomplishment. Women’s strategic organisations also had relatively good
internal debate conditions, with modest capacity to shape public opinion and
public policy. Next, I turn to an evaluation of  women’s access, voice and
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contestation in civics (neighbourhood associations), unions and political
parties. Activism in these three types of  associations offered the strongest
link to active citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa; each was also highly
segregated by sex, and thus had limited debate conditions.
Women’s access, voice and contestation in civil society during the early,
tumultuous years of the democratic transition coalesced under the leadership
of the WNC.20 This coalition exemplified how open and inclusive conditions
of deliberation can be achieved even during a democratic transition,
highlighting why feminists and critical theorists have privileged this sector. It
made efforts to transcend the limits of  family and market that hinder women’s
participation in civil society, actively canvassing a remarkably diverse range
of women by conducting public awareness and education campaigns,
workshops, rallies and conferences at grocery stores, malls, churches and
community centres across the country (WNC 1994b, 25–7 and 30–1).21
The WNC not only provided a broad range of two-million-plus South
African women access to their organisation, but also demonstrated the capacity
to listen to and project their voices into mainstream public debate. The WNC
encouraged women to articulate their interests and make demands of the
new democratic dispensation. A wide array of voices expressing diverse
interests resulted in the inclusion of  both women’s practical and strategic
interests as organisational goals.22 Throughout its campaign, the WNC con-
tinuously debated the objectives and methods of the organisation (Hassim
2003). WNC leaders also projected those goals into the transition negotiations,
the media and parliament. The WNC thus afforded women from across the
country the ability to discover, define and express their interests; discuss what
ought to be done; criticise practices and institutions; and influence the
transition negotiations and public policy.
Diverse women’s power and influence in and through the WNC was striking,
but it did not last. After the first non-racial elections, the Coalition broke its
link to political parties, and ruled that women members of  parliament (MPs)
could not hold an official position in the organisation. The result was a loss in
leadership and political leverage that fragmented the nascent women’s
movement: the most talented leaders left civil society for parliament, and
single-issue grassroots organisations mushroomed over the next decade. The
unintended and immediate result of greater opportunities in the state was
thus the demobilisation of  the women’s movement.
Citizenship, Gender and Civil Society in South Africa 53
As the WNC declined, women’s strategic organisations grew, providing
women with space to articulate their interests and challenge the status quo.
Organisations in urban areas improved women’s access to public power,
piercing the predominantly white, male, middle-class hegemony of  civil society.
Most urban women’s organisations were internally open and inclusive. Many
were young organisations, decentralised works-in-progress, member-driven
and highly participatory. Issue-specific women’s groups, such as the New
Women’s Movement and the Victoria Mxenge Housing Development
Association, encouraged its predominantly black and coloured members to
express their needs and interests and challenge patriarchal assumptions about
women’s subordination in public life (Ismail 1998; Edwards 1997).23
However, women’s strategic organisations throughout this fifteen-year
period had difficulty including poor, urban women as equals, and rarely
integrated poor, black, rural women. Indicative of  the pervasive divides among
women’s experiences, coloured and black women in institutionalised
organisations reported feeling disempowered. Although women’s national
advocacy groups were acutely aware of  the need to include rural women,
logistical obstacles, limited funding and the timetables of government partners
hobbled their efforts.24 Rural women who participated in workshops and
conferences remained isolated, bussed occasionally to urban sites for special
events. One early and notable exception was the Rural Women’s Movement
(RWM), which led protests against local authorities and urged members to
attend and speak out in community forums.25 But the dynamism of  this
movement did not last long after the transition, as its most talented leaders
moved into parliament. The majority of  women’s strategic organisations
remained clustered in urban South Africa, and privileged women retained a
disproportionate influence.
Moreover, groups led by white or coloured women tended to have higher
degrees of institutionalisation, the closest links to government and the greatest
access to funds. Collaborative relationships between these organisations, state
gender institutions and feminists in the state emerged during the early years
of  democracy. An elite, feminist ‘issue network’ projected a variety of  women’s
interests into state proceedings through hearings, petitions and reports (Van
Donk and Maceba 1999; CASE 1998).26 Working with conventional government
agencies and departments, issue networks successfully secured an impressive
array of  legislative reform in areas such as customary marriage, violence against
women and employment anti-discrimination.
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The efficacy of this elite issue-network diminished after the second
election in 1999, as the ANC intensified its efforts at centralisation. The ANC
not only replaced and disciplined dynamic feminist MPs, but also insisted that
NGOs ‘be in line with government policy to get funding’.27 Simultaneously, it
increased the institutionalisation of state–society relations, creating bureau-
cratic obstacles to the disbursement of  government funds. Women’s and
feminist NGOs increasingly struggled to build a collaborative relationship with
government that would not undermine their autonomy (Britton 2006). As
international funding dwindled, ANC influence over organisational agendas
increased. Remarking on the ANC pipeline of funds and policy prescriptions,
Democratic Alliance MP Sandra Botha quipped that the entire NGO sector
was ‘an ANC jamboree’.28 One activist bluntly confirmed that projects were
‘driven by ANC politics’.29 The line between collaboration and co-optation
had dangerously deteriorated. By 1999, state-dominated funding, a smaller
feminist cadre in the state and ANC determination to direct civil society
undermined the ability of  these organisations to speak out and challenge the
status quo.
Even at their pinnacle of influence during the early years of the new
democracy, women’s issue networks and organisations were far less influential
than civics, trade unions and political parties in shaping public opinion, public
policy, the terms of  community membership and strategic goals. Worse, South
African women’s access, voice and capacity for contestation in these main-
stream organisations were quite limited.
Membership in mainstream civic and political society in South Africa was
notably segregated by sex, race, class and geographic location. Fewer women
than men were members. Even where women’s membership was proportionally
significant, their access to leadership positions remained quite low. Women’s
rank did advance slightly over the period. In some cases, this was a result of
established male leadership moving into the state; in political parties, it was
the ANC’s adoption of  a quota for the party list that increased women’s
advancement. Rural women, however, were often denied membership in
community associations and in trade unions, and were marginalised in political
parties. All of  mainstream civil society remained thoroughly male dominated
in 2005.
Civic organisations, and in particular civics, were vital centres of local
urban politics in South Africa before and after the unbanning of the ANC,
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particularly in black townships.30 Unfortunately, no national studies assessing
participation by sex in civic associations have been undertaken.31 It is risky to
generalise across all civic associations in South Africa, as they varied
tremendously by locale, purpose and local power relations.32 Yet anecdotal
evidence indicates women’s access in civics modestly increased with the
transition, and then stalled during consolidation.
During the early years of the transition, women represented the majority
of  members in civics. Although it was common for professional men to ascend
to leadership roles, women were prevented from doing so (Glaser 1997;
Mayekiso 1996).33 As the political influence of the civics peaked in 1994 and
their most talented leaders became local councillors, some women made
advances up the ladder of power, achieving numbers as high as 30 per cent
of leadership positions in the Johannesburg area (Heller 2003, 165).
Unfortunately, it soon became evident that this impressive advance was a
one-time event. Civics remained notable for their large female membership
and male leadership into the twenty-first century.34
Women’s access to leadership positions in trade unions, arguably the most
politically significant and vibrant area of civil society over the period of this
study, followed a similar pattern. The majority of  women in the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) were black and faced substantial pay
and occupational discrimination. In 1993, Connie September became the first
woman to be elected as a COSATU national office-bearer.35 In 1995, when
women constituted 36 per cent of  the membership, they held 8 of  83 top-
ranking positions.36 As one female union member dryly remarked: ‘A democratic
union gives all members a right to a say in the way a union works, yet the
higher up the union you go the less women you will find taking part in decision
making.’37 COSATU made intermittent efforts to target women for promotion,
but they were often impromptu afterthoughts: as the ‘women were not readily
available’ at the time of the decision, the men would have to go ‘fetch them
from home’ to confirm the appointments.38 Shadowed by the prevailing social
constructions surrounding male leadership and women’s roles in the household,
such efforts generated a trend of  only small improvements in women’s ranking
across affiliates.
While formal commitments to women’s greater inclusion in union
leadership were increasing and more women were organising and becoming
union members, by the year 2000, female trade union employees were the
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lowest-paid workers and continued to be excluded from educational
opportunities and most management positions. By 2005, two women had
been integrated into the select group of  six national office-bearers. However,
COSATU continued to reject quotas for women at all levels, and women’s
leadership numbers crested between 20 and 30 per cent across affiliates.
Women outside the formal economy were excluded not only from
leadership positions but also, until 2005, from membership in COSATU
altogether. In the mid-1990s, black women comprised approximately 60 per
cent of  the informal labour market and were concentrated in the less lucrative
sectors, such as crafts and shop work. Black women from Durban formed the
Self-Employed Women’s Union (SEWU) in 1994 and actively pressed for
membership into COSATU to secure international funding. Yet SEWU members
were not eligible to join COSATU, because, as self-employed workers, they
could not negotiate wages and benefits with an employer. Hence, SEWU women
were not ‘workers’.39 This case draws a parallel to the struggles faced by
domestic workers in efforts to gain recognition within the ranks of  COSATU,
as Fish discusses in Chapter 5 of  this collection. Women’s subordinate position
in the economy thus reinforced their exclusion from the trade unions. Urban
women in the formal labour market with leadership skills, education or
experience were able to join civics and unions, but in most cases that was the
extent of their access: the rank and file.
Women’s most notable success in accessing leadership positions took place
in the ANC, which also influenced opposition parties. In 1990, the ANC
Women’s League (ANCWL) won the right to be included in decision-making
forums and attended the ANC Consultative Conference. The League then
spearheaded a highly divisive and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to win a
30 per cent quota for women in the National Executive Council (NEC). That
battle revealed the limited commitment to women’s participation within the
party. As one ANC woman leader noted, it served as a wake-up call to women
that ‘even when you are promised support from senior leadership, it doesn’t
mean that you will get it’ (Baleka Kgositsile as quoted in Hassim 2006, 127).
Despite the quota defeat, the number of women in the NEC increased to 30
per cent by 1999. But by 2002, the number of women in the NEC had dropped
to a little less than 20 per cent.
Other political parties echoed this pattern. In the Democratic Party (DP),
women constituted nearly 30 per cent of  the Federal Council in 1999. In
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2005, that number dropped to only 16 per cent. Women gained access to
parliament, but the balance of power did not correspondingly shift in the
parties. As Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) MP Suzanne Vos emphatically insisted,
men run South African political parties: ‘Because we have a patriarchal society,
women depend on men for patronage in terms of  their places, because . . .
the men are the bosses of  the parties.’40 Within the parties women were not
mobilised to promote women’s strategic interests. The IFP’s large, vibrant
Women’s Brigade provided women with space for public action, but only as
mothers under male guidance and on behalf  of  male leaders: women’s role in
the family was understood to ‘naturally’ complement men’s role as public
leaders. The ANCWL, despite promising early attempts to become a power
base for women, put little energy into organising women at the grassroots or
providing them with leadership opportunities, and it returned to its historic
role as a women’s auxiliary organisation to the party (Hassim 2005, 98).
Like women’s access, women’s ability to speak their minds and be heard
in community organisations, unions and political parties increased modestly
mid-decade and then stagnated. Resistance to black women’s voices in rural
community organisations was acute: ideally, women were to be seen and not
heard. But by mid-decade that position was under attack. Walker (1996)
recounts an exchange during a meeting in the Natal Midlands prompted by an
NGO worker’s suggestion to elect women to a committee:
A woman’s voice came out of  the crowd and said, ‘But we are not allowed
to speak’ . . . An old man said, ‘It has always been said that men are better
than women, but I know there are some women here who can do things
better than some men.’ There was much clapping of  hands by the women. A
man stood up and said, ‘A woman will not be over me as long as I live.’
There was much noise after this. Another man then got up and said, ‘OK, it’s
all right now for women to take over, because the tough fight with the
government for land is now over.’ At this an older woman responded that he
was being unfair since women had also fought the battle for more land.
(146–7)
While women’s public speech was controversial and its value publicly
questioned, it was not impossible for women to make themselves heard. NGOs
in the immediate post-apartheid period challenged women’s limited voice in
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rural areas, hoping to provide a platform for them to be heard. Unfortunately,
NGOs were as susceptible to sexism as were other institutions. NGO researcher
Clare Hansmann noted: ‘Project workers will talk to the men on the water
committees because they want to get things done quickly and they know that
men will be able to take decisions.’41 Rural women reported being dis-
empowered by NGO project consultants who spoke English, used jargon and
‘called meetings at short notice and wanted the women to deal with many
“complicated questions” in a short space of time’ (Motala 2000, 20–1). NGOs
in rural and urban areas ignored the impact of  women’s domestic responsibil-
ities on their availability, their lack of  experience in community decision making
and their limited education. Surface efforts at inclusion worsened women’s
marginalisation, producing alienated bystanders instead of  empowered citizens.
While unions made some efforts to listen to women’s voices, they also
found ways to edit the conversation. Women’s conferences in the late 1980s
were spaces for union women to gather and formulate demands, from equitable
taxation to shared domestic responsibilities. But the male leadership defined
the majority of  the women’s programmes as ‘community issues’ outside their
purview and refused endorsement. The interdependence of  civil society and
the family was denied. By the early 1990s, leadership appeared more flexible
and agreed to women’s institutions within the union, ostensibly to enhance
their voice in shaping union policy. COSATU established a women’s coordinator
and gender forums in a few cities. The forums functioned as internal counter-
publics, providing members with space to discuss sexual harassment and build
skills and confidence.
By 1994, COSATU established a women’s forum in all its regions. But men
in the regions attacked women’s forums as divisive and criticised women’s
cooperative leadership styles as weak and ineffective. Male domination
permeated all regional union meetings – even women’s meetings. As Fiona
Dove reported, ‘You’d find men at a women workers’ conference as leaders
of  a delegation. They said the women needed their help’ (Telela 1994, 15).
Women’s coordination between regions was generally poor, and female leaders
were overextended. Financial support was available only at the national level.
The few successful women’s forums experienced isolation and enjoyed little
power. Judy Mulqueeny insists that gender consciousness within the trade
unions had stalled by 1996, noting that while some men within the unions
‘are very advanced in gender theory . . . practically they don’t implement it’.42
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As we see throughout this collection, striking divisions between ideology
and practice emerge in each of the case studies across a wide span of
organisations. In line with these findings, a 2005 survey found that women
were less likely to participate in union activities and felt they had less influence
with their shop stewards than did men (NALEDI 2006, 32). Instead of  women’s
voices being silenced, as they had been before democratisation, they were
redirected, co-opted and ignored.
Political parties did a bit better in instituting measures to support women’s
leadership, particularly the ANC. Yet women in the ANC criticised their party
for limiting women’s ability to speak and be heard. ‘Does representation mean
participation? We feel no,’ insisted Mohau Pheko, leader of  the WNC. ‘We still
have a situation where men stand at the feast table while women [can only]
smell the hors d’oeuvres.’43 As the ANC tightened party control, women’s
dependency on the male-dominated party leadership increased. Within the
organisation, women’s presence was becoming more symbolic, as party elites
pursued centralisation, encouraging women to be grateful and dependent
supplicants, not vocal members.
The elections in 1999 exemplified the ways in which political parties limited
women’s voices. Registration and opinion polls suggested that a space for
women’s agency within the parties was possible. Women exceeded men in
their voter registration level and their support for female candidates. By 1999,
a gender gap had emerged in election issues, with more women than men
approving gender quotas in political parties and participation in decision
making. Yet a research report and survey conducted by the Commission on
Gender Equality (CGE) in 1999 found that candidates were not targeting
women as an interest group, that the campaigns were male dominated and
that women running on party lists were not promoted by the parties, leading
to their ‘virtual invisibility as political leaders or candidates’ (CGE 1999).
Women rarely served as party spokespersons, and no party demanded better
media representation for their female candidates. A CGE meeting for political
parties to explain their policies on women was poorly attended and this was
interpreted as a lack of  commitment to gender equality. Not surprisingly,
South African gender analysts concluded that ‘women have not received the
recognition they deserve’ by party leaders.44 Against their better interests,
political parties ignored women’s issues and their own women politicians.
The limited opportunities for women to voice their interests in civics,
unions and political parties did not stop them from challenging the status
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quo. Indeed, gender issues were on the agenda of  many organisations, and
efforts at improving women’s descriptive representation were frequent.
However, while women’s challenges occasionally met with success, too often
their victories were short-circuited.
Sometimes persistent male dominance backfired, leading women to
successfully retaliate. In one community organisation, women managed to
formally marginalise their minority male membership, upending the patriarchal
rules of  the game. A woman in the organisation explained: ‘Men are quite
dominating, so the women have taken a decision that men can attend and
make verbal inputs, but they cannot make important decisions’ (as quoted in
White 1998, 16). In this case, majority rule trumped patriarchal privilege.
Such a direct, successful assault was atypical.
The unpopularity of  direct confrontation was clearly evident in the struggle
over women’s leadership in COSATU. In 1997, the organisation’s only female
national officer, Connie September, concluded an eighteen-month investigation
by recommending a gender quota of 50 per cent by the year 2000 to increase
women’s presence in union leadership positions. The Report to the September
Commission noted that the union’s support for affirmative action ‘applies to
everyone except COSATU’. At its sixth congress, COSATU was thus expected
to approve a quota without opposition.
Yet, despite the support for a quota by the ANCWL, the South African
Communist Party (SACP) and the COSATU general secretary, the COSATU unions
rejected the quota, instead supporting a gender training programme to promote
women in the ranks and a declaration of  union solidarity on gender equality.
Opponents argued that quotas imposed from the top down would undermine
democratic accountability and smacked of tokenism. Nevertheless, COSATU
endorsed quotas for blacks (males) in the workplace. Although the September
Commission challenged male hegemony and successfully inserted the issue
of  women’s representation into union debates and policy making, COSATU’s
gender imbalance persisted.45 As Joyce Pekane pointedly noted, even when a
handful of women advanced to the NEC, ‘the men who don’t want the quota
still maintain the status quo’ (Meer 2002, 7). A 2005 survey of  priorities for
change within COSATU ranked gender and the empowerment of  women at
the very bottom.
Women’s challenges to the status quo that were pursued through backroom
channels appeared more successful, but were dependent on elite favouritism.
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In the ANC, contestation over the women’s quota on the party lists was not
won through popular debate, but was handled with discretion. Instead of
publicly exposing sexism and inequality within the party and demanding their
rights, women had to achieve inclusion behind closed doors, leaving inequality
safely under the control of  party leaders. While winning the quota enabled
women to challenge business as usual in parliament and momentarily establish
good conditions of debate, the sexist organisational procedures within the
ANC went largely uncontested, limiting the potential of  women’s greater
presence on the party lists to undermine patriarchal norms in the party
hierarchy.
Clearly, women in civil society were not passively in acceptance of  male
domination. Their strategies for coping with the problem varied. Most chose
to maximise their autonomy through membership in private associations such
as church organisations, burial societies and stokvels, pursuing essential practical
needs. This was also the path of  least resistance, confirming women’s limited
access, voice and contestation within mainstream civic and political
associations. Yet a large number of  women did become members of  civics,
unions and political parties, and a few challenged their marginalisation: they
spoke their minds, demanding quotas and policy reform. Those challenges,
like women’s access to leadership and voice, became increasingly rare after
1998.
An analysis of  women’s agency in South African civil society substantiates
feminist claims that the public and the private are mutually constitutive –
that the market, family and state deeply shape agency in civil society. Women
repeatedly complained that sexist attitudes and the sexual division of labour
limited their time and energy to devote to civic and political organisations.
Women activists, union members and party stalwarts noted resistance from
family members, the double burden, lack of safe transport and inconvenient
hours for meetings. They recognised their limited experience and skills and
the lack of institutional support, and were aware that they had internalised
patriarchal norms and were susceptible to intimidation and sexual harassment.
A wide range of women insisted their male colleagues gave them little respect,
taking more notice of their physical appearance than of what they said. The
South African case thus underscores the validity of  the claim that civil society,
market and family intersect in ways that negatively reinforce women’s sub-
ordination.
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Evidence of the interdependence of the public and the private is not
surprising. The role of  the democratising state in shaping women’s agency in
civil society is more noteworthy. In South Africa, the post-apartheid state
affected public debate conditions in several ways. First, as Dryzek (2000) has
theorised, the inclusion of marginalised groups in the state depleted the ranks
and resources of  civil society. While the vast majority of  civil society found
the transition difficult to navigate, the WNC was eviscerated. Second, as
theorists of democracy have long warned, the state can co-opt civil society
(Dryzek 2000; Habermas 1984). In South Africa, ANC consolidation eroded
the independence of  civil society and took an additional toll on women’s
agency. Women who were independent-minded activists demanding more than
the party leadership was willing to deliver became inconvenient and
expendable.
But the state also had positive effects, as feminist scholars of public policy
have long recognised. Parliament provided space for inspired feminist
leadership and good debate conditions, offering women’s groups in civil society
powerful collaborators. While cooperation was contingent on the interests of
elite ANC leaders, it nevertheless produced impressive legislative reform.
Clearly, scholars and activists are right to be wary of  state threats to the
autonomy of  civil society, but in South Africa the instrumental benefits of
women’s cooperation with the state were substantial. Moreover, effective
cooperation offered women new opportunities to become engaged, active
citizens. Women’s experience in South Africa confirms that, at times, some
state institutions can be more welcoming than mainstream civil society, and
may be an undervalued resource for pursuing greater openness and inclusive-
ness in public life.
Conclusions
The South African case makes it clear that feminists need a better appreciation
for access, voice and contestation throughout civil society to analyse women’s
ability to achieve full citizenship. The instrumentalist attitude of  many
feminists towards civil society has meant that they have under-theorised the
importance of democratic participation. Many have also under-theorised its
scope, locating citizenship in the voting booth, the state and counter-publics,
but not in powerful, publicly oriented civil society. Both are a mistake. Full
citizenship means more than influencing legislation. Power and influence in
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civil society are critical for publicly expressing one’s belonging in the
community, for discovering and continuously reformulating the terms of  one’s
membership, and for recreating and transforming that community. To do this
requires agency in and across civic and political associations.
A number of  factors limit women’s access, voice and contestation in South
African civil society. Indeed, the South African case illuminates the ways the
family, market and state shape women’s agency in civil society. Women
continued to be the majority of the unemployed and the poor, charged with
the heaviest load of domestic responsibilities, while being socialised to accept
those inequalities. Family and market forces were readily identified by South
African women as impediments to their progress, but the role of the state
was less evident and more complex.
Although the state ultimately proved a threat to women’s organisations,
women in parliament and select state institutions also inspired and collaborated
with them. The state was both friend and foe. Legislatures where talented
feminist leadership was concentrated during the early years of the South
African democratic transition and judiciaries that upheld constitutional
principles of  gender equality became important allies.46 Moreover, the
discursive political opportunity structure that endorsed substantive citizenship
would likely have favoured women’s demands for greater agency in civil
society (Hassim 2005, 160–1). However, during the transition, feminist
attention focused on how to make the state accountable to civil society (not
on how to make civil society accountable to the state) and endorsed principles
of non-sexism and non-racism. Nevertheless, South Africa offers a situation
in which select state institutions and the WNC, coupled with the dominant
political discourse of  citizenship, might have put demands for an open and
inclusive civil society on the public agenda.
Theorists of civil society are aware that the state might promote
marginalised groups in civil society. They have argued that state support for
equality in civil society is essential. Whether that support entails advocacy of
the weakest associations (Walzer 2002), liberal rights that provide ‘essential
preconditions’ for communication (Chambers 2002, 97) or anti-discrimination
legislation (Phillips 2002), they envision the state in a supportive role, with
civil society in the lead. Yet an analysis of  women’s agency in South Africa
suggests that a supportive state role may need to be more extensive than
these theorists envision.
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In South Africa, basic liberal rights offer insufficient ‘preconditions’ for
equitable communication. The most powerful organisations in civil society –
political parties and labour unions – have unremittingly resisted women’s
advancement in leadership and have consistently deflected women’s policy
demands and challenges to the institutional status quo. South African civil
society’s institutional decentralisation and feminist activists’ focus on the
state have made the task of securing equality in civil society even more
difficult. The capacity of  women’s organisations and social movements to
promote a civil society that is resistant to the distorting effects of money and
power, or to counter sexist inequality, is thus quite low.
The ANC certainly raised the expectations of  women in civil society,
advocated support for gender equality, inspired many women leaders and
advanced important legislation, but it did little to directly promote women’s
power and influence in civil society. This is unfortunate, as moving towards
this goal would have constructed women as full citizens. As South Africa
continues the process of democratic nation building, the legacies of the
women’s movement and the continuing dynamism of  women’s organisations
constitute a basis for pride and optimism. The future can be worthy of the
past if  women’s power and influence are established throughout civil society
so that all South Africans might claim the rich public life they deserve.
Notes
This chapter draws on the author’s doctoral dissertation, Just Debate: Culture and Gender Justice in
the New South Africa, New School for Social Research, 2006. The University of Virginia, the
Department of  Political Science at the University of  the Witwatersrand and the Transregional
Centre for Democratic Studies in Cape Town provided field-research support. Participants at the
African Studies Association Conference in November 2006 offered insights on an earlier draft. In
addition to helpful comments from the editors, three anonymous reviewers provided invaluable
suggestions.
1. This is true even when middle-class women moved into civil society during the nineteenth
century. Their presence in voluntary associations dedicated to the moral improvement of  the
poor was characterised not as public activism but as private charity.
2. For an early and in-depth discussion of the applicability of the concept ‘civil society’ to
Africa, see Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan (1994). For a more recent analysis of civil society
in Africa, see Gyimah-Boyadi (2004).
3. Not all women involved in these efforts were feminists, and some men were feminists. In
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this chapter, the term ‘feminists’ indicates those who oppose inequitable power relations on
the basis of sex. I follow Hassim (2005, 2006) in conceptualising feminists along a continuum
from inclusionary to transformative. At one end are inclusionary feminists, who aim to
improve women’s political representation. At the other end are radical transformative feminists,
those who attack all forms of economic, social and political forms of oppression, domination
and exploitation.
4. Black, coloured (meaning ‘mixed-race’) and white racial designations inherited from the
apartheid era continue to change in meaning but remained salient categories throughout the
period examined here.
5. This is not to suggest that civil society is the only terrain for exercising full citizenship, but
that it is a vital arena of the public sphere that must not be neglected. For a feminist critique
of  the overvaluing of  civil society, see Jaggar (2005).
6. I use this formulation to expose the differential and multiple forms of domination,
exploitation and oppression specific women in South Africa experience, not to assign this
group of women the symbolic status of disempowered victims. I would like to thank Linzi
Manicom for insisting on this clarification.
7. In this chapter, ‘gender’ refers to the processes that create, sustain and reproduce oppression,
domination and exploitation on the basis of sex. For a discussion of gender as a process, see
the dialogue in Politics and Gender by Beckwith (2005a), Hawkesworth (2005) and Htun
(2005).
8. Feminist analysts working on eastern Europe are an interesting deviation from this pattern.
See Einhorn and Sever (2005).
9. Goetz and Hassim are an exception on this latter point. Albertyn (2003) has recognised the
importance of  targeting society and culture, arguing that the South African women’s
movement has directed too much of its attention towards the state, to the detriment of the
politics of the personal. Contemporary feminist scholars interested in challenging gendered
cultural and social practices often focus on performativity (e.g. Butler 1990).
10. Phillips’s explanations for this failure are unsatisfactory (2002). The state, much like civil
society, is part of  ‘the public’, is interdependent with the private, has instrumental value for
advocates of  gender justice and is clearly gendered. Yet feminists have not refrained from
theorising gender and the state.
11. South African feminists and feminist scholars have long grappled with this issue, however,
and attention to gender in civil society is increasingly integrated in empirical analyses. See note
34 for recent examples.
12. Feminist scholars of  women’s survivalist organisations have criticised Molyneux’s distinction,
arguing that strategic gender interests are often central in the formation of  poor women’s
survivalist groups (Tripp 2000; Tamale 2001). However, these categories are useful for
identifying agendas and groups that directly and publicly aim to challenge gender, class and
other forms of subordination.
13. Civics (neighbourhood associations) and political parties in South Africa are not as distinct
as Young’s typology suggests. Civics engaged directly in political protest in the early 1990s
and competed with local councillors for influence and resources after the transition. However,
they were much less successful in providing members with political opportunities to influence
state policy (Heller 2003; Cherry, Jones and Seekings 2000). Another exception to Young’s
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typology is the family, which in some societies reaches across all three of  Young’s levels and
is also the primary unit of economic production.
14. Young argues that private associations can be ‘depoliticising or brazenly self-regarding’ (Young
2000, 162). However, individual women may gain public stature and prestige through
membership in some types of  private association, such as kinship groups. Weldon also sees
positive potential in private associations, such as solidarity and consciousness-raising.
Nevertheless, her analysis of feminist civil society in the United States confirms that civic and
political associations have a ‘greater direct effect on policy processes than more inwardly-oriented
activities’ (Weldon 2005, 204; her italics).
15. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) do not appear on the list, perhaps because most
NGOs in South Africa do not have a membership base but are sustained by international
donors.
16. Women’s groups that are survivalist but engage in civic and political activities are included. A
wide range of social movements have emerged in South Africa since the transition to
democracy. They aim to shape public opinion and state policy (some, such as the Treatment
Action Campaign, explicitly work to enhance active citizenship) and should be included in
my analysis. Unfortunately, data on women’s participation in these organisations are
insufficient, so these movements are only intermittently integrated into the chapter.
17. Young (2000) suggests a wide range, from articulate speech making, to passionate disruption
and dissent, to storytelling, ceremony and public acknowledgement. The capacity to develop
these skills and an awareness of  one’s interests requires counter-publics, or what Weldon
(2005, 2006) refers to as ‘separate organizations for disadvantaged social groups’, such as
‘feminist civil society’.
18. The Chambers and Kymlicka book is particularly useful here because the editors asked each
contributor to become a representative of a specific tradition and to respond to their set of
questions about civil society (2002, 3). I refer to Phillips’s approach as ‘inclusionary’, as she
focuses on the exclusion of women from civil society and how to challenge it.
19. This discussion is an expanded version of  my analysis of  women’s participation in civil
society during the liberal moment (Walsh 2006).
20. The WNC was an umbrella organisation of  more than 70 women’s groups from across the
racial, class and political spectrum. Some of the organisations in the WNC were feminist, but
not most. The WNC produced a Women’s Charter, itemising women’s strategic and practical
concerns culled from a country-wide consciousness-raising campaign. The WNC’s charter is
available at www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/womchart.htm.
21. While efforts were made to involve all the regions, security concerns, funding problems, lack
of transport and disorganisation within the upper echelon of the organisation caused
problems throughout the campaign, particularly in the Natal region (WNC 1994a, 7–8).
22. The WNC has been described by some outsiders as dominated by middle-class women who
were not active in the liberation struggle. Yet highly politicised ANC women from widely
varying backgrounds led the organisation. They also had different political agendas that
nearly incapacitated the coalition.
23. The Victoria Mxenge Association is an excellent example of a private association that effectively
promoted women’s practical and strategic interests in civic and public life. For additional
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examples, see Hanna Mhlongo, ‘KZN Women’s Organisations Make Proposals to Gender
Policy’, Natal Witness, 14 August 1997; Doris Ravenhill, ‘Her Votes Count’, Sowetan, 8 March
1999; Saint P. Molakeng, ‘ “Women Musn’t Mimic Men” ’, Sowetan, 3 August 1998; ‘Women
Demand a Say in Traditional Courts’, Agenda 43 (2000), p. 73.
24. This pattern was particularly evident in the debate over customary marriage reform (Goldblatt
and Mbatha 1999; Likhapa Mbatha, researcher, Gender Research Project, interviewed by the
author, Johannesburg, 9 July 2003).
25. RWM members experienced dramatic change: ‘Where I live, it is not like before when the
chiefs, kgotla’s [community meeting], or the government used to tell us what to do. Women
no longer accept anything until they have met and discussed things’ (activist Yvonne Padi
from Modderfontein as quoted in Speak 1994, 27).
26. Charity Bhengu, ‘Women Look to Equal Say in Polls’, Sowetan, 18 November 1998; Pamela
Dube, ‘SA Women “Not Treated Equally” ’, Sowetan, 23 October 1998. ‘Issue networks’ are
associations of activists, bureaucrats, lawyers, elected representatives and other specialists
who work behind the scenes to pass legislative reform (Htun 2003, 5). ‘Issue networks’ are
associations of activists, bureaucrats, lawyers, elected representatives and other specialists
who work behind the scenes to pass legislative reform (Htun 2003, 5).
27. Michelle Festus, gender coordinator, National Land Committee. Interviewed by the author,
Johannesburg, 29 July 2003.
28. Sandra Botha, MP for the Democratic Alliance. Interviewed by the author, Cape Town,
25 July 2003.
29. Festus interview.
30. Civics are strongest in black African townships and have been studied extensively (see, for
example, Cherry, Jones and Seekings 2000; Seekings 1998; Adler and Steinberg 2000; Van
Kessel 2000).
31. The Johns Hopkins 2002 study catalogued women’s considerable presence in the non-profit
sector, but failed to distinguish between public and private associations (Russell and Swilling
2002). Smaller, ‘snapshot’ studies of  women’s participation in civil society are available. For
one example, see Hirschmann (1994).
32. This last point I owe to Elke Zuern, private communication.
33. For an exception, see Cullinan (1992).
34. That pattern was replicated in many of the new social movements, such as the Soweto
Electricity Crisis Committee and Anti-Privatisation Forum of  Gauteng. Members are
predominantly ‘grannies’, but the movements are led by men (Egan and Wafer 2006;
Buhlungu 2006; Paley as cited in Hassim 2005, 258). Women’s leadership in the Concerned
Citizens Forum and Bayview Flat Residents Association are exceptions (Dwyer 2006; Benjamin
2007). The Landless People’s Movement has been depicted as sexist, limiting women’s voice
and access by ignoring the sexual division of  labour (Greenberg 2006). Not surprisingly, the
new social movements tend to ignore women’s strategic interests (Hassim 2005).
35. In 1993, estimated COSATU membership was 1.2 million, making it the largest trade union
federation in South Africa. By 2001 its membership had increased, and included 40 per cent
of the waged labour force (Lodge 2001, 170).
36. Women did hold some upper-level positions at the regional and local levels, although most
often as treasurers.
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37. As quoted in M. Naidoo, ‘Union Women Adopt “Charter” ’, Teaser, 29 September 1995.
38. Mummy Japhta, gender coordinator, COSATU. Interviewed by the author, Johannesburg,
30 July 2003.
39. Regional COSATU offices did, however, offer office support to SEWU (Devenish and
Skinner 2006, 264).
40. Suzanne Vos, MP for the Inkatha Freedom Party. Interviewed by the author with Julie
Ballington, Cape Town, 23 July 2003.
41. Kate Skinner, ‘Making Sure Water Works’, Sowetan, 30 July 1998.
42. Judy Mulqueeny, former SACP Central Committee member. Telephone interview by the
author, 27 July 2003.
43. Judith Matloff, ‘For South Africa’s Women Hopes Still Remain Thwarted’, Christian Science
Monitor, 89 (172): 31 July 1997.
44. The analysts were Shireen Hassim, Sheila Meintjes, Julie Ballington, Rebecca Holmes and
Shireen Motara.
45. In 2000, women constituted 94 per cent of the administrative staff and 12 per cent of
organisers (Shopsteward 2000). Strategies to provide women with access to union positions
remained voluntary, and gender committees and coordinators were marginalised throughout
the period.
46. Cathi Albertyn (2003, 608) has argued that equality principles in the Constitution can legitimise
women’s rights in the private sphere. I am suggesting a similar strategy can be used to
promote women’s full citizenship.
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CHAPTER THREE
Gender Equality by Design
The Case of the Commission on Gender Equality
SHEILA MEINTJES
WHILE SOUTH AFRICA’S democratic project after 1994 sought to reshape the
way in which South Africans would participate in creating a new non-racial
national consciousness, it was not uncontested. However, the national debate
about a new constitutional dispensation had initially excluded any reference
to women’s issues or to the notion of  gender equality. This gave rise to a
coordinated and unusual coalition of  a diversity of  women’s pressure groups
and organisations to ensure that these issues became part of the democratic
discourse. A Women’s National Coalition (WNC) was formed in 1992 across
the divides of  race, class and ideology. The coalition’s objective was to inject
a gender perspective into the discussions and negotiations about South Africa’s
Constitution and the country’s future and to influence the shape of  the
institutions that would oversee the creation of  a democratic state and society.
Fifteen years later, the question of how effective these institutions had been
in promoting gender equality was debated by feminists and gender activists
alike.
The outcome of the post-apartheid settlement saw the development of a
broadly agreed-upon strategy among members of  the WNC to create a clutch
of institutional mechanisms to promote gender equality in South Africa,
exemplifying a form of  inclusionary feminism driven by, and perhaps at the
expense of, a more transformational feminist agenda (Albertyn 1995; Hassim
2005a). A progressive Constitution drew together both liberal and social
democratic rights, formal and substantive, that promised both a political and
a social transformation in the country. Through the Constitution, a range of
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bodies to promote and protect democratic rights was established (in Chapter
9 of the Constitution). The Commission on Gender Equality (CGE) was one
of  these bodies. Its specific mandate was to monitor the progress of  gender
equality and to promote and protect gender rights in the state and in society.
This was one strand of  the institutional strategy. Another was to ensure that
feminists in parliament create a mechanism to monitor legislation and to ensure
that the gender implications were well understood – thus the establishment
of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) on the Quality of Life and Status
of  Women. A third strategic site of  state institutional development was the
Office on the Status of  Women (OSW) in the administration – to be situated
preferably at the highest level of  the state, the presidency. Civil society and
the women’s movement tended to think about their relationship with these
organisations as one of accountability: these bodies were the creatures of
civic virtue and civic action and should be accountable to the women’s
movement broadly conceived. How that accountability would operate was
less clear.
Because gender norms shape sex and gender relations in society, the
struggle for full gender equality challenged identities in ways that racial equality
did not (which is not to suggest that the latter is not contested, as Goldberg’s
work shows (1993, 2001)). In South Africa, the discourse around gender in
most institutional environments located it as a ‘women’s issue’ and thus the
responsibility of women. In practice, the effect was that many non-feminists
were able to work within the gender sector without having to deal with the
more challenging aspects of  the ‘transformation’ of  gender relations and gender
norms. Gender mainstreaming became the focus of  the institutional strategy
in promoting gender equality after 1994, which in effect took the form of
demanding the presence of women in a ‘critical mass’, established inter-
nationally as 30 per cent (Baker and Van Doorne-Huiskes 1999).
The translation of gender mainstreaming into institutional practice,
however, varied in different countries that signed the UN protocols after the
Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995. In South Africa, the purpose of  the
gender machinery, particularly the OSW, was to interface with government
departments to ensure that gender mainstreaming became a key aspect of
policy. Here, the strategy focused on the development of  a national gender
policy that would ensure that women were provided equal opportunities with
men for promotion, training and participation in decision making. The JMC
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would monitor the way legislation dealt with gender equity and gender equality.
And intersecting with civil society would be an independent constitutional
body, the CGE, whose responsibility would be to promote and protect gender
equality and democracy, underscoring the dominance of  the constitutional
prescripts of  the Bill of  Rights. The growing focus on women meant that a
‘women empowerment’ model began to emerge as the central approach in
the process of promoting gender equity and gender equality in South African
state institutions.
Government for transformation
The literature on South Africa’s transition has been somewhat triumphalist
about the change from apartheid to democracy. Political democratisation and
economic restructuring and liberalisation seemed to flow easily within the
process of ‘elite pacting’ in the period of negotiations between liberation and
apartheid forces. Although the contest was not without bloodshed, a civil
war did not unfold. Feminists, however, have tended to focus on different
aspects of  the transition – particularly the way in which diverse women’s
organisations strove to develop gender as a significant variable in the con-
struction of  a woman-friendly state and post-apartheid society (Hassim 2005b;
Gouws 2005; Fick, Meintjes and Simons 2002; Murray 1994). The WNC drove
a women’s agenda that saw a remarkable increase in women’s political
representation after the first democratic election in 1994.
The change from apartheid to democracy instilled a dramatic shift in the
balance of  race and gender appointments in the transforming state. In the
new South African democracy, transforming apartheid-based institutions or
building new post-apartheid institutions meant developing them from the
artefacts of  the struggle for democracy – the vision, values, principles and
practices that drove the change in the first place (Albertyn 1994; Hassim
2005a; Meintjes 1998). For gender transformation in the state, the influence
of the WNC and its constituents, including the African National Congress
Women’s League (ANCWL), was significant.
Manicom (2005) argues that the discourse around women, gender and
citizenship in South Africa is somewhat ‘ambiguous or porous’ and
‘multivalent’. She suggests that one of  the consequences of  the constructions
given to ‘women’ as a category in the South African debates was to induce a
‘particular hegemonic representation of the relationship between the category
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in question . . . and other forms of  difference’ (Manicom 2005, 28), thus
abstracting both gender and women from lived social relations. These other
forms of  difference referred to race, ethnicity and, above all, class. Manicom’s
insight is particularly relevant to the way in which the state used the concepts
of  women and gender. However, the WNC was a coalition that placed difference
at its centre, and the descriptive category of ‘women’ was not intended to es-
sentialise women’s experience or their identities. It was the state’s appropriation
of  the women’s agenda that tended to create a discourse that reproduced
gender ‘as binary and heteronormative’ (Manicom 2005, 28). Manicom is
right that in the policy discourse and even in some academic discourse, ‘the
term “gender” often stands in for “women” as the subject of  gender politics’
(Manicom 2005, 29). She argues:
The ‘women’ of the politics of transition represented a gendered construction
that was integral to the building of an emergent discourse of socio-economic
and legal equality and rights-bearing citizenship, one that simultaneously worked
to marginalize or down-play identities based on race, class, region and nation.
That strong emphasis on ‘women’ expressed the politics of democracy and
non-racialism (as actively espoused by the African National Congress) against
other contending constructions of women-citizens in relation to ethno-
nationalist or communal identities. (Manicom 2005, 31)
Manicom might even have emphasised gender identity more strongly in her
argument. The question would then be how far the discourse of gender-as-
women shaped an agenda that limited the nature and possibilities for gender
transformation. The subsumption of  women as gender meant that other than
heteronormative relations and identities were excluded: gay, lesbian, trans-
gendered and intersexed people were theoretically and in practice out of the
loop – and, of course, so were men.
The effect of  the ‘women’s’ coalition politics of  the transition, however,
was to open spaces for women’s participation in the public sphere in the
context of a particular configuration of androcentric (male-centred), hetero-
normative, gendered power that did not lead to a more inclusive transformation
of  gender power relations in society. Gay and lesbian organisations were
certainly part of the WNC, but the particularities of their concerns were
somewhat muted. Their concerns were part of a coalition politics that organised
separately in a National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality.
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Manicom does not pursue why the ANC downplayed the politics of non-
sexism. Indeed, she glosses over the implications of  the use of  the term ‘non-
sexist’. Yet its significance was that it might have opened spaces around which
gender activism directed towards a change in gender relations could occur. In
the context of  the struggle against apartheid, however, South African gender
activists in the transition to democracy were more concerned about women’s
representation than about confronting the nature of ‘patriarchy’ and the
androcentric, male-determined social norms and values that created different
forms of  secondary status for women in society. Indeed, the focus on
representation in democratic institutions and the creation of new institutions
to protect and promote gender equality in the years immediately after the
first democratic election essentially shaped and limited the possibilities for
gender transformation for years to come. By not confronting the deeper issues
of patriarchal cultures and the idea that women are inferior to men, which is
a deeply held belief in the traditional ethnic and linguistic groups to which
many South Africans belong, women would continue to be conceived as
secondary subjects.
This shortcoming in the campaign to assure gender rights as central
priorities in South Africa’s emerging democracy became even more urgent
after the mid-2006 rape trial of Jacob Zuma, who was then deputy president
of the ANC and later elected president of the ANC in December 2007. The
Zuma rape trial brought to the surface the extraordinary depths of belief that
women are ‘at the service’ of  men, particularly in sexual terms, as Moffett
vividly depicts in Chapter 6 of this collection. If women wear revealing
clothes, they are ‘asking for’ sex, and saying ‘no’ is simply another way of
saying ‘yes’. For feminist activists, it became alarmingly clear that the previous
twelve years of  democracy had not shifted people’s beliefs about women.
Clearly a ‘new front’ needed to be opened, where the discourse about gender
equality and the objectives of activism needed to confront deeply held cultural
beliefs about ‘good’ women and ‘bad’ women (see Motsei 2007). These views
are pervasive in society, across the divides of  race, ethnicity and gender.
Growing conservativism and reaction to gender discourses and gender equality
bode ill for any social change.
Manicom emphasises that the way women were defined during the earlier
transition period, both in the WNC’s Charter for Effective Equality and by the
ANC, could be construed in two ways: first, where women were constructed
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as substantively ‘equal citizens’ to men, and second, where women were
constructed in a more limited sense, as maternal citizens, mothers of  the
nation (Manicom 2005). The latter resonates strongly with the roles that
women play in the home. In the national liberation movement and in the ANC
in particular, this idea remained dominant, although not uncontested. Hassim
(2006) has shown how women in the ANC challenged this identity from at
least the mid-1980s and strove for equality. This was clearly evident in the
leading role that the feminists in the ANCWL played in mobilising a wider
constituency of women to influence the gender content of the negotiations
for a new constitutional democracy. The strategic choices made by the broad
coalition of organisations they drew together – including the feminist policy
analysts and gender activists – during the transitional period were to have a
significant effect on the ways in which the new democratic state took up
what it called ‘gender transformation’.
Would a more concerted emphasis on non-sexism by the women’s
movement have altered the politics of  the transition in any significant way,
heralding a different kind of  struggle for substantive citizenship? The effect
of the way in which the arguments unfolded was to differentiate the ‘women-
as-women’ struggles from those of  others, such as the gay and lesbian
movement. But it also limited the debate to one that did not significantly
demand gender transformation. The opportunities for a broader, united
approach to gender transformation were effectively curtailed by the terms of
the debate. It also enabled a silence around cultural practice that subordinated
women and gay people.
The Constitution supports two rather ambiguous sets of equality rights in
the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2, section 9, subsection 3): those of gender, sex
and sexual orientation and those of  cultural practices. While these could
support women in traditional relationships to secure their rights and
entitlements, they could also define new divisions between different social
categories: unemployed ‘dependent citizens’ in contrast to an educated, skilled
and employed middle class of ‘independent citizens’. In this context, some
citizens are more equal than others.
It is important, however, that we understand that the use of  the term
‘women’ should not be read in an essentialist fashion. Nussbaum’s (2000)
philosophical approach to women’s urgent needs and interests in developing
nations provides a thought-provoking antidote to the idea that the category
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‘women’ merely universalises women’s diversity. In her view, ‘real women’s
lives . . . help us to see the salient problems and how they bear on one another’
(Nussbaum 2000, 11). Her account of the situation of women in India points
to the significance of cross-cutting factors such as caste, geographic location,
educational opportunities, child labour and general economic opportunities
in shaping the gender outcomes of  life chances. Accordingly, women in India
experience high levels of sexual assault and abuse. The poverty gap for women,
including those in the higher castes, is much greater than among men. Yet in
principle, India’s Constitution is ‘woman-friendly’ and outlaws discrimination
on the basis of sex. The Indian Constitution also abolished the category of
‘untouchable’ and the practice of child marriage (Nussbaum 2000, 24–33).
Yet neither of  these has come to an end in India. Comparatively, then, the
woman-friendly nature of  South Africa’s Constitution should not blind us to
the enormous difficulties entailed in changing society’s norms, values and
behaviours around gender relations. As this collection surveys the landscape
of  predominant spaces where gender inequalities persist despite the enormous
progress in centralising gender in constitutional protections as well as state
institutions, we see in each case a parallel to the Indian context, where such
public victories have failed to transform gender relations.
While the Constitution and the setting up of the gender machinery provided
the first building blocks for the promotion of gender equality in South Africa,
these institutions also promoted notions of substantive democracy that linked
gender rights to women’s needs and interests. Gender-mainstreaming critics
elsewhere have shown that in the shift to ‘woman-focused’ policy and practice,
the idea of  gender transformation was completely subverted (Kabeer 1994).
Any understanding of how gender power and authority operates is then
replaced by a focus on woman empowerment or on the integration of  women
in development and into decision-making positions, including as public
representatives. The relational aspect of  women’s social subordination is thus
not addressed. The focus on women then allows for the co-option of an elite
cadre of  women to the detriment of  real social transformation. Concessions
can be made to women’s needs and interests without upsetting conventional
political, social or economic power and control (Sainsbury 1996).
In the last decade or so, there has been a spate of  feminist studies that
argue for the political representation of women in the state as ‘a necessary
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first step to the institutional transformation that is required if  “substantive”
representation is to be achieved’ (Goetz and Hassim 2003, 5; see also Fick,
Meintjes and Simons 2002; Gatens and Mackinnon 1998). In this instance,
substantive representation is realised when (1) women actually effectively
represent and are accountable to women’s real interests, and (2) the system is
both gender-sensitive and accountable in order to assure that ‘sanctions against
public sector actors who have abused women’s rights’ are enforced (Goetz
and Hassim 2003, 6). Goetz and Hassim argue that women’s access to public
engagement through consultation and dialogue – and even representation –
is not enough to ensure accountability to women. They suggest that appropriate
means of holding decision makers to account need to be established. This is
more difficult to achieve. In South Africa, the practical outcome of the debate
was to establish the ‘national gender machinery’, which comprised the OSW,
the JMC and the CGE. The fourth leg of this institutional set-up was to be the
‘women’s movement’, which, in the 1990s, comprised civil society organisa-
tions including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based
organisations (CBOs). If the three state bodies could be made to promote and
even represent the needs and interests of women and hold the state to account,
then the issue of  accountability might be dealt with in a novel way. Parliament
itself would then have to account to the national gender machinery and the
women’s movement.
Bringing women into the public arena in ways that do not confront men’s
traditional political role or patriarchal systems of power (as in the Ugandan
model of local government, where special seats for women councillors are
added on) would not be satisfactory, for it merely made women representatives
‘lesser politicians’ (Goetz and Hassim 2003, 7). Indeed, globally, the main
focus of  integration of  women has been into bureaucracies – not in terms of
numbers alone, but also in the establishment of specialised bureaucratic
structures dedicated to improving gender representation in the state. This
follows the UN prescriptions about gender mainstreaming. Thus, a critical
aspect of  women’s integration relates to the terms of  their public engagement.
Affirmative action policies and specialised gender machinery were the chosen
mechanisms of  states to ensure women’s participation in policy making.
Some feminists have argued that the effect of the bureaucratic route to
integrating women’s concerns has been to depoliticise their needs and interests
(Gouws 1996, 2004). Indeed, Goetz and Hassim suggest a somewhat more
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active ‘anti-political’ effect of what they call the ‘discourse of inclusion’.
They argue that ‘the stress is on avoiding politics and competition, except
perhaps within a more narrowly defined field of contestants: women, and
particularly urban and privileged women’ (Goetz and Hassim 2003, 12).
Although the focus of their argument relates particularly to political-party
involvement, the difficulty for gender activists and feminists is to weigh up
the risks of co-option with the risks of marginalisation in the choices made
in either engaging the state through establishing gender machinery (inclusionary
feminism), or pursuing a feminist agenda in civil society through social
movement activism (transformational feminism) (Hassim 2005a; Salo 2005).
The following section explores these arguments through a narrative analysis
of the establishment of the independent constitutional body of the CGE and
the two associated sister institutions, the parliamentary JMC and the OSW in
the bureaucracy.
Gender machinery in South Africa: Institutional design
The new Interim Constitution that was agreed upon before the first democratic
elections in 1994 grew out of a dialogue, negotiations and compromises
between very diverse parties, but the main contenders were the white-
Afrikaner-dominated National Party (NP) and the broader-based, though
predominantly black African, African National Congress (ANC). The
constitution makers were mindful that apartheid had underpinned the huge
social and economic disparities between different racial groups and had
oppressed the majority of the people of South Africa. The foundation
principles of the Constitution Act of 1996 included two unusual concepts:
non-racialism and non-sexism. The Constitution was based on the idea of
promoting a national human rights culture, while also acknowledging that
the state would have to provide a bridge for the creation and protection of
new socio-economic rights for previously excluded and disadvantaged sections
of  society. The legal regime was thus one that melded a rights and welfare
approach and one that brought together two quite different philosophical
and democratic paradigms, the one liberal and the other socialist. In trying to
balance the universal rights of citizens with particular interests of specified
groups, the Constitution had to address ways of promoting equality for all
without tampering with the rights of  particular groups.
The rights recognised in the Constitution in the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2)
emerged from the acknowledgement of demands made by ‘the people’ over
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the previous thirty years and sought to promote equity, or the provision of
resources to previously disadvantaged and excluded groups, as much as to
promote democracy and political equality. Socio-economic rights com-
plemented rights to substantive equality based on race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. The Bill of Rights
also enumerated a host of material rights: to trade; to labour; to a clean
environment; to property; to housing; to health care, food, water and social
security; and to education – among other cultural and legal rights. These were
not abstract rights, but were embedded in earlier and contemporary demands
made by ordinary people in their everyday struggles against apartheid –
demands for land and housing, and for adequate education, health and welfare
provision. Behind the different substantive clauses of the new Constitution
lay assumptions about justice and equity which appear in the Preamble.
The compact between the negotiating parties included a combined process
of  institutional design and affirmative action for previously excluded citizens
in the development of racial and gender equity as the way in which South
Africa might overcome its divided past. While the new democratic state would
try to reform existing government departments and institutions to embrace
norms and values of  democratic civil service, it also set about providing new
institutions in order to protect and promote South Africa’s new democracy
and to create a new citizenship for all South Africans, especially for those
previously excluded or marginalised.
The Constitution enjoined a range of different bodies to protect democracy
in various ways. In Chapter 9 (sections 181–94) six bodies were established
to promote and protect democracy: the Public Protector; a Human Rights
Commission; the Auditor General; the Electoral Commission; the Commission
for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and
Linguistic Communities; and the CGE. In other sections of the Constitution,
other constitutional bodies that protect citizens either directly or indirectly
included the Constitutional Court (section 167, subsection 1), the High Courts
and Magistrates’ Courts, the Judicial Service Commission, the Public Service
Commission, the Finance and Fiscal Commission, the National Directorate
of Public Prosecutions (section 179, subsection 1) and an independent
complaints police body (section 206, subsection 6) that was later set up as
the Independent Complaints Directorate. Collectively, these institutions
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instilled tangible processes that connected the social democratic ideologies
of  the post-apartheid transformation with the pressing need to redress severe
inequalities.
Gender activism had determined that the new democratic state should
establish the national gender machinery, in effect a cluster or ‘package’ of
institutions designed to promote gender equality. At an international con-
ference convened by the WNC in Johannesburg in May 1993, a range of
international feminist scholars and ‘femocrats’ debated the advantages of
different models. The idea of  a package crystallised at this meeting, although
at this stage, there was no discussion of what became the constitutional CGE,
which would intercede in the relationship between civil society and the state
and monitor the progress of  gender equality. The CGE would have specific
powers allocated to it to undertake its work.
There was a strong belief that these institutions would be only as effective
as their relationship with a vibrant and organised civil society actively involved
in policy planning and implementation. Underpinning the dominant thinking
about the institutional mechanisms and their effectiveness was a particular
unspoken vision of  participatory democracy. In the new democratic order,
there was both recognition and concern that the patriarchal nature of political
parties and the liberation movements would subsume the needs and interests
of  women. At the same time, women’s independent initiatives were not
integrated into the broader political consensus developing around the
negotiations. Autonomy held its own dangers. Some of  the rationale for
women’s separate organisation was never publicly debated; it was simply part
of a pacting process within the constitution-making process and the ANC.
The legislation setting up the CGE was developed after that of the Public
Protector and the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in 1996.
The former was the direct heir of  an earlier structure set up under apartheid,
which dealt with citizen complaints about the service of  different state
departments and statutory bodies, while the latter was established in order to
protect citizens’ social and economic rights. The SAHRC was given specific
powers to conduct litigation on behalf of its ‘clients’, authority that was not
specifically provided for in the CGE Act. However, the Commission on Gender
Equality Act gave considerable powers of investigation to the CGE, and gave
the Commission all the rights that would enable it to act as a ‘juristic person’.
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The CGE was able to take up any constitutional matters that it deemed
necessary to promote and protect gender equality, which in effect gave it the
power both to litigate and conduct constitutional court cases. In terms of  the
Constitution, the CGE and other Chapter 9 bodies were independent, subject
only to the Constitution and the law. These constitutional bodies would be
impartial and perform their functions ‘without fear, favour or prejudice’. Other
institutions of  state must support and protect the independence, impartiality,
dignity and effectiveness of  these bodies. No organ of  state can interfere in
the functioning of these institutions, but they are accountable to the National
Assembly and must report on their activities once a year.
The Commission on Gender Equality Act 1996 specified that those
appointed to the Commission, no fewer than seven and no more than eleven,
should be South African citizens, ‘fit and proper persons’, with a record of
commitment to and knowledge about gender equality. A significant proviso
of the Act was that appointments had to reflect the broad race and gender
composition of South Africa. The functioning of the CGE was specified in
the Act through its mandate: to protect and promote gender equality, to conduct
research and investigate complaints and to provide public education and
information. It had to monitor South Africa’s international agreements around
gender equality. This mandate provided the basis for the organisational form
and scope of the activities of the Commission. One important clause was
that the CGE had to develop relationships and partnerships with ‘like-minded
organisations’. These were to be civil society organisations working on gender
as well as other human rights bodies, such as the SAHRC.
The second important body to be established as part of the gender
machinery was the OSW. This institution was part of  the civil service and was
set up by means of a cabinet memorandum. Its mandate was to develop
public gender policy and promote gender mainstreaming in government. The
OSW was first located in the Office of the Deputy President (Thabo Mbeki at
the time) in the Mandela government. From the outset, there was little
understanding of how complex this task would be. Each department had its
discrete role, and the principle of  non-interference by ministries in another’s
activities and functions was important for good governance. Thus the task of
the OSW to ensure that government departments at national, provincial and
local levels mainstreamed gender into their functions was fraught with
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difficulty. There was little understanding about gender budgeting outside of
feminist academe. The essentially hierarchical and functionally distinct
ministerial and sectoral system of responsibility and authority did not change
with the democratic order. So while issues of  gender cross-cut every aspect
of  policy, the implementation of  gender mainstreaming would become a real
site of  struggle. In particular, while the new state committed itself  to gender
equality and gender equity, it did not make any budgeting arrangements for
implementation. Moreover, departments had no line-function accountability
to the OSW. All appointments to government and provincial departments were
made from within, including those for the gender focal points. The latter
appointments were not bound in any way to the authority of  the OSW.
The above difficulties were compounded by an understandable sensitivity
of the OSW to the monitoring of its activities by the JMC and the CGE. It felt
that the three organisations should work in tandem to challenge the reluctance
of national government departments and provincial governments and their
line departments to do more than pay lip-service to the idea of  gender
mainstreaming. It is no surprise that gender focal-point appointments were
‘add-ons’ to the work that officials were appointed to do. After the 1999
general election, when Thabo Mbeki became president, the OSW moved into
the presidency, into a new ministry whose portfolio was to promote the interests
of special categories – women, youth and the disabled. It appeared as if the
state would take the concerns of  women seriously. However, the issue of
cross-cutting responsibilities was never satisfactorily resolved and in many
respects the OSW remained something of a lame duck.
The third institution involved in promoting gender equality was the
parliamentary JMC. This committee was at first an ad hoc committee without
a budget, but after three years was made into a fully budgeted joint standing
committee (including members of the House of Assembly and the National
Council of Provinces). Its chair, initially Pregs Govender, was always drawn
from the House of Assembly and initially drove the process of maintaining
oversight over government legislation, ensuring that each piece of legislation
was analysed for its gender implications. The chair of  the committee played a
significant role in promoting the idea of  a women’s budget, an analysis of  the
national budget that probed the gender implications and outcomes of the
process nationally. During 1998 and 1999, in fact, the minister of  finance
paid rather more than lip-service to this initiative and departments were
86 Women’s Activism in South Africa
enjoined to add gender instruments to their evaluation. But this was not
pursued after 2000, and the gains made during the first period of democracy
to promote the interests of  women were subsequently lost. The JMC’s
effectiveness weakened in subsequent years, especially after Govender resigned
from parliament after voting against the arms deal, a R50 billion plan to
purchase arms and refurbish the armed forces, rather than use these resources
to address the needs of  the poor. During the third term of  the ANC, the JMC
has hardly met, and its leadership did not challenge parliament or the cabinet
on its gender-equality strategies or outcomes on such significant issues as
HIV/AIDS.
One of the critical aspects in the establishment of the gender machinery
was the problem of duplication in the functions and activities of the three
bodies. Role clarification remained an ongoing difficulty between the three
institutions, with each jealously guarding what it conceived to be its territory.
Yet each institution at times ran parallel research and monitoring programmes.
The problem of  overlap and coordination dogged the activities of  all three
bodies since their establishment.
The CGE’s mandate was much broader than that of  the OSW: to oversee
the promotion and protection of  gender equality in state and society. Its powers
were quasi-judicial, with monitoring and investigations key components of
its mandate, combined with powers that far exceeded those of  the OSW.
Through its public education and information dissemination, the CGE should
theoretically have been able to mobilise communities around specific gender
issues such as HIV/AIDS, gender-based violence and other aspects of  people’s
lives that limited their access and thus their enjoyment of  full human rights.
In reality, this was not without its ironies. One commissioner recounted to
the new commissioners in 2001 how, in KwaZulu-Natal, women had marched
to the provincial parliament to protest that gender equality infringed their
rights to test young girls to see whether they were virgins (Meintjes, personal
papers). The CGE, on the other hand, took up the issue of virginity testing as
a violation of  human rights.
A complex range of activities was coordinated within the CGE: gender
information workshops; gender dialogues; campaigns; and the dissemination
of  information through pamphlets, posters, comics, exhibitions at conferences
and a periodical newsletter. Initially, the CGE produced a considerable amount
of  information and literature. However, the organisation became embroiled
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in internal conflicts that were compounded by weak and ineffective leadership.
Tensions between commissioners and staff  dogged its internal relations from
its inception.
The first appointments to the CGE were particularly important in framing
the organisation’s institutional values, meanings and discourses. Where were
appointees drawn from and how did they shape repertoires of action, activities
and expectations to create the identity of the CGE? How were the relationships
between commissioners and the secretariat defined and given substance?
Gender activists, who might not have professional expertise, were nominated
and appointed for five-year terms. Some were appointed to act full-time, while
others were part-time. Members of  women’s organisations, trade unions and
religious and cultural organisations, as well as academics and researchers,
were appointed. Four were academics: a male Muslim cleric, a woman priest
and two white women lawyers. A fifth was a woman Indian lawyer and the
five others were black women, two of whom were strong feminist activists
with a history in the struggle, one a teacher and trade unionist, one a recently
disabled nurse and the other a former nurse and student of  law. (Although a
white man was also appointed, he never served a term.) The final appointment
was of the chairperson, a staunch member of the South African Communist
Party (SACP) and the ANC. Of the appointees, most understood gender as
‘women’s issues’, while the feminists saw a more complex set of  issues at
stake. These ideological differences were never resolved.
The first few years of  the CGE’s existence were critical in shaping its
institutional culture. The influence of  the first chairperson, Thenjiwe Mtintso,
and the first chief executive officer, Colleen Lowe Morna, was significant.
Mtintso’s strategy was to consult as widely as possible to develop a collective
identity within the organisation. Mtintso’s life experience shaped her approach.
She came from a poor background, where an early awareness of the effects
of  class as much as race shaped her guiding ideas. She had joined the Black
Consciousness Movement and was severely tortured in the 1970s. She went
into exile, became an Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) commander and later
represented the ANC in Uganda. On her return from exile in the early 1990s,
she completed a degree in sociology and political studies as a mature student,
and undertook a master’s in public administration and development. She had
played an important role in the SACP in promoting gender equity and during
the transition was part of  the party’s delegation to the WNC’s inaugural
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conference in April 1992. She then became a member of parliament in 1994
(Reid and Walker 2003, 15–21).
Mtintso was a highly principled and independent-minded democrat, fearless
in voicing her opinion but open to debate and discussion. She was also a loyal
member of the SACP and the ANC. Independence and loyalty were, however,
sometimes at odds with one another. She had undoubted leadership qualities.
She was a popular choice as the first CGE chairperson in 1996. Her
appointment was for a five-year term, but she served for only one year. At
the end of  1997, at the ANC’s congress, she agreed to stand for, and was
elected to, the post of  deputy secretary-general of  the ANC at the behest of
the SACP.
Mtintso’s move to the ANC head office pointed to two significant issues
for the future of the CGE. The first was the importance of independent,
authoritative and appropriate leadership for the success of an independent
constitutional body. The second was the extent to which the governing party
influenced appointments to these independent bodies. Mtintso’s election to a
political post was indicative of the manner in which party political loyalty
and commitment could override the needs and interests of society more
generally and this new constitutional body in particular. Indeed, the ANC
treated the CGE as ‘a bit on the side’.1 Overall, it was a disappointing start to
the life of what was a unique experiment in the institutional design of gender
machineries worldwide.
In the process of setting up the CGE, the Commonwealth Secretariat
provided advice on institutional development and institution building. The
consultant was Colleen Lowe Morna, an experienced Zimbabwean gender
activist and journalist, and in 1992, the chief programme officer for the
Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa. From 1994 to 1997, Lowe
Morna was employed by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation.2
When the post for a CEO was advertised, Lowe Morna applied and became
the first CEO in August 1997. The post continued to be subsidised by the
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation until March 1998. Lowe
Morna’s move into the new post seemed a seamless one. However, subsequent
events were to raise questions about the transfer of consultants into
bureaucratic posts.
Lowe Morna drew up the original concept document for the CGE after a
study tour of Australia and Uganda. She consulted with experts on different
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mechanisms to promote women’s human rights in other parts of  the world
and in South Africa. Among those who influenced the process were advocate
Mojanku Gumbi (an adviser to Deputy President Mbeki), Geraldine Fraser
Moleketi (minister of welfare) and Dr Cathi Albertyn (a driving force in the
WNC, who had written about possible models to promote gender equality in
South Africa).3 Lowe Morna was a dynamic and tireless innovator, with an
energy that often left others, particularly commissioners, behind. She had a
very good relationship with the chairperson, but was sometimes at odds with
others in the CGE. This was to become a source of tension after Mtintso left
the CGE.
In the ensuing four years, the CGE tore itself apart in conflict between
different factions. In an attempt to sack Lowe Morna, the CGE dragged itself
into a long and expensive court case. When the second round of commissioners
was appointed in April 2001, they found a dysfunctional organisation: the
court case was not settled, despite the CGE losing an appeal; morale was very
low after more than 27 staff members had resigned; and yet another consultant
had been appointed as CEO, a clear case of  not learning from past mistakes.
The new commissioners were inducted only at the end of  May, a gap of
months in which little work was undertaken. Mutual suspicion between the
new commissioners and those reappointed by parliament did not help matters.
It would take several years for the CGE to recover its balance and even longer,
if  at all, for it to regain the confidence of  civil society stakeholders. The
second round of the CGE reflected a similar make-up to the first. Of the
twelve commissioners, seven were academics and educationists (a musicologist,
two sociologists, a political scientist (myself), a religious scholar who was
also a priest, a lawyer and a gender researcher) and two had been administrators
(one in government and another from the trade unions). Two others were
reappointed from the previous CGE, both of whom had been nurses, but
were pursuing further studies in law and sociology. Almost all had been active
in earlier women’s struggles at different times and in different ways. Although
politics was never formally discussed, several held official positions in political
parties. The second CGE would be no less fractious and influenced by politics
than the first.
The most serious differences in the CGE related to the strategic direction
of the organisation. In particular, the balance between the practical needs of
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people living in poverty and advocacy on their behalf (which some com-
missioners pursued) and more strategic, politically focused issues that would
challenge cultural and gender power more broadly continued to divide the
institution. This had significant implications and consequences for gender
transformation. Commissioners could not agree on priorities. Some simply
continued to act as NGO advocates, an approach that tended to confirm in
the minds of  civil society that the CGE was in fact no different from an NGO.
Others concentrated on constitutional challenges that would redefine gender
relations. But the issues of  gender power relations in the broader context of
South Africa’s transition culture were not strategically addressed.
In its organisational development, the CGE never properly confronted the
dilemmas posed by the difference in strategy required to pursue gender equality
as opposed to meeting the particular practical needs of  poor rural women. To
some extent, this failure reflected the unwillingness of the CGE to confront
state policy, where real transformational gender interests were at stake. But
its unwillingness to confront the state was compounded by the way in which
it conducted its work. Both the lack of  a coherent and long-term national
plan and the internal institutional framework that allowed for disparate
activities by commissioners blocked any potential for effective strategic
intervention. Yet despite the limitations in the understanding of  gender
equality adopted by the CGE and the institutional blockages, it did support a
number of significant challenges to gender discrimination in the course of
the work it undertook in the first seven years of its existence.
The tensions in the CGE prevented it from gaining the confidence of civil
society organisations or interacting boldly with the other two national gender
machinery institutions. Despite undertaking important research into a range
of critical issues such as sex work, gender-based violence, traditional
leadership, the budget, unemployment insurance and social security, with many
submissions to the relevant parliamentary portfolio committees, the CGE made
little real public impact after an initial burst of enthusiastic consultation with
government departments and NGOs.
Seidman (2003) sees the limitations of the impact of the CGE in its inability
to fully decide on what its role should be: a policy-making body or an
organisation tasked with building the women’s movement. Feminist analysis
elsewhere in the world had pointed to the dilemmas faced by gender activists
in promoting engagement with the state. It very often meant a growing distance
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between an elite of ‘bureaucratic’ feminists with professional and legal
expertise and grassroots activists who dealt with the real problems faced on a
day-to-day basis by women in society. Such divisions within the CGE created
new intersections of social power and difference among women who shared
a certain level of  access to the state and political change processes. As we see
throughout the cases in this book and in the broader feminist analyses of
intersections of social power, recognising difference among women is critical,
particularly in the South African context. At the same time, however, such
differences challenged the possibility of establishing a coherent agenda of
action within the CGE. This might be said of all three organisations that drove
the gender agenda in the state in South Africa.
All three organisations faced tensions between the ideology of  promoting
gender equality and their existence as bodies within the hierarchy of the state.
All three organisations also tried to overcome some of the divisions by working
together on strategic priorities. In 2001 a ‘Gender Summit’ was held with
civil society organisations at which agreements were made that they would
work together with civil society to confront the limits to change. Poverty,
gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS were identified as the three most
challenging issues to a sustainable democracy in South Africa. Critics had
also pointed to the need to develop stronger relations with trade unions and
critically engage the state over its policies of combating poverty and HIV/
AIDS. These would be the priorities towards which all would work in as
coherent a way as possible. The OSW agreed to convene quarterly national
gender machinery meetings to discuss strategies and progress, hoping that
this would lead to greater coordination. But the processes of decision making,
along with the strategies, goals and organisational culture that developed,
grew in the context of  continuing significant differences and tensions.
Educational and racial differences alongside deep ideological divisions also
played a divisive role. To hold these differences together required insight,
legitimacy and leadership skill – and the capacity to rise above the differences
to keep the wider objectives of the agreements in sight.
Conclusions
While the Constitution provided a new set of  rules to regulate and reconstitute
the political, social and normative rights framework for South Africa, including
those of gender relations, the lived reality of South African society existed in
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sometimes sharp and ironic contrast to the substantive equality of the Bill of
Rights and the foundation values and principles of non-sexism and non-racism.
Both of  these principles reflected an acknowledgement of  the struggles for
freedom from racist and sexist oppression. Yet in the years to come, the gender
struggle would prove to be the more contested. Formed in the cusp between
state and society, the gender machinery was to mediate and implement the
objectives of the Constitution itself. In the first years, this process occurred
in the context of contested understandings of gender and with very limited
resources.
The importance of the combination of leadership and organisational
structure and development in the success of  any organisation cannot be
underestimated. In the case of  the gender machinery, the issue of  feminism,
too, cannot be ignored. The agenda of  transformation was lost in the process
of  the institutional integration of  women’s issues into the policy process. In
part, this was because ‘femocratisation’ embraced a woman-oriented approach,
as distinct from a gender approach. This tended to subvert the transformation
agenda (Hassim 2005b). Does this mean that institutionalisation merely
bolsters the existing androcentric norms and values of  society?
Feminist activists and scholars have debated the importance of  the
diversity of  position, identity, heterogeneity – in effect the sheer complexity
– of  state–society constructions of  gendered subjects. They have sought to
understand the link between different kinds of politics and the subordination
of women in South Africa. The important point is that a focus on ‘women
empowerment’ does not necessarily address the issue of  men’s power in a
hierarchical society; the objectives are to provide women with the requisite
tools to elbow their way into male-dominated contexts with appropriate skills
and confidence. The CGE did not adequately engage with these ideas in
establishing its modus operandi. However, the very idea of gender equality
constituted a challenge to conventional gender power relations in South Africa.
The CGE faced these dilemmas from the beginning with an agenda that seemed
to speak to transformation. Yet at the same time, it lacked the political
understanding, and perhaps even the political will, to go beyond consciousness-
raising through its education and information activities and women-
empowerment training.
One could argue that a feminist agenda was never able to take root in the
organisation from the beginning. The CGE was so concerned to get the
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structures and structural relationships – its roles and functions – right that it
failed to get the ideology and politics right. The struggle for gender equality
is not just about empowering women but also about changing gender power
relations in society; it is about providing space for women, but it is also about
changing ideas about who should make decisions and the roles traditionally
assigned to women and men. It is here that the opportunity for a new form of
pragmatic feminism, as defined in the introduction to this collection, is salient.
By grafting Hassim’s (2005a) transformational feminism onto inclusionary
feminism, we see pragmatic feminism emerging in ways that embrace both
agendas. Institutional culture and discourse is as important as the structural
aspects of institutional development. Had the CGE taken more time to identify
what gender transformation really meant and then developed a long-term
plan of action to promote it, it may have avoided some of the debilitating
conflict that ensued. This failure opened the CGE to interference and criticism
from outside – especially from the dominant ANCWL, who saw many of its
members in the CGE as accountable to the party rather than to a constituency
of women. This need not necessarily have been detrimental had it been part
of  a broader strategy for gender transformation, rather than a narrower route
for political reward and mobility for individuals into a political career.
We end, perhaps, where we started: to suggest that while the CGE was an
original concept, its capacity to influence the course of change was severely
limited by its inability to grasp the nature and needs of  gender transformation.
Meeting the needs of  poor women will not achieve the desired results. A
much broader and deeper understanding of  gender constructions and gender
power relations is required if  the CGE is to promote gender equality.
Notes
This chapter is a revised version of an earlier article published as ‘Gender Equality by Design: The
Case of  South Africa’s Commission on Gender Equality’ in Politikon 32 (3) (2005).
The author lectures in political studies at the University of the Witwatersrand. Both an
activist and an academic, she was involved in opposing apartheid and, in the 1970s and 1980s,
participated in internal women’s organisations linked to the liberation struggle in the Western
Cape, Natal and the Transvaal. In the 1990s, she was a member of  the Women’s National
Coalition and was a member of  the research supervisory group that oversaw the development of
the Women’s Charter for Effective Equality. She was a member of  the Charter drafting committee.
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In May 2001 she was appointed to the Commission on Gender Equality as a full-time
commissioner for five years. She agreed to serve for a three-year term and resigned in March 2004.
This chapter draws on both her activist and her academic experience.
1. This phrase is the title of an article written by a group of feminist scholars during the apartheid
era: Hassim, Metelerkamp and Todes (1985).
2. Colleen Lowe Morna. Interviewed by the author, Johannesburg, 12 May 2004.
3. Colleen Lowe Morna. Interviewed by the author, Johannesburg, 12 May 2004.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Women’s Sport as a Site for Challenging
Racial and Gender Inequalities in
Post-apartheid South Africa
CYNTHIA FABRIZIO PELAK
THE NON-RACIAL SPORTS movement in South Africa that emerged in the late
1950s and expanded through the 1980s played a critical role in the anti-
apartheid struggle. Some argue that ‘the movement was, perhaps, the most
successful at bringing international action against apartheid structures in South
African society’ (Nauright 1997, 156). Those calling for an international sports
boycott against South Africa appreciated the symbolic significance of
challenging exclusionary practices within sports. They knew that despite sport’s
reputation for being ‘outside of politics’, institutionalised sports contribute
symbolically and materially to the reproduction of dominant racial ideologies
and inequalities. The anti-apartheid sports movement and changes in the
sporting realm since 1994 serve as powerful examples of  how sports can be a
site both for reproducing and challenging dominant ideologies and practices.
Scholarship on race, sport, and nation building within South Africa is
growing (Booth 1998; Nauright 1997; Alegi 2004). This body of research,
however, focuses almost exclusively on the world of elite male sports and on
highly visible leaders of the non-racial sports movement. Experiences of
athletes and coaches as change makers at the grassroots level within sports
dominated and controlled by women are given very little attention. In this
chapter, I broaden the existing literature by focusing on how women athletes
and sport administrators are using sports, particularly netball and soccer, to
challenge and transform dominant race and gender relations in post-apartheid
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South Africa. Moreover, through this analysis, I hope to suggest that historically
grounded research on gender/race/class hierarchies within sports can be useful
for theorising more broadly issues of gender relations and democratisation,
such as gender-based violence and women’s bodily autonomy, in South Africa.
The centrality of bodies in sports and the use of sport to naturalise gender
differences make the sporting realm a particularly useful context for grappling
with patriarchal imperatives in South Africa and the limits of  women’s political
equality.
The two sports examined here – netball1 and soccer – were chosen because
of their popularity and specific historical configuration along race and gender
divisions in South Africa. Netball, a sport closely related to basketball, was
historically constructed as a women-only sport and controlled by white
Afrikaans-speaking women in South Africa. Soccer, on the other hand, was
historically constructed as a men-only sport and dominated by black2 men.
Within each of these sports, I aim to demonstrate how women (and some
men) have actively and collectively challenged the historical legacies of
colonial, apartheid and patriarchal relations. The differing race and gender
histories of netball and soccer offer appealing contrasts for understanding
intersecting power relations and democratising practices in post-apartheid
South Africa. Before presenting the case studies, I briefly review relevant
theoretical insights and the methodological tools that shape this analysis.
Theoretical considerations
By conceptualising South African women athletes and administrators as political
actors and examining the process of collective change within two popular
sports, this study expands conventional notions of the political and sheds
light on important contributions to struggles of  democratisation of  South
African society that largely go unnamed and unrecognised. Principally, this
analysis grapples with the question of how the dismantling of apartheid created
space for women athletes, especially black women athletes, to challenge
racialised and gendered structures in male-dominated and white-controlled
sports. I rely on theoretical insights from the sociology of  sports and social
movements literatures to develop an analytical framework to elucidate how
sports can be an effective site for social change. I also draw on theoretical
insights from studies of intersecting race/class/gender relations to understand
how multiple and cross-cutting hierarchies shape South African women’s
experiences in sports (Collins 2000).
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Scholars adopting a critical approach to theorising sports view sports as
social practice embedded within specific historical and cultural contexts,
structured by material power relations and legitimated by dominant ideology
(Carrington and McDonald 2001; Gruneau 1983/1999; Hargreaves 1994).
Consistent with this view, sports are understood as human social inventions
rather than predetermined sets of  structures and practices. I adopt these con-
ceptualisations along with Gruneau’s (1983/1999) assertion that ‘[d]epending
upon their association with divergent material interests, the meanings of
sports, like all cultural creations, have the capacity to be either reproductive
or oppositional, repressive or liberating’ (17).
In South Africa, modern sport, which emerged in connection to European
colonialism, has played an important role in supporting the status quo of
white, affluent, male colonial rule. Although South Africa is popularly
considered a ‘sports-crazed’ society, mass participation in sports is limited
and contested. During colonialism and apartheid, sporting facilities and
resources were distributed according to a rigid racial hierarchy (Archer and
Bouillon 1982; Booth 1998; Nauright 1997). These racialised disparities were
also simultaneously influenced by gender and class status, as well as by whether
someone lived in an urban or rural setting (Hargreaves 2000; Jones 2001;
Roberts 1992). Rugby, for example, has been closely linked with the con-
struction of  white masculine power and Afrikaner nationalism (Grundlingh
1995). Soccer, on the other hand, has served as the ideological cornerstone
for constructing black masculinity and asserting black men’s power and
leadership within black communities and families (Alegi 2004). Through the
historical exclusion of  women, rugby and soccer have been marked as men’s/
boys’ territory and have been sites of ‘rigid expressions of chauvinist
masculinity’ (Hargreaves 2000, 30). The historical construction of  netball,
on the other hand, has been based on middle-class notions of femininity
espoused by white Afrikaans-speaking women in South Africa. The racial
and gender specificity of  netball suggests that the sport contributed to the
colonial and apartheid projects of the imagined communities of white South
Africans (Pelak 2005a). Like rugby and soccer, it is netball’s embeddedness
in dominant social hierarchies of gender, race and colonial orders that creates
distinct limitations and possibilities for change in South Africa.
Scholars of sports have documented how the institution is highly gendered,
such that gender differences shape and constrain who participates in sports,
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the organisation and structures of  sporting activities and the social and cultural
meanings attached to sports. Scholars generally agree that dominant structures
and practices within sports reflect and facilitate boys’ and men’s social, political
and economic advantage over women (Messner and Sabo 1990). The rigid
distinctions between so-called male sports and female sports illustrate the
process by which sports highlight and construct gender differences and justify
gender hierarchies. Scholars argue that masculine flagship sports sustain
hegemonic models of  masculinity through rituals of  conformity, social
isolation from women and deference to male authority (Sabo and Panepinto
1990); naturalise men’s privileged status by linking maleness with highly valued
and visible skills; and positively sanction the use of  aggression/force/violence
(Bryson 1990). Writing from within South Africa, Roberts (1992) argues that
the gendered division of household labour, which burdens women and
privileges men, is a critical factor in limiting South African women’s access to
sports.
Women share a long history of  challenging gender boundaries within sports
(Birrell and Cole 1994; Lenskyj 1986). One way that women have gained
access into the male-dominated realm of  competitive sports is to construct
sporting practices that emphasise their femininity. Netball is the quintessential
feminine sport that opened up sporting activities to large numbers of South
African women. Theoretically, netball, a non-contact, women-only sport, does
not radically challenge gender-appropriate behaviours or dominant construc-
tions of  gender, because it is constructed as naturally suited for women. Even
the standard uniform of  a blouse and skirt emphasises its feminine gender
construction. Netball is thus constructed as a ‘women’s sport’ in opposition
to ‘real’ sports that men play. Nonetheless, women-dominated sports do afford
women the often rare opportunity to control top decision-making positions
within sports.
Another way to challenge masculine dominance in sports is for women to
take up male-typed sports, such as soccer. The masculine construction of
soccer means that women who take up the sport wage a formidable challenge
to dominant gender constructions and exclusionary gendered practices (Pelak
2005b). The resistance and backlash women experience when they seek to
participate in a so-called male sport can be read as evidence of the challenge
to the dominant gender order. This challenge is limited, however, in the area
of  organisational control because women are constructed as outsiders within
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a sport such as soccer and typically are not considered as ‘real’ soccer players/
administrators.
Employing a fluid conception of  social movements, Staggenborg (1998,
182) uses the notion of social movement communities ‘to encompass all
actors who share and advance the goals of a social movement, regardless of
the site and form of  their resistance’. It is through the conception of  multiple
and fluid forms of  social movements that I come to think of  female netball
and soccer participants as part of the broader non-racist and non-sexist sports
movement community in South Africa. Although netball and soccer players
do not represent a formal social movement, nor do the players necessarily
identify as political activists, they do intentionally mobilise to challenge the
existing order in a symbolically important institution in civil society.
To demonstrate how netball and women’s soccer participants can be agents
of change, I utilise the insight of social movement scholars that posits two
major prerequisites for the development of collective action: a degree of
openness in the political order and a shared understanding of an injustice
among a group of  individuals. Political opportunity theory holds that collective
mobilisation emerges and succeeds in contexts in which divisions among
political elites and institutions are heightened and counter-mobilisation tactics
by elites are weakened (Jenkins 1985; McAdam 1983). Collective identity theory,
in contrast, suggests that individuals come together and translate their
experiences of  social injustices into social protest only when they construct,
negotiate and maintain a collective identity of common interests, experiences
and consciousness through ongoing interactions linking people (Taylor and
Whittier 1992; Melucci 1996).
Data and methodological approach
The data for this analysis were collected during two three-month stays in
South Africa during 1999 and 2000 and a one-month stay during 2003.3 The
data include interviews, surveys, documentary evidence and direct field
observations. For the analysis of  netball, I conducted semi-structured inter-
views with fourteen elite netball athletes and eight top-level administrators.
The interviews with athletes were conducted at the 2000 national netball
championships using a randomly drawn sample from players of the top ten
most competitive teams.4 The sample of  interviews with the administrators
was purposively drawn based on their position in the governance of netball.
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Three administrators were board members of Netball South Africa (NSA),
the governing body of netball; one was a provincial netball administrator;
one was a national administrator for netball at the school level; and three
were from the South African Sports Commission, the national umbrella
organisation for sports.5 The analysis of  netball was also informed by completed
surveys from 251 participants at the 2000 national netball championships.6
Beyond the interviews and surveys, I use documentary evidence including
newspaper articles, policy statements and tournament programmes to illumin-
ate the struggles within netball.
For my analysis of  women’s soccer, I conducted semi-structured interviews
with seven players and eleven administrators. The sample of  interviewees
was purposively drawn by first identifying the most central actors involved in
women’s soccer nationally and in the Western Province and then continuing
to interview individuals as time and opportunity allowed. The content of  an
interview was determined by the institutional location and unique experiences
of  the respondent. Four of  the seven soccer players interviewed had competed
on the national soccer team, and the remaining three athletes competed at
the regional level for varying lengths of  time. Four of  the administrators were
from the Western Province South African Football Association, and seven
worked at the national level with the South African Football Association
(SAFA).7 The analysis of  soccer also relies on completed surveys from 84
athletes participating in the 2000 Western Province Women’s Football League
and direct observations of  league matches during 2000.8 My attendance at
the games allowed me to observe interactions between players, coaches,
administrators, umpires and fans; to build rapport with those whom I wanted
to interview and survey; and to engage in casual conversations with people
who made up the women’s soccer community.9 Throughout my analysis, I use
pseudonyms to identify the respondents in order to ensure their anonymity.
Finally, like the netball case, these findings also draw from documentary
evidence such as newspapers, policy documents and tournament programmes
to further my understanding of the context.
Overall, I ground these observations within an interpretive, anti-racist–
feminist epistemological and methodological framework (Andersen 1994;
Fonow and Cook 1991; Harding 1991). Drawing on feminist critiques of
androcentric social science, I recognise the interplay between researcher and
participants in producing knowledge. Although I lived and worked in sub-
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Saharan Africa for several years in the past and conducted substantial fieldwork
for this research, my identity as a white American academic limits and shapes
my perspective. Rather than supplying definitive answers to my questions
regarding the experiences of South African athletes, this analysis is one attempt,
however limited and partial, to grapple with understanding those experiences.
The case of netball
Netball has its roots in basketball, which emerged during the late nineteenth
century in the United States. The sport was developed in Britain by female
physical educators and then spread globally when British colonialists imported
their sporting practices as a means of establishing British culture in the colonies
(Archer and Bouillon 1982). In South Africa, netball first emerged in English-
speaking white schools in the late 1950s, but quickly became popular at
Afrikaans-speaking white schools. By the 1960s, as one administrator
remarked, ‘Afrikaner women owned netball in South Africa’. It appears that
netball offered Afrikaner women an acceptable ‘ladylike’ sport that con-
tributed to the larger project of white nationalism while not challenging
dominant norms of  femininity and womanhood espoused within Afrikaner
communities (Pelak 2005a).
The international sports boycott directly affected netball between 1970
and 1994. No international netball teams travelled to or from South Africa
throughout this period. During the 1970s, in the context of mounting
international pressure, the apartheid government instituted a number of so-
called multinational sport reforms that encouraged the development of
separate race-based sport federations, but left in place the broader structure
of  white dominance (Booth 1998). In response to these reforms, white netball
administrators started training camps in black townships and lobbied black
schools to offer netball for girls. According to a white netball administrator,
the mission of the training camps was to ‘spread the gospel of netball’. By
the 1980s, although the sport was still dominated by white women, netball
became the most popular sport among women of all racial and class
backgrounds from rural and urban communities (SISA 1997). Netball, in fact,
was the only sport regularly offered at schools regardless of their racial
designation within the apartheid system.
With the dismantling of apartheid in the late 1980s, a period of intense
racial conflict emerged within netball that ultimately led to substantial
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transformation of  the sport. As the political context shifted, formal talks to
unify the four racially segregated netball associations began. The talks were
extremely contentious and saturated with historical distrust and suspicion. It
was not until 1994 that a racially inclusive national governing body was formed.
The formation of  the NSA marked a major change in the political opportunity
structure within netball, and many seized the moment to articulate their
grievances.
Challenging apartheid structures and practices
The vast political changes that followed the 1994 democratic election in South
Africa sparked a series of challenges by black women in netball. Given their
strong collective identity, black netballers were able to translate their
grievances into collective action. At the first national netball competition
after racial unification in 1994, black players protested at what they perceived
as racial discrimination in the selection of national players (Motsei 1994). In
1995, dissent re-emerged around an all-white team travelling to the All Africa
Games.10 Amidst this conflict, the NSA president was pressured to resign, and
shortly thereafter the executive committee was reconfigured. In 1996, black
women again organised protests at the national championships and stopped
the competition from proceeding. The protestors argued that racial trans-
formation in netball was taking too long and that white leaders were not
working hard enough to integrate black women into netball at all levels. The
conflict became so intense that officials from the Ministry of Sport and the
National Sports Council stepped in to arbitrate. Another shake-up happened
at the 1999 national championships and the executive committee was again
replaced. This time, an African woman was appointed president and a diverse
executive committee was installed.
In response to black women’s collective protests during the mid-1990s,
netball leaders instituted a number of  affirmative action policies to increase
black women’s participation and influence. The most controversial policy
was that of racial quotas for provincial teams competing at national
tournaments. As a starting point, in 1995, racial quotas were enforced at
competitions of the under-19 age division. By 2000, quotas were enforced at
the highest level of competition – the national championship tournament.
Provincial teams lost points in the tournament if they did not have at least 40
per cent representation of  blacks or whites on their player rosters. In addition,
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the rules required that there be at least two players of  the under-represented
race playing on the court at all times. Tensions surrounding this policy at the
championship tournament were palpable. As one would expect, the policy
found more support among those identifying as black and/or African than
among those identifying as white and/or Afrikaans.11 The rewarding of  racial
integration and the penalising of  racial segregation in determining points at
an elite sports competition was a strong statement about the value of diversity
within netball and a bold move that was unprecedented in South Africa.
Paradoxically, however, the use of  binary racial categories in the quota
policy reinforced the rigid racial boundaries that the policy aimed to dismantle.
While the policy challenged racial inequalities, the designation of players as
‘black’ or ‘white’ simultaneously underscored racial divisions and contradicted
the multiple racial/ethnic/cultural categories and fluid and situational nature
of identities in South Africa (Jung 2000). Although netball administrators
maintain that the term ‘black’ was inclusive of  all ‘non-white’ South Africans,
the meaning of  the term varied widely among athletes, who come from all
across South Africa, where regional differences are stark. Because of the
controversy around the racial quota policy at the 2000 championships, the
policy was modified for the 2001 championships. In place of  racial quotas for
teams and penalties for not meeting the quotas, racial targets were im-
plemented to encourage, but not force, racial integration.
Many of  the interviewed players talked about the loosening up of  rigid
racial divisions within netball. Assertions expressing the need for tolerance
and acceptance of differences were common. Lynne, a 23-year-old Afrikaans-
speaking woman, explains how netball itself  serves as a site for bringing women
together:
If you put yourself in the team, then you must be there and you must accept
the other players. It is not that you are white or black; you can’t think that she
is white and she is not. People are different in culture or colour, or whatever.
But all of  us are people; all of  us are in the world and living together. Maybe
tonight we sit down and have a talk. The white and the black differ very
much. Because [of] our religion, we do this and this. In our culture, we believe
in this and this. And then, you see the differences but you can do nothing
about it. You must be accepting of  one another and play the game.
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Integrating geographically based netball teams has proven extremely difficult
in the context of  rigid spatial divisions. Although racial residential segregation
decreased slightly in the 1990s, South Africa is still one of the most spatially
segregated nations in the world (Christopher 2001). Movement across
communities in the ‘new South Africa’ is constrained by structural inequalities,
high costs of  transportation and perceptions of  crime and safety. In general,
white women’s fear of  crime constrains their visiting historically black
townships to play netball, and black women’s lack of  financial resources limits
their travelling to historically white-dominated central cities, where most of
the sporting facilities are found. Moreover, the rise in the level of gender-
based violence in South Africa since 1994 surely constrains all women’s and
girls’ movement through public space (Moffett 2002). Divergent experiences
of travelling to team practices and matches build resentments and work against
constructing a unified ‘we’ within diverse teams. While the racial quota policy
demands integration, spatial segregation, whites’ fear of black neighbourhoods
and contrasting material realities among South Africans hinder the integration
of  teams. This contradiction presents a parallel to other cases where prevailing
structural social inequality presents the sharpest barriers to the actualisation
of  democracy.
Limitations of a fragmented collective identity
It is no secret to even the most casual observer that women’s sports take a
back seat to men’s sports in South Africa. Given the rigid gender segregation
within sports and the visibility of  men’s opportunities and rewards, women
athletes commonly develop a keen awareness of  structural gender inequalities
within sports. Through accumulated experiences of  the trivialisation of  their
athleticism and the lack of material support compared to men athletes of
their own racial/ethnic and class backgrounds, women netball athletes have
developed a collective consciousness about structural gender inequalities.
However, not all South African women have understood and experienced
gender inequalities within sports in the same way (Hargreaves 1997, 2000;
Jones 2001; Roberts 1992).
The varying levels of race and class privilege among netballers mediate
their experiences of gender inequalities and thus influence the development
of  a shared consciousness of  intersecting systems of  inequality. While most
netballers invoked a structural framework to explain gender imbalances, when
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it came to understanding race and class inequalities many athletes relied on
individually based frameworks. In the following quote, Sheila, a 22-year-old
who identified as white, talks about how an individual’s desire and ‘heart’
can overcome her financial difficulties:
It is difficult for some of them [blacks] and it is difficult for some of us
[whites]. That is the people that I see. I want the best coaching, but to get the
best coaching I must drive 50 kilometres to the court and 50 kilometres
home. You understand. But it is my choice because I want to have the best
coaching because I want to have my colours, my national colours [to get on
the national team]. But, OK, they have transport problems sometimes, I can
understand that. But if  you really, really want to do something, put your heart
to it, there must be a way. Sometimes I feel that they [blacks] just take it for
granted.
Although Sheila recognises transportation difficulties facing some players,
she believes it is ultimately the individual’s choice and effort that secure access
to quality coaching. Contrasting explanations for why black women frequently
drop out of teams are another illustration of the fragmented group conscious-
ness of  race/class disadvantages among netball participants. I asked Danielle,
who identified as white and Afrikaans, why she thought black women drop
out of netball. She responded:
Well, it depends. Um, I don’t know. It all depends on let’s say if  they can’t
keep up with the training, or can’t keep up with the techniques, that can be a
problem. I don’t think money is a problem. That I don’t think. So it all
depends on what they can do, or want to do. If  the want is there, I think
they’ll probably stay there.
When I asked Nomsa, who identified as black, the same question, she said:
They normally drop out because of  financial problems. And it’s heartbreaking
really, heartbreaking . . . This thing of  black women not wanting to play
netball, it’s not like that. I’m 36 years old and I’m still playing today. So, these
women are not playing because it’s costly.
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The assessment offered by Danielle is based on a framework of individual
skills and desires, while Nomsa interprets the problem as one of financial
hardship. Without suggesting that racial/ethnic identity directly determines
race/class consciousness, the observed differences in the interpretive frame-
works employed by athletes suggest a fragmented group consciousness of
intersecting inequalities. Collective identity theory suggests that the lack of  a
shared consciousness among netballers constrains the emergence of collective
action against race/gender/class inequalities facing netballers.
Transforming the image of netball
Despite the limitations of a fragmented collective identity among netballers,
by the end of the 1990s, netball was in a new place. The following quote
from a high-level administrator at the South African Sports Commission
describes the unique struggle within netball:
I think netball is much more advanced than, say, cricket in dealing with [racial]
transformation issues. They have been through the painful process longer.
Netball is still going to have problems, but its problems will not be
transformation-related. I think it is because they have not taken short cuts.
They have seen through all the pitfalls that were there. You can see the pitfalls
with rugby, with cricket and hockey; you can name most of  the sports. You
can sort it by the grumbles. It is still there, the stomach is still grumbling, you
know. Now and again, you will get the outbursts [within netball], but look at
the national team. The top seven netball players, four or three of them are
black . . . They have become more sensitive and more innovative in dealing
with [racial] transformation than other sports.
Many have left netball to avoid the pain of change, but those who have
remained or have recently joined are dealing with the ‘grumbling in their
stomachs’, those gut-wrenching feelings that accompany challenges to beliefs
and practices that have been reproduced for centuries. The sports administrator’s
comment about the inclusion of black players on the national team is a
common litmus test used by South Africans to measure racial transformation.
Based on this criterion, netball has made measurable gains towards racial
transformation.
Like the racial diversity of the national team, the appointment of the first
African president of  the NSA serves as a salient symbol of  racial trans-
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formation within netball. The following quote from a black woman adminis-
trator conveys the symbolic importance of  the new president for transforming
the image of  netball from a conservative ‘white sport’ of  the past to a racially
inclusive sport of the future:
Netball was just not well accepted by most South Africans . . . whatever
people would say about netball it was very negative. We had to change. I
think the image of netball is no longer one of being white. People can start
seeing more racial integration because it’s now headed by a black woman. It
is the first time in the country that netball has a black woman as president.
And I think that has brought a lot of  acceptance of  netball. Even if  we’re not
yet there, I think the process is there. We are moving.
Despite the unfinished transformation of  netball, many within netball argue
that the process and mechanisms of change are present. Indeed, women
netballers are renegotiating historical practices and structures of  power and
engaging in the construction of  a new collective identity. As Mohanty (1991,
58) argues, a shared collective identity among women of diverse racial and
class backgrounds can only be forged through concrete historical practices,
such as those on the netball court.
The case of soccer
Although men have historically dominated as both participants and adminis-
trators of soccer in South Africa (Couzens 1983; Thabe 1983), women have
at least a 30-year history of  participating in organised soccer. Oral histories
offered by members of  the women’s soccer community suggest that individual
women participated in soccer before the early 1970s, but that it was not until
then that formal teams and leagues were organised in major urban settings
such as Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg. Starting in 1975, the South
African Women’s Football Association sponsored an annual interprovincial
tournament at which players for a national squad were selected. However,
given South Africa’s isolation due to the sports boycott, no international
matches were played until the late 1980s (Booth 1998). The first international
competition played by a national squad was during a five-week ‘rebel’ tour in
Italy during 1989. To participate in the Italian tour, the South African squad
had to covertly leave the country disguised as an anonymous soccer club
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(thus making it a ‘rebel’ tour). The first official international match played by
South Africa was against Swaziland in 1993, which took place in Johannesburg
(Hawkey 1993).
Since the dismantling of apartheid and the readmittance of South Africa
into the international sporting community, the popularity of  soccer among
South African women has grown exponentially (Egunjobi 2000). The growth
of  women’s football during the 1990s is reflected in the steady increase in the
number of  teams competing in the Cape Town women’s league. According to
league documents, there were approximately 6 teams competing in 1990, 10
teams in 1994, 13 teams in 1996, 16 teams in 1998 and 22 teams at the
beginning of the 2000 season. This represents a 267 per cent increase over a
ten-year period. A 1997 national representative survey of  women’s sport
participation in South Africa estimated that 65 000 women participated in
recreational and competitive soccer (SISA 1997). SAFA administrators, however,
criticise the methodology of  the survey and claim that some 200 000 South
African women and girls currently participate in soccer. According to the
national survey, soccer is the eleventh most popular sport among South African
women, well behind netball, the most popular sport, with over 700 000
participants (SISA 1997).
Despite men’s soccer being popularly defined as an ‘African’ game, women
of European descent were the first women to take up organised soccer in
South Africa. Paralleling the growth of  women’s soccer in many parts of  the
industrialised world (Hong and Mangan 2004; Scraton et al. 1999), it was
white, English-speaking, middle-class women who dominated women’s soccer
in South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1970s, token black
women – first coloured, then African women – started to join teams. Although
some black women played during this early period, the harsh material
inequalities structured by apartheid and the legacies of  colonialism meant
that very few black women enjoyed opportunities in sport. For the vast majority
of  African women, especially those in rural areas, sport participation was
irrelevant to their lives (Hargreaves 2000; Roberts 1992). Without school-
based soccer opportunities for girls/women like those available to boys/men,
the development of  women’s soccer in South Africa was limited.
Changing racial demographics
According to several interviewees, racial integration of  women’s soccer teams
in the apartheid context was not a problem because the sport was so insigni-
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ficant and hardly noticed by most people. Although women of diverse racial/
ethnic identities came together on the soccer field, apartheid and white
privilege still shaped race relations in the sport. For example, on 16 September
1978, the Cape Herald published a short editorial on women’s soccer titled
‘White Selfishness Must Cease’. I quote the article in its entirety because it
reveals the racialised context of  women’s soccer in the Western Province
during this period:
It is to the credit of  Western Province women’s soccer that its team for the
recently-completed interprovincial tournament was chosen ‘on merit’, that it
was not an all-White team. It is a pity, though, that they allowed their good
non-racial intentions to be outweighed by attending a racial celebration. Surely,
good manners dictated that, if some of their party were disqualified from
any activity surrounding the tournament, they should all disqualify themselves
as well. In other words, the White members of the team should have declined
to attend a dance from which their Black teammates were excluded. One
understands it is difficult for Whites to appreciate the social humiliation (among
other humiliations) which Blacks have to suffer. But one believes that, at a
time when South Africa is supposedly changing, Whites should make an effort
to learn. That they are learning is evident, but it is also evident that they refuse
to learn when it is at the expense of their own comfort or their privileged
position. White selfishness must cease, and soon, for a proper solution to our
problems.
This editorial recognises the ‘good non-racial intentions’ within women’s
soccer, but highlights how social relations within the sport were not insulated
from white privilege and the socio-political mandates of apartheid.
Paradoxically, in the post-apartheid context, women’s soccer became more
racially segregated. As political opportunity structures shifted with democrat-
isation, black women seized the moment to forge new sporting identities and
challenge gender-exclusionary practices in soccer. Black women started to
join existing teams and form new teams in increasing numbers. In 1993, the
first women’s team based in an African township was organised in the Western
Province and became a model for other teams (Keim and Qhuma 1998). As
more African and coloured women joined soccer, more league games were
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played in black townships, places where white South African women rarely
travelled. As a result, ‘white women started to disappear’, as one interview
respondent remarked. Given the constraints of racialised spatial arrangements
in South Africa, many white women started to play indoor soccer, which is
played primarily in white-dominated neighbourhoods, where such sporting
facilities are available. By the mid-1990s, indoor soccer became dominated
by white women and outdoor soccer became dominated by black women,
although there are token white and black women involved within each context.
The shift in racial demographics of  women’s soccer athletes is also
reflected in the changing composition of provincial teams participating in
the annual interprovincial tournaments between 1987 and 1994. By examining
team photographs and player names printed in tournament programme guides
from 1987, 1988 and 1989, I estimated that black women made up 15 per
cent, 18 per cent and 13 per cent of the teams’ membership in each respective
year. Later, in 1990, 1992 and 1994, team photographs and player names
suggest that black women made up, respectively, 21 per cent, 41 per cent and
39 per cent of  the teams’ membership. According to the 1997 national survey
mentioned above, 86.8 per cent of the women soccer participants identified
as black/African, 5.9 per cent as white, 4.8 per cent as coloured and 2.5 per
cent as Indian/Asian (SISA 1997). Comparing these estimates with census
data (Statistics South Africa 1999), it appears that Africans are over-
represented in women’s soccer, whites and coloureds are under-represented
and Indians/Asians are proportionately represented. Generally speaking,
participants do not view the decrease in white women’s participation in soccer
as problematic – first, because white women do not represent a large part of
the South African population, and second, because white women’s material
advantages suggest that they could participate if  they desire to do so.
Negotiating gender structures within soccer
The tremendous increase in the number of women taking up the masculine
flagship sport of soccer during the 1990s must be understood in the context
of the changing public discourse around gender equality within and beyond
sports. The following comment from Oliver, an assistant coach with the
national women’s soccer team, speaks to the changing ideas and opportunities:
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Before it was sort of a tough move for a woman to play football [soccer],
but now it is not that difficult. We are living in a democratic country where
you can do whatever you want.
As the new South Africa was consolidating in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
a wave of gender activism emerged around the goal of recognising gender
equality as an autonomous aspect of the new democracy (Lemon 2001;
McFadden 1992; Meintjes 1998; Nnaemeka 1998; Seidman 1999). As part
of  this emerging women’s movement, new sport structures and a new national
discourse on gender equity in sports developed. In 1992, a Women’s Desk
was established at the National Sport Council, the leading sport organisation
associated with the African National Congress, and in 1994 an independent
advocacy organisation, the Women’s Sports Foundation, was formed. Later,
in 1996, the umbrella organisation Women and Sport South Africa (WASSA)
was launched (Hargreaves and Jones 2001; WASSA 1997). The stated mission
of  WASSA is to
develop a culture where all girls and women will have equal opportunities,
equal access and equal support in sport and recreation at all levels and in all
capacities as decision-makers, administrators, coaches, technical officials as
well as participants. In doing this, it ensures that women and girls may develop
and achieve their full potential and enjoy the benefits that sport and recreation
have to offer. (WASSA 1997, 7)
While gender equity is now a part of the official rhetoric of state-supported
sports organisations (Department of Sport and Recreation 1998/9), in practice
the transformation of  patriarchal structures within sport has been limited.
National sport leaders have prioritised racial integration of  big-time men’s
sports, such as rugby and cricket, and the hosting of  mega global sports events
over mainstreaming gender equity in sports. In general, sexism in sports is
conceptualised by national male administrators as secondary and unconnected
to racism within sports. The following quote from a top administrator from
the South African Sports Commission illustrates how intersections of race
and gender inequalities are often overlooked. In the context of talking about
gender and race within sport, the administrator remarked:
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We are still dealing with the first stage of  transformation. What are we doing
with the black population? Before you even get to the subsections of the
broader problem . . . Our focus is at the first level. We are still focusing at the
main problem, racial transformation. So gender becomes the next focus. If
you have not solved the first focus, you are not going to start focusing more
on the second focus.
The clear separation of  race and gender structures articulated by this
administrator renders black women’s experiences in sport invisible. Such
conceptualisation constructs black men’s experiences as the standard and
women’s experiences, which are not understood as racialised, as secondary.
Black men stand in for ‘the black population’. The prioritising of racial
transformation over gender transformation means that the inequalities facing
black women, who are the majority of the South African population, are
subordinated to the inequalities facing black men. The dynamic of ignoring
intersecting social inequalities and subordinating concerns of gender inequality
to those of  racial inequality is not unique to sports. It is, however, clearly
visible in the new government’s financial and symbolic investment in using
big-time male sports as a mechanism for nation building in the post-1994
context. The use of a male-dominated social realm to build a collective identity
among all South Africans was not questioned. Given the symbolic importance
of sports in the public discourse on democratisation, one must wonder how
the strategy of  using male-dominated sports to unify the nation actually
undercut the emerging public discourse on the importance of eradicating sexism
in the new South Africa.
Despite the lack of recognition of the intersections of racism and sexism
in sports and the androcentric priorities of male sports administrators, the
political context and discourse have shifted such that concerns about gender
inequalities in sports have become legitimate and politically salient.
Democratisation has, using Mikell’s (1995) language, opened up ‘dialogue
spaces’ to grapple with issues of gender inequality and challenge gender-
normative practices in sports. Even within masculine flagship sports, such as
soccer, sport leaders can no longer ignore the issue of sexism.
Conflict over the control of  women’s soccer
As one would expect, as more women showed up at soccer pitches, more
overt power struggles between women and men emerged. Some men reacted
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with violence and sexual harassment, while others have been more accepting
and have embraced women as part of  the broader soccer community. Up
until 1994, women’s soccer was organised autonomously, separate from any
men’s soccer governing body. In 1994, the unification of  the various racially
based soccer organisations and the formation of  SAFA led to women’s soccer
becoming associated with, although still independent of, the male-dominated
association. In the context of  the growing popularity of  women’s soccer in
South Africa and an influx of  monies for women’s soccer during the 1990s,
problems erupted in one of  the women’s leagues in the Johannesburg area.
Allegations of sexual harassment and mismanagement of funds were raised
against several men who were owners and managers of  various local women’s
soccer teams (Rulashe 1997). After the problems persisted for several years
and written requests for SAFA to intervene went unanswered, the minister of
sport and the national government got involved. The Office of the President
of South Africa convened a judicial commission headed by Judge Pickard to
investigate the women’s complaints along with other conflicts within the
organisation. The following quote from a women’s soccer administrator
describes the nature of the gendered conflict, the judicial commission and
structural consequences for women’s soccer:
The sport [women’s soccer] grew very rapidly and in 1994 we started having
a lot of  problems with men. They saw women’s sports growing and they
wanted to come and start running it. We had huge troubles in those years –
1994, 1995 and 1996. It was really a tormented time for all of  us. A lot of  the
women were threatened by these men and their kids intimidated. It led to the
police being involved and all sorts of  mess. And unfortunately, the men who
were trying to take over the running of  women’s football had connections
with the federation [SAFA] and the federation supported them instead of  the
women. The people in charge of the men did not take us [women
administrators] seriously. We had to go to the minister of  sports. And there
was a huge [judicial] commission for men and women in soccer and it took
about three years to complete. It resulted in women being rendered powerless.
It resulted in the federation disbanding women’s soccer as a separate entity
and incorporating it into the men’s structure. Of  course, it is not a men’s
structure but a football structure. But unfortunately, it doesn’t work like that.
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The emergence of physical violence, intimidation and sexual harassment
suggests the real and profound challenge that women in soccer posed and the
deep sense of entitlement to control the sport that some men felt. The Pickard
Commission found that SAFA was extremely dilatory and negligent in giving
attention to the problems, and advised SAFA to increase resources for women’s
football and create structures to develop the women’s game (Pickard
Commission 1997). After intense public negotiations, a decision was made
to change the organisational relationship between women’s soccer and SAFA.
Specifically, women’s soccer was to become a subcommittee of  SAFA rather
than simply affiliated with the organisation. As a subcommittee, the larger
male-led governing body would have total control over and fiscal responsibility
for women’s soccer.
Most within the women’s soccer community welcomed this change, but
some leaders and players voiced concerns. The vast majority of  Western
Province soccer players that I surveyed thought that joining SAFA would be
beneficial because it would bring in more monetary resources for women’s
soccer, especially from corporate sponsors.12  Others, such as the administrator
quoted above, articulated concerns about women losing decision-making
power. As with women’s soccer in other countries (Hong and Mangan 2004),
men have been an integral part of  women’s soccer in South Africa, serving as
team sponsors, coaches, managers, referees, administrators and fans. Given
women’s limited access and experience within soccer, South African women’s
soccer is dependent on men’s expertise and resources. Despite concerns about
losing organisational control and the hostilities from some men, the women’s
soccer community did not seek to exclude men’s participation. Rather, it was
a question about the extent of  men’s involvement, the lack of  women in
leadership roles and the marginalisation of  women leaders.
While most national SAFA administrators rhetorically supported increasing
women’s leadership capacities, the process of  dismantling male dominance
within soccer has yet to be fully embraced and institutionalised at all levels.
The following quote from a high-level SAFA manager highlights the challenges
of mainstreaming gender equality within the sport. Responding to a question
about gender transformation, he said:
On the executive level there is recognition that women’s football has to be
treated a whole lot more seriously than had been in the past. But how to
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translate that into real action is another matter. Whilst there is a commitment,
the commitment on a philosophical level that it needs to change, how to do
that practically . . . becomes another matter. Because, you know, we are not
quite sure if  everyone is as committed to that as they say they are on paper.
The difficulty of translating commitment to gender equality into policy and
practice has become as clear to the women’s soccer community as it has to
those in other social and political sectors in South Africa (Friedman 1999).
Nonetheless, the democratic transition afforded South African women new
resources, including an emergent national discourse on gender equity,
governmental support and more opportunities to challenge beliefs and practices
that construct them as outsiders within soccer. As elite women sport
administrators were advocating for change at the highest levels of sports
administration, women at the grassroots were challenging barriers on the soccer
fields. Soccer players, particularly young black women, were putting into
practice what national sports leaders were putting in writing. Rather than
simply benefiting from new opportunities, women/girls in soccer can be
considered agents of change in the new South Africa. By escaping the trappings
of  daily domestic labour and dominant gender ideology and showing up at
the soccer fields, they contribute to the process of democratisation. Further-
more, through their engagement in everyday social spaces, these women and
girls are crafting new dimensions of civil society that provide opportunities
to organise across divides.
Conclusions
The findings of this study contribute to our understanding of the potential
role athletes and sport administrators play in social-change projects and nation-
building processes in the new South Africa. Although women’s netball and
women’s soccer may not constitute formal social movement organisations,
the waves of collective action against racism within netball and the challenges
to male dominance in soccer are illustrative of how grassroots activities within
civil society can contribute to everyday democratisation. Rather than women
athletes simply being the beneficiaries of anti-racist or feminist organising
within South Africa, these observations suggest that women athletes are an
integral part of  that collective organising against racial and gender inequalities.
Borrowing from social movement theories, I conceptualise netball and
soccer athletes and administrators as political actors who formed collective
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identities and engaged in collective resistance against race/gender hierarchies
within sport. Although these efforts are not widely recognised in this politicised
form, they do suggest the continuation and expansion of  the earlier non-
racial sports movement in South Africa. Consistent with political opportunity
theory, these data show that the democratic transition within South Africa
undercut state support for the status quo within netball and soccer, and
weakened the power of white female leaders in netball and black male leaders
in soccer to exclude black women from full and equal participation in their
respective sports.
Within netball in recent years, it appears that athletes and administrators
are building on the positive changes of the 1990s by turning their attention
to economic privileges and disparities among netballers and South African
women more generally. During my 2003 field research in South Africa, netball
administrators reported that they were making strides in developing a group
consciousness of  structural inequalities. It appears that the increase in racial
integration and the lessening of racial tensions have created space for netballers
to disentangle race and class barriers facing South African women and move
forward in building a new collective identity. For example, the financial costs
incurred by netball administrators, who are largely volunteers, became more
visible in recent years and this led to administrators grappling with how
economic differences discourage black women’s leadership within the sport.
As a result, new policies of reimbursing expenses of administrators were
adopted. As Meintjes (1998) argues, it is the recognition of the ‘yawning
gulfs’ of material differences among South African women that makes it
possible for them to collectively challenge their shared subordination. Future
research on the development of a collective identity within netball and the
role of netball in the democratisation of civil society is warranted.
The case of the masculine flagship sport of soccer also shows how past
traditions are being reworked by women (and some men) and new ‘traditions’
and meanings are being created (Hargreaves 1994). The growth of  women’s
soccer in South Africa during the 1990s signals a significant challenge to
gender-exclusionary practices in the sport. South African women, particularly
black women, are actively negotiating dominant gender ideologies, the realities
of poverty and the burdens of domestic labour (Roberts 1992) to enjoy the
physical pleasures of  competitive soccer. Challenges to male dominance in
soccer, however, have not gone unchecked. Some men within soccer have
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resisted strongly the growing presence of women. Sexual harassment and
intimidation have been used to keep women in their place and helped men to
gain organisational control of  women’s soccer. Nonetheless, women have
found successes in tapping into the new national discourse on gender equity
and have gained new opportunities that were not imagined just a short time
ago.
The shifts in racial demographics within women’s soccer also demonstrate
that South African women do not form a homogeneous unified group whose
members experience gender inequalities in sports in the same way. White
women had access to soccer before black women, but as the number of black
women in soccer grew during the 1990s, many white women left the sport.
Shifting and contentious race relations among women within soccer and netball
demonstrate how a shared gender status among women is not sufficient for
mobilising against inequalities.
Overall, these data lend support to African feminists’ assertion that African
women are not tradition-bound and interested only in issues of  survival (Salo
and Mama 2001). South African women athletes are not simply victims of
sexist, racist and colonialist relations, but are active agents in negotiating
structural inequalities and ideological constraints to build new subjectivities
and opportunities. Despite the difficulties inherent in negotiating the legacies
of  colonialism, apartheid and male supremacy, this analysis suggests that
women athletes have made significant changes whereas other popular men’s
sports have not. Although national political and economic elites may not
recognise or celebrate women athletes’ contributions to nation building,
scholars should not ignore the contributions of women athletes and the
importance of sports in limiting and facilitating gender change in South Africa.
Given the centrality of bodies in sports and nation building, sports are an
ideal and important site for understanding how dominant race/gender/class
hierarchies are constructed and maintained. Considering the growing popu-
larity of competitive sports among African women, continued research on
their experiences within sports promises to produce insights into African
feminisms and the processes by which patriarchal relations within civil society
are being challenged and transformed. Questions regarding how South African
women’s sport participation is connected to participants’ sense of  bodily
integrity and confidence, as well as their experiences of gender-based violence,
are ripe for investigation. The uncontested use of male-dominated sports to
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build a unified South Africa also ignores the issue of the gendered nature of
the state and the limitations that current political strategies pose for South
African women to translate their newly gained political rights into freedom
and autonomy in civil society.
Notes
1. Netball is typically played on a hard-surface court measuring 100 feet by 50 feet and divided
into thirds with goalposts at opposite ends. The seven players on a team are restricted to
certain areas of the court depending on their position. The aim of the game is to score goals
by throwing the ball through the hoop at the top of the goalposts. Players may not run with
the ball, kick it, hold it for more than three seconds nor touch another player (International
Federation of  Netball Associations 2001).
2. Drawing on the convention of the Black Consciousness Movement, I use the term ‘black’ to
refer to South Africans of African, Asian, and coloured racialised identities.
3. The primary sites of  my fieldwork were Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town.
Johannesburg and Pretoria were chosen because the national headquarters of  women’s
soccer and netball are located in these cities. Cape Town was chosen because it is considered
the most developed location for women’s soccer in South Africa and was the site of  the 2000
national netball championships, a week-long tournament involving over 600 athletes from
throughout South Africa. See Pelak (2005a and 2005b) for additional descriptions of data
and methodological approach employed in this research.
4. The interviews focused on the participants’ sporting histories; the personal, structural and
organisational changes taking place within netball; and the athletes’ attitudes and thoughts
about gender, race and class relations within sports. The ages of the athletes ranged from
20 to 36 years and averaged 25 years. The racial/ethnic/cultural backgrounds of  interviewees
approximate their relative representation within competitive netball. According to a
representative survey I conducted at the championship tournament, 47.2 per cent of  netball
participants identified as white and/or Afrikaner, 43.1 per cent as black and/or African,
5.2 per cent as coloured, 3.2 per cent as Indian and 1.2 per cent as having mixed racial/ethnic/
cultural heritage.
5. The South African Sports Commission was formed in 1999 out of the amalgamation of
part of the Department of Sport and Recreation and the National Sports Council, but was
disbanded in 2005.
6. The survey was designed to assess the demographic background of  participants, the structural
barriers they experience in competitive sport and their attitudes regarding racial transformation
in netball. Self-administered survey forms were distributed to members of  30 of  the top 40
regional teams participating in the tournament. Twenty-four teams returned completed
surveys for a team response rate of  80 per cent. Of  the estimated 382 individuals who made
up the 30 teams sampled, 251 usable surveys were collected for an individual response rate
of 68 per cent.
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7. Of  the soccer interviewees, 58.8 per cent are women and 41.2 per cent are men. The average
ages of  the athletes and administrators interviewed were 27 and 44 years old, respectively.
Because racial identities and categories in South Africa continue to be highly contentious,
variable and context-specific, respondents were asked to self-identify (Jung 2000). About
53 per cent identified as coloured/black, 29 per cent as African/black, 12 per cent as white and
6 per cent as Indian.
8. The self-administered survey forms were distributed to all but four teams participating in
the league and included questions regarding players’ demographic characteristics, experiences
playing competitive soccer, opinions of  the status of  women’s sports in South Africa and
views on gender transformation in soccer. Completed surveys were returned by nine of  the
eighteen teams for a team response rate of 50 per cent.
9. Notes were taken during informal conversations when possible, and more extensive notes
were written directly after leaving the matches. I also took photographs during my field
observations, which was an effective way to introduce myself  and explain the purpose of  my
research. At the end of my fieldwork, I used the photographs to construct a league yearbook
and I distributed the yearbook as part of my ‘giving back’ to the research participants.
10. ‘Stop NSC Meddling, Appeals SA Netball Executive’, Citizen, 7 September 1995.
11. According to the representative survey conducted at the tournament, 42.3 per cent said the
quota policy was positive, 46 per cent said it was negative and 11.7 per cent said that the policy
was neither positive nor negative. Respectively, 65 per cent and 62 per cent of  blacks/Africans
and Indians said the policy was positive. Only 19 per cent of white/Afrikaner respondents
said the policy was positive.
12. Of  the 84 women soccer athletes surveyed, 87.5 per cent said that joining the men’s
organisation will help women’s football, 2.5 per cent said it will hurt women’s football and
10 per cent said that joining SAFA would neither help nor hurt. In a follow-up open-ended
question, respondents were asked why they thought joining SAFA would help or hurt. The
modal response of  those supporting the change said that joining SAFA would increase
financial resources.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Organising from Private Spaces
 Domestic Labour in South African Civil Society
JENNIFER FISH
PAID DOMESTIC WORK institutionalises the deeply embedded historical
processes that relegated black women’s labour to relations of  servitude within
the private households of  South African society. At a structural level, paid
household labour continues to comprise the largest sector of work for black
women in South Africa.1 Often characterised as the ‘last bastion of apartheid’,2
domestic labour symbolises a critical disjuncture between the public emphasis
on gender rights in the transitional democracy and the everyday processes
that maintain sharp asymmetries of power between those who employ
household workers and those who perform such labour. Moreover, paid
domestic work remains distinctly racialised and feminised, which places
formidable socio-economic barriers in the daily lives of  women employed in
this sector. As a result of  these distinctly instilled power relations established
during apartheid, domestic labour remains a central social institution fourteen
years after the democratic transition. A close look at this institution clearly
reveals the extreme challenges to actualising human rights for all in democratic
South Africa.
Although the daily lives of  domestic workers continue to be structured
by ongoing and severe socio-economic inequalities, in the post-1994 context
of macro-societal changes, this sector is also gradually shifting as a result of
women’s activism and organising within civil society. Domestic workers
continue to enact both individual and collective agency to demand that the
gender rights of  South Africa’s new democracy are accessible to the largest
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sector of working women, namely by building on union organisation and
alignment with central gender rights initiatives. This chapter3 explores the
successes of  women’s organising from some of  the most severely marginalised
positions within South African society. I draw on seven years of  longitudinal
field research to explore how women have formed vibrant sites of  organisa-
tion within civil society that are actively reconstituting South Africa’s new
democracy.
Theoretical framework
To understand the particular space that domestic labour holds in post-1994
South Africa, I ground my work in former analyses of  the role of  this sector
as a manifestation of broader systems of power within the apartheid era. In
South Africa’s history, domestic labour reinforced the overarching ideology
of apartheid throughout daily interactions in the private household sphere.
Gaitskell et al. (1984) analysed how this institution of  servitude specifically
situated black women’s labour as a ‘product of  the complex operation of
class, race and gender divisions over time’ (107). Cock (1989) similarly
depicted the relationship between ‘maids and madams’ as a site of intimate
racial socialisation that served to reinforce systemic social practices central
to apartheid rule:
The role of the domestic worker is important in socialisation in the dominant
ideological order. Often it is the only significant interracial contact whites
experience, and they experience this relationship in extremely asymmetrical
terms. Many white South African children learn the attitudes of  racial
domination from domestic relationships with servants and ‘nannies’. The
converse is also equally true in that blacks presumably learn the attitudes of
submission (or at least the semblance thereof) that apartheid requires, and
also the resentment it generates through some experience of  domestic service.
(8–9)
As Cock suggests, these often intimate social interactions within the private
household are integrally connected to governing public ideologies, which
reproduced systems of  severe race, class and gender inequality at the structural
level.
Institutionalised paid household labour served a particular function in
South Africa’s apartheid context. The system demanded women’s labour in
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the private household in order to reinforce the privileges of the dominant
minority as well as relations of  servitude across the colour line. Throughout
these racialised processes, gender socialisation simultaneously connected black
women to paid labour in the private household spaces of the white minority
population. This social arrangement constructed distinct experiences for
domestic workers, whose lives were shaped by the demands of physical,
emotional and psychological labour. Central to the nature of  this work, women
were required to migrate from their own homes in order to provide services
in the residentially delineated spaces of  privilege in South African society.
Domestic workers were most often ‘live-in’ help, which created a particular
form of  entrapment and posed serious challenges to workers’ autonomy,
privacy and ability to mobilise collectively. These central characteristics of
paid domestic labour, therefore, created a distinct duality in workers’ lives as
they negotiated the day-to-day realities of their experience in employers’ private
homes while maintaining financial, emotional and psychological relationships
with their families and communities of  origin. Workers’ bifurcated experiences
further heightened the power of employers while reinforcing the geographic
divides that dominated the apartheid system.
As is evident throughout the global growth of transnational paid household
labour (Romero 1992; Perreñas 2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Chang 2000;
Pettman 1996; Enloe 1989), this institutionalised socio-economic arrangement
illustrates that women’s experience of  gender oppression is extremely variant,
based on the interconnected nature of  race and class positions. In my analysis,
I employ the theoretical perspectives of intersectionality and post-colonial
feminism that reject a monolithic construction of  womanhood (Mohanty,
Russo and Torres 1991) and assert that gender inequality must be understood
through its interconnected relationship with race, class and nation.4 In South
Africa, black domestic workers remain extremely disadvantaged as a result
of what Collins (1990) describes as a ‘matrix of domination’, in which race,
class and gender marginalisation operate simultaneously. In contrast to this
‘triple oppression’ (Cock 1989), women positioned as employers are often
able to draw from race and class privilege in ways that dilute their experience
of gender oppression.5 Through the practice of paid household labour, we
see how privileged women also participate in gender discrimination by
reinforcing the devalued nature of household labour in the private sphere,
which ultimately socially reproduces the privileged position of men through
their placement in the public labour arena.
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The institution of domestic labour complicates the presumed division
between public and private spheres that repeatedly devalues the feminised
household space.6 Recent political theorists have eschewed this public–private
dichotomy in gendered analyses of  citizenship, the state and globalisation.
For example, in her discussion of  the ‘interactive mutuality’ of  spheres, Ling
offers a feminist perspective on the inherent interconnectedness between the
public and the private realms by positing, ‘What pertains within the individual/
household/nation contributes to the community/state/world, just as what
happens in the world/state/community affects us as a nation/household/
individual’ (2002, 174). The concept of interactive mutuality between the public
and private realms is particularly useful in seeking to understand the institution
of paid household labour in post-apartheid South Africa – where state
processes of democratisation are actively resisted in private spaces as a result
of  ongoing gender, race and class power structures. By connecting the theory
of  interactive mutuality with an intersectional framework of  inequality, we
see how the social reproduction of domestic labour is reinforced in the
household, state and global spheres through the pervasive race, class and
gender inequalities that continue to constitute social relations in post-apartheid
South Africa. This chapter explores the spaces in which women’s collective
mobilisation has infused the potential for social change in the face of imposing
structural obstacles.
Research methodology
To illustrate the relevance of  these theories, I draw on narrative data collected
over a seven-year period during the early phase of  South Africa’s transition
to democracy. Field research conducted in Cape Town initially in 2000–2001
yielded 85 semi-structured interviews among a wide cross-section of  indi-
viduals and organisations throughout South African society, including
domestic workers, employers of domestic workers, local experts, parliament-
arians and union leaders.7 Extensive participant observations within South
African households employing domestic workers yielded exceptionally
valuable content for further analysis. These combined data are enhanced
through longitudinal follow-up of  interviews and participant observations over
the course of five subsequent field-research site visits from 2004 to 2007.
Because of the highly particular and shifting complexities of race and
class relations in Cape Town since 1994, the data gathered for this study
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represent the perspectives of both black and coloured domestic workers as
well as a range of employers, including the ‘newly elite’ coloured and black
parliamentary employers and the more traditional white ‘madams’.8 For
domestic workers, union membership was over-sampled to gather the
perspectives of  women actively involved in restructuring this sector. The
sample of domestic workers was also equally divided between those who
live where they work and those who live in their own homes and commute to
work each day, in order to account for the substantial impact of  residential
location on the nature of  paid domestic labour.9 The race of  the employer
was purposively sampled within the domestic worker population to include
shifting patterns in the post-1994 context. Of the domestic workers who
were formally interviewed, 20 per cent worked for ‘new employers’ at some
point in their careers.10
Employer participants were purposively sampled to address the study’s
overarching emphasis on change within the institution of domestic work since
the inception of the democratic state. In line with a predominant emergent
discourse about South Africa’s ‘new madams’, black, coloured and Indian
employers accounted for 13 of  the 20 formal employer interviewees. Of  the
7 white employers, 4 were considered ‘non-traditional’ because of their role
in key human rights groups or their identity as strong feminists.11 Also, within
the overall group of 13 coloured, Indian and black employers, 8 were identified
as either feminists or highly professional women, or both. The employer
sample therefore draws much more heavily on emergent groups that have not
previously been represented in the literature on domestic work in South Africa.
In addition to the formal semi-structured interviews, I conducted focus
groups, substantial archival research and an additional 30 in-depth interviews
with particular experts across a wide variety of sectors (including government
leaders, NGO members, gender activists, legal experts and policy makers) to
acquire a comprehensive set of perspectives on the institution of domestic
labour in South Africa’s post-apartheid context. Extensive participatory
research with the central national organising body of domestic workers – the
South African Domestic Service and Allied Workers Union (SADSAWU) – and
the governmental Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) provided central
content throughout the fieldwork.12  Within the group of experts and the
organisational leaders, follow-up longitudinal interviews were conducted in
2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. The following analyses explore women’s
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collective organising around the case of domestic labour by drawing on data
gathered from a variety of  sources in this longitudinal study. As a scholar-
activist, my intent throughout this process is to document the voices of women
at this particular juncture in South Africa’s history while providing analyses
that situate these narratives within a broader trajectory of post-apartheid
democratisation.
Domestic labour and collective organising
To contextualise this research, I begin with an abbreviated overview of
women’s mobilisation within domestic labour during South Africa’s apartheid
era. Throughout this period of  severe social inequality, domestic workers
repeatedly organised to challenge collectively the extreme marginalisation of
this sector. Domestic workers’ unionisation emphasised the central need to
transform conditions of  labour where systematic injustices distinctly enforced
the relegation of  black women to this particularly marginalised work sector.13
Although working-class, predominantly black, unions were banned during
much of  the apartheid era, the broader labour movement served as a key site
of  resistance and collective action. The Federation of  South African Trade
Unions (FOSATU) and the Congress of  South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
provided national structures that supported the unionisation of  domestic
workers and the eventual formation of  the South African Domestic Workers’
Union (SADWU) in 1986. Within the context of heightened enforcement of
apartheid, SADWU afforded a space to organise workers and advocate for
basic labour benefits within the household employment site. Unionised
domestic workers also aligned with the broader anti-apartheid struggle for
social and economic justice through the elimination of racialised governance.14
Non-union organisational efforts to train domestic workers throughout
the apartheid era also provided spaces where workers met on a regular basis
and shared opportunities to align in their common struggles. The Domestic
Workers Association of  Cape Town, for example, offered educational services
for workers’ children while serving as an advocate organisation to meet the
diverse needs of  women employed in this sector. Such organisations
simultaneously created venues where larger NGOs and women’s rights
organisations, such as the Black Sash, invested in increasing the protection
of  domestic workers. In such organisational alignments, collaboration around
domestic workers’ rights represented a particular complexity between public
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advocacy and everyday social arrangements in private household spaces.
Women with access to social power in the apartheid system served as
advocates for domestic workers’ rights while at the same time often employing
domestic workers in their own homes. Similarly, some women’s groups were
invested in serving as networking organisations between workers and potential
employers, which more often reinforced women’s relations across racial lines
within the context of paid domestic labour, rather than advancing a movement
for political transformation of  the sector.15 These historical examples of
domestic workers’ organising during apartheid illustrate how the asymmetric
power relations between women, structured through the institution of  paid
household labour, stand in sharp contradistinction to the broader ideology of
social equality central to the anti-apartheid struggle. In this regard, women’s
activism around the rights of domestic workers in their private household
employment contexts also repeatedly confronted the overarching race, class
and gender power relations embedded in apartheid society.
Domestic labour and democratisation
As we explore social change in the contemporary post-1994 South African
context, the collective action of domestic worker unions and gender-rights-
centred NGOs elucidates the potential for women to utilise organisations as a
central space to mobilise civil society in ways that move South Africa into
the next phase of  democratisation. This research illustrates that women’s
political engagement surrounding this sector has resulted in tangible policy
changes that assure protective citizenship rights to domestic workers for the
first time in South Africa. Furthermore, domestic workers’ collective organisa-
tion continues to provide a policy basis that is beginning to impose standards
of accountability among employers within the private household sphere. As
a result, protective policies that recognise domestic workers as both citizens
and a vital workforce provide a partial conduit for shifting power relations
within the private sphere to promote access to the promises of gender rights
for all women.
Participants in this research continually suggested that the organisation
of  domestic workers affords the most effective strategy for democratising
this distinct apartheid icon. The asymmetrical power relations and persistent
socio-economic inequalities that exist within this institution gradually lose
their power as individual workers align with a broader movement for both
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gender rights and the formalised protection of  domestic workers. This research
illustrates that working through unions and NGO networks has been beneficial
to realising domestic workers’ inclusion in protective policies. The most
challenging aspect of social change, however, remains centred on shifting
asymmetrical power relations between workers and employers in the private
household such that policies ‘have teeth’. Given the substantial barriers to
social change within this ‘last bastion of apartheid’, democratising social
relations hinges on both effective policy protections and domestic workers’
organisation to counter the structural inequalities embedded within this
pervasive and normalised institution of  paid household labour. To explore
the impact of collective action within this particular sector, let us next turn
to a case-study analysis of domestic workers’ union activism that illustrates
how spaces within civil society provide important opportunities for women
to organise across social divides and advocate for the protection of this highly
vulnerable labour sector.
Organising across divides: Domestic workers and civil society
The resistance to democratic transition in South Africa’s private household
labour spaces motivated a gender-rights movement built on the notion that
‘Women won’t be free until domestic workers are free’.16 By working with
and through the gender machinery of  South Africa’s new democracy, along
with a series of  human-rights-based NGOs, SADSAWU successfully amended a
central social security policy to include domestic workers in unemployment
insurance for the first time.17 This case illustrates how women’s mobilisation
through civil society organisations has facilitated the inclusion of domestic
workers in central protective social policies, thereby formalising women’s
household labour in ways that complement the social protections central to
the guiding ideologies of democracy in South Africa.
The launch of  SADSAWU in April 2000 built on pre-existing leadership
alliances within SADWU to emerge as a new organisation within the context
of  the transition to a national democracy. Although SADWU established the
first formal unionisation of  domestic workers, it disbanded ten years later in
the early phases of democratic transition, ironically the same year that the
national Labour Relations Act was passed to legalise domestic worker
unionisation. The central articulation of gender priorities in the post-1994
process of  nation building provided a powerful platform to overcome this
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sectoral void in unionisation through the launch of  SADSAWU. In the early
inception of this organisation, leaders emphasised domestic workers’ limited
access to improved social and economic conditions. As SADSAWU national
office-bearer Hester Stephens stated: ‘It is our interest now in the union to
build this union because we are quite aware that the struggle is still continuing;
whatever is the new South Africa, nothing has changed.’18
Throughout my longitudinal study among all members of the executive
body, SADSAWU leaders repeatedly expressed this motivation to build the
national union of domestic workers in accordance with the new democracy
and its particular emphasis on gender rights. In this regard, women’s organising
through unionisation provided a space to begin to advocate for the inclusion
of  domestic workers in formal public policies central to the building of  a
democratic nation.
SADSAWU’s national leadership is supported by the local Cape Town office
of  COSATU, an alignment that provides substantial support through operational
resources as well as an ideological commitment to the prioritisation of domestic
workers in the broader labour campaigns. However, according to leaders in
both organisations in 2006, at the national level, SADSAWU and COSATU have
not yet aligned for reasons of historical conflict over the ‘viability’ of domestic
worker unions in the broader initiatives of labour in South Africa. In this
respect, the relationship between SADSAWU and COSATU at the national level
is parallel to the disjuncture between South Africa’s broader commitment to
gender rights and the ongoing institutionalisation of  domestic labour. As a
result, echoing Walsh’s analysis in Chapter 2 of  this collection, ‘the struggle
continues’ in prioritising domestic labour within the national union movement.
Notwithstanding these organisational challenges in relation to COSATU,
within the first year after its launch, SADSAWU demonstrated the effective
organisation of women within civil society by opening six regional offices
and establishing an enrolment base of approximately 11 000 members by
June 2001.19 At this same time, Department of Labour officials estimated
that over one million women were employed in domestic service.20 As this
low overall enrolment rate suggests, the primary organisational goal for
SADSAWU during its first year focused on membership recruitment, as reflected
in the overarching national priority of membership growth. One of the
strongest barriers to enrolment in this early phase stemmed from social power
dynamics maintained within the households of employers, which, in many
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cases, scrutinised workers’ union affiliation, as well as the long-term
implications of  domestic workers’ labour empowerment. Domestic worker
participants, for example, repeatedly conveyed that open union membership
within the household work space created a serious threat to their employment
conditions, making it difficult to attend meetings and align with other women
organisationally. One respondent in this study described how her employer
reacted to her SADSAWU campaign T-shirt by saying, ‘Never, never, never
wear that T-shirt in my house again!’
These barriers to individual membership were of concern to union
leadership for two primary reasons. First, without a central employer where
union dues could be easily collected, weak financial viability remained a
serious hindrance to organisational growth. Second, in addition to membership
campaigns, SADSAWU’s main focus remained centred on policy change to
include domestic workers in labour and social security legislation. Yet without
a stronger membership base, SADSAWU’s organisational strength as a lobbying
agent was quite constrained in these early phases of growth and development.
Moreover, each of  SADSAWU’s national office-bearers, with the exception of
one leader, worked in domestic labour, creating a structure where substantial
responsibilities rested on the shoulders of a few officers who also assumed
full-time and often live-in roles as domestic workers.
Despite these pervasive challenges, the commitment of  individual
SADSAWU leaders has resulted in continual growth in the organisation’s
membership and capacity. Domestic worker participants in this study who
enacted personal agency through joining SADSAWU repeatedly expressed the
sense of  empowerment in their individual employment contexts. The following
interview response captures the felt benefits of  union membership for one
domestic worker:
I’m only involved in the union and then I also like to go to different meetings,
like the NGOs and that kind of  meetings, and it’s also empowering me as a
worker, and not sitting here in the room and do nothing for yourself.
(Domestic worker interview, Khayelitsha, February 2001)
Part of  the strategy of  increasing union enrolment among domestic workers
emphasised a broader awareness of  the personal empowerment potential
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available through organisational affiliation. Another domestic worker linked
her felt sense of  individual empowerment with a broader political struggle to
realise the ‘new South Africa’:
Yes, it [unionisation] is part of  the struggle, and to make other workers aware
of it, that I can talk to them about the union, because I find the union like a
security for myself, you know, if  I got a problem, I can go there. So I also
want them to be part of  that union. (Domestic worker interview, Gugulethu,
March 2001)
These statements illustrate how union membership fosters worker agency at
the individual level. Yet the role of  unionisation also involves a collective
level of  participation in political processes of  nation building. Through
domestic workers’ engagement with the organisational capacity of the national
union, they also gained direct access to a broader gender rights movement in
South Africa as a result of  the necessary alignment of  SADSAWU with other
civil society and human rights organisations.
Organising within the gender machinery
Union leaders, SADSAWU members, parliamentary and NGO participants in
this study repeatedly asserted that even though domestic workers realised
marked success in collective organisation, the severe forms of  inequality within
this labour sector necessitated a need for alignment with other gender rights
organisations. Accordingly, one year after its inception, SADSAWU established
an organisational alliance that continues to position domestic workers more
centrally within South Africa’s broader gender rights movement. Initiatives
resulting from the collective activism of this alliance pushed forward a public
discourse that began to challenge the inherent contradictions of domestic
workers’ limited rights in the context of  South Africa’s public gender priorities.
I move now to an analysis of the process of organising that led to the inclusion
of domestic workers in unemployment insurance. The victory that was
achieved elucidates one of  the most viable avenues to utilising women’s
collective mobilisation from a variety of social locations throughout civil
society. This case study thus reveals an effective approach to organising across
socio-economic divides to advocate for the protection of domestic workers
within South Africa’s democratic dispensation.
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In 2001, SADSAWU’s first major policy initiative involved securing domestic
workers’ access to the national Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) intended
to provide a critical safety net for workers during periods of unemployment.
Since 1994, the UIF policy has been widely viewed as one of the most
important social security initiatives within the new democracy, particularly
because of the estimated 40 per cent unemployment rate in South Africa.
Yet within government structures, the inclusion of  domestic workers in UIF
benefits remained under investigation from 1991 until 2001 because of the
particular implementation challenges inherent in legislating the private
household sphere.21 Government policy makers interviewed for the present
research shared a particular scepticism about including domestic workers in
the UIF because of the criticism they would receive in relation to ensuring
compliance among employers, particularly in this case where the labour site
is also the private household. In addition to the power dynamics at play, the
extensive deliberations over domestic workers’ protection within the UIF
illustrate the symbolic importance of this first measure to include domestic
workers in social security benefits, thereby instilling measures to formalise
women’s labour in the private sphere.
Ally (2007) provides a critical analysis of  the state’s relationship to
domestic workers by centralising the repeated constructions of  this sector as
‘vulnerable’ in state discourse and policy construction. In Ally’s argument,
such ‘democratic statecraft’ reproduces the severely marginalised positions
of workers while enhancing state power as a result of the particular subjectivity
framing this sector. ‘ “Vulnerability” as a mode of  entry into citizenship-rights
for domestic workers presumed, in particular, a victimised subject with
compromised capacity’ (7). As we examine the crafting of policy on the part
of  the state, the construction of  domestic workers among allied gender and
human rights organisations, and the response to such policies by domestic
workers themselves, Ally’s astute analysis shows how this repeated construc-
tion of  ‘vulnerable workers’ creates a particular form of  subject status that
shapes the creation of policy as well as its later implementation. As we shall
see, the discourse surrounding the inclusion of domestic workers in the UIF
encapsulates Ally’s analysis.
In March 2001, the Department of Labour presented a final draft of the
Unemployment Insurance Fund Bill (B3-2001) to the Labour Portfolio
Committee. This third draft specifically excluded domestic workers from
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unemployment insurance coverage and identified a need for an additional
eighteen months to investigate the administrative challenges involved with
this sector. Refusing to accept this delay, SADSAWU joined a coalition organised
by the CGE, a constitutional body established in 1997 under Chapter 9 of the
Constitution to promote and protect gender equality. The collective became
known as the Gender Monitoring and Advocacy Coalition for the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Fund (GMAC-UIF). This alliance consisted of four predominant
NGOs (with both gender and human rights profiles) – including the Black
Sash, the South African Council of  Churches, Women on Farms Project and
the Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference – along with representa-
tion from the COSATU parliamentary office. The collective aligned by
identifying shared concerns about the unconstitutional nature of the exclusion
of the ‘most vulnerable’ sector of the labour population. This coalition
represented the first collective organisational initiative to take on the case of
domestic labour as a central gender priority since the 1994 transition to
democracy.
In order to enhance participation in the newly open parliamentary process
of public submissions on draft policy documents,22 this collective
representation of civil society centred its work on strengthening each individual
submission by establishing a shared platform of  gender justice within the
context of  social security rights. Organisational members of  the GMAC-UIF
aligned with SADSAWU and presented individual submissions on the case of
domestic workers’ protection, each of which clearly demonstrated the
unconstitutional and discriminatory nature of the exclusion of domestic
workers from unemployment insurance benefits prioritised in the new
democracy. Furthermore, every submission repeatedly challenged government
on the contradictory nature of its social security philosophy – to protect the
‘poorest of the poor’ – and its practice of excluding the most vulnerable sector
of  the working population from unemployment insurance benefits.
According to parliamentarians interviewed in this research, SADSAWU’s
opening statements during the UIF hearings made a central contribution to
the reform of  this policy. General Secretary Myrtle Witbooi challenged
parliamentarians to acknowledge the multiple contributions domestic workers
repeatedly make to the overall governmental and economic livelihood of the
nation:
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We ask you to think seriously about domestic workers. You know ever since
this slavery started in this country, domestic workers were there. We have
been doing the work for all of you, yet when it comes to laws, there is just no
way it can be extended to domestic workers . . . We find it most problematic
that the bill seeks to include the poor while overlooking the poorest of the
poor, the domestic worker . . . We feel the unemployment insurance is
discriminating against us as women . . . We see women that are working for
twenty years. We see them walking in the streets because there is no
unemployment benefits for them. There is no pension fund for them . . . I
am asking you this morning, listen with your heart to the domestic worker . . .
think of your mothers because many of you were raised by domestic workers
working for you while you are here now . . . I am asking you this morning,
please consider the domestic workers . . . if it were not for them in your
houses, you would not have been here today, if  it were not for domestic
workers working for the people of Parliament, there would be no Parliament
today.23
Witbooi’s emotional plea draws on constructions of  gender and the collective
symbolic meaning of  motherhood and domestic service in South African
society. At the same time, the statement on the nation’s ability to function as
a result of  domestic workers’ labour, made within the formal chambers of
parliament, struck a chord in a very public venue – one laden with historical
symbolism – and instilled a serious challenge to denying workers protective
rights. In this sense, the prominent position of  SADSAWU within the GMAC-
UIF initiative proved to be an effective tool of accountability and public
presence during the parliamentary submission process.
Less than one week after these public submissions, government announced
that the UIF would be extended to cover all domestic workers, acknowledging
that they comprised the largest and ‘most vulnerable’ sector of working women
in the country. Many NGO leaders and political analysts in this study suggested
that this bold change in government policy resulted directly from the pressure
exerted by civil society and specifically the GMAC-UIF public submissions.
One parliamentarian stated that the public statement delivered by SADSAWU
made the decision to extend coverage ‘unavoidable’. Interestingly, while such
policy change marks a monumental victory for domestic workers, we also see
the co-optation of the discourse of vulnerability and the strategic use of
essentialised gender constructions of  motherhood and household labour as
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pivotal in this inclusive amendment. Such competing analyses are evident in
the work of  the coalition organised to advocate for domestic workers’ rights.
The CGE led the process of organisational networking from its particular
position of power within the new democratic framework. As an independent
monitoring body, the CGE assumes a central role in the structure established
by the broader national gender machinery, captured by its mandate:
The CGE exists because South Africans, when writing their Constitution, insisted
that such an institution be established. But it is also there to ensure that gender
issues are visible and integrated in the day-to-day policy and practice of state
and non-state institutions. Until gender equality is a way of  life in South Africa,
the mandate of  the Commission on Gender Equality remains.24
The CGE works with government structures to a certain degree, yet its primary
role is as a monitoring body, holding the state as well as private institutions
accountable to upholding gender equality as an integral part of  democracy.
Meintjes, analysing from her insider position on the CGE, demonstrates in
Chapter 3 of this collection that this organisation, while holding the potential
for powerful change, faced severe limitations in its ability to actualise change
through the promising trilateral public structures of  the gender machinery.
Meintjes points to the moderate leanings of ‘femocratisation’ as a critical
shortcoming of  the CGE. Rather than advocating the transformation of  gender
relations through the simultaneous emphasis on women’s empowerment and
men’s redistribution of  power, the CGE more often emphasised advocating
for women’s rights within the existing structures of  the state. In her words:
‘The Commission was so concerned to get the structures and structural
relationships right – its roles and functions – that it failed to get the ideology
and politics right’ (page 92–3, this volume).
I share with Meintjes this critique of the ideological shortcomings of the
CGE that posed serious barriers to the potential for radical gender
transformation through use of  the gender machinery structures. At the same
time, however, the focus on establishing the structural relationships served
to leverage power within the context of  the CGE’s leadership of  other NGOs
in this strategic coalition. In the case of advocating for the rights of domestic
workers, the CGE’s work on the UIF campaign, in collaboration with SADSAWU
and other well-positioned NGOs, afforded a space where organisations aligned
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across divisions to establish a collective civil society voice and mobilise for
policy change. From this platform, the CGE used its elevated position as a
tool to lead NGOs and speak in alignment with those organisations positioned
as ‘most vulnerable’, particularly the domestic workers’ union. Ironically, even
though both SADSAWU and the CGE share serious limitations in their
organisational strength and operation, their alliance in the GMAC structure
elevated the collective power of these organisations as aligned civil society
voices for women’s rights.25
Union leaders recognised the importance of the unemployment insurance
policy to the domestic work sector because it could provide a sustainable
income for women during periods of unemployment. Because of the vulnerable
position of  domestic workers in jobs that continue to be considered ‘informal’,
the worker participants in this research identified the ability to secure such
transitional resources as critical to assuring some sort of a ‘safety net’ in the
context of  severe socio-economic circumstances. Organisational submissions
from the GMAC-UIF described this benefit as a central component of an
overarching commitment to assure equitable access to democratic social
security, rather than an isolated protection policy. This allowed for a wider
participation of  NGOs focused on gender rights as human rights.
The UIF policy reform process also established a new framework for the
coalition model organised by the CGE. The integral membership of  SADSAWU
within the coalition afforded domestic workers a pivotal space to network
with other NGOs who represented their cause. SADSAWU’s presence as an equal
party in the coalition in turn informed NGOs about the practical realities of
policy decisions in ways otherwise unavailable without the representation of
domestic workers’ experiences at the decision-making table. In a personal
interview, Fatima Seedat, director of  the GMAC-UIF, described her perceptions
of  how the structure of  the coalition informed her own understanding of  the
recipients of this critical policy change.26 She said that this particular coalition
allowed her to develop a heightened awareness of the daily realities of
domestic workers in ways she had formerly not considered, even in her
experience as a gender specialist. Other leaders in the GMAC-UIF process stated
that their integral work with SADSAWU forced them to continually consider
the question, ‘Why are we here?’, within the broader framework of gender
rights. Thus, the public structure of  South Africa’s gender machinery
constructed a successful platform for women to align across race and class
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boundaries and, through the use of effective organisational mobilisation,
advocate for the inclusion of domestic workers as a viable and central labour
sector.
SADSAWU also benefited extensively from its involvement with GMAC-
UIF. Primarily, its alignment with organisations with wider networks, extensive
histories as human rights advocates, greater lobbying experience and larger
resource bases positioned SADSAWU more powerfully when several other
organisations backed its parliamentary submission with the same outlined
concerns and suggestions for reform. This alignment of  civil society organ-
isations proved to be effective in the efforts to ‘take domestic workers seriously’
within the context of  inclusion in policy rights. SADSAWU leaders embraced
the GMAC-UIF model and associated it directly with the ultimate success of
the policy reform.
Another critical component of the effectiveness of this collective model
stemmed from a shared reference among GMAC-UIF members to the inter-
national conventions adopted by South Africa. In particular, the resolutions
of  the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW)27 became both a central reference point and a tool to hold
the state accountable to the gender rights platform centralised in the nation’s
transition to democracy. By referencing international conventions such as
CEDAW, members of  the GMAC-UIF reinforced the state’s obligation to the
international community in ways that proved to be effective. Even though
such references can often be more rhetorical than applied, in this case of
instituting change in domestic labour policy, the strategic invoking of  CEDAW
standards connected the GMAC-UIF to a broader transnational gender rights
movement. Drawing on international documents therefore illuminated the
anomaly of the gender discrimination inherent in the exclusion of domestic
workers from critical social-security legislation, in sharp contrast to commit-
ments held by South Africa within the international community. Furthermore,
because South Africa’s own national policies surrounding gender rights are in
many instances more progressive than CEDAW, pointing to the international
standard underscored these sharp contradistinctions. As South Africa debated
its first major social security protection for this sector, the combined influence
of domestic workers, local NGOs, the CGE monitoring body and the
international standards provided a powerful collective stance to usher in policy
change.
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Because state institutions hold substantial power in their ability to recon-
stitute the symbolic and material nature of domestic work, they cannot be
ignored or discounted. However, state accountability is enhanced when it is
demanded from aligned international organisations applying pressure from
‘above’, as well as from within civil society putting on pressure from ‘below’.
The Black Sash, historically a women’s anti-apartheid organisation that remains
involved in domestic worker rights, drew on the guiding principles of  CEDAW
to make the following submission on the UIF to the South African state:
There has been a clear trend in recent years amongst international jurisdictions
to bring casual workers and workers in the informal sectors within the ambit
of  more formal employment legislation. This trend has been brought about
in recognition of the principle established under international law that to
exclude them amounts to unfair discrimination. We submit that the exclusion
of domestic workers from the UIF benefits is in clear contradiction of
international law, is at odds with accepted international practice and for all of
these reasons, as well as the reasons outlined above, is unfair discrimination.28
As members of the GMAC-UIF utilised these international documents, they
participated in a broader global women’s movement in two ways. First,
drawing on CEDAW reinforced South Africa’s role in formal institutions of
global governance and its commitment to gender rights within the international
community. Second, GMAC-UIF members strengthened informal international
civil society networks by utilising alliances and strategic relations with global
organisations to enhance their ability to hold states accountable both to their
local populations and to the governing international standards. In this case,
while the CGE’s effectiveness in pushing forward a radical agenda for gender
transformation remains truncated, its overt focus on building structures
through relationships demonstrated success in this instance by connecting
NGOs at the local level, strengthening the representation of less powerful
organisations, such as SADSAWU, and strategically capitalising on its rhetorical
power by aligning with the international women’s standards articulated in
CEDAW. The combination of  these roles proved to be effective in instituting
important policy change to protect domestic workers and connect this sector
ideologically to a larger gender rights discourse.
142 Women’s Activism in South Africa
The GMAC-UIF process illustrates that while the labour performed by
domestic workers may remain in the private household, it is not in isolation
from the public sphere at both the national and global levels. At the same
time, the strengthening of  both formal and informal civil societies shapes the
nature of domestic work. As workers in private households are connected to
a larger movement of  gender rights through union membership, their power
within the labour site is strengthened in both material and ideological ways.
Workers acquire direct knowledge and skill sets from their union experience
that enhance their ability to demand rights in the work setting in accordance
with national protective labour legislation. At the same time, the domestic
workers in this research articulated a feeling of  internal empowerment through
their knowledge of the context of domestic labour outside of South Africa
and the ‘solidarity’ they experienced as a result of  support for SADSAWU’s
campaign for protective rights in South Africa. Thus, through their membership
in the national union, domestic workers both gain an increased awareness of
rights and benefit from participation in a broader imagined international civil
society. This union participation, which places their work in private households
into the national public dialogue through organisational representation, is
then connected to global levels of  activism surrounding domestic labour.
While workers themselves do not often directly take part in transnational
organising, their membership in the national union instils in them a broader
awareness about the global nature of domestic work, and connects women in
South Africa to international activists in ideological solidarity. As revealed
through my interviews with union members, this identification with a broader
labour movement provided a level of  empowerment that strengthened
workers’ agency and countered the extreme vulnerability of isolation that is
particular to this form of  employment. For example, a domestic worker named
Thelma stated that she discussed her knowledge of the domestic workers’
union movement in Jamaica, the US and Brazil with her employer, suggesting
that South Africa’s standards of  unionisation and protective legislation were
not unrealistic given the progress of  the sector in other global locations. This
knowledge provided a level of  agency within Thelma’s work setting that
stemmed directly from her informed power base. Furthermore, union
members’ knowledge of the investment of international organisations in their
struggle provided a foundation of  strength that advanced the organisational
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capacity of the national union, and, in some instances, instilled a level of
hope for workers about the potential to democratise the institution of domestic
labour in South Africa.
The voice of  domestic labour in state structures
Since the GMAC-UIF initiative, the case of domestic labour has moved to a
more central position within the broader public dialogue on gender rights. In
2001, the Department of Labour initiated minimum-wage legislation for
informal workers, and in this context domestic workers received wide coverage
in public dialogue. In participant observations since the 2001 GMAC-UIF
campaign, I noticed the domestic labour sector at times becoming a measure
to assess the viability of gender rights or labour policy implementation. In
daily discourse throughout field research evaluation, perceptions of domestic
workers continue to be commonly connected to women who are among the
‘poorest of  the poor’ in South Africa. Such constructions resonate with the
overarching ‘vulnerability’ discourse generated by the state in relation to
domestic workers. Because they make up the largest sector of  working women,
however, any measure of gender rights progress must be evaluated in relation
to domestic workers’ ability to access such rights. As one union leader put it:
‘Women’s rights mean little for this country unless domestic workers’ lives
improve.’
As we move beyond the legislative victory to explore the ways in which
domestic workers are positioned within the broader discourse of gender and
social rights in South Africa’s new dispensation, Ally’s (2007) theory of  the
state’s contradictory role provides one of  the most illustrative analyses of  a
striking and overarching relationship between domestic workers and the new
democratic government. Even though the state eventually granted inclusion
for domestic workers in the case of  the UIF, it did so within a broader context
of  constructing this group as particularly ‘vulnerable’, thereby reifying the
pervasive race, class and gender power asymmetries central to South Africa’s
apartheid system. As Ally acutely points out, ‘In various forms, by posing the
vulnerability of these workers as the basis for state regulation of the sector,
the state constructed workers as lacking the capacity to effect change
themselves, thereby extending the state’s responsibility, and with it, its powers
and reach’ (7). Ally goes on to assert that such pervasive constructions of
workers as ‘vulnerable’ simultaneously put forth a notion of their unionisation
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efforts as weak and ineffective. Unlike other unions, in the eyes of the state,
domestic workers are not positioned to enter into bargaining situations to
assure protective legislation or minimum-wage standards. Accordingly, in the
UIF campaign case, while assuring protective rights, the state maintained power
in the doling out of  such rights, thereby reconstructing this particular sector
as vulnerable (read ‘weak and ineffective’) from the perspective of the state.
As Ally argues, this allowed the state to act by proxy to determine the
conditions of  employment for domestic workers. Such analyses pose serious
questions about the extent of actual social change instilled through the UIF
policy victory, when it occurred within the context of  an ongoing construction
of women in this sector as distinctly vulnerable, weak and ineffective at
unionisation.
As we see in Witbooi’s parliamentary address on behalf  of  SADSAWU,
union leaders also draw on these generalised constructions of  vulnerability
in their own discourse and interactions with state actors. I suggest that in
doing so, they are both rhetorically reproducing their own marginalised position
and enacting a particular form of  agency within the distinct nature of  South
Africa’s democratic transition. For example, the use of  imagery surrounding
motherhood, the phrase ‘poorest of the poor’, and the symbolic meaning of
‘domestics’ in South Africa emerge in the public discourse of  SADSAWU leaders.
Accordingly, Witbooi encouraged policy makers to ‘think of  your mothers’
when considering the exclusion of  domestic workers from the UIF. Such
discourse both reproduces this notion of vulnerability and, as policy makers
admitted, ‘makes it very difficult to ignore domestic workers’.29 Perhaps this
use of the rhetoric of vulnerability is chosen strategically by domestic workers
as a creative form of  resistance distinct to this particular phase of  South
Africa’s transition. I suggest that the way in which domestic workers respond
to state constructions of  the ‘vulnerability’ and the ‘highly marginalised’
position of  women in this sector constitutes their own distinct form of
pragmatic feminism.
The GMAC-UIF case paved a path for state recognition of domestic workers
as a viable labour sector, as well as a central constituent of any protective
gender measure. In line with Ally’s critique, the positioning of  ‘vulnerability’
as the central framework from which the state constructs its relationship to
(and protection of) women in this sector reinforces a distinctly paternalistic
power relation, whereby the state continues to allocate reform ‘from above’.
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Such relations hardly advance the progressive feminist vision of gender change
or the redressing of  gender, race and class divides central to South Africa’s
democratisation project. While these pervasive power asymmetries must
continue to be actively challenged, the practical and felt victories of domestic
workers surrounding the UIF campaign may also be held simultaneously.
According to SADSAWU leaders, a shared perception that ‘now we are on the
map’ symbolised a critical victory in the state’s public recognition of  this
sector through tangible policy change. As a result, from the GMAC-UIF we see
a new pattern in the intentional inclusion of domestic workers in state
processes dealing with gender, social security, minimum-wage standards and
labour rights.
As a critical example, the integration of domestic workers in state processes
extended to the executive level in 2006, when President Thabo Mbeki’s
Working Group on Women invited SADSAWU leaders to join in a broader project
of  examining the state of  women’s conditions in South Africa. The scope of
this initiative is defined as ‘promoting and monitoring the implementation of
government’s policies on the empowerment of  women’ as a measure of
‘advancing gender equality in the second decade’.30 Delegates from women’s
organisations throughout South Africa participate in this Presidential Working
Group, which is structured by an emphasis on ‘social cohesion’ and women’s
contribution to a ‘second economy’. As we see in the GMAC-UIF case,
international initiatives such as CEDAW and the Beijing Platform of  Action31
guide the work of  evaluating gender progress within state processes. This
presidential initiative draws from the gender machinery in place within South
Africa and works directly with the Office on the Status of  Women (OSW) and
the CGE. Yet the formalisation of  this initiative represents an added component
of state processes focused on the analysis of gender equality following the
first fourteen years of  democracy.
Women’s organisations are central to structuring the representation within
the Presidential Working Group on Women. From the 53 women’s
organisations represented within the broader working group, President Mbeki
selected a Coordinating Committee of 12 members based on initial
presentations that outlined the specific gender concerns of organisational
constituents. When SADSAWU leadership presented their interests to Mbeki,
they stated: ‘We are here to represent the women that clean your houses.’
Here again, we see domestic worker union leaders evoking the imagery of
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marginalisation and traditional gender roles in their efforts to attain solid
representation within state-led structures. After these initial meetings in which
leaders shared the lived experiences of women employed in domestic labour,
SADSAWU succeeded in acquiring a central position as one of  12 members on
the Coordinating Committee. This inclusion positions the national union of
domestic workers in a direct line of visibility with the highest level of the
executive structures, within a broader effort to evaluate the effectiveness of
gender rights implementation throughout South Africa. Moreover, through
this structure, the case of  domestic labour holds a central position within the
broader gender rights movement through women’s collective mobilisation in
civil society. SADSAWU’s participation in the Presidential Working Group
exemplifies how women’s organisations provide a liaison between workers
positioned in this severely disenfranchised location and state processes
established to promote the advancement of  gender rights. Ongoing analyses
of  SADSAWU’s role in the Presidential Working Group’s Coordinating
Committee will afford the opportunity to evaluate the extent to which such
formal inclusion impacts shifts in social relations that play out in the private
household sphere, where women’s labour remains a serious challenge to the
ongoing actualisation of  gender rights.
Assessing challenges
The victories associated with the organising of domestic workers have
grounded the most vulnerable and largest sector of  the working women’s
population in South Africa within the larger public discourse on gender rights.
As the GMAC-UIF case represents, the protective legislative measures illustrate
enormous progress in terms of  formalising domestic labour as a bona fide
sector of  employment for the first time in South Africa’s history. Women’s
use of civil society organisations and unionisation proved to be a pivotal
component in realising these central protections. The domestic labour case
depicts an innovative model of  women’s organising across NGOs, which
fostered an increased collective strength for both SADSAWU and the CGE
through this unique approach to mobilising for policy change. Such critical
measures of progress hold the potential to actualise the gender equality goals
central to South Africa’s new democracy. Furthermore, the collective action
of  the GMAC coalition incited a gradual shift in the social norms that govern
domestic labour. When the demand to protect domestic workers in
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unemployment insurance is backed by a larger body of civil society
organisations, domestic workers’ rights have more clout in individual
employment contexts. In this regard, the mobilisation of  domestic worker
unions demonstrates that civil society affords the opportunity to align more
closely the private and public spheres of democratisation. While change in
everyday social relations remains the sharpest challenge to implementing the
progressive gender, labour and social security policies assured on paper, the
GMAC-UIF victory represents an important initial step in that journey. As the
other chapters in this collection also illustrate, civil society comprises the
most vital space for women’s collective organisation and political participation
in the ongoing reconstruction of  a democratic South Africa. Through
organisations such as SADSAWU, women are supported in their pursuit of  roles
as political agents invested in reconstituting the terms of  the emergent nation.
These accounts of collective organising in South African civil society show
how women emerge from marginalised positions to confront predominant
structures of  race, class and gender inequality that prevail in the post-apartheid
context.
The impact of these victories, however, must ultimately be measured by
the extent to which such policy changes have encouraged shifts in social
relations within the private household sphere, where workers and employers
maintain distinct power asymmetries as a result of  pervasive socio-economic
divides that persist fourteen years after the realisation of governmental
democracy. Domestic workers in this study repeatedly asserted that ‘our rights
are only on paper’. Therefore, as we see in broader analyses of the progress
of  democratisation, accessing the social protections formalised in policy
change remains one of the greatest obstacles to assuring democracy for all
South Africans. The pervasive dominance of  ‘social apartheid’ in many
instances renders policy changes ineffective because of the power of ongoing
structures of  race, class and gender inequality. As a result, the GMAC-UIF
victory must be placed within the broader and more complex project of
infusing democratic policy in everyday social life.
In this research, examples of gradual shifts in social relations did surface
in direct response to the policy protections realised through domestic workers’
collective action. Employers, for example, expressed a heightened awareness
about minimum-wage legislation for domestic workers and in some cases
increased their pay scales. In some interviews, workers also expressed that
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their awareness of  new laws strengthened their employment situations.
Thandi’s knowledge of  the protections supplied in the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act, for example, allowed her to set boundaries within the work
context, limiting her weekend hours and asserting her rights to appropriate
leave time throughout the year. In instances such as these, the impact of  civil
society organisations’ work does have a presence within the actual work
setting, where the realities of social hierarchies persist and continue to
constitute the most striking contradictions of the emergent South Africa.
This level of change in social relations, however, remains the greatest challenge
to South Africa’s success in redressing apartheid and assuring that even the
most severely marginalised sectors of the population are able to access social
rights in their everyday lives. When domestic workers can do so, the notion
that ‘democracy stops at my front door’ may gradually shift as the work of
civil society organisations incites felt social change, particularly in relations
across race and class divides. Furthermore, successes such as gaining access
to the UIF place important examples of change in everyday discourse, which
also holds the potential to change relations at the community, household and
family levels. As the 74 000 domestic workers who have been able to access
UIF benefits since 2003 interact within their communities, the impact of civil
society organisations continues to expand. Cases such as these represent the
integral connections among the mobilisation of  women in civil society, the
realisation of further legislative measures to assure gender rights, and the
gradual transference of  South Africa’s rhetoric of  social equality to material
changes in everyday relations at the most private level of  society.
Conclusions
Through an in-depth analysis of the case of domestic labour in South Africa,
this chapter explored a sector that confronts some of  the most formidable
barriers to the full realisation of  gender rights. Findings from this research
repeatedly underscore how domestic labour holds a particular space in South
African society, where the feminised household retains interconnected power
asymmetries central to apartheid’s structure of  dominance (Fish 2006a). These
severe inequalities present pervasive obstacles to women’s organising that
are particular to this sector, including power asymmetries among women,
required migration and the perpetuation of  racialised constructions of  female
servitude. The nature of  domestic labour continues to be shaped by a complex
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set of relations between women positioned as either employers or domestic
workers. As this intimate relationship illustrates, any concept of  gender rights
must embrace an intersectional approach to consider the extremely disparate
positions of women as a result of ongoing class and race divides that mediate
access to protective legislation in South Africa’s ongoing process of
democratisation. The way in which domestic labour is situated in South
African society therefore presents a very specific case of how women mobilise
within and around this extremely challenging sector to assure wider access to
gender protections within the new democracy.
Domestic workers’ agency at a collective level has been most evident in
the case of  the national union, SADSAWU. Since its 2000 launch, this
organisation has established a solid membership base, aligned with a series
of gender and human rights NGOs, and positioned itself at the centre of the
recently launched Presidential Working Group on Women. Notably, the
alignment of  SADSAWU through the GMAC-UIF established a context where
gender rights organisations collectively took on the case of domestic labour,
advocating for the union motto ‘Women won’t be free until domestic workers
are free’. The victory realised in the UIF case illustrates how even the most
severely marginalised women are able to utilise organisations to work through
the embedded state structures of  the gender machinery in ways that contribute
to the ongoing processes of  assuring democratic gender rights. As Meintjes
(Chapter 3 of  this book) and Ally (2007) point out, such state structures
present striking limitations in advancing progressive gender change. The
‘femocratic’ emphasis on representation within state structures places distinct
boundaries on the promises of  the integrated gender machinery. At the same
time, even though women hold over one-third of the parliamentary positions,
the state discourse with its gendered, paternalistic constructions of  domestic
workers as ‘vulnerable’ renders this sector weak and unable to exercise agency.
Overall, then, the domestic labour sector illustrates a very distinct case study
of gender rights in relation to the state.
This research illustrates that civil society organisations provided a structure
where the successful mobilisation of women across race and class divides
resulted in tangible policy change to protect this extremely marginalised sector.
I suggest that while at the organisational level women have united to include
domestic labour as a central gender rights concern, the private household
presents a case where women’s alignment across divides remains most seriously
challenged by the persistent relations of inequality between ‘maids and
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madams’. As Britton (2005) asserted in her research on South African women
parliamentarians, the private sphere remains the most serious obstacle to
realising the public victories of  democracy. In Chapter 6 of  this collection,
Moffett contends that the prevalence of  rape serves as a policing agent in
South African society – where men retain power and dominance in the most
private encounters with women. The private nature of domestic labour
similarly affords those with power an opportunity to ‘police’ the extent to
which the public discourse of gender rights infiltrates the private sphere,
where social relations continue to be structured by a history of  servitude,
thereby reinforcing distinct race, class and gender divides. This policing of
domestic worker rights in the private household in many cases renders policy
changes insignificant, as employers maintain enough social power to retain
former systems of  power and dominance. Furthermore, the state’s persistent
reinforcement of domestic workers as ‘weak’ and ‘vulnerable’ reproduces
the power of employers in relation to this sector of working women commonly
constructed as ‘the poorest of  the poor’.
In this regard, we see another context in which women repeatedly asserted
that democracy is most severely inaccessible in the realm of the private house-
hold. In the case of  domestic workers, the duality of  daily survival creates
two distinct experiences of the limitations of gender rights within the private
sphere. First, when the household becomes a site of paid labour, it is still not
generally considered a formal work sector. Thus, this feminised and highly
racialised institution presents a severe contradiction in relation to the public
discourse of protection of gender rights, as the data throughout this chapter
illustrate. Second, domestic workers return to their own homes and communities,
both in rural areas on an annual basis and in township locations where
economic structures continue to define the geographic inequalities central to
residential location. Domestic workers similarly contended that the concept
of gender rights had not yet been embraced within their own private homes,
where their daily lives remained confined by gender inequalities. As one worker
asserted, ‘No matter what laws say we have gender rights, if a man wants to
hit me, he will hit me.’ This duality of  existence therefore inflates the extent
to which women employed as domestic workers must deal with the
contradictions of  the public and private spheres in their daily lives. For some
workers in this study, living with this contradiction motivated their enrolment
in the national union as a mechanism both to empower them personally and
to build organisational strength as part of a collective workers’ voice.
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Domestic workers hold a particular material and symbolic space that links
their day-to-day lives with the former system of  apartheid through powerful
ties to the embedded social conditions of  servitude. Shifting the nature of
domestic work requires substantial changes among those who continue to
hold privilege, those ‘formerly disenfranchised’ who now employ domestic
workers, and the state in its relationship to this particular sector. Given the
overlapping obstacles central to the nature of domestic labour discussed
throughout this chapter, collective mobilising at the organisation level is critical
to advancing social change at both the private and public levels. The work of
SADSAWU, in alignment with other NGOs, to assure the inclusion of  domestic
workers in the critical UIF social security protection marks a pivotal victory
in the long-term pursuit of  assuring ‘domestic democracy’. The ongoing
organising of women across divides through civil society organisations
constitutes one of  the most promising routes to engendering long-term social
change in the shifting terrain of  South Africa’s democratic landscape.
Notes
1.  While Statistics South Africa (2000) reports two other slightly larger occupational categories
for women, the number of women in official estimates is severely under-reported because
the employment context is the private household. Department of Labour officials in this
research repeatedly referred to domestic labour as the ‘largest sector of working women’ in
South Africa. Furthermore, disaggregation of  the data by racial categories illustrates that
domestic work remains the largest sector of labour for black women in South Africa.
2. This phrase was repeated by several participants in this study, with interview narrative data
from 2001 capturing this description of domestic labour among participants who were
domestic workers, employers of domestic workers, parliamentarians and non-governmental
organisation leaders.
3. The research presented in this chapter builds on an earlier book (Fish 2006a) and journal
article (Fish 2006b).
4. For further explanation of intersectionality and its connection to domestic labour, see
Guillaumin (1995); Young and Dickerson (1994); Collins (1990); and Cock (1980).
5. Throughout this chapter, I refer to ‘employers’ as women. While I recognise that men also
employ domestic workers, my work focuses specifically on the power relations among women
in the private household labour context.
6. For analyses of this public/private division, see Pateman (1988) and Enloe (1989).
7. English was the primary language of  communication in each of  the individual interviews,
although a translator was employed to interpret local meanings throughout the interview
transcripts.
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8. Critical to the ethics and confidentiality of  this project, however, I did not interview any
employers of workers, or workers of employers, in my sample.
9. All of the domestic workers in this sample worked for one employer on a full-time basis
during the time of  this study. Other aspects of  the research, however, did take into account
the shifting dynamics in this sector, with particular attention paid to the role of part-time
domestic workers (or ‘chars’) who work for a number of different employers.
10. An additional set of  interviews was conducted with five women recruited to work in coloured
communities through domestic worker ‘agencies’.
11. Because the term ‘feminism’ carries wide associations and meanings, in this study I define
feminism as a social movement that seeks to emancipate women from the oppressive
circumstances of structural inequality that continue to privilege men. Critical to this research,
however, I also acknowledge the vast difference in women’s experiences that leads to diverse
perspectives on this term. In this research, when I label participants as ‘feminists’, I am
referring to those who self-identify in this way as well as to those who espouse gender rights
orientations, but may not have used the term ‘feminist’ to describe themselves.
12. I have maintained relationships and continual communication with key participants in this
study for the past seven years. Several have reviewed and commented on the findings from
this research.
13. For an extensive historical review of domestic work unionisation, see Gordon (1985).
14. I am grateful to Eunice Tholakele Dhladhla, Myrtle Witbooi, Hester Stephens and Maggie
Shongwe for their detailed depiction of this complex history of union organisation over the
past 35 years.
15. See, for example, the case of  the ‘Centres for Concern’ depicted in Jacklyn Cock’s 1989 film
Maids and Madams.
16. SADSAWU motto, 2001.
17. By ‘first time’, I am referring to the first time since the establishment of the apartheid
government. Domestic workers were not included in unemployment insurance throughout
the apartheid era (from 1948 to 1994). This 2001 victory marked a critical step towards the
formal recognition of this sector.
18. Hester Stephens, SADSAWU president, personal interview, Kenilworth, Cape Town, February
2001.
19. These data were acquired through review of  SADSAWU’s organisational membership database
and union records as of 2001. Without national data on the exact number of women
employed in this sector, the ratio of union membership cannot be precise; however, local
estimates suggest that SADSAWU’s membership remains at approximately 1 to 4 per cent
of the total number of domestic workers in South Africa, illustrating the ongoing work of
collective mobilisation.
20. This is according to interviews with three Department of  Labour officials who consulted
national records in 2001, as well as general estimates reported in the Cape Times newspaper
from 2001.
21. For detailed accounts of this extensive investigation process, see the following South African
government reports: the 1991 Manpower Commission Report on Domestic Workers, the
1993 Limbrick Report and the 1996 Task Team Report on domestic workers and the UIF.
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22. In the South African parliamentary legislative process, policy drafts are initially written by the
relevant government department. The portfolio committee (composed of members of
parliament) then reviews and critiques the bill, holds public hearings to gather input from
civil society and eventually approves the final legislative document, along with the national
president and the relevant minister.
23. Myrtle Witbooi, SADSAWU general secretary, parliamentary public submission in Cape
Town legislative chambers, March 2001.
24. From the ‘Vision, Mission and Values Statement’ of  the CGE, internal organisational
document, 2001.
25. I thank the anonymous reviewers of earlier versions of this chapter for this important
analysis.
26. Fatima Seedat, personal interview, CGE Cape Town office, April 2001.
27. The Division on the Advancement of  Women at the United Nations sponsored the
Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
which was adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly. Accordingly, ‘this document is
often described as an international bill of rights for women. Consisting of a preamble and
30 articles, it defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets up an agenda
for national action to end such discrimination’ (United Nations Division for the Advancement
of  Women, 2008; www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw).
28. Shehnaz Seria, parliamentary public submission in Cape Town legislative chambers, March
2001.
29. Drawn from interviews with government policy makers, March 2001.
30. The quotations are drawn from the mission defined by the Presidential Working Group,
acquired as internal documents, June 2006.
31. Initiated in Beijing, China, in 1995, the Beijing Platform of Action is widely considered the
largest international gathering focused on women’s rights. From this United Nations
conference, the Platform of Action established twelve critical areas of concern, which remain
an active reference standard for the ongoing evaluation of gender rights at local and global
levels (www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm#statement).
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CHAPTER SIX
Sexual Violence, Civil Society and
the New Constitution
HELEN MOFFETT
SOUTH AFRICA HAS the worst known figures for gender-based violence for a
country not at war. At least one in three South African women will be raped
in their lifetime. These rates of sexual violence against women (as well as
children and men), along with the signal failure of our criminal justice and
health systems to curtail the crisis, suggest an unacknowledged gender civil
war. Yet narratives about rape continue to be rewritten as stories about race,
rather than gender. This stifles debate, demonises black men, hardens racial
barriers, and greatly hampers both disclosure and educational efforts. As an
alternative to racially inflected explanations, I argue that contemporary sexual
violence in South Africa is fuelled by justificatory narratives rooted in apartheid
practices that legitimised violence by the dominant group against the
disempowered, not only in overtly political arenas, but also in social, informal
and domestic spaces.
In South Africa, gender rankings are maintained and women regulated
through rape, the most intimate form of  violence. Thus in post-apartheid
democratic South Africa, sexual violence has become a socially endorsed
punitive project for the purpose of  maintaining patriarchal order. One result
has been to constrict and compromise women’s experience of  citizenship, as
the promises of constitutional equality are countered by the fear of sexual
violence. The 2006 rape trial of  Jacob Zuma, now president of  the ruling
African National Congress (ANC), provided a clear demonstration of the
shortfall between the rights women are guaranteed under the 1996 Constitution
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and the cultural, political, judicial and social backlash women risk should
they lay claim to these rights.
In this chapter,1 I explore the ways in which sexual violence, the epidemic
of rape in particular, undercuts the gender gains of the post-apartheid state
almost as fast as they are made. However, while this conundrum is obvious
to everyone able to read newspaper headlines, what is of particular interest
here is how apartheid and colonial scripts concerning race and gender are
intertwined and embedded in private spaces, where they remain apparently
impervious to public efforts (by the state and civil society) to dismantle them.
Worse still, as I aim to show, it seems that sexual violence has become a
means of policing a society that, while egalitarian for the first time in public
spaces, remains highly stratified, vertically organised and potentially violent
in private, intimate and domestic spheres – a tension that does not bode well
for the newly enfranchised women citizens of South Africa.
Sexual violence and the long shadow of  apartheid
In the few years since South Africans queued to cast their votes in the country’s
first election based on universal adult franchise, the status of women in this
fledging polity has come under increasingly troubled scrutiny. Sexual violence
in particular has spiralled, with a vast array of  research suggesting that South
Africa has higher levels of rape of women and children than anywhere else in
the world not at war or embroiled in civil conflict. This claim, and the statistics
that support it, are often angrily contested, with the result that yet more data
are collected and yet more quantitative analysis is undertaken by yet more
reputable organisations and institutes. All emerge with the same grim findings,
which are regularly reported in the mainstream media: at least one in three
South African women can expect to be raped in her lifetime; and one in four
will be beaten by her domestic partner.2 These figures emanate from credible
organisations, including parastatals, such as the Medical Research Council
(Wood, Maforah and Jewkes 1996; Wood and Jewkes 1998; Mathews et al.
2004), the Human Sciences Research Council and Statistics South Africa;
academic initiatives, such as the Centre for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation (Vetten 1997) and the Groote Schuur Hospital Rape Protocol
Project (Denny et al. 2002); international monitoring groups, such as Human
Rights Watch; and private institutions, such as the Population Council.3
Findings from these studies, as well as the failure of  South Africa’s over-
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burdened criminal justice and health systems to respond appropriately to the
crisis, suggest an unacknowledged gender civil war. The high rate of  rape in
particular is also fuelling South Africa’s HIV/AIDS pandemic, a major stumbling
block to the functioning of  the new state and a vibrant civil society. If  we
view South Africa’s brave new democracy from the perspective of  the millions
traumatised by sexual violence, we cannot escape the staggering contradiction
between the hard-won gender rights enshrined and even showcased in the
public arena and women’s everyday experiences of  private violation.
Much of the research on sexual violence undertaken in the first ten years
of  South Africa’s democracy has been quantitative (some examples have been
cited above). Theoretical investigation has tended to fall within the ambit of
masculinity studies or the field of  social anthropology (see, for instance, Bhana
2005; Niehaus 2003; Morrell 2001; Vogelman 1990). There is a growing body
of work on sexualities in Africa that adds useful context to local studies of
sexual violence (Arne 2004).4 While useful, Western aetiological models (Cahill
2001; Schwartz 1997; Scully 1994; MacKinnon 1989; Groth 1979; Brown-
miller 1975) that highlight the anger, fear and inadequacy of individual men
or the monstrosity of patriarchy as central to the ‘story’ of why men rape fail
to provide sufficiently nuanced explanatory or analytical frameworks for the
current South African experience of  pervasive sexual violence. The present
‘narratives of  normalisation’ surrounding sexual violence in South Africa and
other developing societies are more wide-ranging and complex than those
identified in Western feminist discourses of  the 1970s and 1980s, which did
not take fully into account the acute and complex forms of  ‘othering’5 present
in societies with a history of extreme racial/ethnic conflict. It needs to be
established whether there is a theoretical relation between South Africa’s
apartheid narratives, which were based on vigorous, even frantic principles
of ‘othering’, and our current climate of sexual violence.
Meanwhile, we might well find insights in sophisticated post-colonial
analyses of  gender violence that focus on the citing of  women’s bodies and
sexuality as political and cultural capital whenever nationalist, religious and
ethnic agendas are invoked in the process of  political transformation (Green
1991; Mama 1997; Jayawardena and De Alwis 1996). While it is generally
recognised that during times of  war, civic unrest and open political turmoil,
there is a rise in rates of  sexual violence (Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen 2001),
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little data have been collected on the correlation between incidences of sexual
violence and more benign forms of  political transformation – those accom-
panying national independence, the overthrow of repressive regimes, and so
forth. Yet it seems that there is a case for arguing that during periods of  overt
nationalist fervour, political regeneration, emancipation and other arguably
more laudable forms of  political restructuring, the rates of  sexual violence
against women (and children) also rise alarmingly, often for reasons that have
to do with the immediate past. This has certainly been the case in South
Africa.
I believe the pernicious and overtly racially ranked hierarchies endorsed
and enforced during South Africa’s apartheid regime continue to have profound
implications for women and their experience of gender-based and sexual
violence, even after these forms of  social stratification are apparently
dismantled or transformed in line with rights-based principles. I suggest it is
vital to investigate the complex relationship between South Africa’s recent
history of  apartheid, with its emphasis on rigid stratification and abnormal
social rankings along racial lines, and the disquieting rise in gender and sexual
violence in the years since the institution of  democracy.
Has the first flourish of democracy simply afforded South Africans the
opportunity to observe an already entrenched problem? Unfortunately, while
there is no doubt that sexual violence6 has always been prevalent in South
Africa, there is also no avoiding the fact that the first fourteen years of the
new state saw a dramatic increase in sexual assaults on women, children and
men. Many ask whether improved education on rights, the transformation of
the courts and police force and increased reporting have not contributed to
the spiralling of these figures, but while these factors may have been partly
responsible for an initial jump post-1994, they do not explain the continuing
steep increase. It is also worth noting that in spite of  attempts to reform the
overburdened and beleaguered criminal justice system, survivors of  intimate
violence still regularly experience discrimination and inefficiency at the hands
of the courts and police, and rape in particular remains hugely under-reported.
I pose the theory that sexual violence in post-1994 South Africa is fuelled
by justificatory narratives that are rooted in apartheid discourses. At the same
time, discourses of race, including accusations of racism, have stifled open
scrutiny of  the function of  rape as a source of  patriarchal control. Under
apartheid, the dominant group used methods of regulating blacks and
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reminding them of  their subordinate status that permeated not just public
and political spaces, but also private and domestic ones. In post-apartheid
South Africa, it is gender rankings that are maintained and women who are
regulated. This is largely effected through sexual violence, in a national project
that gives every indication that many men may indeed have bought into the
notion that by enacting intimate violence on women, they are performing a
necessary work of social stabilisation. In what follows, I will present various
‘cameo’ scenarios for scrutiny that point to the need to deconstruct our current
narratives of both rape and race – a task that is vital if we are to translate
gender equality from statutes into lived experience and if  we are to survive
as a viable democracy.
Rape narratives
There are numerous ‘narratives’ concerning rape in South Africa’s public
discourses. To begin with, I will focus on two cameo examples that demonstrate
how demands for gender equality (and in particular, an end to male violence)
are undermined, attacked or silenced either by accusations of  racism, or by
backlash from sectors of society that resist holding men responsible for rape.
In 1999, with the ‘new’ South Africa only five years old, several NGOs,
together with corporate sponsors, put together two short educational broadcasts
on gender-based violence, featuring the South African-born Hollywood actress
Charlize Theron. These were shown on terrestrial television channels during
advertisement breaks and also at some commercial cinemas. The first time I
saw one, I was electrified by Theron’s opening line, which ran: ‘Hey, all you
South African men, here’s a question for you – have you ever raped a woman?’
The two-minute ‘ad’ went on to deliver a straightforward message on date
and acquaintance rape, but what impressed me was that it was the first time
I had ever seen those responsible for the problem acknowledged, much less
addressed, in a public information broadcast. Never before in the history of
South African educational media campaigns had rapists or potential rapists
been directly addressed.7
Clearly, I was not the only one struck by this: the short films caused a
furore, and within a matter of weeks the Advertising Standards Authority
(ASA) had banned them from airing, in response to consumer complaints. The
reasons given were that they were offensive to South African men, stereotyping
them as ‘either being involved in rape or being complacent about it’ (Johnson
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2003, 14), and script changes were advised. The appeal process overturned
the ASA ruling within weeks, but the broadcasts were not screened again.
The Theron broadcasts had all the markers of a South African society
transformed not only in racial but also in gender terms, reflecting the constitu-
tional enshrinement of equality for all. Those who scripted them assumed
that this amounted to a socially endorsed and cohesive view that in such a
society women should not be raped, and men should be held responsible for
their acts of violence. However, in assuming that the newly democratic society
could grapple with the issue of  rape as a marker of  gender inequality only,
the makers of the ad were sadly mistaken. While responsive to the crisis of
intimate violence plaguing the infant democracy,8 they would have done well
to attend the conference on Women in Post-War Reconstruction in Johannesburg
in 1999, which signalled that something was terribly amiss with Africa’s brand-
new and most feted democracy. Activists and scholars noted that ‘[d]uring
the transition from war to peace, or from military dictatorship to democracy,
the rhetoric of  equality and rights tends to mask the reconstruction of
patriarchal power’ (Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen 2001, 4). The new South
African polity was proving to be no exception.
Five years later, against a backdrop of  celebrations marking the country’s
first ten years of  democracy, President Thabo Mbeki publicly attacked anti-
rape campaigner Charlene Smith, herself  a rape survivor, on the grounds that
her efforts to educate South Africans about rape were racist.9 His rationale
for doing so was that Smith had described South Africa as having the worst
figures for sexual violence in the world.10 It was the second time he had publicly
denounced her as a racist – for critically addressing the issue of rape – and
this time it caused a public stir, as Smith’s tireless and courageous efforts to
educate the South African public on rape and its deadly relation to HIV/AIDS
had earned her considerable public acclaim (Smith 2001). Mbeki never
retracted any of these accusations, although he subsequently acknowledged
that a quotation he had attributed to her (that she had described black men as
‘rampant sexual beasts . . . unable to keep it in [their] pants’) had in fact been
authored by an American academic (Smith 2005).
Having established that efforts to critique rape lead to backlash, whether
from civil society or the highest elected public official in the land, we begin
to see how this might lead to paralysis, even as the problem escalates. Only
weeks after the Mbeki–Smith clash (perhaps the starkest example of how a
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critique of patriarchal violence can be hijacked by anxieties about racism), I
attended a reading and discussion group at the home of Professor Njabulo
Ndebele and his wife, Mpho. Vice-chancellor of  the University of  Cape Town,
Ndebele is himself a celebrated writer and astute critic and social comment-
ator. His most recent novel, The Cry of  Winnie Mandela, had been lauded for
its remarkable insight into the emotional and political terrain traversed by
southern African women. Those present made up a fair representation of
Cape Town’s progressive intelligentsia, and included writers, activists,
academics, publishers and even theologians. The guest of  honour was well-
known writer Sindiwe Magona,11 recently returned to Cape Town after fifteen
years of  an exile of  sorts in New York City.
Sindiwe spoke openly and eloquently of her grief and shock at returning
home to discover that hers was now a society in which babies were raped on
a regular basis. She was particularly outraged to discover nurses at her local
clinic instructing mothers to bring in their daughters to receive contraceptive
injections as soon as they began menstruating – given the extremely high
likelihood that they would be repeatedly raped during their teenage years.
She was appalled and bewildered by the fatalism of a society that simply
accepted that it was women’s lot to be raped, and saw this as a tragic cross to
be endured, rather than an illegal and untenable act of violence, especially in
the age of  HIV/AIDS. The subsequent lively discussion focused on possible
causes for this tide of sexual violence, with many of the speakers detailing
the attack on masculinity conveyed by the degradation and humiliation of
apartheid, the breakdown of the African family through the system of migrant
labour, and so on. Sindiwe became angrier still, eventually crying out, ‘I’m
sick of hearing apartheid used as an excuse! There can be no excuse, no
justification for this behaviour!’
Sindiwe’s response is salutary, not least because it reveals the pitfalls of
most discussions of  rape in public and private forums that attempt to link it
causally to South Africa’s history of  apartheid. First, they generate discourses
that often begin to resemble a series of ‘excuses’; second, in unproblematically
detailing the degradation of masculine pride as the reason for the propensity
to rape, such discourses offer no critique of patriarchal frameworks that shape
such ‘pride’; and third, they unwittingly lay the blame for sexual violence at
the door of those who were discriminated against under apartheid. Every
single contributor to the elite debate described above premised their remarks
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on the unspoken assumption that rapists were black. Yet my years as a hotline
counsellor in the latter half of the 1980s rapidly disabused me of the notion
that domestic and sexual violence were the province of poor, black or ill-
educated men. I received distress calls not only from women living in townships
or ghettoes, but from the wives of  professional men living in Cape Town’s
most exclusive suburbs. I listened to women who had been sexually assaulted
or beaten not only by gangsters, illiterates, alcoholics and unemployed men,
but also by ministers of religion, teetotallers, university professors, doctors
and lawyers.12 Counselling women of  all races and religions and classes brought
home to me the truisms of  sexual violence: rape, like most crimes, is intra-
communal (that is, it is usually committed by ‘insiders’, not ‘outsiders’); women
are far more likely than men to be raped; and women are invariably raped by
men. In other words, sexual violence (outside of wars of ‘ethnic cleansing’
and genocide) is an instrument of  gender domination and is rarely driven by
a racial agenda. In brief, if we look at the Theron and Mbeki–Smith incidents
and others like them as markers of the kinds of rape narratives tolerated or
disrupted in the newly democratic South Africa, we begin to see that racial
accusations and assumptions like these prevent the unmasking of patriarchal
violence. It is clear that the makers of the Theron ads were naive in assuming
that South African society could stomach any discourse on rape that located
responsibility for sexual violence with the perpetrators: men. Five years later,
luminaries from the president himself  to the cream of  South Africa’s writers
and academics assume all too readily that any discussion of rape is predicated
on a rapist who is always black. Therefore, certainly according to Thabo Mbeki,
any critical investigation or denunciation of rape is an attack on black men,
which can be demonstrated by such talk of  rape being racist. Obviously, this
makes it very difficult to debate the aetiology or purpose of  rape.13
These common discursive responses to rape reveal alarming trends about
the post-apartheid South African society and its inability to discuss openly
issues of gender: any discussion of rape is invariably subsumed in narratives
about race or class, not gender; these assumptions concerning rape, race and
class are held at the highest political and intellectual levels; and the aetiology
of sexual violence, while a serious concern, is almost never directly addressed.
South Africans of all races, it seems, assume that perpetrators of sexual
violence are black men, no doubt because of apartheid narratives they have
internalised. This leaves us without an adequate framework for critique. The
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truth is that the majority of  rapists in South Africa are black only because the
majority of  the South African population is black. Ten years of  transformation
have nevertheless failed to deconstruct the old apartheid narratives of  sexual
violence that demonise black men as incontinent savages, lusting after
forbidden white flesh, with the result that open discussion of a major problem
is at a standstill. I have written elsewhere about how rape narratives inscribe
the rapist as simultaneously black and monstrous, noting:
It’s clear that by using monster narratives that literally ‘paint it black’, the standard
stories of  rape in South Africa confirm everyone’s worst fears. White women
fear every man that does not belong within their community . . . white men
buy guns to protect their families from the threat of the heart of darkness
beyond the garden gate. Black men are outraged and humiliated at being
categorised as violent, sex-crazed maniacs preying on white woman; black
women are kept from reporting the violence they experience for fear of
being disloyal.
The irony is that as a result, the great majority of rapes (between peer
members of the same community) can never be addressed or discussed, and
so the real problem of sexual violence flourishes in the dark. Meanwhile, the
worst kind of racial stereotyping is kept alive, and barriers between
communities harden. (Moffett 2002, 60)
Neither is this new. Davis (1983) first laid out the way rape narratives can be
used to inflame racial attitudes some 25 years ago. It is clear that in
a newly democratic society, the ‘racing of  rape’ serves as a counter-
transformative narrative, one that maintains and nurtures fear and suspicion
in communities that are already historically or culturally divided, or prompts
a return to conservative values and traditions. Public and private responses
to the ‘story’ of rape that features a depraved black perpetrator include gloomy
prognostications of the eventual collapse of the state and failure of the
democratic project under black majority rule.14 They also include an array of
prescriptive ‘antidotes’ that run counter to transformative values: re-embracing
hierarchical family structures that locate men as ‘heads of  households’ and
advocate the subordination of women (a common response seen in some
religious groupings), or the enthusiastic endorsement of cultural and ‘tribal’
rituals such as virginity testing – often couched in terms that are explicitly
164 Women’s Activism in South Africa
sexist and homophobic. Moreover, as shown above, such anxieties and
assumptions about race are both stifling open discussion of sexual violence
and avoiding any confrontation with the perpetrators.
Although I have explained elsewhere that there are no logical barriers to
women raping men,15 rapists are invariably male, which places any discussion
of rape squarely within discourses of violent gender and patriarchal domin-
ation. Nevertheless, South African men and women find this almost impossible
to contemplate. In a society battling to shake off the legacy of institutionalised
racism, it may seem a bridge too far to acknowledge that gender is at the
heart of this acute social problem. Instead, one hears repeatedly that apartheid
and its ills (such as the migrant labour system) ‘emasculated’ black men, left
them ‘impotent’ and experiencing a ‘crisis of masculinity’;16 and although
these remarks are problematically embedded in unquestioned patriarchal
discourses, they carry a grain of  truth. But these explanations explicitly exclude
white men, thus implying – however unwittingly – that they do not rape.
Even those who recognise that the assumption that all rapists are black is
outrageous and offensive to black men nevertheless continue to insist that
poverty and joblessness are key to the aetiology of  sexual violence without
acknowledging that such claims might also be degrading and offensive to the
poor and unemployed (if only through the demonstrably false corollary that
middle-class men in secure employment do not commit rape). Yet aetiological
theories about substance abuse and alcohol, dysfunctional families, childhood
traumas, conservative religious or cultural traditions, and so on, continue to
proliferate. There is no doubt that factors such as alcohol and substance abuse,
unemployment, entrenched poverty, lack of  infrastructure in rural areas, the
hopelessness born of lack of opportunity and joblessness, the threat of HIV/
AIDS, prior history of  abuse, post-traumatic stress syndrome, oppressive
cultural and religious mores, gang membership, peer pressure and breakdown
of  the family and clan structures all exacerbate the problem of  sexual violence
– as they do almost any social ill.
Some of these factors are certainly more relevant than others in shaping
the scourge of sexual violence in the South African context, and indeed their
impact will differ within communities according to geographical, religious,
ethnic, economic, linguistic or still more specific local factors: for example,
young men in impoverished urban ghettoes ‘learn how to be a man’ from
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crime lords and drug dealers, with group rape a common initiation ritual in
gangs. As Elaine Salo explains, ‘While all men are capable of  rape, the reasons
why they rape are diverse, and informed by whom they rape, as well their
own and their victims’ structural location in society.’17
Neither is it as easy to tease out the entangled categories of gender, race
and class in South Africa as I have perhaps suggested, in the interests of
clarity. Race, gender, class and sexuality continually inflect each other and
are often subsumed into one another, as a result not just of apartheid (which
merged the categories of race and class), but also of centuries of patriarchal
colonialism that made strenuous efforts to monitor and control the category
of  gender along racial and ethnic lines. However, none of  the factors listed
above – all of which might amplify sexual violence – supply an authentic
aetiology; none cause rape.18 Neither do they fully explain the prevalence of
sexual violence across every sector of  South African society, including the
wealthy, privileged, educated and employed classes. It would seem that it is
more palatable, acceptable even, to ascribe the tide of sexual violence in
post-apartheid South Africa to a discourse of apartheid ‘emasculation’ or
poverty. To examine the gender ideologies and identities in which it is rooted
would mean acknowledging that no matter how many women sit in parliament,
the goal of gender equality remains out of reach, certainly in private spaces,
where sexual violence defines relations of power; it would also mean facing
up to the virulence of  the overlapping patriarchies that threaten even those
fragile gender rights that have been established. No wonder we flinch from
such scrutiny.
Like most feminists, I believe the cause of sexual violence lies in the
construction of  dominant masculinities found in all patriarchal social systems.19
Nevertheless, there is indeed a link between South Africa’s recent history
and the failure of  its citizens under democracy to respect women’s rights to
bodily autonomy and integrity. I believe questions about the relation between
apartheid’s legacy and the current scenario of  unchecked sexual violence must
be framed – but in such a way that they do not focus exclusively on black
men. This means that any discussion of the relation between the history of
apartheid and the current crisis of gender-based violence requires the crafting
of new paradigms that acknowledge that there are men in every stratum of
South African society who enact sexual violence.
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Rape and the anxiety inherited from apartheid
We have already established that the area of  gender-based violence is fraught
with racialised assumptions, in which rape narratives are endorsed and
circulated when they feature a barbaric Other, invariably inscribed as ‘darker’
(literally, morally and figuratively) than the victim. Secondly, there is the
problem that arises when women, rather being seen as the potential victims
of  a demonised Other, become the Other themselves. For over 50 years,
South African society operated on the explicit principle that the Other was
unstable, potentially extremely powerful and therefore dangerous, and needed
to be kept in its place by regular and excessive shows of  force.20 Women –
the current subclass – are also seen as having significant agency and therefore
they pose a potential threat to the uncertain status quo. Today, as under
apartheid, there is considerable social anxiety about a powerful, unstable
subclass that must be kept in its place. In the words of sociologist John Moland:
‘Both systems, the patriarchy and the race-caste system, rest upon a relationship
in which the dominant or superordinate has made the dominated or sub-
ordinate “an instrument of  the dominant’s will and refuses to recognize the
subordinate’s independent subjectivity” ’ (1996, 404; my italics).
Many sexually violent men justify their behaviour in terms of  the discourse
that women ‘ask for it’. However, closer scrutiny of  the local context would
suggest that this differs from Western constructions concerning supposedly
provocative behaviour or dress, and is implicitly related to the project of not
only refusing to ‘recognise [women’s] independent subjectivity’, but actively
punishing such ‘independent subjectivity’.
A cameo that sheds revealing light on this issue was presented in a ground-
breaking televised interview screened at about the same time that the Theron
anti-rape broadcasts were banned. A taxi driver openly described how he and
his friends would cruise around at weekends, looking for a likely victim to
abduct and ‘gang-bang’. His story was unselfconscious and undefended: he
showed no awareness that he was describing rape, much less criminal
behaviour. When the interviewer pointed out that his actions constituted
rape, he was visibly astonished. What was most striking was his spontaneous
and indignant response: ‘But these women, they force us to rape them!’ He
followed this astonishing disavowal of male agency by explaining that he and
his friends picked only those women who ‘asked for it’. When asked to define
Sexual Violence, Civil Society and the New Constitution 167
what this meant, he said: ‘It’s the cheeky ones – the ones that walk around
like they own the place, and look you in the eye.’21
This reflects a disturbing pattern in which a woman is described as ‘asking
for it’ because she has asserted her own will, answered back, moved around
on her own, and so on. So it would appear that in some cases men are ‘forced’
to rape women because the latter dare to practise freedom of movement,
adopt a confident posture or gait, make eye contact, speak out for themselves:
in other words, when women visibly demonstrate a degree of autonomy or
self-worth that men find unacceptable, they are perceived as sufficiently
subversive and threatening as to compel men to ‘discipline’ them through
sexual violence. What is more, if  rape is believed to be deserved – if  a woman
is simply being ‘corrected’ or ‘taught a lesson’ – it is somehow not considered
to be a criminal activity.
This rationale for rape – as a handy shorthand means of teaching a ‘cheeky’
woman a lesson – is deeply familiar to anyone who grew up under apartheid.
This is the same script that was used during five decades of  apartheid rule to
justify everyday white-on-black violence as a socially approved and necessary
means of ‘showing the “darkies” their place’. This is not so much a script of
flat-out racial or gender rejection, as one that is violently punitive towards
those members of a subclass who reveal (through body language, visible signs
of self-respect, freedom of movement) that they do not recognise or accept
their subordinate status in society.
As a child growing up in a conservative farming area in the Western Cape,
I heard again and again, ‘I love the blacks, I get along fine with my workers,
I’m like a father to them – but what I won’t tolerate is the cheeky ones, the
troublemakers’. Even as a very young child, I knew exactly how this ‘cheeki-
ness’ was shown or ‘performed’ – very often in no more than a bold stare, an
upright posture (‘walking tall’) or a refusal to demonstrate sufficiently grovel-
ling gratitude for the weekly tot of wine – and how it was punished – usually
with beatings, occasionally severe enough to result in serious injury or even
death.
Such behaviours followed a social and political pattern of ‘keeping the
blacks in line’, reminding them who was ‘master’. ‘Subversives’ or ‘agitators’
were singled out for humiliating or brutal treatment as a means of  threatening
their peers, reminding them of the fate that awaited them should they step
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out of line. These acts of violence were generally random and spontaneous,
and sometimes fairly low-key, aimed not necessarily at causing life-threatening
harm, but at shaming and humiliating the target. In other words, these acts,
while not necessarily public spectacles, nevertheless served a useful didactic
and warning function to others.22 Such shows were necessary under an apartheid
state that gave whites unparalleled power and relegated black citizens to a
subordinate status because the latter were in the majority. Whenever a small
group attempts to dominate a large group, fear becomes an important strategic
weapon.
Here the parallels between blacks under apartheid and women in South
Africa today become more compelling; women, in the well-known saying by
Gloria Steinem, are ‘a majority that are treated like a minority’. Although
women’s numerical majority is marginal, there is no doubt that as a group
women are sufficiently numerous (compared to men) to make ‘control’
problematic. It could be argued that sexual violence in South Africa has thus
become a form of  ‘witch ducking or burning’ – an ordeal visited on women in
order to keep them and their peers compliant with social ‘norms’ determined
by hegemonic, powerful, yet threatened patriarchal structures.23 The useful
thing about this particular hypothesis is that it incorporates the fallout of
apartheid across race groups.
Of  course, this is not to suggest that women in pre-apartheid or even pre-
colonial South Africa were not policed or controlled, or lived free of the fear
of patriarchal violence. But the legacy of apartheid has contributed to two
critical problems: our subsequent focus on race still tends to repress open
scrutiny of  gender issues; and the tendency of  apartheid to drive violence
into intimate and domestic spaces continues to fuel the epidemic of sexual
violence.
In South Africa, then, some men believe that by resorting to sexual violence
they are participating in a socially approved project to keep women within
certain boundaries and categories (as well as a state of continuous but necessary
fear). After all, the Other has historically been seen as powerful, subversive,
potentially unstable, needing to be policed (even if this meant torture,
detention and murder) not only ‘for their own good’, but also for the ‘greater
good’ of  society. This kind of  hierarchical thinking (and anxiety about how
to keep certain groups stable and bounded within socially prescribed and
limited domains) does not disappear simply as the result of a democratic election.
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This kind of ‘rationalised’ intimate violence is also often used as a ‘control
mechanism’ when the group believed to be inferior is absolutely necessary to
the continued comfort and survival of  those in power, and an integral part of
the latter’s daily lives: when they are needed not only to provide conventional
labour, but to carry out domestic chores and childcare as well. The vast
majority of white South Africans who vocally and enthusiastically supported
apartheid entrusted the cooking of  their meals and the care of  their children
to black servants. These and similar domestic duties involve a considerable
measure of  trust and exposure, and point to the paradoxical vulnerability of
the dominant class being serviced.24
Something else difficult to convey to those who have never lived in a
society where unskilled domestic labour is cheap and plentiful is the degree
of  practical helplessness of  many white and/or middle-class South Africans.25
Similarly, it is entirely possible that a great many violent men in this country
are genuinely unable to calculate a grocery budget, prepare a nourishing meal
or do the laundry – and are therefore dependent on female partners or relatives
to perform these chores for them. But this form of  dependency generates
anxiety and a need to regularly display authority to sustain the services of  the
oppressed, thus inflaming the propensity for violence, particularly in the
intimate sphere. South Africans of all races remain familiar with social
strategies that combine intimate and ongoing proximity with ongoing
enactments of extreme repression.
Moreover, the complex blend of peer and societal pressures men experience
regarding the need to ‘police’ feminine subversion exists against a backdrop
that tells them that rape is a ‘safe’ crime to commit (and perhaps not a real
crime after all); there are unlikely to be legal consequences; and that any
shame attached to the act will adhere to the victim, not themselves. These
socially accepted scripts concerning gender and violence were underlined by
Vogelman’s findings in his 1990 study of  South African self-confessed rapists
who had evaded the criminal justice system (they were often found ‘not guilty’
for technical reasons). Some of these subjects expressed indignation that an
act as normative as rape should be criminalised. In short, many men rape not
because they want to or are ‘tempted’, but because their social context suggests
that they can (and in some cases, should) do so with impunity.
The parallels with low-level, continuous ‘punishment’ meted out by white
South Africans to black South Africans under apartheid are compelling: for
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instance, black workers who might be beaten by their white employers (or a
black ‘boss boy’ authorised by his ‘masters’ to implement white social control)
had little or no redress. While a range of  violent behaviours, from assault to
murder, were crimes according to apartheid statute books, there was once
again a tacit social understanding that certain kinds of white-on-black violence
were ‘necessary’ as a kind of  oil that kept apartheid hierarchies running
smoothly. It was certainly extremely difficult for blacks to institute criminal
proceedings against whites (or the lackeys of the dominant group) who used
violence against them. Both forms of  violence – men’s sexual attacks on
women, and racist attacks shaped by apartheid ideology – reveal the anxiety
of the perpetrator class about possible loss of dominance.
My interviews with local researchers investigating gender and the
construction of  identity (national, racial, ethnic, cultural and linguistic) are
beginning to point to the possibility that South African women are policed
and immobilised by fear of rape by the ‘Other/Outsider’. At the same time,
they are punished for attempts to break out of subordinate roles and rigidly
enforced cultural or ethnic communities by covertly ‘legitimised’ sexual
violence that takes place within recognised social structures: families, co-
religionists, tribes, villages or neighbourhoods.26 Acts of  violence are therefore
seen as necessary, not only to keep the unstable subclass of  women in their
ordained places, as discussed above, but to confirm and remind them of  their
membership in a specific community. As a tool of  social control, sexual violence
is especially effective, as it combines the literal pain and shock of physical
violence with deep shame and self-blame on the part of the victim, which
leads to self-punitive and self-monitoring behavioural changes by the victim
(who is extremely unlikely to report her attacker or seek legal redress,
particularly if he is part of her immediate circle, and who may instead become
withdrawn, submissive, fearful or restricted in her movements). Such changes
on the part of  women, who might otherwise display autonomy, possibly serve
orthodox and conservative community ‘needs’ in the short term. At the same
time, women’s entitlement to gender rights – particularly as citizens of  a new
democracy – is placed in jeopardy, if  not destroyed, because of  the power of
sexual violence to circumscribe individual agency.
Rape and gender equality
Having established that appalling levels of sexual violence in South Africa
are directly shaped by the legacy of  apartheid, the question arises as to why,
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in the post-1994 society, such violent forms of  social control are still being
imposed on South African women.
South Africa’s new Constitution enshrined the rights of  all groups in society.
It had to. The spectre of  apartheid – social structuring and discrimination on
the grounds of  the precise shade of  one’s skin, ancestry and so-called tribal
identity, and the suffering this caused – haunted the 1996 Constitution. One
of its chief aims, therefore, was to enshrine the right to equality for everyone.
Like many ‘peace treaties’, it was driven by a sense of ‘never again’. The
recent history of legislated inequality was so abhorrent that rights were
endorsed and guaranteed across the spectrum of  race, gender, class, ethnicity,
religion, language, level of  ability, sexual orientation or preference. The battle
for women’s political rights in particular, which gathered momentum during
the last two decades of  the twentieth century, was especially visible, as were
the efforts to enshrine the legal rights of  lesbians and gays.27
The ruling ANC responded to these imperatives with an admirable
programme of  women’s representation: what amounts to one of  the world’s
most radical affirmative action programmes in favour of  women, with a stated
commitment to placing women in one-third of political spaces by 2009 (Mama
2004, 2–3). The path to what might seem an unusually bold strategy was
smoothed by a liberation struggle that had co-opted and honoured women in
roles beyond the usual undervalued and feminised ones of  supplying food,
shelter and nursing care (although women undertook these duties too); their
contributions as political strategists, leaders and guerrilla fighters were
acknowledged and at times encouraged.
Nevertheless, these rights were crafted in a country contending not only
with a legacy of racism, but also one of manifest sexism, homophobia and
xenophobia. In the areas of  gender and sexuality, the emergent South African
nation was arguably not ready for full equality; neither did it popularly endorse
such equality. To paraphrase a conclusion from one of  the gender-based
violence surveys, ‘Violence arises when a chauvinistic citizenry is in a
relationship with a liberated Constitution.’28
It can thus be argued that political space (on all sides of  the spectrum) for
women in South Africa has invariably been carved out in ways that do not
undermine the variety of  interlocking patriarchies in society. In the process,
the tension between validating women’s rights to full citizenship and political
participation without revising their social subordination has created a new
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variation on the disjuncture between the private and the public realms typical
of  capitalist patriarchal systems. This theme is perhaps best illustrated
anecdotally. Pregs Govender, former ANC MP, recounts the story of  a senior
male member of government who was extremely supportive of her work as
chair of the Joint Standing Committee on the Improvement of Quality of
Life and Status of  Women, a body that made Herculean efforts to translate
the equality principles of the Constitution into substantive legislation. He
saw no contradiction between his enthusiastic endorsement of  women’s active
participation in politics and his repeated insistence that at home he was the
master: ‘Democracy stops at my front door.’29
Even if this kind of splitting between the public and private realms is not
typical of all South African men (or women), it is nevertheless openly and
informally reflected in social interaction. It is perhaps best summed up in the
near-identical phrase, taken from an interview with a married man, cited in
the title of a report on domestic violence: ‘I do not believe in democracy in
the home.’30 It is a requirement of  participation in the new South African
state that one should ‘believe’ in democracy ‘outside the home’; with the
exceptions of a few extremist fringe groups, no credible political grouping in
South Africa is likely to call for the withdrawal of universal adult franchise or
drive women out of  political structures. However, the substantial divergence
between the ways in which men and women are understood to inhabit public
and private spaces means that the flattened and transparent structures
associated with democratic practice are eschewed in the domestic and, even
more so, the sexual realms.
So it would seem that it is important that South African women are
frequently reminded that their equality in the public domain does not translate
into equality in the private domain, an arena that remains highly stratified
and hierarchically structured. Consequently, we witness the uneasy and
convoluted relation between violence and rights wrought by more than a
decade of  democracy. The women’s movement in South Africa had done
much to position women on centre stage at the moment of transition to
democracy, but it had arguably failed to deconstruct the multiple overlapping
and entrenched forms of  patriarchy that had flourished under apartheid. Given
that much of this patriarchal heritage remains intact, the newly democratic
South African state can be suspected of trying to site women as holding
equality only some of  the time and in certain spaces. So a devil’s bargain has
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been struck: women are widely accepted as having equal political status,
even within structures such as parliament, as long they remain subordinate in
the private and domestic realms.31 It is entirely possible that rape covertly
performs the function of  policing this fault line.
Citizenship and the Zuma rape trial
Nowhere was this more clearly seen than in the 2006 rape trial of  the ANC’s
then deputy president, Jacob Zuma, who was charged with raping a woman
half his age while she was an overnight guest in his home. As the daughter of
one of  his valued struggle comrades, she was in the position of  an honorary
daughter to him; throughout the trial, she referred to him as ‘uncle’. Zuma’s
claim was that the woman, who is openly HIV-positive and a lesbian, had
approached him and aggressively insisted on sex, leaving him little choice
but to comply. His bizarre explanation – that in his (Zulu) culture, it was
necessary to satisfy an aroused woman, otherwise she would make a rape
accusation – provoked perplexity and outrage, even though in the final analysis
the white male judge accepted this explanation. Zuma did not use a condom,
and infamously reported that he showered after the encounter to try to avoid
HIV infection.
Zuma was entitled to a vigorous defence, and he received one. In the
end, he was found not guilty: the judge determined that the sex had been
‘consensual’ and that ‘Kwezi’ (the accuser’s nom de plume) had lied. Gallons
of  printer’s ink have been spilt over the theatre of  the trial itself – in which
Zuma supporters chanted, danced, threatened women from anti-rape
organisations, attacked and stoned a woman rumoured to be the accuser and
burnt the accuser in effigy.
The inexplicable weakness of the prosecution, the inherent sexism of the
judgment and its implications presented grave challenges to gender equality
in social institutions and public processes. The fact that the accuser’s sexual
history (including her history of prior rapes as a child) was exhaustively
uncovered and used to discredit her testimony dismayed many, as did Zuma’s
apparent lack of remorse at having (at the very least) acted recklessly and
irresponsibly in having unprotected sex with a woman he knew to be HIV-
positive, not to mention the impropriety of the sexual contact (even if
consensual) itself. Zulu izangoma (diviners) and cultural commentators have
observed that Zuma’s behaviour constituted a form of  social incest taboo in
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the culture he vigorously appropriated to support his behaviour; indeed, if he
was the ‘100% Zuluboy’ he claimed to be during the trial, he was required to
undergo cleansing rituals and pay damages.32
Space does not permit a full discussion of  the fallout of  the trial, or a
detailed analysis of the discourse thereof. However, what is important for
the purposes of my argument is that the Zuma trial blew wide open many
debates at the heart of  South Africa’s plague of  sexual violence. The kind of
rape mythologies embedded in social and intimate relations mimicking the
hierarchies of  apartheid were overtly present in the ‘text’ and ‘performance’
of  the trial – not only in the strategy of  the defence and in the judgment
issued by the judge, but even in the discourse of the prosecution. The latter
was marked to an extraordinary degree by absence and silence. What follows
is a list of  questions the prosecutor, inexplicably, did not ask:
1. If  you were afraid, as you testified, to leave Kwezi in an aroused state, did you ensure
that she had an orgasm? Zuma’s own orgasm was a matter of  public record; the
complainant’s sexual satisfaction or lack thereof  was never raised. Was Zuma
in fact admitting to being a lousy lover?
2. Can you supply independent medical proof that you are, as you claim, HIV-negative?
Much was made of  Kwezi’s apparent lack of  compliance with a forensic
psychologist or neurologist – as if every single rape complainant in South
Africa needs to submit to nebulous tests to eliminate the possibilities of
hallucination and mental disorder leading to confabulation – yet the one
question the prosecution asked about Zuma’s medical history remained
unsupported by any objective or expert independent testimony. Zuma was
asked if he knew his HIV status, and he replied that he did, and that he was
HIV-negative. No questioning followed that asked, for instance, how he knew
this; where and when he had been tested; or whether he could supply any
supporting evidence, such as receipts or the test result itself. If medical evidence
(in the form of  a court-ordered and independently administered test for
HIV) could have been provided that disproved his statement on the witness
stand, it would have had a devastating impact on the case for the defence.
3. No questions were asked about Zuma’s sexual history, even though he is a
much-married and indeed polygamous man, with a well-known history of
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multiple adulteries. While Kwezi’s sexual history was minutely scrutinised and
her traumatic past probed, no mention was made of the fact that one of
Zuma’s former wives had committed suicide, allegedly as a result of  her
husband’s cruelty. Kwezi’s history of  unreliability in her relationships with
men was exhaustively rehearsed; no corresponding elaboration of  Zuma’s
exploitative relationships with women was undertaken.
4. The most glaring omission of all was the failure to ask Zuma, Have you ever
been accused of  rape before? Have you ever faced disciplinary hearings within the ANC in
exile for rape or sexual harassment?
The prosecution was not the only party to be blinded by the paucity of rape
narratives and models available to the criminal justice system in South Africa.
Probably the most alarming of  the judge’s decisions in the course of  the trial
was his legal blurring together of  the accuser’s sexual history and her history
of  sexual violence. These were collapsed, with Kwezi’s history as a survivor
of  child rape used to suggest that she was unstable, emotional and disturbed
– and therefore could not be trusted. The hoary old stereotypes of  hysteria
and neurosis were flagrantly invoked. It was clear that Kwezi had suffered
profound trauma in her youth, and this was not disputed by the defence – but
it was used to emphasise the ‘unreliability’ of  her testimony.
Given that millions of women following the progress of the trial were
themselves rape survivors, this was chilling. Rape hotlines reported that they
were inundated with calls from survivors re-traumatised by the case – and
terribly afraid that, should they be raped again (unfortunately by no means an
uncommon occurrence), this would be held against them in a court of  law.
Not only did the discourse and narrative of the trial underline the mental
fragility of  rape survivors; there was also an explicit element of  ‘once is
unlucky, twice is careless – more than that, and you have to be lying’. Given
that many women in this country experience multiple rapes, the implications
are deeply disturbing.
I belong to an Africa-wide listserve that connects feminist and gender
scholars and activists throughout the continent. The day after the not-guilty
verdict, the tone of  postings on the listserve was not one of  indignation, but
of  fear bordering on terror. Black lesbians in particular felt that they had been
marked out as ‘fair game’. One woman spoke for many when she observed
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piteously that the judgment seemed to have handed men a licence to rape any
former rape survivor again and again.
It is possible (although in my opinion highly unlikely) that Kwezi and
Jacob Zuma enjoyed consensual sex on the night in question; nevertheless,
the shape of the trial made it quite clear that in order to be perceived and
treated as a credible witness by the criminal justice system, any woman who
lays a charge of rape in the ‘new’ South Africa must be articulate and preferably
educated; if not virginal, then clearly morally beyond reproach;33 and possessed
of impeccable mental health (the trial transcripts clearly indicate that having
sought counselling or experienced any kind of trauma renders a woman
disturbed and unreliable for purposes of giving testimony).34 Above all, this
paragon needs not to have been raped before. This eliminates, for many
women, the possibility of laying charges of rape, regardless of their constitu-
tional rights to equality and dignity before the law.
The new South Africa has led many women to believe that they have the
right to justice, a comprehensive justice that cannot be denied them on the
basis of  race, class, gender, sexuality, health status or history. But the Zuma
trial showed the extent of the backlash: the full ire of civil society was invoked
against an HIV-positive young lesbian who had dared to lay a charge against
the second most powerful citizen in the country. Outside the court, a pro-
Zuma supporter said to the television cameras, ‘How dare she? Who does
she think she is?’ Whatever Kwezi’s thinking, she clearly believed she was a
citizen who was free to press charges – and she paid a high price for doing so.
Commentators from elsewhere in the developing world have observed,
correctly, that this trial would never even have been able to take place in
most of  the rest of  the African continent;35 and in that respect, South Africa’s
Constitution and judiciary still hold out the promise of equality before the
law, even in matters of  sexual violence. However, as the trial showed, although
women’s rights as equal citizens may be guaranteed by the letter of  the law,
powerful elements within civil society, political organisations, government
institutions and the independent judiciary mitigate against gender equality in
such cases.
Moreover, none of  the trial revelations concerning Zuma’s reckless and
sexist behaviour slowed his rise to power. In December 2007, he was elected
president of the ANC – a post that holds the promise of the presidency of the
country in the next national election. The ANC Women’s League was among
Sexual Violence, Civil Society and the New Constitution 177
the powerful bodies that endorsed his candidacy. It would appear that the
delegates who lobbied for Zuma at one of  the country’s most critical political
crossroads consider gender rights to be of such little importance that the
notion of a chauvinist president holds no fears for them.
Conclusions
This chapter does not prove my claims. Instead, it presents a framework that
might explain why rape in the new democratic South Africa is so extraordinarily
widespread. I believe this framework could be useful for future research on
the causes and extent of  rape in South Africa. As Moolman’s contribution to
this collection shows (Chapter 7), organisational responses to gender-based
violence must address the troubling and pervasive divides between the
promises of gender rights and the prevailing social scripts that render such
rights inaccessible. Future research and practical applications that use this
model will undoubtedly provide new insights into sexual violence in South
Africa, as well as in the field of gender-based violence.
Like Sindiwe Magona, South African women are sick of hearing that
apartheid is to blame for the brutality that men mete out to them. Nevertheless,
we must examine how the legacy of apartheid intersects with justificatory
narratives of rape and the use of sexual violence as a tool of social control
and intimate terrorism. But in doing so, we must learn to confront and
deconstruct the knee-jerk response that in scrutinising the sources and pur-
poses of rape we are engaging in a racist project. Rape is about many things,
including the toxic after-effects of apartheid; but it is probably one of the
few burning social issues in South Africa that are fuelled not by narratives
about race, but rather by vitriolic patriarchal imperatives.
There are already signs of change in civil society discourse. In the seven
years since I began this project, there has been a shift in the popular tendency
to pigeon-hole sexual violence as a ‘woman’s problem’. (The growing rate at
which men and small children of both sexes are also becoming rape victims
has helped jolt the public into taking a broader view of the problem.) In spite
of  the danger that efforts to scrutinise men as perpetrators will be deemed
racist, there are shifts towards holding men accountable for what is, after all,
a problem of  their making. There have been energetic efforts by men, male-
aligned NGOs, civil society organisations and social institutions to tackle the
problem of male violence,36 especially against women and children, as reflected
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in Moolman’s analysis of  the organisational shift towards including men in
confronting prevailing constructions of  masculinity in the work of  Rape Crisis
Cape Town. Unfortunately, many are still wrestling with patriarchal baggage.
Given that the nascent ‘men’s movement’ has roots in faith-based organ-
isations, it is disheartening, but not surprising, that the then Anglican
Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane headed the Men’s March on National
Women’s Day in 2003 in which men carried placards announcing ‘Hands Off
Our Women’, or that he was quoted as saying, ‘. . . real men don’t rape women
and children . . . we want our women, our wives, sisters and daughters to
walk freely in our streets’.37 Apart from the entirely unproblematised
identification of  women as property, this kind of  discourse reflects that South
African men still posed mostly patriarchal solutions to the problem of their
own violence: if  they are not to be predators, they are urged to be protectors.
Meanwhile, the escalation of  particularly brutal rapes, including the spate
of baby rapes in recent years, has shamed the nation into asking, ‘What is
wrong with our men?’ (Posel 2005; Pillay 2001, 43). But we cannot answer
this question, or join hands in organising with men in combating the scourge
of sexual violence until we have debunked the distracting and dangerous
myths arising from our past that continue to hijack the debate on rape.
In the mammoth task that lies ahead – nothing less than the dismantling
of  patriarchies on a global scale – perhaps a helpful starting point is Albertyn’s
suggestion (2004) that freedom and autonomy might be more useful goals for
women in South Africa’s transformation process than political equality.
Certainly, as the research in this chapter and throughout this collection
repeatedly suggests across a number of  cases, political equality alone is
unfortunately insufficient to establish women as full, free and rights-bearing
members of  a democratic polity.
The last idealistic words belong to Kopane Ratele, a male lecturer at the
University of  the Western Cape, and are taken from a public letter in support
of Charlene Smith, after she had written in the Mail and Guardian weekly
newspaper about her experience of being raped:
. . . if  the liberation struggle was meant to free us from oppression, it must
have been to free us all from all kinds of  oppression. If  the struggle was truly
for liberation, it was for all kinds of liberation. Liberation has no plural.
Being an indivisible whole, liberation cannot be partitioned. It is radical. To
opt for anything else is to endanger it. (Smith 2001, 211)
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This serves both as a prompt to broaden the scope of  the liberatory project,
and a reminder of how far the South African project of democratisation has
yet to go. It is up to the men and women of  this country to ensure that sexual
violence does not continue to deny women the freedom enshrined in our
brave new Constitution.38
Notes
1. This chapter is drawn from my more extensive writings on rape as a form of social control
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Rape as a Narrative of Social Control in Post-apartheid South Africa’ in the Journal of
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2. These figures are supported by most of  the sources cited below, but in this case are drawn
from Gender: The New Struggle, a survey of  3 500 participants by the University of  Cape
Town’s Unilever Institute of  Strategic Marketing (November 2004).
3. Some studies have turned up even higher figures than those cited here. For example, a 1999
survey of  more than 2 000 male Cape Town City Council workers revealed that 48 per cent
of them had physically abused a domestic partner at least once. This figure was expected to
be significantly lower than the estimated national average, given that the study population
were in secure employment. See N. Abrahams, R. Jewkes and R. Laubsher, ‘ “I Do Not
Believe in Democracy in the Home”: Men’s Relationships with and Abuse of  Women’
(Tygerberg: Medical Research Council, 1999).
4. See also the special issues of  Feminist Africa 5 (‘Sexual Cultures’), December 2005, and
Feminist Africa 6 (‘Subaltern Sexualities’), September 2006.
5. By this I mean the ongoing, deliberate, politically and culturally endorsed creation of and
emphasis of difference, with a dominant category and ‘normative’ of ‘us’, and the projection
of qualities of ‘strangeness’ and ‘otherness’ onto a usually subordinate category – ‘them’.
6. The area of gender-based violence (which might include domestic violence, spousal/partner
abuse, abuse of the girl child, human trafficking, as well as attacks motivated by homophobia)
is too broad to scrutinise for purposes of this discussion.
7. Official (police) anti-rape education strategies in South Africa prior to this date contained
standard warnings on avoiding the perils of ‘dark alleys’ and ‘short skirts’; these explicitly
addressed potential victims only, not perpetrators.
8. As early as 1995, Human Rights Watch had published a damning report, Violence against
Women in South Africa: State Response to Domestic Violence and Rape. See in particular Chapter 5,
‘The Magnitude of  the Problem’, pp. 44–59.
9. At the same time, he denounced a senior UN office-bearer, Kathleen Cravero, claiming that
her statement (relating to HIV/AIDS) that many African women were unable to negotiate
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consent, much less condom use, stereotyped African men as ‘violent sexual predators’. See
‘Letter from President Thabo Mbeki’, ANC Today 4 (39), 1–7 October 2004, available at
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2004/at39.htm, and Charlene Smith (2005).
10. Lisa Vetten of  the Centre for the Study of  Violence and Reconciliation, in a response in the
Mail and Guardian (29 October 2004), argued that neither Smith nor Mbeki had cited the
correct figures in enumerating the number of South African women who had been raped.
(Mbeki, working naively on the assumption that all rapes were reported to the police, cited
reported crime figures only, whereas Smith simply multiplied the number of  reported rapes
by a ‘guesstimate’ of  20.) Vetten nevertheless noted that even the most conservative of  the
professional surveys reflected exceptionally and disturbingly high figures for rape. Joan van
Niekerk, the national coordinator of Childline South Africa, also issued an open letter to
Mbeki in which she deplored the attack on Smith and debunked the watered-down statistics
on rape and child abuse presented by the spokesperson for the National Commissioner of
Police in the press. She went on to entreat the president and the police not to stifle efforts to
discuss violence against women and children with misleading accusations of racism (posted
on the GWS Africa listserve hosted by the African Gender Institute at the University of  Cape
Town on 11 October 2004).
11. Magona is perhaps best known abroad for her book Mother to Mother (Cape Town: David
Philip, 1998), a fictional collection of  letters between the mothers of  murdered Fulbright
scholar Amy Biehl and the young South African political activist who struck her down.
12. Data gleaned from crisis organisations are not usually statistically useful, given the cultural
disparities and practical barriers that inform whether or not a woman is able to call a helpline.
Such disparities doubtlessly explain why so many of my callers were middle-class educated
women. Nevertheless, the point remains that they were not being abused or violated by
impoverished strangers, but generally by their equally middle-class and educated partners.
13. This is not necessarily indicative of obtuseness; it reflects perhaps the anxieties found within
a post-apartheid society facing not only the same endemic racial tensions that occur in any
racially or ethnically diverse society, but also battling the demons of  a recent past of
institutionalised racism.
14. It is not only locally that I encounter the assumption that my work must necessarily highlight
the ‘barbarism’ of black men. During a visit to the US in 2000, after I had assured an
American academic at a respectable college that black South African men were not hell-bent
on punitively raping white women (an impression he seemed to have gleaned from reading
J.M. Coetzee’s novel Disgrace), he responded, ‘You mean they do this to their own kind?’
15. In ‘Constructing Sexual Aggression and Vulnerability: Further Thoughts on the Body Politics
of  Rape’, a paper I wrote for the British NGO, Womankind, I argue that rape is easily
simulated: all that is required are the means of immobilising the intended victim and a
penetrative or blunt instrument. It goes without saying that I do not advocate that anyone
‘try this out at home’; rather, my intention is to separate the choreography of rape from the
biology of  penetrative sexual intercourse. Too many people assume that only those able to
produce an erect penis are able to ‘perform’ rape, whereas a small but significant number of
rape survivors report that their attackers could not sustain erections, and therefore resorted
to using their hands or other instruments (see Smith 2001; Denny et al. 2002).
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16. These are the very terms used in almost every public discussion of the topic, the Harold
Wolpe Forum debate on ‘Gender-based violence and sexuality in South Africa’ being a case
in point. (Summary notes of  the discussion from the floor were kindly provided by Tracey
Bailey of  the Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust; www.wolpetrust.org.za.)
17. ‘Gangs and Sexuality on the Cape Flats’, African Gender Institute Newsletter 7 (December
2000). Available at web.uct.ac.za/org/agi/pubs/newsletters/vol7/elaine.htm.
18. In a nutshell, women who experience identical pressures and deprivations may respond in a
multitude of maladaptive ways – but they do not resort to sexual violence.
19. The UCT Unilever study noted that ‘conflict or violence happened mostly when a chauvinistic
male was in a relationship with a woman with a liberated mind’ (Cape Times, 15 November
2004).
20. And nearly five decades of apartheid rule were preceded by centuries of colonial rule and
enslavement.
21. Special Assignment documentary, SABC 3, 2000.
22. It must be stressed that although the kinds of ‘controlling’ narratives of violence under
scrutiny here were enacted by whites (or their representatives) upon blacks, they would have
been internalised to varying degrees by all South Africans living under apartheid, regardless
of race, class or gender.
23. Readers of my work who live outside South Africa have queried whether all South African
women do indeed live in fear of  rape. This is impossible to prove statistically, and of  course,
the degree of such fear is determined by the widely variant risks and resources presented to
women (whether they travel to work by public transport or after dark, whether they can
afford burglar bars and alarms, and so on). Nevertheless, visitors are often shocked by the
extent to which many South African women self-regulate their movements and adopt
guarded patterns of  living. I regularly interact with visiting North American and European
students, and am invariably struck by the untrammelled sense of freedom with which many
of  these young women move around and conduct themselves socially, in sharp contrast to
the cautious demeanour of  my female South African students. Simidele Dosekun of  UCT’s
African Gender Institute is currently conducting research on the extent to which fear of rape
dominates the social habits of young women who have not been raped.
24. Servants are of  course privy to a great deal of  sensitive and intimate information about their
employers: digestive disorders, sexual habits, menstrual cycles, drinking problems, parenting
difficulties, family conflicts, and so on. This is a well-trodden path within the field of
Marxist feminism and slavery studies.
25. This ‘learned helplessness’ is being passed on to middle-class blacks, now the largest group
in southern Africa employing domestic workers, cleaners, childminders and gardeners.
26. The relationship between construction of identity and sexual violence is an area that requires
closer scrutiny than is possible here.
27. For a useful account of  the way the women’s movement has interacted with the state in the
last 25 years, see S. Hassim’s Women’s Organizations and Democracy in South Africa: Contesting
Authority (Madison: University of  Wisconsin Press, 2005). N. Hoad, K. Martin and G. Reid
(eds) chart the story of how sexual equality came to be included in the new Constitution in
Sex and Politics in South Africa (Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005).
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28. See note 19 above.
29. Personal communication to the author, July 2004.
30. See note 3 above.
31. When heterosexual women do enjoy equality in the family and other domestic spaces, the
general perception is that they are ‘permitted’ to do so by a liberal partner, rather than entitled
to do so.
32. See, for example, Nomboniso Gasa’s presentation to the Centre for Conflict Resolution at
the University of  Cape Town immediately after the verdict. Gasa is a struggle veteran,
academic and trained isangoma (traditional healer).
33. I’ve written elsewhere (Moffett 2002) about how standard rape ‘scripts’ in this country make
it nearly impossible for most rapes to be acknowledged as such in South Africa. For example,
rape survivors are considered credible only if  their rapist is a stranger, or if  the rape takes place
during the commission of an additional crime (such as housebreaking or hijacking) or when
severe physical violence over and above the rape itself occurs. Of course, the most credible
rape victim is the one who is murdered by her assailants.
34. This sets up a classic catch-22 scenario: the chances of a South African woman escaping
trauma during her lifetime are slim. But if she does experience trauma, her legal standing as
a potential rape victim is permanently compromised.
35. Amina Mama, chair of  UCT’s African Gender Studies (who hails from Nigeria), and Rhoda
Reddock, chair of  Gender and Development Studies at the University of  the West Indies,
both made this point at the Centre for Conflict Resolution workshop immediately after the
verdict.
36. For an overview of  these efforts, see Robert Morrell’s ‘Men, Movements and Gender
Transformation’ in Ouzgane and Morrell (2005).
37. ‘Real Men Don’t Rape Women and Children’, SAPA, 17 November 2003.
38. I am extremely grateful to Amina Mama, Jane Bennett, Brenda Martin, Joanne Henry, Elaine
Salo and other members of  the African Gender Institute at the University of  Cape Town for
infrastructural and collegial support provided during this research.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Race, Gender and Feminist Practice
Lessons from Rape Crisis Cape Town
BENITA MOOLMAN
RAPE IS A complex construction of  power and power relations given meaning
through personal and social identities, specifically identities of masculinity
and femininity (Moolman 2004). ‘Second-wave’ feminist analysis of rape as
an act of power has often focused on rape as a dynamic of gendered power
only (Brownmiller 1975). The scourge of rape in South Africa necessitates
an analysis of power as expressed and facilitated through a multiplicity of
identities, as Moffett discusses in Chapter 6 of this collection. This implies
that an understanding of the dynamics of rape in South Africa must include
an analysis of how power is expressed through different race, class, national
and sexual identities. Steady (1996) claims that ‘[a]n African feminism that
encompasses freedom from the complex configurations created by multiple
oppression is necessary and urgent’ (4).
The statistics on rape in South Africa during the past ten years have
remained significantly high. South African Police Services (SAPS) statistics1
indicate that in 1996, 50 481 rapes of women and children by men were
reported, as compared to 55 114 rapes reported in 2004–2005. One has only
to recall the apartheid period to be reminded of the extreme violence in South
African history. Morrell (2001) states that ‘masculinity and violence have
been yoked together in South African history’ (12). Within dominant meanings
of manhood in South Africa, a physical display of manhood symbolises values
of  strength, dominance, power, control, conquest, achievement and bravery.
These same values used in the construction of  manhood were embedded
within apartheid systems and policies and they are also present in the act of
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rape. Certainly, the prevalence of  violence against women in South Africa
can be linked to the valorisation of masculine violence reproduced throughout
the militarised history of apartheid (Cock 1991). Without attention to the
intersection of  gender with other forms of  identity, however, the existing
high incidence of rape in South Africa contributes to the broader public
perception that all South African men are ‘bad’. Advocating the importance
of  contextualising masculinity, Reid and Walker (2005) note that ‘men accept
where they were situated as part of the problem (the abuser, the oppressor,
the patriarch) and were neither the object or the subject of study’ (6). In
grappling with the complexities of rape, feminism and feminist practice in
South Africa, I suggest each at its core has been about gendered identity
politics.
This chapter is grounded in the notion of rape as a manifestation of power
relations, but it also challenges previous static notions of  patriarchy, mascu-
linity and femininity. I take up the conversation of  power-laden gender-, race-
and class-based politics in post-1994 South Africa through an analysis of the
country’s longest-standing rape crisis organisation, Rape Crisis Cape Town
(RCCT). My analysis of race is based primarily on my own ‘lived experience’.
As a coloured South African woman living in a country where whiteness has
defined ‘scientific and theoretical evidence’, I struggle with conforming to
standard or acceptable academic practice where theories and references are
used to provide evidence and legitimise ‘truth’. This chapter is an indication
of  my struggle. While at times I conform and use references to situate my
work, at other times I don’t.
Feminist practice at the RCCT has been synonymous with women’s
understanding of feminism and rape activism. Since its inception in 1976,
the RCCT has been created, shaped and managed by women for women, and
originally men were excluded from membership. In January 2005, the policy
that stipulated that ‘[a] member shall be a woman who has worked in the
organisation for six months or volunteers’ (RCCT 1998a) was finally dissolved
and men became full participants in the RCCT. This dramatic change in policy
was the result of months and years of meetings, discussions and emotional
debates. The final decision symbolised not only a policy change but also a
shifting of  deeply held values, theories, identities and power. This chapter
will analyse different aspects of this organisational and ideological
transformation to explore how gender identity politics played out in the post-
1994 context within a central woman’s organisation.
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What I attempt to demonstrate is how the national transformation of
social and political rights enlivened the organisation with a new form of
feminism that no longer excluded men and no longer essentialised men as
violent perpetrators. Further, I demonstrate that race, as a system of  power
relations, acts as a catalyst in the transformation of  feminist practice within
the RCCT. While many of  the geographic and economic barriers of  apartheid
still exist within the organisation, a new form of  feminist/womanist practice
is also developing, one that seeks a notion of ‘combined responsibility’
between men and women for fighting gender-based violence.
The analysis of organisations affords an opportunity to explore how civil
society contributes to changing social power relations, especially in this recent
inclusion of  men in rape activism. I suggest that this policy change to include
men within the RCCT will have a huge impact in shaping service provision. At
the same time, its emergence provides a central case that links the theoretical
work on sexual violence and social identity with the applied practices of
gender organisation within civil society.
This chapter traces the dynamics between feminism as a collective identity
and its influence on organisational identity in the shaping of feminist practice
within the RCCT. I explore the assumptions of  femininity and masculinity
embedded in feminist praxis, specifically rape activism at the RCCT in South
Africa. First, I discuss the origin of the organisation, looking at the ideological
underpinnings that inform its feminist practice. I then provide an overview
of  the current situation with regard to organisational politics and service
delivery. The methods for this study include content analysis of  organisational
documents as well as data from participant observations, both of  which I
acquired throughout my nine years of  service within the RCCT. This insider
status affords a complexity of perspectives for this analysis and draws on
autoethnography as a methodological approach, where the researcher is an
integral part of what is being researched. While much of this chapter will be
a reflection of  general observations, trends and dynamics of  the organisation,
I am also guided by professional ethics that assure the anonymity of all clients
who receive services from the RCCT. Thus, for their protection, I will not
reveal the identity of  any clients. In addition, while I advocate for a
transformative feminism that dissolves fixed dichotomies of  sex, I salute the
women who initiated this radical organisation in a time when South Africa
was brutally violent towards all women. The RCCT was then a beacon of
hope. It remains this today, for many women.
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Herstory
The herstory of the RCCT is linked to the transnational feminist movement
that spread ideas of  women’s empowerment and their quest for freedom from
violence: ‘Feminism had become a mobilising force for women in the Western
world, and some women in South Africa started speaking about women’s
oppression . . .’ (RCCT 1989). This was the impetus that got a small group of
women in South Africa to ‘start talking about rape’ as a central component
of  women’s organising. The RCCT was started in 1976 by a group of  women,
some of  whom were rape survivors. They met weekly at the Women’s Centre
in Rondebosch – a geographical area that was then under the Group Areas
Act (1950). It was during this period that apartheid was institutionalised
through social policies that enacted overt racism between white, black and
coloured people.2 Consequently, Rondebosch was spatially designated for white
people, which meant that black and coloured South Africans had limited
access into and out of this area. They were allowed to drive through this
residential neighbourhood, but they could not buy houses or attend schools
in this space reserved for the white minority.
The racial geography of  Cape Town therefore shaped the organisation
directly, as a result of  the relative privilege afforded to founding staff  members
and the complexities of  accessing services. In its infancy – and as a result of
the apartheid system – white women initially defined the RCCT, and hence
race was part of  the organisation’s complex dynamics from its inception. The
initial volunteer groups were drawn from the women’s movement at the
University of  Cape Town (UCT), which was formed after the well-known
feminist Juliet Mitchell delivered a lecture there in 1975. These women had
also just withdrawn from the university’s Community Commission3 because
they identified reluctance by the men to address women’s issues in politics.
During these early stages, this theme of  male reluctance to deal with ‘women’s
issues’ was thus brought into the RCCT organisation. The purpose of the
organisation at that time was to provide safe opportunities to talk about rape.
Women-only spaces were seen as essential to creating strategies of  survival
and pathways for social change. This is reminiscent of global second-wave
feminist approaches to gender-based violence.
The organisation initially provided counselling services to rape survivors
and then expanded by offering public educational talks and workshops for
various community groups, churches, student groups, and so on. The RCCT
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Constitution (RCCT 1979) stated that ‘the aims and objectives of the
organisation are to offer advice, moral support and legal advice as a form of
social assistance to the rape victim and to any member/members of the family
or any other persons who might be involved’. The organisational mandate
was to deal with ‘crimes of sexual intent involving women, children and men’.
In relation to the populations served, the RCCT Constitution stated that ‘Rape
Crisis renders assistance to any person (irrespective of race, colour, sex or
creed)’. The organisation thus provided services to men as rape survivors.
In contrast to this distinct stance on service delivery, the organisation did
not clearly define its membership in terms of  social identity. Guiding RCCT
documents focused on how one became a member, rather than who could
become a member. For example, to be a member required the payment of  an
annual subscription. There was nothing in the RCCT Constitution that defined
membership in terms of  gender, race, class, sexuality or nationality. Or-
ganisational records such as the Rape Crisis Herstory Booklet (RCCT 1989)
explained that membership was defined through the organisation’s feminist
ideology: ‘After the influx of  women from the women’s movement, we became
much clearer in our idea that what feminism was fighting for was our aim . . .
by early 1981 we openly called ourselves feminist.’ This ideological linkage
to feminist values within the organisation captures the complexities of
women’s access and identity affiliation, which was centrally shaped by the
race and class divisions dominant within the overarching apartheid context
at this time. At the same time, this very definite feminist standpoint provided
an empowering and affirming social space for women as beneficiaries and
members.
Feminism within the RCCT
Feminism in South Africa has always been a contentious issue, sharply divided
along racial lines (Salo 1994, 2005; Fester 1998; Hassim 2005). The RCCT
was not immune to these complexities. Initially, gender as a construct of
difference assumed the central priority in the fight to end gender-based
violence, rather than the intersectionality of  race, class and gender. The
Herstory Booklet (RCCT 1989) describes the RCCT brands of feminism as
historical and structural. These brands of  feminism defined violence against
women as a strategy of  patriarchy, which maintains the system of  men’s
domination over women. The RCCT drew on feminist theories, in particular
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radical, liberal and socialist feminism, which translated into the various policies
and practices that impacted every aspect of the organisation. The overarching
structure, for example, remained flat/horizontal rather than vertical/
hierarchical, with decision making taking place at general meetings with the
full membership present. In support of  women’s particular concerns, the RCCT
provided childcare at all meetings, and the overall tone of newsletters was
affirming of  and to women. As an active space of  dialogue, the organisation
held regular debates, where guest speakers were invited to talk about feminism
and feminist concerns. These organisational processes capture the patterns
that linked the overarching political and social ideologies of feminism to the
daily processes and defining culture within the RCCT. This space provided a
‘home’, a place to belong, for many women.
By 1982, RCCT members agreed that the organisation should provide a
safe haven for women – irrespective of  race, religion, class or sexuality. More
black and coloured women were recruited as volunteers through the training
courses, which resulted in additional course offerings within coloured
communities such as Mitchells Plain (RCCT 1983). White women managed
the organisation at this time. The intentional ‘reaching out’ to black and
coloured women can be seen as a part of the broader socio-political race
relations and liberal ideology in South Africa. Biko (2006) criticised such
limited measures by stating:
White racism in South Africa was expressed through the liberal ideology . . .
demonstrated so well as the insistence that the problems of the country can
only be solved by a bilateral approach involving both black and white . . .
The integration they talk about is first of all artificial in that it is a response to
conscious manoeuvre . . . (21)
Within the RCCT, the recruitment of  black and coloured women did not
effectively translate into equality and equity within the organisation, as will
be discussed later.
In terms of  dealing with sexuality difference, however, the RCCT provided
a strong model of integration. The organisation became a space where many
lesbians felt safe enough to disclose their sexual status and preferences (RCCT
1989). This was one of the greatest strengths of the RCCT as a defined women-
only space, and one which makes the organisation significantly different from
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much of  the women’s movement in South Africa (Hames 2003; Gqola 2006).
Sturdy (1987) describes her understanding of working in this progressive
women’s organisation as follows:
[W]hether expressed or not . . . its internal structure and culture should reflect
or embody the group’s feminist values . . . we were to express our feminist
perspective not only in what we did as a group, but also in how we did it.
(31–2)
The approach to feminism supported within the RCCT similarly modelled this
critical theory–practice cleavage, with the intention to create safe spaces for
women across socio-economic divides.
In relation to men’s participation within the RCCT, the organisation did
not specifically exclude men from receiving services. Evidence from workshop
reports and discussions,4 however, illustrates that men were not allowed to
become members of the organisation:
The issues that we deal with are a clear and direct reflection of the oppression
of  women in society, and we can come to a better understanding of  them
when men are not present; the nature of our work means that the vast majority
of our clients have suffered pain at the hands of man, it would be traumatic
for them to have a male counsellor; we know that in many mixed organisations
men develop at the expense of women, so here our members can develop
confidence in a non-threatening environment; in order to fight the issues of
sexism and violence against women, we need to build solidarity amongst
women; from our experience in other organisations, we have found that
women-only organisations work more democratically. (RCCT 1989)
Thus the organisation maintained a women-only safe space for women to
grow and develop, to build solidarity among women and provide safety for
female clients. Sturdy (1987) states that ‘working collectively could be seen
as a safe way for an organisation to be radical in identity . . . [I]t can also
obscure real differences of interest within a work group in not very helpful
ways’ (43). Gender was not problematised within the organisation during the
1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the assumptions of  femininity and masculinity,
along with the interconnectedness of personal and social identities, emerged
as central and defining moments throughout the development of  the RCCT.
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 Yet the RCCT did not totally resist working with men, as the organisational
herstory documents reveal. There were early attempts to engage men, such as
through a socialisation workshop held in 1981, where the organisational
direction and the issues of gender and rape were discussed with men. A training
course in 1981 integrated men in the process, but membership barriers made
it necessary to maintain a portion of the organisational process for women
only. Conclusions from these sessions indicated that men should start their
own rape crisis group because they were ‘too defensive’, and the group spaces
were more productive when men were absent.
In terms of  feminist practice, service delivery centred on counselling and
public education. The counselling services focused on the individual rape
survivor and her experience of  rape, irrespective of  issues of  race and class
and the impact of  the environment (such as poverty, housing and transport)
on that experience. The RCCT states that its services have always been open
to all people, but in the early years services were offered in historically white
areas, initially Rondebosch and then, when the organisation acquired funding,
it set up an office in Observatory. This is a central and recurring theme in the
herstory of the organisation: class and race boundaries defined access to space,
often reproducing the political geography of apartheid.
This micro-focus on counselling services for rape survivors seems to have
been adopted from rape crisis centres in the United Kingdom, where the
focus then and now is on counselling around the emotional and psychological
impact on the individual rape survivor. Indeed, I argue that feminist practice
as seen in the RCCT was largely drawn from the European model, despite the
fact that in Europe the experience of rape remains very different from the
South African situation. Assumptions based on experiences of mainly white,
middle-class and Western women have been used to define rape-crisis service
delivery in South Africa. By using a liberal ideology of  race, the organisation
practised a colour-blind approach to racism, even as it espoused feminist
values. The assumptions of  this ideology centre white women’s experiences
as the experiences of  all women. This form of  internalised dominance is
indicative of  modern institutionalised forms of  racism (ELRU 1997).
At the RCCT, we see these ideological underpinnings in everyday processes.
For example, the then and still current counselling practice is that rape survivors
have to make their own appointments, in the name of taking the first steps in
their own empowerment. This policy applies regardless of  the survivor’s
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employment status, ability to access (or own) a phone and financial resources
base. Intended to empower, this policy in fact places severe and dispro-
portionate disadvantages on the majority of black and coloured women, who
often struggle to access these resources. As these realities suggest, by drawing
from predominant models of  services found in Europe, the counselling
services at the RCCT did not take the broader socio-political context into
consideration. Rather, the public education work focused only on universal
understandings of rape without looking at the particular impact of apartheid
and taking the local context into account. Such generalised notions of rape
are also evident in the organisation’s use of  educational materials such as the
‘Myth Sheet’,5 which categorised all women as the same. Accordingly, one
training document stated that ‘women who go into a dangerous area at night
are asking to be raped’. Yet the scenario of  black and coloured women going
into a dangerous area is very different from that of white women going into a
dangerous area, as the majority of black and coloured women actually live in
‘dangerous areas’. This assumption that women experience a universal threat
of danger epitomises what the Early Learning Resource Unit (ELRU 1997)
problematises in its work to develop an intersectional appreciation of experience.
Salo (1994) states that defining feminism purely in gendered terms assumes
that our consciousness (or identity) of being ‘women’ has nothing to do with
race, class, nation or sexuality, but only with gender. I argue that defining
feminist practice in terms of  gender only is limited and restricts its potential
to be a transformative discourse that advocates for change. Furthermore,
such practices support a universalised notion of womanhood, critiqued heavily
by Mohanty (1991) in her analysis of  the inherent bias of  Western feminism
as supporting an essentialised woman who occupies a single category with
universal experiences and interests and is opposed by an oppressive male
figure. In this binary interpretation, women are constructed as victims and
men are constructed as the oppressor. African feminists such as Oyewumi
have also critiqued Western feminist categorisations of  woman, pointing out
that many female Africans did not even have access to the concept of ‘woman’
(Oyewumi 1997). This deconstruction of  feminist discourse by post-colonial
feminists (Nnaemeka 1998; Mohanty 2004) seriously challenges some of the
underlying assumptions on which Western feminism is based.
At the organisational level, this ideological shift in feminism meant that
the RCCT’s assumption of  a polarity between ‘victims’ and ‘survivors’ of  rape
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needed to be challenged at the levels of both theory and practice. Similar
universalised definitions of ‘woman’ and of dominant femininity as caring,
empathetic, sensitive, powerless, passive and vulnerable (Funk 1993) serve
to limit women in these distinctly defined social constructions, while
positioning them as inferior in a patriarchal context. The RCCT struggled with
the idea of  woman. ‘Woman’ was constructed as strong, capable and
independent, while ‘women’ were defined, in a distorted manner, as victims.
Within the paradigm of  dominant femininity, to remain valued as a woman
required the ability to realise personal power and safety. As a result of  the
mutuality of  gender constructions, men were thus defined as extremely
threatening, powerful, oppressive and potentially rapists.
In the 1970s and 1980s this particular form of  feminist ideology was
used to mobilise women and the organisation. In an RCCT socialisation
workshop in 1981, a participant reflected:
. . . in retrospect the evening raised for me a whole collection of issues . . .
the first was whether Rape Crisis wasn’t in fact using rape and the experience
of the victim as a powerful mobilising point for women. I had a strong sense
both within the small group and the larger group that many people were
attempting to resolve private crises by investment in the movement. There is
nothing wrong or bad about private crises, but to attempt to resolve them by
masking them in the generalised positional politics of a movement is, I think,
dangerous for everyone. (RCCT 1981)
On one level, this process of blurring social and personal identities is common.
There are numerous socialising agents, such as religion or the media, which
exist for exactly this reason, often telling us how to be as women or how to be
as men. However, feminism was supposed to be an alternative discourse
emphasising choices. Feminism could provide many women and some men
with opportunities to define themselves differently with a new value system
and way of  being.
Sturdy (1987) contends that ‘an unwillingness to admit difference seems
to be especially pronounced in an all-women’s group’ (43). However,
separating the personal/individual feminist identity from the collective can
be very difficult and confusing, particularly in the South African context. At
the RCCT during the late 1970s and 1980s, I believe the collective and individual
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feminist identities merged, which influenced organisational policy and practice.
In addition, the identity of  the ‘rape’ victim and/or survivor as someone who
was vulnerable, powerless, helpless, distrustful and angry was absorbed into
the identity of the organisation. Based on my assessment from within the
RCCT, I contend that the organisation vicariously lived and still lives the life
struggles of  the rape survivor.
This patriarchal and feminist context defined men as a single, unitary,
universalised subject where the values of dominance, control, conquest,
competition, sexual performance, achievement and power identified indicators
of manhood (Funk 1993). According to this feminist discourse, all men want
ownership of women. This context also influenced the RCCT during the 1970s
and 1980s, as the organisation assumed a universalised construction of  men,
without taking the differences of race, class and sexuality and their influence
on shaping masculinities into consideration. RCCT ideologies, policies and
practices were based on an essentialist assumption of ‘man’ which reinforced
broader constructions of  masculinity. The definition of  man became blurred
with that of rapist. The need to investigate alternative preventative options
meant that the RCCT had to review its perception of man and rapist, as I
explore later in the chapter.
The criticisms of feminist discourse, with its emphasis on the de-
construction of  grand narratives, coupled with the introduction of  post-
structural and post-colonial discourses have helped make clear that masculinity
and femininity are not homogeneous categories. Theorists such as Connell
(1995) and Morrell (2001) have challenged the notion of essentialised
masculinity and identified the multiplicity of  male subjectivity. Morrell (2001)
discusses the history of South African masculinities and highlights the
interconnectedness of colonialism, capitalism and racism in the shaping of
South African masculinities. He identifies the tense relationships between
different forms of  masculinities during the late nineteenth century among
English-speaking white men, Afrikaans-speaking white men and African men.
The fact that these relationships were played out in settings such as mines
illustrates how violence was regarded as a legitimate means of resolving
conflict between these groups of men:
For white men, the uneven distribution of  power gave them privileges but
also made them defensive about challenges (by women, blacks or/and other
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men) to that privilege. For black men the harshness of  life on the edge of
poverty and the emasculation of political powerlessness gave their masculinity
a dangerous edge. Honour and respect were rare for black men, and getting
it and retaining it (from white employers, fellow labourers or women) was
often a violent process. The release of  Nelson Mandela in 1990 heralded a
significant shift in constructs of  South African masculinity, in that the men
who agreed to this landmark shift had earlier been committed to a military
defence of  white privilege or the armed overthrow of  white rule. (Morrell
2001, 14)
Reid and Walker (2005) propose that ‘the transition to democracy in South
Africa [is] . . . unseating entrenched masculinities’. Some argue that women’s
increasing power in the political sphere has been threatening to these forms
of  masculinity (Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen 2001). For example, the 1990s
saw huge changes in national policies related to gender, as evidenced by the
increase in the number of women parliamentarians to over 32.8 per cent of
the total by 2004. In addition, I would argue that the transfer of political
power from white men to black men has contributed to this ‘unseating’ of
masculine identities.
Morrell (2001) organises the responses of  men experiencing South Africa’s
democratic transition into three categories: reactive or defensive; accommod-
ating; and responsive or progressive. He identifies the reactive/defensive
responses as those shown by men who have attempted to turn back the changes
in order to reassert their power. The appalling rise in incidents of  rape in
South Africa can also be considered as a masculinist response to transition.
The accommodating responses, some of which are apparently traditionalist,
can in fact be understood as attempts to resuscitate non-violent masculinities.
For example, rites-of-passage practices among African youth being initiated
into manhood have strong ethnic connotations, yet they also invoke an ideal
of manhood that is responsible, respectful and wise. This is distinct from the
antisocial masculinities of many of the youth on the street. The responsive
or progressive responses are demonstrated by men who attempt to challenge
violent masculinities, and in so doing construct new ways of  how to be a
man. A number of  organisations (including GETNET, FAMSA and GAP)6 are
currently working to end violence against women by engaging male
responsibility for violence, condemning aggression and working for more
equitable gender relations (Britton 2006). As these organisations develop and
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increase their ability to shape everyday social relations through civil society,
drawing from those theoretical contributions which debunk the myth of a
monolithic ‘man’ and promote an appreciation for many different masculinities
(Morrell 2001), they provide valuable tools to increase the potential positive
impacts of such gender activism. This understanding of men is very different
from the rigid understanding of men that existed at the RCCT during the 1970s,
1980s and early 1990s, and creates opportunities to work with and include
certain types of  men in challenging and opposing exploitative gender relations.
Second-wave feminist theories viewed power as unitary and rigid. Power
is determined through gendering and sexualising practices, and this creates
essentialised identities of  male and female. Identities have been constructed
as static and immutable. Since individuals are unable to challenge, resist or
change these identities, the position of the ‘victim’ as powerless will always
be associated with the ‘woman’, and the position of the perpetrator as powerful
with the ‘man’ (Jackson 1999; Funk 1993). These gender identities of woman
as powerless and man as powerful have been conflated with sexual identities.
Power has been and continues to be constructed as meaning the same in both
gendered and sexualised identities, such as ‘all men want control’. In the case
of  gender, power has been fixed within male attitudes, emotion and behaviours.
In the case of  sexuality, power became imprinted on the male body, namely
the penis, and historically much of  South Africa’s rape legislation defined
rape exclusively in terms of  male penetration. This power has been constructed
as ‘power over’, where power has been synonymous with control (Funk 1993).
The understanding of power as control is the definition of power that existed
within the RCCT until the 1990s. By arguing that men should be excluded
because they would dominate the space in the organisation, the RCCT was in
fact essentialising men as power and women as powerlessness.
In addition, the organisation had to facilitate the healing process for rape
survivors, particularly in dealing with rape trauma syndrome, which involves
issues of anger, power and control. Gibson, Swartz and Sandenbergh (2002)
argue that ‘human service organisations inevitably end up carrying the distress
of  their clients’. Sometimes survivors remain at certain stages, and they do
not move past being angry with men. Alternatively, they completely remove
themselves from ‘male’ spaces, feeling powerless and out of control. The
RCCT as an organisation had experienced vicarious trauma and seemed also
to assume this identity of  a healing rape survivor struggling with issues of
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anger, power and helplessness. Gibson, Swartz and Sandenbergh (2002) go
further to say that sometimes organisations find that the feelings their clients
bring with them are too difficult to manage at all, and the organisation devises
ways of trying to avoid them.
As gender organisations prepared for, and worked within, South Africa’s
democratic transition, they confronted the pervasively essentialised con-
structions of  femininity, masculinity and power. On a societal level, massive
changes around race relations took place, starting in the early transition period.
The abolishment of old policies, such as the Group Areas Act, created a
sense of  displacement and anxiety, which resulted in different forms of
resistance. The apartheid state expressed overt resistance through the police,
while covert resistance also continued, even by some privileged white South
Africans who saw themselves as ‘non-racial’. Covert resistance to and anxiety
about the changes manifested in many ways within the RCCT, as the organisation
absorbed some of these societal tensions of democratisation.
The RCCT: 1991 to 2006
During this transitional period and throughout the first twelve years of
democracy, the RCCT reflected the transformative social and cultural processes
of the national transition. Shifting power asymmetries in the broader gender
movement were evident as early as 1991, when, for example, at the Natal
Conference on Women and Gender in Southern Africa, black women walked
out because white women were dominating the discussions and agenda. This
conference was attended by activists, academics, trade unionists, ANC exiles,
youth organisers and international observers from Mozambique, Canada and
the United States (Horn 1991). Lewis (1995) contends that white feminists
hold a certain power, and it is in their interest to keep black women as passive,
victimised, silenced objects. Recognition of  black women’s own interpretations
would lead to white feminists’ loss of dominance. Black women in the RCCT
had also started speaking out, which resulted in the organising of numerous
‘race workshops’ (RCCT 1994). Black women entering the organisation were
politically conscious and were either members of a political party such as the
African National Congress or former participants in political protests against
apartheid. The variety of women speaking out about their different ideologies
and values both challenged old assumptions and introduced new ideas of
woman, gender, identity and feminisms.
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The RCCT has experienced rapid change since 1993 as a result of both
funding and a new state apparatus (Britton 2006). Pressure from international
funders precipitated the employment of the first director in 1996, and the
introduction of  a board of  trustees to replace the steering committee, which
meant that the organisation was shifting from the feminist-alternative flat
structure to a hierarchical form of  leadership and decision making. For the
first time, this management committee was not fully involved in any area of
service delivery. The board of  trustees ultimately held the authority and
therefore the decision-making power within the organisation. This shift
represents a movement towards hierarchical processes that imposed distance
between the recipients of  service delivery and the governing bodies of  the
organisation. Britton (2006) identifies the ‘funding debate’ as a pivotal space
for the reshaping of  women’s organisations in the post-apartheid era.
The vision statement adopted three years after the national transition to
democracy reflected this pivotal change process:
We the women of  RCCT have a feminist political understanding of  violence
against women. We seek to confront and challenge rape in communities, on
the level of the individual as well as on the level of social structures and
beliefs. (RCCT 1998a)
Although feminist assumptions always guided the work of  the RCCT, this was
the first time that the organisation formally stated this in its vision and mission
statement. The RCCT also included the word ‘political’ because black and
coloured women were uncomfortable with and could not relate to the word
‘feminist’. This vision statement was important for the organisation because
it was the first time the women-only space was explicitly stated, and this
translated into policies such as the Deed of  Trust (RCCT 1998a), which, for
the first time in the legal policies of the organisation, defined a member as ‘a
woman who has been a member of  the trust for a minimum period of  six
months and has undergone a training course run by the trust’.
In the post-apartheid context, race relations within the RCCT changed
rapidly as black and coloured women entered the organisation. As a central
move to overcome the geographical-access disparities, the RCCT opened what
were initially called satellite offices, and then community offices, in Khayelitsha
in 1995 and Heideveld in 1997. These new offices represented a means of
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making services more accessible to women across race and class divides that
continued to define women’s day-to-day realities in the post-apartheid context.
Many black and coloured women could not access the organisation’s services
because of  the lack of  transport and money to get to Observatory. However,
the Observatory office remained the head office for the RCCT, representing a
distinct complexity in terms of  access as well as the organisation’s broader
function within the new democracy.
The Khayelitsha office opened in 1995 to serve one of  the most severely
disenfranchised populations within Cape Town, an important moment in the
organisation’s development. The physical space was substantially smaller than
the premises in Observatory. Training volunteers, which is a core RCCT
programme, had to take place at venues within the community. In this regard,
the RCCT as a civil society organisation transcended geographic lines and moved
into the everyday social spaces of residential life. In contrast to this movement
to integrate the work of the RCCT in community life, all organisational meetings
continued to be held at the Observatory office. Similarly, the opening of  the
Heideveld office in 1997 reinforced racist/classist assumptions – such as
access to/ownership of transport, availability of resources such as photocopying
machines and books, and the location of decision making – operating within
the RCCT.
Differences among women started surfacing during these post-apartheid
years. The category woman was contested as issues of  race in the RCCT became
more salient. Within the shifting dynamics of  this context, women’s needs
for power and control became clearly evident. Processes that affected the
management, control and distribution of resources, for example, exemplified
both internal power dynamics as well as a broader struggle to increase access
to gender protections – such as services for rape survivors – within the wider
women’s population in South Africa. These realities of  organisational power
struggles and limited access to gender rights illustrate how the second-wave
assumptions that all women share the same experience of their gendered
positions are severely inadequate, particularly in the case of South Africa,
where striking race and class divides persist.
Developing an inclusive feminist practice
Entering the RCCT as a public education and training coordinator, I thought
working in a women-only organisation would be a form of  utopia. Here I
could forget about the heterosexual and masculinised norms that continue to
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shape everyday social life. We no longer had to deal with conditions where
men were always watching women’s bodies – where we would have to survey
each other and ourselves about how we spoke, sat or dressed. In this
organisational space, we would not have to fight with men for power or to be
recognised as equals. From this perspective, I loved the freedom that working
in an all-women’s organisation offered.
However, I soon realised that this ‘utopian’ organisational context was
not without its own dynamics of  power and powerlessness. Although we
would not fight with men for power, we fought with each other. We were
definitely not unified, nor did we have the same experiences within the
organisation. In dealing with our differences, race surfaced most clearly as a
dividing factor among women working for the RCCT. The need for numerous
racism workshops, an affirmative action policy and the distribution of  the
resources between the three offices were constant, and racially charged,
tensions that confronted the organisation. Often in these discussions, black
and coloured women would stand together ‘against the white women’ and we
would often refer to the ‘Obs-centric’ way of doing things, linking the
historical white geography of  Observatory with the racial power dynamics
within the organisation. According to ELRU (1997), because modern racism
is more subconscious and racist feelings more submerged, it is often harder to
‘prove’ racism in this context, and therefore it takes much longer to challenge
and eradicate it. The organisational enactment of institutional racism similarly
presents challenges in transforming structures of  inequality when decisions
that limit access, for example, are not linked to a history of severe
marginalisation and pervasive barriers to social equality.
Black women have challenged many of the underlying assumptions within
the RCCT. For example, they lobbied for the rotation of  meeting locations to
be more geographically equitable and for the purchase of  bigger premises for
the Khayelitsha and Heideveld offices. At the same time, however, important
organisational structures remain unchanged. At the time of  this research,7
the two most senior/powerful positions in the RCCT continued to be held by
two white women. In addition, the economic resources are still managed at
the Observatory office. With the appointment of  the white director in 2002,
the board of  trustees told the staff  that the reason that they could not appoint
a black director was because black women were not interested in earning the
salary of R15 000 per month.8 This was an overt dismissal and devaluation
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of  black and coloured women, and an explicit form of  racism. Such acts of
subtle and not-so-subtle racism reinforce positions of power and powerlessness,
while reproducing dehumanising systems of practice. This is a concrete parallel
to the broader South African transition, where political power has shifted to
the hands of black people but economic power still rests in the hands of the
white minority.
As an agent of  change within the RCCT, my own social location shaped
the nature of my experience in the organisation. I draw from these experiences
to substantiate the pervasive divide between women based on race and class
positions. Because gender was at the top of  the hierarchy of  identity within
this organisation, my race identity as a coloured woman was repeatedly
dismissed. In my own process of  forming affiliations, I could not identify
with white women; as a coloured woman, I related to blackness and
experiences of racist oppression. I had similar experiences at UCT during my
undergraduate training. The issue of  access to resources was always assumed,
but because I am a coloured, lower-class woman, this reality was not mine. In
South Africa, class positions are extremely racialised, and further reproduced
in educational systems (Barnes 2007) as well as civil society organisations.
As a means of ‘fighting back’, my race identity became my primary identity
within the organisation. Externally, when I represented the organisation, my
gendered identity was primary. This prioritising of  one form of  oppression
over another is something that I was not comfortable with, and I often shifted
between these subjectivities, moving between race and gender on a daily
basis. I am reminded of  Nnaemeka’s (1998) statement that African feminism
resists prioritising oppressions and identities. Instead, she challenges us to
examine the position and context of  women to determine their degree of
powerlessness and agency.
Feminist practice is most effective when it challenges systems of  hierarchy
and promotes the value of shared power between people, including the
socialising of boy and girl children. This propelled me into exploring
prevention strategies locally that were based on the concept of  shared power.
I realised that historically in South Africa interventions aimed at addressing
rape had focused almost exclusively on work with women, with the goals of
empowerment, education, support and advocacy. This notion of  shared power
therefore became central to my work within the organisation in ways that
more closely paralleled the guiding values of  South Africa’s new democracy.
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Masculine identities in transformation
It is important to acknowledge that the RCCT has always educated men as
community members, police officers, magistrates and teachers, and also as
partners, fathers, husbands and brothers of  rape survivors. Even though the
work of ending gender-based violence has been viewed as the responsibility
of both men and women, the application of this guiding perspective continues
to challenge the organisation. To date, the RCCT has not yet undertaken a
practical strategic analysis of the role men can play within the organisation to
address violence against women.
Men fulfil multiple roles in their personal and social identities as fathers,
husbands, brothers and lovers, as well as in their professional identities as
police officers, magistrates, teachers and other male-dominated occupations.
These multiple roles present opportunities for men to challenge and confront
sexist attitudes and practices and to assert alternative values that promote
non-violent masculinities. Working with masculinities provides opportunities
for intervention in addressing and preventing rape. Particularly in South Africa,
with the lingering associations of militarised masculinity coupled with the
exorbitant levels of gender-based violence, such initiatives are even more
pressing.
As part of  my experience in South Africa’s gender-based anti-violence
movement, I worked with young boys on the Cape Flats9 as part of  the RCCT’s
Birds and Bees programme.10 From this experience, I have witnessed directly
young boys’ fragility in their attempts to define their masculinities. They come
from severely impoverished homes and communities where family upheaval
and social problems are commonplace. Often, the protection that ganging
and gang membership offers in such contexts seems attractive and necessary
to feel a sense of self-worth or visibility (Moolman 2004). How do we provide
these young men with alternatives to violent, sexualised masculinity?
Theoretically, the RCCT’s position on prevention strategies has been to
advocate for changes in the traditional socialisation practices central to the
rearing of boy and girl children, which as an organisation we had drawn from
early feminist theories. However, this strategy focused mainly on the sharing
of gender roles rather than the promotion of shared power. In its work on
masculinity, the RCCT did not consult contemporary theoretical models and
debates that have influenced feminist practice. Rather, the complexity of
power has not been analysed, and therefore its multiple locations have yet to
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be identified. As a result, preventative programmes have focused on a very
narrow understanding of gender, power and rape.
Including men in preventative work meant that the RCCT had to revisit
the debate of allowing men as members, considering both the internal and
external realities of  the newly democratic South Africa. Internally, a pervasive
tension existed between the historical culture and the current culture and
organisational practices. Morrell (2001) argues that the
[h]istory of  masculinity is not exclusively made by men. Women opposed
certain aspects of  masculinity and supported others. They did so in ways that
reflected the class and race forces. Race and class loyalties and political agendas
were often stronger than gender subordination. (16)
Black women entering the RCCT were committed to fighting gender sub-
ordination. At the same time, they came from a history of fighting racist
oppression with men as their allies, and thus they held the belief that men
can also be collaborators in fighting rape because they too experienced different
forms of  oppression.
Externally, the public space of  violence against women in South Africa
has changed. The shifting context of democracy in 1994 forced the organisation
to review its practice and intervention strategies (Britton 2006). An Interfund
report (2002) suggested both positive and negative factors attached to the
use of  interventions with men. This study concluded that there ‘was a need
to mainstream men into the interventions in order to address the issue from a
preventative aspect, while not neglecting the symptoms’.
RCCT service delivery was confronted with questions about the extent to
which the assumptions about the positive impacts of ‘women counselling
women’ hold true for ‘men counselling men’. Within the training and
development departments, the concept of preventative work and the role of
men and boys had to be revisited. The changes in the organisation resulted in
changing value systems embedded in personal and collective identities of
masculinity and heterosexuality. This case provides yet another example of
how the dissonance between theory and practice remains a challenge for the
RCCT.
Workshops held with staff  and volunteers identified that the RCCT would
benefit from including men in the organisation in a number of ways, namely
because it would gain insight into men’s behaviours and its work would be
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intensified through combined responsibility. For example, men’s presence
within the RCCT could provide role models for boys, increase the number of
male clients and reduce the pervasive rate of  gender-based violence. At the
same time, including men would serve to debunk predominant myths about a
monolithic notion of masculinity because it would increase the potential to
work with inspiring men who understand the enormous impact of  gender-
based violence. The negative impacts for the organisation were identified as
losing an exclusively female space, along with the freedom and safety it affords
for clients and members. For example, particular risks associated with this
ideological and applied shift included the chance of attracting offenders into
the organisation, the possibility that some members might leave the
organisation and the potential to lose focus in terms of  advocacy and lobbying
around men.
This dramatic change in policy and practice also signified a move away
from the European model of dealing with rape. These gains were an indication
that a new feminism was emerging, a feminist/womanist practice that was
inclusive of men, that did not fix men in the role of violent perpetrator and
that sought shared power expressed in the notion of ‘combined responsibility’.
Nnaemeka (1998) highlights combined responsibility as central to African
feminism. These changes also symbolised the letting go of the monolithic
identity of woman as powerless victim. Letting go of the homogeneous
category of man created spaces for the development of caring masculinities
as described by Morrell’s ‘responsive masculinities’ category.
The impetus to make this huge policy shift came from two organisational
realities. First, the diverse women within the RCCT brought with them a variety
of value systems, challenging the perception of the ‘universal woman’ that
existed within the organisation. Consequently, if  women could be different,
then men could also be different. So we began to challenge the perception of
men as a homogeneous grouping and as always-violent perpetrators. These
women injected a set of values that acknowledged all people (including men)
as having a caring and nurturing ability. Second, because preventing sexual
violence is part of the RCCT mission, the organisation had a responsibility to
the broader public to explore all avenues in its fight to prevent rape/sexual
violence, which necessitated the broader inclusion of men.
As this autoethnographic analysis depicts, organisations exist within and
respond to the overarching national and social contexts in which they operate.
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In South Africa, the national transition to democracy, with its focus on gender
rights, incited a transformative dialogue within the oldest rape service
organisation in South Africa. Just as the national context of transition is
characterised by a process of sorting out policies, priorities and ideological
commitments, so too is the ongoing work of  transitioning the RCCT’s
organisational position and response to the shifting landscape of South Africa.
Throughout the new nation, rape incidences remain extremely high. This
mandates a commitment to and focus on the development of rape-prevention
strategies. Transformative rape activism must include, first, the concept of
ownership and responsibility for dealing with sexual violence and, second,
practices of role-modelling the concept of shared power and non-violent hetero-
sexualities. Using gender as a form of  exclusion reproduces dehumanising
relationships, practices and systems. The exploration of  men’s role in stopping
rape and violence against women presents us with opportunities to redefine
ourselves as women, men and human beings, while also encouraging the
development of  healthy non-violent relationships and sexualities.
Conclusions
Feminism is a very powerful collective identity politic that has shaped the
story of  gender-based violence activism in South Africa. We cannot let go of
this legacy and the strengths of  the feminist movement. We can, however,
transform them and adapt them to our changing needs. Through the process
of  transforming feminist discourse, we need to uncover its oppressive practices
and produce new discourses of  power.
The scourge of rape presents us with huge challenges and opportunities
for developing a transformative feminist discourse and practice. The RCCT
Constitution (1979) states that ‘[t]he basic premise for any lasting success in
our work is therefore a democratic society where resources and power are
shared equally among all people. It is towards this broad goal that we direct
our energies.’ A society of  shared power is the goal, but gender is not the only
form of  power operating in the discourse of  rape. Equally important are the
issues and intersections of  race, class, nationality and sexuality. Power is multi-
layered and embedded within social and personal identities. It also changes
as the economic and political context changes. Power relations on many levels
must be uncovered and transformed. For rape survivors, for women and for
the organisation, an understanding of shared power needs to be infused within
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the RCCT. There is a need to experiment with different identities or
subjectivities of power, without locating them in essentialised social
categories. Power as a process rather than a fixed attribute needs to be affirmed
throughout organisational efforts to address such pervasive manifestations
of  gender inequality.
The concept of subjectivity is useful as a starting point from which to
develop strategic interventions. Organisations such as the RCCT do not have
to attach themselves to any one identity, but they need to be aware that
service delivery is influenced by a broader political context that differs in
varying locations. The RCCT has to examine the different social, political and
geographic spaces in which it operates. Having a rape crisis office in
Observatory is very different from having a rape crisis centre in Khayelitsha
or Heideveld (historically white, black and coloured areas respectively). Life
in Khayelitsha varies enormously from life in Observatory, even though the
distance between them is only 80 kilometres. The different political economies
have a definite impact on the shaping of masculinities and femininities as
well as on the experiences of rape. The RCCT has to hold these many
interpretations of rape, in the same way that any one person will inhabit
many subjectivities. The challenge for feminist practice, however, is to move
beyond an exclusive focus on gendered identity. The goal is not to be restricted
by the fear of losing an ‘identity’ on which feminist theory and practice has
been built. Courage to embrace different and changing subjectivities might
assist in finding the answers to eradicating rape.
This is the potential contribution that the RCCT can offer South Africa. In
many ways mirroring the national transformation, this civil society organisation
is replicating the persistent inequalities of  apartheid’s latent political economy.
Yet the RCCT is also championing new visions of  feminism/womanism that
are inclusive of  multiple forms of  masculinity. By challenging static,
universalising visions of men as oppressors and women as victims, the
organisation is in a position to contribute something original to the national
discussion of gender and the national quest to end gender-based violence.
These new forms of  masculinity may also offer encouraging perspectives for
men throughout the country to find alternatives to the violence and crime
they have experienced on a daily basis, and thus such contemporary models
may help to challenge violent sexualised masculinity. What the RCCT may
begin to offer the national discourse is the idea of combined/collective
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responsibility. Moving the idea of  a rainbow nation beyond rhetoric and beyond
a focus on race relations, this new vision of shared power through collective
responsibility may offer a model for altering power hierarchies and could
demonstrate that the survival and well-being of  all citizens is enhanced through
mutual dependency and cooperation.
Notes
1. Available on the SAPS website: www.saps.gov.za.
2. Apartheid classifications, such as the terms ‘black’, ‘coloured’ and ‘white’, are used in this
chapter as a form of analysis and not as essentialised social categories.
3. The Community Commission was a UCT organisation that worked with community groups.
4. Organisational documents of  the RCCT Socialisation Workshop, 1981.
5. The ‘Myth Sheet’ is a printed form with a list of sixteen statements about rape; participants
are asked to say whether the statements are true or false.
6. Gender Education and Training (GETNET), Family and Marriage Society of  South Africa
(FAMSA) and Gender Advocacy Programme (GAP).
7. This was mid-2006. In 2007, the organisation employed a coloured Muslim woman who
occupied the position of financial manager.
8. The majority of black women in South Africa earn less than R5 000 per month.
9. The Cape Flats are a group of coloured and black townships, established when coloured and
black people were relocated from areas such as District Six and Claremont as part of the
Group Areas Act (1950), which stipulated where the different racial groups could live.
10. The Birds and Bees is a youth life-skills educational programme. Its purpose is to educate
and empower young people on the Cape Flats about sexuality, relationships and rape. It also
has modules on prejudice and HIV/AIDS.
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The Politics of the Girl Child in Democratic South Africa
CHRISTINA NOMDO AND SHAAMELA CASSIEM
As citizenship is increasingly interpreted as involving responsibilities as well as
rights, it is important not to lose sight of  this element when discussing children’s
citizenship. Indeed the evidence of  responsibilities that many children exercise
can be used in support of  their claims for more effective rights. (Lister 2007,
695)
THE CHILDREN’S BUDGET UNIT (CBU) of the Institute for Democracy in South
Africa (IDASA) initiated the Children Participating in Governance project in
2004 to encourage children’s inclusion in public political discourse. Because
social and political environments are created on children’s behalf  for their
future adulthood, this project set out to ensure that children are not just
governed by adults, but that they take an active role in contributing to
governance processes in the present. Recognising South Africa’s youth as
individuals with democratic rights, this initiative promoted a paradigm shift
from the conception of children as passive recipients to the promotion of
active young citizens.
In the existing South African context, however, interconnected challenges
pose substantial barriers to children’s rights on a number of  levels: perceptions
of children as outside of the political process, inequitable gender relations
and prevailing cultural dynamics that often prevent or limit the interactions
of children within public political discourse. In this case we see a disjuncture
between the ideology of  democratic social rights central to South Africa’s
emerging democracy and the pervasive ways in which children are generally
excluded from public spaces where democracy is enacted. In addition, social
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constructions of  childhood, especially predominant notions of  the girl child,
structure children’s lives and shape their interaction in private and public
political discourse. This chapter begins with an overview of  the Children
Participating in Governance project to elucidate how civil society organisations
can provide important spaces to link children with South Africa’s democratic
process and promote engaged citizenship. Constructions of  the girl child as a
citizen are then explored to illustrate the central linkages among gender,
democratic rights and civil society leadership.
This chapter emerges from our own direct experience with the Children
Participating in Governance project. Our methodology includes participant
observations of  workshops held throughout the project and an analysis of
the data acquired through the written narratives of  girl participants. Through-
out this chapter, we draw on the direct experiences of a small subset of girls
involved in the project to expound on these connections and offer perspectives
from the voices of girls whose everyday life experiences are continually shaped
by South Africa’s ongoing transition to democracy.1
Children Participating in Governance project
IDASA assumes a central role as a civil society organisation committed to
monitoring the progress of democratisation and the provision and protection
of  social rights in the country. IDASA promotes democracy by building
institutional capacity, advocating for social justice and facilitating active
citizenship in a number of  contexts. The CBU is a unit of  IDASA that focuses
on advocating for public budgets which promote and protect the rights of
children. As one of  the CBU’s initiatives, the Children Participating in
Governance project envisaged a representative group of children that would
participate in governance by monitoring budgets for the realisation of their
rights in urban and rural contexts on a local government level. The project
objectives were:
• to create opportunities for children in South Africa to monitor government
budgets;
• to improve children’s participation in budget processes and facilitate
children’s research and monitoring of  budgets and rights realisation that
ultimately informs the shaping of  policy; and
• to contribute to the alignment of government budgeting to rights
realisation.
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In order to implement this initiative, the CBU partnered with four children’s
organisations that intended to increase awareness of the central link between
resources and rights realisation. The CBU strategically partnered with organ-
isations that would be better positioned to develop the life skills necessary
for the empowerment of  teenage participants and to facilitate the full
implementation of this project. These partner organisations included the
Youth Development Programme (YDP) of  the city of  Cape Town; the national
Disabled Children’s Action Group (DICAG); It’s Your Move, a subsidiary of
Molo Songololo (based in Cape Town); and Life Hunters, operating under
the auspices of  Practical Ministries in Port Shepstone, KwaZulu-Natal
province. The YDP, It’s Your Move and DICAG (children selected from Western
Cape and Gauteng provinces) are proxies for children in the urban areas.
Representatives from DICAG (Mpumalanga province) and the Life Hunters
representatives living in rural Port Shepstone are proxies for children in rural
areas. The central roles of  each of  the partner organisations are described as
follows:
• The city of  Cape Town’s Junior City Council (JCC) was established during
the apartheid era with representatives from white schools only. In the
post-apartheid context, the JCC now consists of delegates from across the
city. Due to perceptions that the JCC is not fully representative of  youth
from all socio-economic backgrounds, a new initiative within the city of
Cape Town began in 2004: the High Schools Capacity Building project.
The YDP comprises delegates from both these organisations. The YDP
was established by the local municipality to facilitate the acquisition of
leadership skills among school-going youth.
• It’s Your Move is an active child rights group under the auspices of  Molo
Songololo, a well-established child rights organisation in South Africa
renowned for its work on child trafficking. It’s Your Move works with
young people at the local level across South Africa and develops national
campaigns that aim to protect, promote and fulfil children’s rights.
• DICAG was established in 1993 by the parents of disabled children with
the goal of empowering parents to educate their children in an inclusive
environment. DICAG is an advocacy organisation that helps to raise the
level of awareness of disability by challenging stereotypes and perceptions
of people with disabilities in South Africa.
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• Life Hunters is supported by Practical Ministries, a development organis-
ation focusing on the needs of  those living in the rural areas on the South
Coast of KwaZulu-Natal. Practical Ministries provided impetus for the
establishment of Life Hunters, a life-skills initiative for children.
For this project these organisations partnered with the CBU facilitation team
made up of Shaamela Cassiem and Christina Nomdo (chapter authors), with
logistical support provided by Faldielah Khan. A reference group comprising
two experienced child-participation experts as well as elected leaders of the
children’s groups guided the CBU in this process. The Children Participating
in Governance project operated on a peer-facilitation model where leaders
relay training to their constituency groups.
The configuration of these organisational partnerships, as well the overall
implementation of the project, models the role of civil society organisations
in building democracy ‘from the ground up’. In particular, these organisations
aligned with the intent to protect one of the most vulnerable sectors of South
Africa’s population. In line with the participatory democratic ideals of  South
Africa’s democracy, this project is premised on conceptions of  children having
the ability and willingness to be active citizens.
Active citizens: children as social agents
The contemporary sociology of  childhood’s construction of  children as social
actors with agency and varying degrees of competence opens up possibilities
for the recognition of children as active citizens in a way that a construction
of them as passive objects of adult policies and practices did not. (Lister
2007, 697)
A contextual prerequisite exists in order to include children as agents in public
political discourse. Meaningful participatory citizenship requires a process of
‘active engagement in nurturing voice, building critical consciousness, ad-
vocating for the inclusion of women, children, illiterate, poor and excluded
people, levering open chinks to widen spaces for involvement in decision-
making, and building the political capabilities for democratic engagement’
(Cornwall 2002, 28). For South Africa, the levels of  ‘political capabilities for
democratic engagement’ span civil society and government. Our young
democracy that is challenged by the need for skills development for
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government officials is at the same time strengthened by a rights-centred
Constitution and a civil society with a history located in advocacy for social
justice and youth activism. This sets the stage (and expectation) for the central
role of civil society in public political discourse and the involvement of wide
sectors of the population in the ongoing creation of a human-rights-focused
democracy. We suggest that this expanded notion of  citizenship stems from
the emphasis on human rights within South Africa’s emerging nationhood.
While the notion of  children’s status as agents in political processes is debated
among scholars and activists, our position stems from a guiding assumption
that children play an active role in reconstituting the ‘new South Africa’. In
this particular context, with its emphasis on the continual building of processes
and structures that assure the continuation of  the ideals of  democracy central
to the 1994 transitional period, children play an even more central role as
political and social agents in South Africa. This ideological stance is in line
with the guiding organisational assumptions that governed this research project.
In the Children Participating in Governance project, the CBU operated
from the orientation that active citizenship could be fostered among children
by providing a structured skills-development process that builds knowledge
and experiential opportunities for learning. This is not to suggest that all
children present the same needs in terms of  their preparation for active
citizenship roles. Lister (2007) alludes to the fact that children are often
constructed as a monolithic category, with seemingly unified needs. Such
assumptions fail to recognise the complex intersections of identity that children
share with adult populations in relation to race, ethnicity, gender, class and
ability divides. To counter this homogeneous construction of  children, during
the selection of participants for this project, we considered the diversity of
‘children’ and paid particular attention to the needs of girls at each phase.
Overall, the group participants were diverse in race, ethnicity, gender and
capability; however, almost all were from low-income households.
Our work with children as social and political agents affords the
opportunity to examine applied practices that illustrate how the democratic
ideologies of South Africa are actively defined and applied in civil society
organisations that engage this notion of  expanded citizenship. In our case,
we utilise a gender perspective to explore how democratic engagement through
civil society shapes the protection of girl children – one of the most vulnerable
sectors in South African society. Below, we discuss the framework for skills-
216 Women’s Activism in South Africa
development training to illustrate the specific processes taken up by civil
society to promote the active engagement of  children in South Africa’s ongoing
process of democratisation.
Overview of  the training programmes
The training programme for peer facilitators entailed three one-week training
workshops that took place between February 2005 and February 2006. The
first workshop, titled ‘Linking Budgets and Rights’, shared information about
the progressive realisation of  children’s socio-economic rights entrenched in
the South African Constitution, the process for the division of revenue and
the competencies of  the various levels of  government. In this workshop, the
peer facilitators were also introduced to facilitation and gender-analysis skills.
The second workshop, ‘Budget Analysis as a Monitoring Tool’, provided
information about budget-analysis tools, including gender-responsive
budgeting. During this workshop the peer facilitators had an opportunity to
discuss governance issues with one of the tribal chiefs (who partner with
elected representatives to ensure effective governance at the local level) and
to visit community development projects to analyse their budgets and financial
management.
The final workshop, ‘Developing a Strategic Budget Advocacy Campaign’,
shared advocacy strategies and strategic planning techniques, which delineated
a few preliminary steps in initiating local advocacy campaigns. This workshop
was planned to coincide with the 2006 budget speech and civil society
advocacy initiatives. At this workshop participants were provided with the
opportunity to watch films about anti-apartheid advocacy, participate in a
press conference, hand over a petition for the extension of the Child Support
Grant (to children 14 to 18 years old) to officials at parliament, take a tour of
parliament and visit Robben Island (where political prisoners were held under
apartheid). Some workshop participants had the opportunity to observe the
budget speech being given in parliament (others watched on television), and
two children from the project asked the Minister of Finance questions on
live national television. All the workshop participants attended the meeting
of the Joint Monitoring Committee on Finance, where they posed further
questions to the minister of finance. This workshop succeeded in providing
children with direct exposure to the central processes of governance sur-
rounding civil society’s participation in policy making and collective action.
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A delegation of five peer facilitators also participated in a learning exchange
by travelling to the CEDECA Ceara project in Brazil in December 2005.
CEDECA Ceara is a child rights organisation that monitors government budgets
at local government level to ensure the realisation of  children’s rights. In
addition, the organisation gives effect to the right to child participation by
involving children in the monitoring of  government budgets. The Brazilian
child budget advocacy network, Rede OPA, demonstrated its advocacy
strategies and arranged for South African delegates to meet with government
officials, who explained their processes for participation. The two groups
also shared information about the participation of  children in all spheres of
society (for example, home and school), and exchanged and evaluated the
skills-development methodologies of each project. This international
experience provided a valuable opportunity to promote cross-cultural aware-
ness and understanding by building linkages among youth agents within both
Brazil and South Africa. Participants left this exchange with a much greater
understanding of their own processes of democratic governance, as well as
the foundation to understand youth activism from a global comparative
perspective.
One outcome of the Children Participating in Governance programme
was that the participant peer facilitators engaged actively with the programme
and, as their knowledge and skills grew, they became more confident about
their ability to lobby local government officials. Our hope is that this
experience will form the basis from which they will interact with their local
government officials as they develop into adulthood, ensuring that the rights
of children are realised by monitoring the allocation and spending of public
resources. This self-advocacy for appropriate expenditure of  public resources
for children’s rights contributes to participants’ growth as ‘active citizens’. In
the following section, we elaborate on the impact of these developmental
initiatives by presenting and analysing the narratives of some of the girl
participants in this project.
Girls’ perceptions of  participation and citizenship
In this section, we explore the issues that emerged from the journals and
articles girl participants have written about the project. These documents
provide important insights into girls’ experiences of the project through their
reflections on participation and citizenship in the milieu of their broader social
218 Women’s Activism in South Africa
realities. Although their journals rarely alluded directly to these broader
realities, our engagement with the girls over a protracted period gave us insight
into the gendered nature of  their lived experiences. Thus, we will incorporate
our own reflections on the girls’ written narratives to add depth to the analysis
of  the data through use of  a methodological form that complements the
context of  our participant observation research and our relationship to the
participants in this project.
First, we explore the context of girls’ participation in organisations through
their reflection on the circumstances in which they live, their families and
their communities and the ways in which these factors have influenced whether
and how they became involved in organisations. These insights facilitate an
understanding of barriers to participation as well as the positive effect of
involvement on personal development. Second, because the project’s
uniqueness was enhanced by the diversity of the participants, we explore the
narratives of  children who live in rural and urban areas from four provinces
in the country, participants who identify with an array of  socio-economic
backgrounds (related to experiences of apartheid race labels)2 and children
with disabilities working together with mainstream children. Examining the
ways in which girl participants grappled with the challenges they faced –
especially when it came to including children with disabilities – provides insight
into prejudices and the subsequent reorientation of the attitudes they project.
Third, we discuss our experiences with the girls in their roles as facilitators
and leaders. With an equitable distribution of  girls and boys in the peer-
facilitation groups, our analysis attempts to ascertain how the girls experienced
leadership within this project. Finally, we consider how girls’ aspirations for
the future are significant to understanding how the project fits into their strategic
life goals. In addition, we explore how the project’s peer facilitation and model
of children as socio-political agents and decision makers provided various
opportunities for empowerment, which girl participants became very aware
of as the project progressed.
Factors that facilitate or inhibit participation
In building active citizens, it is necessary to be cognisant of the contexts
within which the girl child participates. Cornwall (2002) cautions that ‘spaces
in which citizens are invited to participate, as well as those they create for
themselves, are never neutral. To make sense of  participation in any given
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space, then, we need also to make sense of  the power relations that permeate
and produce these and other spaces’ (7). Contrasting the participant
experiences of two girls of similar age who live two totally different realities
provides an opportunity to analyse the contextual factors that determine or
inhibit the access of girls to projects intended to create conditions of
empowerment. The stories of  Zubeida3 and Khanya are used to illustrate
how their communities and families impacted their involvement in
organisations that complement their aspirations to change their own lives or
those around them.
Zubeida is a 16-year-old, completing her penultimate year of secondary
education during 2005 and living in Heideveld,4 a township outside the city
of  Cape Town. Her geographic location is characterised by poverty and crises
of  identity evident in the high levels of  drug abuse and gang involvement
among the youth in her community. In these residential areas, clear socio-
economic distinctions construct divisions between residents able to own their
free-standing brick homes and those living in the blocks of flats leased from
local government. Zubeida has a great empathy for residents living in the
flats, even though she herself lives in a house. She explains passionately:
I . . . started making friends in the flats, where I would experience first-hand
the poverty most of the people in the flats put up with . . . In the apartheid
era not only the black people5 suffered! Coloureds are [marginalised] and
seem as if they do not exist, they too are jobless, they may not live in shacks
but they live in two-bedroomed flats, which accommodate more than one
family. (Zubeida, 17 June 2005)
Zubeida is clearly distressed by the difficult circumstances of her neighbours
and feels that she has a responsibility to help them. She would like to improve
the lives of others by being a positive role model to her peers through her
involvement with children’s organisations.
I am a step closer to bettering my life and those of my people. I realised that
most of the children here do not know their basic rights and feel as if they
belong in the gutters. One or two make it out of  here, but I need to find a
way to show them a better way out rather than drugs and gangsterism . . . I
find myself visioning a way out for us, my voice being heard in government
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. . . I am just a person that always finds a way to stand up for the rights of
those who are being overlooked. (Zubeida, 17 June 2005)
Her mother and schoolteacher are both very supportive of  Zubeida’s
involvement in children’s organisations. However, Zubeida herself  is mired
in a crisis of identity that relates to her sexual orientation, family dynamics
and the ever-pervasive drugs which are so integral to the socialisation of
youth in her area.
In contrast, Khanya’s family and cultural practices played a significant
role in delaying her involvement in a formalised children’s group. Khanya is a
17-year-old Zulu-speaking girl, completing her final year of secondary
education in 2005 and living in the rural African township of  Gamalakhe (on
the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal, about two hours’ drive from the provincial
capital, Durban). She lives with her father, mother, siblings, cousins, aunts
and grandmother in a house that her father built. They have electricity in the
house, but also use paraffin stoves for cooking. Water is accessible only from
a tap outside the house. Khanya is the eldest daughter in the family, with an
aunt and a cousin who are near her age. In the household, she is responsible
for cooking and cleaning as well as participating in the care of her younger
siblings. As is typical with gendered dimensions of  household labour, her
brothers are responsible for gardening, which takes place in the exterior,
whereas female labour is connected to interior family spaces. Similarly, if  the
family had cows, tending the cattle would be the primary responsibility of
the boys.
Khanya learned about the Life Hunters group in February 2001; however,
she was permitted to join it only in November 2003. She remembers how
difficult it was to convince her family that she wished to belong to a children’s
group. She sadly recalls:
My parents did not want me to join the group at first because of the fact that
there are both boys and girls. Culturally girls do their chores at home [and do]
not mix with boys. My parents later saw that I wanted so bad[ly] to join this
group. (Khanya, 23 August 2005)
Gender roles are embedded in everyday social life. According to Merrifield
(2001), socialisation is the central process whereby ‘both mainstream and
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(alternative) political cultures are passed on from generation to generation’
(9). As central institutions, family and community have a great influence on
socialisation processes that foster notions of  power, roles and responsibilities.
Of particular importance to the gendered component of socialisation, these
institutions also instil central values and norms about the individual’s ‘place’
in social systems. Asymmetrical power relations between men and women
are, therefore, socialisation models for boys and girls. As a result, these
generationally reproduced constructions of  gender more often than not
distinctly limit the public/visible roles of the girl child. The internalisation
of these marginalised roles affects the extent to which women participate in
public spaces. Thus, political spaces also become centrally constructed by
gender inequalities. This poses serious challenges to generations engaging
with the principles of democracy for the first time – particularly for girls’
involvement in political spaces. The children’s workshops, therefore, focused
on debunking socially accepted gender inequalities and demonstrating the
importance of  women’s and girls’ engagement in civil society organisations.
It would seem as if every new generation must be won over by the promises
of  democracy. In South Africa, we can classify a first generation of  democratic
citizens as black persons who cast their first vote in 1994. However, casting
a vote for a democratic dispensation implies subsequent development of
democratic principles. However, these principles, such as ‘freedom of
expression’ or ‘citizen participation’ or ‘freedom of movement’, sometimes
go against the grain of  alternative political cultures. The tension between
alternative political cultures and dominant political culture can be traced in
the history of  women’s political participation (Merrifield 2001).
A history of discrimination as well as a perceived lack of competence
often leads to the exclusion of  certain groups of  people – namely, women –
from democratic processes and institutions. Their exclusion is couched in the
perception of  incompetence in women’s ability to act appropriately as citizens.
For the girl child this is a double-edged sword. Girls are perceived to hold a
certain place in society (that is, outside public political space) and children
are perceived to have no opinions of value (that is, not worthy of interacting
with public political space). Given these severe obstacles, we assert that any
democratic reform must take cognisance of  multiple intersections of  identity
stemming from cultural, historical and political contexts that continue to shape
the experiences of the girl child.
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Central to the South African context of identity politics and socio-political
change, data from this research also indicate that ‘culture’ need not always be
in conflict with the democratic process. In Khanya’s experience, the group
participation process actually enhanced her understanding of the complete
context of her culture, rather than eroding it, as her parents may have feared.
Participation in this political process contributed to her personal development,
as Khanya related in a manner that illustrated an enhanced level of self-
confidence:
Being part of  [the] group grows on[e] culturally, spiritually, emotionally and
even your mind. Because of  getting to learn about one’s culture, one’s emotional
reactions and a lot more makes you think widely and wisely. (Khanya, 23
August 2005)
Khanya was, in fact, one of the most fierce defenders and monitors of cultural
practices, especially expectations of  girls. After completion of  her secondary
education, at the age of 18, she moved to the city to work and live with
friends.
In other instances, rather than being restrained by family norms that limit
girls’ participation outside of the private sphere, girls conceptualised their
roles in public processes as holding the potential to positively impact their
communities. Zubeida’s empathy for members of  her community living in
impoverished conditions provides insight into the reason why she chose to
belong to a children’s organisation. Her motivation for being involved in the
project is based on her desire to be a role model for her peers in her community
by holding a role in a civil society organisation. As we see in these contrasting
cases of Zubeida and Khanya, supporting and inhibiting factors for girls are
predicated on their role within families and communities, which ultimately
affects their involvement in civil society organisations.
Learning about rights, governance, budgets and advocacy
The CBU has facilitated workshops on budget monitoring from a rights
approach for several years. The Children Participating in Governance project,
however, launched the first initiative that would build the skills of children
to act as budget monitors. As project coordinators, we remained fairly certain
that this goal was achievable, as it had been accomplished in a project in
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Brazil. The training programme concentrated on four key topics: (1) justiciable
socio-economic rights of children entrenched in the South African Constitu-
tion; (2) structures, levels and functions of  government; (3) budget concepts,
processes and analysis tools; and (4) strategic planning and advocacy processes.
The recollections of  the children provide a broad overview of  what interested
them about these topics as well as insights into their development process as
active citizens. Audrey, Lorraine and Petunia commented about the impact
of learning about rights:
When we started with the rights and the differences between various rights,
there was more participation because people seemed to know their rights
well. (Audrey, 11 August 2005)
We spoke about different kinds of  rights and how they affect us personally.
(Lorraine, 10 July 2005)
We learnt a lot about steps we should take in order for our rights and needs
to be met. (Petunia, 10 July 2005)
Rights discussions were familiar terrain for many participants; however, none
had ever before focused on justiciable socio-economic rights, which are the
cornerstone for improving conditions and experiences of poverty – especially
for children, who have specific protections within the South African Bill of
Rights.
Participants’ interest peaked during discussions of the operations of
government. Even though this topic forms part of  the school curriculum in
South Africa, we suspect the children were interested to see if we could
transform ‘dry’ classroom lessons into fascinating avenues of  discovery. Their
enthusiasm for learning was remarkable and allowed for an open, creative
process among leaders and participants.
We went over the three levels of  government which is national, provincial
and local government. (Audrey, 11 August 2005)
I jumped at the opportunity to learn about the systems that run our country.
(Lorraine, 10 July 2005)
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 . . . I didn’t expect to learn so much about how government operates. (Petunia,
10 July 2005)
These training spaces also provided opportunities for participants to engage
with local leaders, thereby broadening their perception of  South Africa’s
government process. During our workshop in KwaZulu-Natal, for example,
the CBU facilitators were able to arrange for the peer facilitators to interact
with the traditional authorities who work with municipal structures to opera-
tionalise governance. Petunia, a 16-year-old Zulu-speaking girl who lives in
an area presided over by the chief we visited, had never dreamt of having the
opportunity to engage with this leadership figure about his role in democratic
South Africa:
The Amakhosi [chiefs] told us that they have a very good relationship with
government and even [though] the country has [modernised], they still practise
the culture and tradition. (Petunia, 10 July 2005)
Petunia expressed that meeting the chief personally increased her understanding
and appreciation for her rich cultural heritage. Many of the children who
lived in the chief ’s area reported that they had felt too intimidated to engage
with the chief before and also did not know that he would be so welcoming
of children. Personal engagements with local councillors and budget officials
(during the same workshop) not only injected a dose of reality into the
programme, but also provided advocacy opportunities that most children used
to their advantage.
Even the girls whose chief we visited were not shy to voice their opinions
and to ask questions of this male authority figure. In fact, at the very start of
the project, the level of confidence the girls from KwaZulu-Natal displayed
impressed us as facilitators. At times, this confidence played out with the girl
participants challenging their boy counterparts throughout the sessions. For
example, during the course of their constituency workshops, the girls became
impatient with the boys and often assumed responsibility for activities
delegated to the boys. These acts demonstrated empowerment that no doubt
resulted partly from the girls’ continuous engagement with the Practical
Ministries’ Life Hunters project. Furthermore, women’s leadership as facilitators
provides alternative frameworks to traditional gender roles in ways that
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socialise girls to access and develop their own leadership capacity. Even though
the girls demonstrated enormous capacity in this regard, their development
as leaders did not exhibit a universal acceptance of their acquired power and
authority. Reflecting on the reversal of  gender roles in terms of  their dismissive
views of the boys’ capacities during workshops, the girls reverted to blaming
themselves and each other for not allowing the boys to fulfil their respons-
ibilities. This caretaking approach represented the power of  embedded gender
norms and the ongoing need to develop girls’ internal sense of  their potential
as powerful agents of change.
Another area of  empowerment centred on girls’ skills development in
finance and budgeting. All participants were initially most daunted by the
prospect of  learning about government budgets in the workshops. Many of
the girls in the group, however, had not been given the responsibility of
handling their own money. As a result, their budget literacy remained very
low. This was particularly evident when the girls who formed part of  the
delegation to Brazil were expected to manage part of their per diem by
themselves. Zettie became particularly confused and overwhelmed by this
experience, leading to her becoming visibly anxious and stating, ‘I am still
young in terms of  handling money and easily forget . . . the simple truth is
that I’m too scared to handle my own money’ (16 December 2005). This
perceived lack of capacity for budgeting prevailed for Zettie despite the fact
that the peer facilitators had been exposed to budgeting from the first workshop
in February 2005. The notion of  handling real money in a different currency
and foreign context posed a serious challenge to Zettie in her process of
skills development.
Reflecting on Zettie’s experience in Brazil and her comment about her
abilities according to her age, we need to consider the kind of responsibilities
that are expected from children in the process of developing their capacities
of ‘active citizenship’. As we see in this case, the application of knowledge
gained in the workshop presented one of the most serious challenges to
children in our project. In Zettie’s home situation, for example, she was not
expected to control her own money; this is the responsibility of the adults
around her and she is content with this. In fact, Zettie expressed her opinion
by stating, ‘I am still young’ as if she were saying, ‘My time will come’. On
the one hand, Zettie is involved in youth forums that prepare her for
participation in public policy discourse. On the other hand, Zettie was not
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ready to take on so-called adult responsibilities such as handling money. This
wavering position around responsibility reflects one of the core characteristics
of  the conception of  children as active agents in civil society. Lister (2007)
states clearly that there is no argument that ‘children should exercise the
same responsibilities as adults’; however, ‘the responsibilities that they do
exercise should be recognised’ (716). Drawing from this perspective, our work
in training children to take on active roles in civil society underscores the
importance of  valuing and actively recognising children’s willingness to
participate in public discourse while at the same time recognising their right
to be children.
As children are brought into the political process, these dual roles as
developing adults must be taken into consideration consistently. In our own
experience with the budgeting workshops, we witnessed moments in which
participants exhibited simultaneously their roles as maturing young adults
and developing children. For example, many of  the girls reported that the
budget-analysis training was very challenging. Khanya recalls her bewilderment
at the ‘[m]any different complicated formulas that I sometimes confused’ (17
February 2006). However, after this first workshop, Audrey was amazed at
how much knowledge she had acquired: ‘I learnt so much about government
and how it spends its money’ (11 August 2005). She even developed the
capacity to interpret the national budget speech, screened every year on
television. Her sense of accomplishment is evident:
When we had returned from the workshop, we were back just in time for the
national budget speech. We were requested by the [CBU] facilitator to watch
the budget speech, and since we now understood everything, it was easy for
us to just sit down and listen, but this time we understood what was being
said. (Audrey, 11 August 2005)
By the end of  the first peer-facilitators’ workshop, participants expressed that
their abilities in relation to both personal and governmental budgeting exceeded
their expectations. Petunia noted confidently, ‘When I went there, I didn’t
expect to learn so much about . . . how the country’s budget links with children’s
rights’ (10 July 2005). As this case illustrates, building children’s capacity for
active citizenship necessitates the ability to focus support in areas which present
as exceptionally confusing or overwhelming, in order to allow participants to
access their developing critical consciousness as engaged actors in civil society.
Activating Children’s Citizenship 227
For girls, this process is even more critical because of  the added barriers
they face as a result of  socially constructed gender roles, coupled with the
limitations they often experience in their own environments. Acquiring
budgetary skills holds the potential to empower girls with heightened capacities
to manage their financial resources and participate in public processes that
inform governmental spending. Furthermore, the empowerment of  girls in
this sphere debunks myths about girls’ capacity in math and economics. To
this end, the workshops linked the acquisition of personal skills with girls’
long-term potential to contribute in public democratic spaces.
Assessing the impact of this portion of the training on rights, governance,
budgeting and advocacy, girl participants reported that they found some of
the most empowering experiences in the opportunities to engage with
traditional authorities, as well as local and national government officials and
politicians. Increasing budget literacy, enhancing knowledge of  children’s socio-
economic rights entrenched in the Constitution and learning about the power
of  advocacy denoted some of  the most important skills acquired by girls. As
our analysis of the overall outcomes of girls’ participation in workshops and
training sessions makes clear, the enhanced confidence, awareness and political
understanding acquired among participants powerfully positions girls to take
part in democratic processes throughout their future. The foundation of
preparation for active citizenship instilled through the training promotes
participants’ increased likelihood to serve as long-term leaders in civil society
and government. Ideally, the roles participants eventually assume will con-
tribute to South Africa’s long-term development and encourage greater access
to human rights in the ongoing process of democratisation. The following
participants’ reflections on key experiences capture the enhanced power bases
acquired by girls in this project:
I know how to stand up for my rights and that each right comes with a
responsibility. (Petunia, 17 February 2006)
Getting to know how to behave around politicians or any other superiors in
my country . . . [She reported this as a significant feature of her personal
growth during the project.] (Rene, 17 February 2006)
I learnt that children do have a voice and that there are people willing to listen
to us . . . I learnt to use my power I have as a child and I’ve become confident
around a lot of  people. (Lorraine, 17 February 2006)
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 . . . [I]t only developed my self-esteem and it motivated me to have the
courage to get more involved in my community. (Fatima, 17 February 2006)
All in all this was a great experience and I would say ‘we are really doing it
ourselves for ourselves!’ (Khanya, 17 February 2006)
Our assessment of  the overall impact of  these reflections on empowerment
must be placed within the context of the serious barriers girls are likely to
face when they return to their immediate families and communities, which
often reflect the prevailing patriarchal social norms that continue to marginalise
women and girls. For example, their confidence acquired in the training
workshops along with their engagement with government when mediated by
an external development organisation may differ significantly when girls return
to their local context, where they may be expected to conform to cultural
norms relating to the position of  girl children in their communities. In addition,
their local organisations will need to be very supportive of their initiative in
order to reinforce lessons learnt and give them opportunities to practise new
knowledge and skills. As participants re-enter their daily life following the
workshops, they face a critical juncture in terms of  their ability to retain
skills. For example, knowledge of  budgeting and budget analysis may be
forgotten if it is not reinforced by continual practice of engagement with
economics on a personal and public level. Therefore, we assert that civil
society organisations must provide mechanisms that assure the ongoing
development of  children’s capacity as political agents. To counteract the
dominant gendered social norms, this long-term work is particularly critical
for girls. Access to social spaces that encourage the development of  girls’
leadership capacity and continue the acquisition of knowledge and skills is
therefore a critical factor in the long-term success of  participants, and in
their eventual capacity to hold positions of  influence within civil society.
Grappling with the concept of the infamous rainbow nation
A unique feature of this project was its intention to bring together children
from diverse socio-economic circumstances and, even more significantly, to
integrate children with disabilities into the peer-facilitation group. These
training contexts created microcosms of  South Africa’s diversity, which
afforded opportunities for children participants to engage in diverse learning
communities and challenge prejudices. These skills are central to long-term
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engagement with and leadership within South African society. In many cases,
learning to overcome past socialisation around difference became one of the
most powerful outcomes of this initiative. Lorraine, a boisterous girl selected
especially for her ability to fit into any group – and, incidentally, the only
white girl in the entire project of approximately 80 children – remembers
how surprised she was to meet her fellow participants from diverse socio-
economic backgrounds. She recalled vividly, ‘The first time I realised that we
were all from different parts of South Africa was when we met up with some
of the other participants at the Johannesburg airport [for the first peer-
facilitators workshop]’ (10 July 2005). However, after a year in the project,
she commented, ‘My biggest challenge . . . was dealing with racial prejudice.
It was a little sad that I struggled so hard to fit in’ (25 February 2006). On
another occasion she intimated despairingly, ‘Even though everyone wanted
me to learn their cultures, nobody was interested in learning mine’ (17
February 2006). As this reflection illustrates, children’s workshops tapped
into the core realities that South Africa faces in grappling with its ‘rainbow
nation’ ideology.
Besides living in different provinces and having divergent cultures, the
group members also needed to find a common language for communication.
Zettie noted sagely: ‘. . . for almost all of  us that were at the workshop, English
was not our first language or our mother tongue and we had to [speak] English
nearly all the time because it was the only way we could communicate’ (10
July 2005). Later, however, language choice became an important indicator
of  the cohesiveness of  the group. Zettie commented that although the
workshops used a common language, the various groups continued to rely on
their own languages after each workshop’s completion as a way to exclude
others. The CBU facilitators recognised that in the context of  a nation with
eleven official languages, language politics can have a significant impact in
moulding or destroying a group. When tensions arose among members of  the
group, their first reaction was to revert to their home languages and retreat to
their organisational groups. As a result, language became both a practical and
symbolic aspect of dealing with difference in efforts to support increasing
understanding and interaction skills that promoted the value of diversity among
participants.
For the mainstream children, working with children with disabilities made
as much of  an impact on them as did the content of  the workshops. Zettie,
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Lorraine, Rene and Khanya remembered how this direct engagement changed
their attitudes about children with disabilities. Lorraine was most impressed
by the deaf participants, and felt enthusiastic about learning a new language:
I learnt a lot about myself  and how I react to others. I honestly felt ashamed
of how I used to think. Because I had never been exposed to so many
different people before, I didn’t know exactly how to react, or understand
children with disabilities. I am learning now, and trying to find someone in
Cape Town to teach me sign language. (Lorraine, 23 August 2005)
In addition to two deaf peer facilitators, the initial peer-facilitation group
also included three participants confined to wheelchairs, because of physical
disabilities or cerebral palsy. Mainstream children had to find ways to
‘reasonably accommodate’ their peers who required assistive devices for
physical mobility.
. . . [T]he thing [that] surprised [me] was that the ‘disabled’ kids were there
too because I never thought that there will be ‘disabled’ kids and what we
were told there by the facilitators was that we [were] to include everybody in
anything that we do, assist the ‘disabled’ kids as much as they will tell us . . . I
have learnt a lot about myself in this project, even about myself and how I
deal with diversity. (Zettie, 10 July 2005)
I was very excited as I learnt that sign language for the first time. In four days
I also learnt a lot in the workshop and outside where we were socialising –
about disabled people as I have never spent a lot of time like that with
disabled children. I realised that we are all the same no matter if you are in a
wheelchair or you use both legs. This training helped me mentally and
emotionally, as I used to feel pity for a disabled person and I know that we
have lots in common. I shouldn’t pity as they need no pity, but fair treatment.
(Khanya, 23 August 2005)
I never worked with disabled people in my life and I always thought that they
can’t think like we think . . . Now I work with them and we are in one big
project. (Rene, 17 February 2006)
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It was remarkable to witness attitudes and prejudices of mainstream children
towards children with disabilities, particularly given the associated meanings
of  such dominant perceptions in the context of  South Africa’s broader
commitment to diversity. Children’s biases are notably comparable with the
attitudes and prejudices that adults have towards children, and with the
attitudes of men towards women, such as failing to recognise the ability of
the ‘other’ to participate in civil society and governance. Lister (2007) compares
children’s participation and citizenship with gender and citizenship. She states
that ‘lack of recognition implies exclusion and marginalisation from “full
participation” in the community’ (709). Similar reasons are given for excluding
children with disabilities from mainstream activities, women from their full
capacity for leadership, and children from adult contexts: their lack of
competence, their inability to be rational and their dependency (710). Yet it
is questionable whether all adults have the competence to make rational
decisions.
During our project, we witnessed how mainstream children positively
changed their attitude towards the children with disabilities. The authors
intentionally provided situations and experiences that would allow mainstream
children to reflect on their own attitudes and prejudices towards children
with disabilities. The children had to overcome their prejudices and find ways
to interact with everyone in the peer-facilitation group. This experience not
only affected their attitudes, but many became advocates for the inclusion of
children with disabilities among their peers.
In South Africa, many aggressive policies exist to integrate children with
disabilities into the mainstream. One example is the inclusive education white
paper published in 2001, which is currently being piloted for implementation
(Philpott 2004, 118). An integrated approach to policy development and
planning is currently being called for, which dedicates sufficient human and
financial resources to the realisation of  the rights of  children with disabilities.
The prevalence of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of poverty place added burdens
on an already vulnerable sector of  society. Therefore, the participation of
children is predicated on the extent to which disabling barriers in their social
and physical environment can be removed (Philpott 2004).
The facilitation of workshops represented microcosms of society and
prepared participants for the skills needed to eventually lead South Africa in
its promotion of  diversity as a central component of  democracy. Participants’
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engagement with children from different backgrounds and places and with
different abilities made for significant experiential learning. As South Africa
is a very diverse society, projects that seek to foster participation and active
citizenship will need to factor in identity issues such as culture and language.
We learnt that in order to neutralise these issues and prevent the politics of
these factors from sabotaging the primary intention of a project, they must
be addressed from the outset. This process heightens our understanding of
difference at the vector of multiple identity factors, including gender, race,
class, language and ability. Working from this vantage point promotes a more
nuanced understanding of  the overarching context of  South African society,
and at the same time provides skills for youth as they prepare for active roles
as leaders within civil society and government. This conceptual framework
played a particularly important role in the development of girls’ awareness of
their own location within society and their ability to overcome structural
barriers to leadership participation.
Leaders empowering others
In the peer-facilitators group, girl participants especially took their role as
leaders or representatives very seriously. This was evident throughout the
project, but more notably when two girls were selected to represent the project
in Brazil as part of a learning exchange. Zettie and Nandie were very mindful
that they were acting as the ambassadors of the project:
The selection . . . I believe it was quite a difficult decision to make, but when
I realised how selectively and importantly we were chosen I started to have
my personal checkup to see why I’ve been chosen. (Nandie, 16 December
2005)
The only challenge for me was for the whole trip that I have to make everybody
proud of me and make them feel I have represented them in a responsible
way, but I too have to feel it in my heart that I have tried my best, which may
not be good enough. (Zettie, 16 December 2005)
Both girls displayed significant leadership skills in order to be chosen to be
part of the delegation. They were selected in a two-phase process that firstly
included the peer facilitators themselves, with a final decision made by the
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reference group. Even in Brazil, boys in the delegation, as well as members
of the host organisation, commended the girls for the skills and capacities
they demonstrated throughout the experience. These skills developed
gradually from the first workshop, where girls were trained to be facilitators.
There is no doubt, however, that a significant contributing factor to the long-
term success of  these girls will be their innate determination to continue
their development as active citizens.
Learning facilitation skills at the first peer workshop enabled the peer
facilitators to arrange and present confidently at their constituency workshops.
The inclusion of girls in this peer-facilitation role was part of the
transformation process central to girls increasingly assuming leadership roles
in development initiatives. Khanya shared her opinion of  the benefit of  being
a facilitator, commenting introspectively, ‘The project means a lot to me as a
peer facilitator as I will learn to facilitate under any circumstances. And it
also teaches [me] to have self-respect so that I can respect others’ (23 August
2005). Facilitation was a very challenging and nerve-wracking experience for
some. Khanya remembered disappointedly: ‘I did facilitation, I tried my best
but [only a] few “participants” participated fully, which disturbed me’ (23
August 2005). The amount of  work required to infuse energy into the group
surprised facilitors. Audrey, however, wisely judged their performance on the
impact of their facilitation on their audience. She was pleased to note that
‘we work well with the children and they had a good understanding of what
we were trying to bring over’ (Audrey, 11 August 2005).
In addition to assuming leadership positions as peer facilitators, one peer
facilitator from each group was elected to represent their organisation in the
reference group, which provided guidance about the strategic direction of
the project. Two boys and two girls were elected to fulfil this leadership role,
their first engagement as decision makers with equal power in a forum
consisting of adults and children. Khanya was surprised that everyone
recognised each other’s value: ‘We attended a meeting at IDASA offices where
I met adults from different organisations who were full of great ideas and
also listened to our ideas’ (23 August 2005). The child-participation experts
in the reference group especially encouraged the children’s input. It was also
necessary to solicit the children’s opinions before those of  the adults in order
to get the children to realise the value of  their opinions. Girl participants
assumed leadership positions as peer facilitators, and some also acted as the
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representatives who served on the reference group for the project, both
nationally and in the international learning exchange. As an important indicator
of the power of these initiatives to break down asymmetrical gender relations,
the capacity of the girls in the group to assume leadership positions was
never questioned by the boys in the group. However, this reticence could be
affected by the all-female adult leadership of  the children’s group, as well as
the all-female facilitation team. Nevertheless, boys’ attitudes towards girls’
leadership illustrates how the microcosmic social spaces created throughout
such educational experiences provide critical opportunities to transcend
inequitable gender roles. Our intent in the design and long-term impact of
this work is to foster the transference of these attitudes to participants’
continued engagement in civil society. As the data illustrate, involvement in
this project positively shaped the girls’ aspirations for the future as a central
aspect of their experience.
When I grow up I want to be . . .
In order to carry on the gender victories of  women’s leadership in South
Africa, girl graduates of this training must continue their involvement at the
public level to practise and enhance the foundation of skills and perspectives
acquired in these children’s workshops. Varying motivations to join organisa-
tions and projects surfaced for girls in this project. As they were encouraged
to envision their roles as future leaders, however, they sometimes had to
overcome challenges that threatened their ability to participate in governance
initiatives. Girls consistently recognised the value of  belonging to their
organisations and participating in this project. Many stated that their involve-
ment broadened their perspectives and enabled them to develop enough
confidence to realise the strategic value of their participation in governance
initiatives for their life goals. As a result, many girl participants now envisage
a future in politics, community development or civic education. Lorraine and
Zettie dreamed of  a career in service to their society:
. . . I hope to move into politics one day. I jumped at the opportunity to learn
about the systems that run our country. It was important for me as youth to
see where we as youth fit into the system. I also think it’s the responsibility of
the youth though, to actively get involved in the governance of  our country.
By learning today, we can acquire the skills to govern a successful nation,
when it is handed down to our generation. (Lorraine, 10 July 2005)
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Personally, this workshop means a lot to me because maybe I will end up
working for government and it has clarified lots of things for me. (Zettie, 10
July 2005)
The project impressed the young people primarily because of the impact it
had on their own development and the doors it opened in government.
We are being trained as tomorrow’s leaders, and with the skills and knowledge
we learn here, we will make our difference in this world. (Lorraine, 10 July
2005)
Some of our municipal officials are interested [in] this project. This will surely
break the concrete I assumed was between children and government. (Khanya,
23 August 2005)
Girl participants were very confident about the possibility of careers within
the government of  the country, even though they would have to overcome
several cultural and economic barriers to fulfilling their aspirations. The project
contributed to their personal development and enhanced their capacities to
become active citizens. Those who continued to participate in the project
increased their skills and knowledge, while developing the capacity to confront
deeply embedded gender roles that severely limit the participation of many
girls in civil society organisations.
Conclusions
The Children Participating in Governance initiative utilised a rights-based
framework to foster children’s self-advocacy as a model to support the long-
term development of  South Africa’s democracy. The project intended to
facilitate the development of children and youth as civil society participants
and advocates of  active democratic citizenship. By providing direct exposure
to a variety of  political contexts, this project fostered the growth of  children’s
meaningful participation in public political spaces in South Africa. As Wyness,
Harrison and Buchanan state, ‘[O]ne of  the themes running through the
research on young people’s political participation is the lack of  real opportunity
to have a say on social and political matters’ (2007, 94). This initiative
overcame these common barriers for youth participants by demystifying the
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political process, which will ultimately allow them to confront structural
barriers to civil society participation stemming from continuing inequitable
power structures.
Our focus on the girl child encouraged the long-term advocacy necessary
to realise the gender equality promises of  South Africa’s democratic ideologies.
Throughout the workshops, girl children formed an integral part of  three
major components: (1) the peer-facilitation group that transferred information
and skills to a broader constituency group; (2) a reference group that provided
strategic direction to the project; and (3) an international exchange with a
partner in Brazil. Extracts from the girls’ journals illustrate their own per-
ceptions of their participation in these processes, along with the overarching
aspirations instilled in girls as a result of their participation.
From the exploration of factors inhibiting or facilitating the participation
of girl children in development initiatives, we learnt that culture need not
conflict with democratic process. However, the interpretation of  gender roles
within specific families or cultural groups may inhibit or facilitate participation.
Cultural diversity is not the only challenge faced by girls wishing to participate
as active citizens. Other identity issues, such as language and race or even
disability, may prove to be barriers to full participation. The development of
programmes that promote civil society participation in public political
discourse must therefore take cognisance of these complex intersections of
identity central to both individuals’ experiences and the overarching social
environments within which participants engage in their day-to-day lives.
In the context of transitional democracies, our findings underscore the
need for special attention to be paid to the gender relations in society that
undermine equality and limit girls’ potential to contribute to civil society. By
providing social spaces where traditional gender assumptions may be
challenged, this participatory project demonstrated that educating young
populations holds great promise in the eventual transcendence of asymmetrical
power relations that severely disadvantage women and girls. In our work, the
agency of girl children in their ability to deal with issues relating to power
emerged as one of  the most striking and hopeful observations. Although
gender relations permeated all the visible and invisible, planned and unplanned
activities of the three peer-facilitators’ workshops, girls’ interpretation of
their roles and responsibilities as representatives (either as peer facilitators,
group leaders or project ambassadors) relayed their determination to succeed.
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Many of the girl children have also decided that they intend to take up public
office or play a significant role in South African civil society. These empowered
positions acquired by girls as a result of their participation in the project
build the foundation for the future of  women’s increased engagement in civil
society and public governance. At this critical juncture in South Africa’s
development, we assert that the ongoing empowerment of  girls assures that
the vision of gender equality as a central component of democracy will remain
at the forefront of  realising long-term social change at both the public and
private levels of  society. It is our hope that when participant graduates such
as Khanya, Zettie, Petunia and Lorraine assume leadership roles throughout
civil society, South Africa may provide an even stronger model of  women’s
empowerment and gender equality.
Notes
1. For the purposes of this research, all participants approved the use of their narratives, reflections
and journals as a source of  data for this chapter. To protect the identity of  our participants, we
use pseudonyms for each.
2. The apartheid system classified the South African population into race groups, the primary
ones being African (referring to the indigenous peoples from groups such as the Xhosa and
the Zulu); coloureds (referring to those of mixed origin); Indians (referring to persons with
Indian descent); and whites (referring to descendents of European settlers). These race labels
were used to delineate a hierarchy of citizenship and privilege, with whites being the preferred
class of citizens; Indians, coloureds and Africans being discriminated against and oppressed
in varying degrees; and Africans being the worst off. Although South Africa is no longer
segregated according to race labels, one of the residual effects of the apartheid system is the
continued existence of racially homogeneous communities (Christopher 1994, 103–16). In
this study, the demographics of  the group are varied. Only one of  the girl children in the peer-
facilitators group of this project would have been classified white and she resides in the city of
Cape Town. The rest of  the group’s girls are either coloured (living in Cape Town) or African
(living either in Cape Town or Johannesburg or in the more rural area of  Port Shepstone in
the province of KwaZulu-Natal). These girl children would not normally have the opportunity
to interact with girls of other race groups.
3. None of  the children’s real names have been used.
4. Heideveld is a residential area previously demarcated a coloured township by apartheid policies
that created separate residential areas for the designated race groups.
5. Classified African by apartheid laws.
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CHAPTER NINE
Crafting Spaces for Women’s Voices
The Case of Refugee Women in KwaZulu-Natal
JANINE HICKS
WHILE GREAT PROGRESS has been made in ensuring that women can stake
their claim as equals in the new South African society, refugees in the country
appear to have taken the place of previously disadvantaged black South
Africans, in that they are treated as second-class citizens or inferiors. In the
context of the post-apartheid democratic transition, the case of refugee
populations illustrates a distinct marginalisation as a result of  new constructions
of ‘others’. At times, this marginalisation comes at the hands of black South
Africans, who themselves have been at the receiving end of such treatment,
illustrating how asymmetrical power relations are reproduced among newly
emergent groups in the post-apartheid context.
An invisible community: Refugee women in KwaZulu-Natal
In South Africa, refugees are permitted safe haven from situations of  conflict
in their home countries until they have been granted official refugee status,
an exceptionally long-winded bureaucratic process that keeps thousands in
limbo while temporary documents are processed. In 2004, the number of
refugees in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) was estimated at 14 000 people, but there
are no statistics available on how many of these are women (Kanani 2004,
8). Research into the living conditions, survival strategies and acceptance of
refugee women in KZN reveals that the majority live with their husbands and
children in small, relatively expensive, often shared dwellings. Their average
monthly income is less than R300, derived largely from car-guard work,
hawking or running hair salons. Almost all reported that they are receiving no
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assistance or support from the South African government or local service
providers, and that they are discriminated against when trying to access public
services at schools and hospitals (Kanani 2004). Their struggle to survive
and support their families is ‘compounded by the fact that they are dislocated
from their homes and families, living in a country with a high level of
xenophobia’ (Kanani 2004, 1).
Refugee men and women experience great difficulty in securing the all-
important asylum status that secures their right to remain in South Africa and
should entitle them to constitutional and basic social rights. Yet those who
are able to obtain refugee documentation report that this is not understood or
accepted by a broad range of stakeholders, such as employers, immigration
officials, embassies, banks and landlords. Nevertheless, without such docu-
mentation refugees cannot access basic services such as banking, education
or housing (Kanani 2004, 11).
In South African society, refugees face overwhelming xenophobic attitudes
and unsympathetic responses to their plight from members of local
communities, who appear to lack an understanding of refugees’ situation:
In South Africa, xenophobia is one of  the biggest challenges faced by refugees
and asylum seekers . . . Often termed ‘amakwerekwere’ (a derogatory term for
black foreigners), non-citizens, especially refugees and asylum seekers, are
wrongly held responsible for the hardships facing poor and disadvantaged
South Africans in terms of  jobs, education, health and other opportunities.
(Kanani 2004, 6–7)
Kanani notes that ‘language is cited as the primary cause of discrimination’,
with the inability to speak Zulu identified as ‘a major cause of being
marginalised’. Refugees have experienced an unwillingness on the part of
local South Africans ‘to be welcoming and willing to teach their language to
these “other” people’, unlike the experience of refugees in other African
countries such as Malawi (Kanani 2004, 13). In South Africa, refugees en-
counter at the very least an unsympathetic response to their experiences and
the difficulties they face. One refugee woman recounted how, on the death
of her husband, she battled to secure the release of his body from the South
African Police Services (SAPS). Although she was in possession of  her
husband’s death certificate, local officers insisted on being given a copy of
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her marriage certificate, and would not accept that this had been left behind
in the couple’s flight from their home country.
Many women were forced to cut their studies short because of situations
of  war in their countries. Some of  these women have been refugees for more
than six years and have not had the opportunity or support to further or finish
their education (Kanani 2004). Bursaries for tertiary studies are limited, with
a local agent for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
offering one or two bursaries per year, and tertiary institutions restricting
their bursaries to South African students only, despite their being specifically
designed to support African students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Women
also cite difficulties in having their home-country education certificates
recognised by tertiary institutions.
In the current South African context, there is little or no welfare or social
support for such vulnerable individuals, who are forced to rely on the generosity
of  fellow refugees who themselves are in desperate situations. In addition,
only limited support is available from service providers designated to assist
refugees and from religious and civil society sectors. More generally, well-
meaning individuals serve as key sources of  support for refugee populations
as a result of  the limited institutionalisation of  refugee services in South Africa.
Women refugees form an especially vulnerable group because of  their
particular social location at the intersection of marginalised gender, race,
class and citizenship positions. Conversations with refugee women reveal
abusive treatment at the hands of government and health officials and
landlords, which shapes their lived experience in even the most basic processes
of life management and negotiation. This treatment ranges from disparaging
remarks based on women’s physical appearance and grooming, to rough
handling during childbirth, to continuous sexual harassment and vicious
repercussions for women not willing to grant sexual favours for ‘special
assistance’. Some women refugees are especially at risk – those who are
pregnant, the chronically ill, single mothers, widows, women with disabilities
and unaccompanied girls who have no means of earning an income. There
are also those women who, like their South African counterparts, have to
deal with the effects of  domestic violence and the reality of  HIV/AIDS. Unlike
most South African women, however, refugee women lack a network of
support from family, friends and state institutions. Kanani (2004) notes that
‘women in such situations have to rely on the kindness of fellow refugees as
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South African grants are not available to those who are not citizens’ (19).
The majority of  refugee women surveyed reported that the stress of  daily
survival and long working hours, together with a sense of  being unable to
provide adequately for family needs, has a distinct negative impact on their
family lives and relationships.
Against this backdrop of the day-to-day realities of refugees in South
Africa, I explore in this chapter the extent to which the voices of these
marginalised women find their way into South African policy and programming
processes. This enquiry is rooted in the perspective and experience of  refugee
women in KZN, through an organised membership-based civil society body,
the Union of  Refugee Women (URW). The URW was established by an informal
network of refugee women based in Durban to provide support to women
refugees and address their social grievances. Research for this chapter is
informed by my long-term work within this organisation. In particular, my
findings are based on a series of discussion groups among refugee women
associated with the URW and NGOs that work with refugee rights. In this
context, I conducted a series of  semi-structured interviews with URW leader-
ship, refugee service providers, the Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) Refugee
Rights Project, agents of the UNHCR and the Mennonite Central Committee
(MCC). I also conducted extensive semi-structured interviews with South
African institutions forming part of  the gender machinery in KZN, including
the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) and the Office on the Status of
Women (OSW) in the office of  the KZN premier. In addition, I reviewed all
legislation pertaining to the status of refugees since 1994. Throughout this
chapter, I draw on data from these multiple sources to locate refugees within
South Africa’s political transition. This broad enquiry into refugee women’s
participation in policy processes may be compared with the concept of in-
clusion of marginalised communities generally in governance – a topic that
has received considerable attention in the literature.
The democratic deficit
Many authors have written about the idea of a ‘democracy deficit’ – the failure
of established, liberal notions of representative or participatory democracy
to link citizens with the institutions and processes of the state, which impacts
on the quality and vibrancy of democracy and results in reduced accountability
(Gaventa 2004; Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor 2000). Many democracies are
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consequently characterised by a disappointing sense that free elections have
done little to improve government accountability and performance. Carothers
(2005) notes that typically, with growth in poverty, inequality and corruption,
and as citizens become increasingly sceptical and distrustful of  political parties
and institutions, there is declining political participation. This widening gap
between citizens and state institutions results in a ‘diminished democracy’
(Skocpol 2003, 11). With the focus of political parties characteristically being
on electoral processes to the detriment of effective representation, links
between citizens and the state remain weak or non-existent. Carothers (2005)
states that the result is an underdeveloped democracy with limited repres-
entation.
Around the world, governance actors, analysts and activists are grappling
with this issue and exploring how best to engage citizens in government
decision-making processes. However, citizen participation is often reduced
to participation by elite, organised civil society, predominantly in the form of
NGOs, business and other interest groups with access to resources. Participa-
tion mechanisms that are established to channel citizen input are not accessible
to the majority population in societies characterised by inequality, with
marginalised communities and sectors in particular being excluded, and
typically do not ‘automatically benefit poor people and groups that have long
faced social exclusion’ (Manor 2004, 5).
Developing avenues to overcome the ‘democracy deficit’ through the
active participation of civil society organisations is particularly important in
the South African context, where pervasive inequalities persist and new forms
of  social exclusion replace apartheid divisions. The question that emerges is:
how can we develop mechanisms that enable the poor and unorganised, and
vulnerable groups such as refugee women, to influence policy making, thereby
building ‘democratisation with inclusion’ (Manor 2004, 6)? The case being
examined in this chapter – namely, the prospects for refugee women to engage
with governance processes – highlights sharply the deficiencies in a system
that serves to keep marginalised groups firmly on the periphery of  decision
making.
When asked what advantage they saw in being drawn into policy processes,
URW leadership representatives stated that this would ensure that when
government makes policy relating to refugees, it does so from a position of
being aware of refugees’ needs, ‘instead of just guessing’. They stated that
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this would ensure that refugees get what they really need, prevent having to
address problems arising from the implementation of costly and inappropriate
services and assist in integrating refugees into the local communities. In the
existing South African context, however, access to protective policies is
mediated by constrained notions of citizenship because refugee populations
remain unprotected from a policy standpoint and, at the same time, are socially
marginalised in ways that limit full participation in democratic processes.
Refugee status, rights and services
The United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (UN 1951)
defines a refugee as a person with a ‘well-founded fear of persecution on
account of  race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group
or political opinion’. This definition forms the basis for South African
legislation pertaining to refugees. The LHR Refugee Rights Project staff  stated
that the definition of refugees discriminates against women, in that the
emphasis tends to be on political distinction and political discrimination, and
that women tend to fall outside of  this category. Kanani (2004) supports this
notion, pointing out that the ‘traditional focus on the word “persecution” . . .
has made it difficult for women or others who cannot claim to be directly
politically persecuted to claim asylum status’ (4).
The UNHCR has endorsed the notion that gender constitutes a social group
or subset, affirming that states are ‘free to adopt the interpretation that women
asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhumane treatment . . . may be considered
as a “particular social group” within the meaning of the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention’ (UN 1986, at conclusion, para. k). Despite gender having been
recognised as a marker of  vulnerability, and states encouraged to adopt
measures necessary to address the needs of  this vulnerable group, nothing
has been put in place in South African legislation, policy or practice to ensure
that women refugees do not endure ongoing persecution on the basis of  gender.
This suggests that the gender rights framework central to South Africa’s
democratisation has not yet been expanded to include women in refugee
populations.
South African refugee legislation permits asylum-seekers to remain
temporarily in the country. Those with official status as refugees – that is,
those who have been granted asylum – are entitled to ‘full legal protection,
which includes the rights set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution and the
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right to remain in the Republic’ (RSA 1998, clause 27b). The Act goes on to
state that refugees are entitled to seek employment (clause 27f) and ‘to the
same basic health services and basic primary education’ as South Africans
(clause 27g). Kanani (2004), however, points out that there is ‘no coherent
government policy dealing with health and welfare service provision for
refugees and asylum seekers’, and that as a result ‘it is not known which
services refugee households are entitled to’ (6). Despite the legal guarantee
of access to constitutional and basic rights, which should entitle refugees to
child-support grants and other social support, Kanani notes that this has ‘failed
to materialise in any significant way. At present, refugees are not being accorded
the same rights as South African citizens’ (12).
It is clear from the experiences described by refugee women that they do
not enjoy treatment equal to that of South African citizens, and that they
continue to experience persecution and discrimination as a result of xenophobic
attitudes on the part of  government officials and ordinary citizens. The fact
that there are no official programmes in place to address this, or to provide
support to refugee women, heightens this experience of social exclusion and
severe marginalisation. The question that arises, then, is, what opportunities
or spaces are created for refugee women to raise these anomalies and bring
these issues to the attention of policy makers to ensure that appropriate
policies and programmes are developed and effectively implemented?
The role of  support and gender institutions
At this juncture it is critical to assess the role played by service provider
agencies and gender institutions in addressing the needs and concerns of
refugee women, and their ability to take these up at policy levels. South Africa
may be distinguished from other African countries that receive refugees in
that it does not have refugee camps that provide social and material assistance
to refugees. In South Africa, the UNHCR is essentially responsible for ensuring
that refugees entering the country are able to access their constitutional rights
by encouraging ‘government, the public and private sectors to understand
and implement these basic rights’ (Kanani 2004, 5).
In KZN there are three primary support institutions to assist refugees: (1)
the MCC, the UNHCR’s only implementing partner for refugee social needs in
KZN, as it does not have an office there; (2) the LHR Refugee Rights Project;
and (3) Refugee Pastoral Care, which offers basic welfare services to Catholic
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refugees only (Kanani 2004, 17). The MCC provides subsidies towards school
fees, uniforms and stationery for vulnerable and unaccompanied minors, and
a scholarship to pursue tertiary education for one or two refugees annually. It
also provides assistance for social needs for refugees falling into the categories
of the chronically ill, the aged and unaccompanied minors, as well as limited,
time-bound support to new arrivals and ‘crisis cases’. Further, it provides job
placement services through micro-loans and subsidies towards vocational
skills training. The LHR Refugee Rights Project primarily provides legal
assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers in accessing documentation and
asylum status. It interacts with the Department of  Home Affairs on these
issues and reports to the UNHCR. It also addresses issues related to refugee
housing and police brutality. Neither the MCC nor the LHR Refugee Rights
Project has programmes specifically addressing the needs of women, although
both recognise them as a particularly vulnerable group.
While both the MCC and the LHR Refugee Rights Project interact with
government officials on refugee issues, both groups acknowledge that more
focused policy advocacy interventions would be of  great benefit, in terms of
addressing certain procedures that are not properly implemented by the
authorities and responding more effectively to capacity problems and lack of
awareness in relation to the case of refugees on the part of Home Affairs
staff. Both the MCC and the Refugee Rights Project do seek to create spaces
for refugees to engage with government stakeholders through workshops for
refugees on their rights, to facilitate forums for refugee service providers and
representative structures and to convene events at which government
representatives interact with these bodies.
From the perspective of  gender rights, two government institutions form
part of  South Africa’s gender machinery active in KZN: the Office on the
Status of  Women (OSW) in the office of  the KZN premier, and the Commission
on Gender Equality (CGE). The OSW does not have any programmes
specifically focused on addressing the particular needs of refugee women. In
terms of  its implementation strategy, it has two key programme areas: violence
against women and children, and women’s economic empowerment. However,
OSW office manager, Queeneth Mkhabela, states that she sees refugee women
fitting into the category of women with ‘special needs’, and expressed great
interest in interacting with representative groups, such as the URW, to draw
them into OSW programme areas.
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Thabisa Dumisa, a CGE commissioner at the time of this research,
acknowledged that if black South African women are triple-oppressed, refugee
women are in an even worse situation with regard to the vulnerability of their
status. The CGE does not have any official programme responding to the
needs of refugee women, and has not yet tackled this issue. Dumisa reported
that refugee women could be drawn into CGE provincial initiatives, depending
on the stakeholders and networks active at provincial level. The CGE would
be limited to intervening where discrimination on the basis of  gender is
experienced.
These findings reveal huge gaps at both policy intervention and service
delivery levels. Institutions mandated to address issues relating to refugees,
and those addressing issues impacting specifically on women, do not have
information or programmes focused on the needs of  this particularly vulnerable
group. While refugee women consulted in this research identified themselves
firstly as women and secondly as refugees by virtue of their situations, neither
gender nor refugee service providers are positioned to engage in advocacy on
or provide support in response to the violations and discriminations
experienced. Furthermore, at the time of  this research, neither the CGE nor
the OSW was positioned to take up the particular needs of this population at
policy levels.
Spaces and mechanisms for public participation
In examining what opportunities exist for refugee women to engage with the
policy machinery in South Africa, it is essential first of all to assess the broader
context of spaces and mechanisms for public engagement with policy pro-
cesses in the new democracy. South Africa has clear constitutional and
legislative provisions for community participation in governance, leaving no
doubt as to the existence of extraordinary political commitment to notions
of participatory governance (RSA 1996, 2000). However, some significant
barriers to participation in policy processes present distinct challenges to the
implementation of democratic governance. These include design, capacity
shortcomings and resource gaps impacting the effectiveness of measures put
in place, as revealed in the research findings within this sector.
Another challenge faced is that of the political system of proportional
representation. The selection of representatives from party electoral lists
undermines the notion of  citizen representation, with representatives allocated
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to constituency areas that they must then service. This system is not sufficient
to ensure that citizens’ needs and interests are incorporated in policy making,
with many arguing that elected representatives owe greater allegiance to the
political parties who include them in party lists than to the electorate, who
can only vote for parties and not individuals.
Interrogation of existing opportunities, spaces and mechanisms at the
levels of the provincial legislature, executive and local government through
desk-top analysis (Ngwenya and Ngema 2005), focus-group discussions and
interviews with policy makers (Hicks 2005) reveals further inadequacies.
Public participation within processes of the provincial legislature is under-
mined by inadequate time for members to consult with communities and few
opportunities for public comment. Insufficient political will to implement
broader participatory processes, lack of clarity on where responsibility for
this lies, as well as lack of guidelines, resources and capacity to facilitate this
objective further weaken participation. Poor information dissemination and
lack of summarised, plain-language versions of policy and legislation under
scrutiny further prevent marginalised groups from participating effectively.
Policy discussion sessions and interviews with policy makers on par-
ticipation at the executive level (Hicks 2005) reveal that departmental
initiatives are in the main limited to the izimbizo (public gatherings) of  the
office of  the premier. These gatherings draw together thousands of  community
members to raise issues of concern in the presence of the premier and
departmental representatives, who have to respond to and address issues and
problems raised to the satisfaction of  the premier. While this innovation has
been welcomed, limitations of  this forum have been noted, such as the sheer
size of  the gatherings, which makes the forum unsuitable for deliberation on
issues and possible solutions. They are also often unfocused, resulting in a
catch-all process for all community problems.
In the local government sphere, discussion sessions and interviews with
policy makers (Hicks 2005) reveal that municipalities have initiated numerous
mechanisms to facilitate public input into their decision-making processes.
In the main, integrated development planning processes are regarded as central
to engaging community groups in decision making. These include integrated
development planning forums, ward committee meetings, roadshows and
budget processes, each of which is supplemented by stakeholder meetings,
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media work and dissemination of  information through traditional leadership
structures.
Opinions of policy makers
Discussion sessions and interviews with policy makers reveal a heartening
approach to public participation in policy making. Interviewees were unanim-
ous in their view that engaging citizens in joint decision making brings benefit
to all. As a positive spin-off, interviewees noted that participation enables
the crafting of innovative solutions to policy challenges, and that engaging
citizens in policy making contributes to the empowerment of  communities,
with people learning more about governance and policy processes by getting
involved in them.
However, analysis of existing mechanisms reveals that policy makers tend
to seek communities’ input into already formulated policy responses, or to dis-
seminate information on existing government programmes. When asked
whether it would be possible to engage communities at the early stages of
problem identification and policy drafting, the response was that communities
lack sufficient understanding of  these processes to do so, and that such
consultation would require innovative approaches.
Civil society experiences of policy processes
Some critics might argue that there are existing spaces for engaging with policy
processes, as highlighted above, and that civil society needs to be better
informed, positioned and active to engage with these. A counter-argument to
this is that only a privileged few have access to these spaces, which are not
sufficiently advertised or accessible, particularly to marginalised groups such
as refugee women. Attempts to facilitate community input are largely
superficial, and do not tap into the real power base where decisions are made.
Most processes present predetermined positions and programmes for limited
feedback or the sharing of  information, or create opportunities for communities
to raise concerns, and therefore make very little substantive difference to
policy decisions. This thinking appears to be supported by civil society
experiences of the policy process, and by refugee women in particular, as
shared in policy discussion forums (Hicks 2005).
Groups at these forums spoke of  mixed experiences of  the policy process.
Feelings of  being sidelined, marginalised, excluded and disempowered
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overwhelmingly dominated. These feelings were occasioned by not receiving
feedback on inputs made in processes; not seeing any recommendations being
taken up or any impact from having participated and made input; being co-
opted into participating in a process with a predetermined outcome; being
excluded from an ‘inner circle’ enjoying privileged access to decision makers
and information; and not being recognised as worthy of  participating.
Concerns were raised at government’s tendency to call for community
input for political buy-in and implementation at advanced stages of policy
formulation, rather than at the outset, when problems are being identified
and solutions are being developed. In this regard, participants from the children
and women’s group noted that
[m]eaningful, participatory spaces are closing up – the really consultative
processes or spaces where decisions are made are not in the public arena.
There is not meaningful engagement with civil society – decisions are taken
elsewhere. (Hicks 2005, 16–17)
They also commented that the use of primarily print media in government
communication and information dissemination excludes certain groups and
communities. Representatives from the discussion group for community-based
organisations (CBOs) noted further that the language used in these processes
further alienates communities, and that notices of opportunities to make
submissions tend to ‘come late’. As a result, CBOs are excluded from decision
making. They stated that CBOs need to be involved from the outset of  the
policy process.
Impact on refugee women
Refugee women reported a particular set of experiences at the hands of
government representatives with whom they attempted to interact to obtain
information and services. In the main, the treatment meted out by government
officials can only be described as abusive. Refugee women are typically treated
with contempt. Officials often refuse to speak in English and insult and swear
at refugee women, giving instructions in Zulu, knowing full well that they are
not conversant in this local language. Officials have refused to provide
information, receive documentation or accept legitimate refugee documentation.
Refugees are forced to queue in poorly maintained facilities, set aside from
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those used by South African citizens. Refugee women are sexually harassed
on a routine basis by male officials and other men in countless other situations.
Women report distinct acts of  harassment and discrimination, ranging from
being propositioned regularly, receiving aggressive responses when they spurn
advances, to being denied assistance from public officials and receiving
threatening messages about eviction from landlords.
Attitudes reveal deep xenophobia and prejudice, with women being told
that they stink, that they have too many children and that they are taking
away resources from South Africans. Findings from this research reveal little
or no interest in, or empathy with, the trauma experienced by many women in
standard institutional processes, with women continuing to be harangued by
officials even in desperate circumstances, such as during childbirth or upon
the death of a husband. When asked about making attempts to interact with
more senior government officials to raise awareness about their plight, a
woman at the discussion forum convened for refugee women retorted: ‘We
are invisible. They do not know us – we don’t ever meet them. They know us
on papers only.’
Power in the policy process
Discussion forum participants (Hicks 2005) were particularly struck by power
relationships at play in the policy process, both among policy makers
themselves and between policy makers and civil society. Groups reflected on
how these power relationships impact on the process, resulting in the kinds
of experiences they shared. These were typified by unequal power relationships
between politicians and bureaucrats and between government and civil society
representatives, between those with access to information and resources and
those without, between those who belong to organised structures and those
who do not, between those who are viewed as educated and those who are
not, between urban and rural residents, between men and women, and between
people with different abilities.
Refugee women in particular noted further discrepancies, stating that
power inequities are deepened on the basis of  both gender and citizenship,
with women constantly experiencing distinct forms of  sexual harassment.
Language is also used as a means to further alienate women attempting to
engage with government officials, with the inability to understand Zulu
resulting in verbal abuse and poor service at the hands of  officials. Perceptions
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of  women’s standards of  education and income – denoted by aspects of
women’s physical appearance such as grooming, dress and skin tone – also
influenced how they were received by officials.
Finally, refugee women identified information and knowledge as key
influences. Those who possess a better understanding of  government systems
and processes, as well as their rights within that process, fared better at the
hands of officials than those who are ignorant and who do not have support.
Similarly, those who received support from organised structures such as the
URW were better able to receive proper services. However, women reported
that they had to be careful to appear humble and inferior so as not to anger
officials. They noted that officials seem to lack information on or an
understanding of  how refugees come to be in South Africa. The misinformed
perception that refugees are illegal aliens fuelling crime rates, HIV infection,
unemployment and drug dealing only serves to deepen the xenophobic
response typically received. Therefore, as long as women acted in ways that
upheld these xenophobic notions of ‘outsiders’, they were less likely to receive
proper services. Although women’s survival may hinge on socially reproducing
embedded stereotypes about the ‘other’ in the presence of public officials,
such social encounters reinforce a broader system of severe inequality that is
gradually recreating the forms of  treatment that were so vehemently resisted
during the apartheid era.
Discussion forum participants in this research reflected that these unequal
power relationships play themselves out in the policy arena, resulting in some
issues not making it onto the agenda, the exclusion of some stakeholders, the
rendering invisible of others, and the isolation of many from that critical
juncture where decisions are made. Participants noted that unless these power
issues are surfaced and addressed through careful planning, collaboration and
facilitation, they will continue to undermine participatory initiatives seeking
to gain civil society input and buy-in.
Participants from the children and women’s group discussion noted that,
as a starting point, power resides with political parties. There is power in the
process of setting the agenda for discussion itself, and participants questioned
how issues get on to the political agenda and attract sufficient support and
attention. When it comes to the implementation of policies and programmes,
power is devolved to government agencies, and this is not monitored by or
made accountable to civil society – illustrating that although the country’s
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democratic process is noted for open participation, South Africa too is
characterised by a ‘democracy deficit’.
Participants from the HIV/AIDS discussion group picked up on this
concept, and they thought it important to distinguish between the power
base of political and bureaucratic actors and national government actors as
opposed to provincial and local actors. While politicians deliberate ideas and
make decisions, bureaucrats have the final power of implementation.
Likewise, most policy processes are formulated at national level, which is
perceived as being far removed from communities and difficult to access,
with provincial and local governments then tasked with implementing these
policies.
These experiences and reflections from civil society stakeholders indicate
that although South Africa has in place legislative provision for participatory
mechanisms, it is not enabling civil society to participate meaningfully. Policy
makers acknowledge the limitations of these mechanisms, and civil society
experience leaves no doubt that these are inadequate, inaccessible and
disempowering, and that new approaches to participatory policy making are
required.
Preconditions for civil society engagement
A further issue for consideration is how marginalised groups such as refugee
women can enter the policy arena motivated, empowered and equipped to
engage with a greater sense of equity with government and other civil society
actors. The literature on agency and citizenship identifies a notable challenge
in how individuals develop the ability to act when they experience a sense of
internalised powerlessness that keeps them from the discussions at the centre
(Kabeer 2005; Gaventa 2005). In discussions of access to democratic rights
in South Africa, civil society stakeholders repeatedly focused on issues of
the agency of poor people, the development of political attitudes and opinions
among the marginalised, and whether these groups can be motivated to engage
with policy debates in ongoing processes of  nation building. Discussion forum
participants felt strongly that the satisfaction of basic needs has a central
impact on people’s ability to engage with policy processes. Furthermore, those
lacking in basic service delivery experience a particular sense of  alienation
from government. Participants in the children and women’s discussion forum
stated how difficult it is to engage ‘hungry’ people on policy issues.
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Yet the government’s prioritising process needs to be consultative and
participatory, so that a people-driven national agenda is developed. For refugee
women, the biggest challenge centres on how people can engage in South
Africa’s democratic processes:
People’s lives are stressed – how do you sustain processes and draw in groups,
when the benefit or impact is not immediately apparent? The challenge is
sustaining public participation at community level, and finding a balance for
this, acknowledging that it comes at personal cost. Processes need to be
managed in a way that helps people’s lives. (Hicks 2005, 22)
Comments made by refugee women in their deliberations confirmed these
sentiments, with one discussion forum participant noting: ‘People are not
ready to claim their rights, because of  the cost of  life.’ While the challenges
to participation in governance and the ability to directly influence policy change
may well be shared by other civil society groupings in South Africa, the
additional factors of  discrimination and vulnerability, xenophobic and
unsympathetic responses from officials, lack of established support networks
and the overwhelming struggle for survival set refugee women apart.
Several authors refer to basic resources and capacities required by
participants to make full use of  government participatory processes. Cornwall
(2004) speaks of the need to assess what work is required with groups prior
to their participation in a process to ensure that they engage with greater
equity. This includes, as a starting point, capacity building to develop an
understanding of the policy framework and process, and enhanced technical
and planning abilities (Logolink 2002). Also required are improved advocacy
skills to mobilise and organise outside of the policy arena in order to challenge
any barriers to participation, as well as essential consciousness-raising (Gaventa
2003b; Kabeer 2005). The important role played by NGOs in providing support
to participatory initiatives is highlighted, including providing marginalised
groups with access to information and material support, as well as establishing
‘vertical lines’ of  communication that link grassroots issues and structures
with national processes (Stiefel and Wolfe 1994, 207).
In the South African context, the Human Sciences Research Council
(HSRC) conducted a survey into citizens’ knowledge of  government processes,
their willingness to participate in these and what actual participation resulted.
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Their findings indicate that citizens’ knowledge of government processes is
insufficient, which impacts on their ability to engage with them (Roefs and
Liebenberg 1999). Issues raised by civil society groups in their discussion
forums support these findings. The CBO group (Hicks 2005) noted particularly
that CBOs tend to lack information on how to work with government and
how to get involved in policy making, stating that they are often unable simply
to find the appropriate contact point. In the case of marginalised group
members’ engagement, these obstacles tend to be even more daunting as a
result of  educational inequalities and institutional barriers.
Refugee women display a great lack of understanding of South African
government processes and opportunities to engage, with one discussion group
participant asking, ‘What is a municipality?’ They identified the need for basic
training and information on their rights as refugees in relation to international
conventions, South African legislation and government services and pro-
grammes. They specifically identified the need for greater understanding of
South African governance processes, including where to go for information,
how to engage with policy processes, who is responsible for delivery of
particular services and how to advocate effectively on their rights and issues.
Refugee women identified a range of  support interventions that would be
required to enable them to engage with policy processes on a more equitable
basis, including having access to relevant documents and information about
processes. Refugee women also called for preparatory processes among
themselves to enhance their efforts to participate in policy deliberations,
consider the policy issues and proposals put forward by government, deliberate
alternative options and reach broad agreement on their priorities. The particular
needs of refugee populations highlight the importance of an evaluation of
assumptions underlying individuals’ as well as marginalised groups’ abilities
to engage in civil society. In the South African case, while the democratic
model is one of open participation, overlapping barriers for refugees create
asymmetrical power relations that mandate particular considerations for the
involvement of  this growing population in civil society processes. Furthermore,
refugee women’s ability to mobilise and demand greater protections is severely
challenged by two predominant obstacles: barriers to understanding the system
of governmental participation and prevailing xenophobic assumptions that
place extreme disadvantages on women.
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Crafting new democratic spaces
From the critiques and findings reported above, it is clear that careful attention
needs to be paid both to the institutional design of new democratic spaces
and to the facilitation of spaces themselves, in order to address challenges of
representation, power and voice, and to ensure more equitable participation
of  marginalised groups, such as refugee women, in policy processes. Fung
and Wright (2003, 15) note that the institutional design of  empowered
participatory governance is based on three principles: a focus on specific,
tangible problems; involvement of ordinary people affected by these problems
and officials close to them; and the deliberative development of solutions to
these problems. In addition, Fung (2003) has developed ‘recipes for public
spheres’, and sets out a range of ‘institutional design choices’ facing policy
makers in creating deliberative forums or ‘mini-publics’ (339). The creation
of these mini-public spaces affords opportunities for citizens to engage in
political processes and, in the South African case, in the ongoing process of
democratic nation building.
In order to understand how the design of these spaces is connected to
social power asymmetries, it is critical to consider where these spaces are
located. Gaventa (2005) stresses that the process of creating democratic
spaces must take place where people naturally act. In creating new democratic
spaces, we must consider how the framing of civil society spaces impacts on
the quality and value of  the participatory process. Issues such as who creates
the space for participation (thereby setting the agenda) and who invites certain
groups to participate (thereby excluding others), what knowledge is valued
and what is disregarded, and how the ‘rules’ for engagement are determined
substantially influence the nature of the deliberation and decisions that are
made within that space. Forms of  participation are clearly determined by
who creates the space (Gaventa 2003a; Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa 2001;
Cornwall 2004; Sisk 2001). In the case of refugee populations, such spaces
are often exclusionary, presenting substantial barriers that impede the full
participation of  this sector.
In understanding the case of refugee women, it is also critical to keep in
mind that no political or civil society space is ‘neutral’. When participatory
spaces are created, they are ‘infused with existing relations of power’, which
‘reproduce rather than challenge hierarchies and inequalities’ (Cornwall 2004,
81). This means that established patterns of behaviour, perceptions and
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stereotypes that exist between groups and classes of people will ‘follow’ these
people into a participatory space, and subtly influence the decision-making
process underway. These spaces need to be transformed by introducing new
rules, techniques and processes to avoid reproducing the status quo. This can
be done through the choice of  language used, seating arrangements, rules for
engagement and decision making, and by building on existing spaces where
people are already engaging (Cornwall 2004).
In CBO discussion forums, recommendations were put forward on choices
of  community spaces to use in convening participatory processes. Participants
spoke of the need to create a greater sense of equity among government and
civil society representatives by seating them alongside each other at round
tables, or making use of  horseshoe seating arrangements and removing tables.
Leaders gave careful attention to the facilitation of processes, and to the
preparatory work that should be undertaken in the form of  disseminating
information in plain and local languages on the process and policy options
under consideration. Participants also called for consultative sessions to enable
community members to come to grips with policy options and develop their
positions and inputs.
While echoing many of these recommendations, refugee women made
specific additional inputs on how such spaces could best be facilitated to
ensure their engagement with policy processes. They identified the need for
ordinary refugee women to form the majority at any policy discussion related
to their issues of concern, and for an understanding of who they are, why
they have come to be in South Africa and their interest in the policy issue to
be established upfront, as a context for the discussion. Refugee participants
emphasised the need to exercise the right to express themselves, and not be
spoken for by service providers or groups claiming to represent their interests.
Women stressed the need for government representatives to listen to what
they have to say, and felt strongly that the venue for discussions should be
located where refugee women would feel confident to talk ‘in our own place’,
as one discussion session participant noted.
Clearly, if  notions of  power, space and voice are not addressed, the mere
opening up of public spaces for participation in government decision making
will result in these being filled by those who already have power and access
to resources (Gaventa 2003a). Of greater concern is the need to ensure that
new spaces work to the advantage of the poor and unorganised, and not to
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that of  bureaucrats. Friedman (2004) speaks of  the danger of  creating ‘forums
which are most convenient for officials and politicians because they are
structured . . . neat and easily manageable [yet] least convenient for the poor
who may well be far better off  using the less structured methods of  expression
which are allowed by a democratic constitution’ (25). Refugee women in this
research identified how such processes could enhance their participation in
civil society. For example, participants noted that service providers, Chapter
9 institutions and parliamentary committees could strengthen deliberative
policy processes that engage refugees by networking with refugee structures
and drawing them into their events and processes; providing support to their
campaigns and lobbying government on their behalf; and assisting in raising
awareness among local communities on refugee issues.
Conclusions
Returning to the original question of whether new democratic spaces can be
crafted that enable marginalised groups such as refugee women to engage
with policy processes from an empowered position, findings from this research
suggest a way in which this may be done. In the case of  South Africa, although
barriers imposed by xenophobic attitudes and limited access to democratic
processes continue to shape the experiences of refugees, civil society engagement
also provides a space where this population has been able to participate in
the democratic process, thereby accessing collective agency and establishing
the foundation for further levels of organisation. A distinct dialectic emerged
throughout my work with refugee women in KZN, who were both constrained
by and actively resisting the social exclusion of ‘outsiders’. Civil society
organisations provided a space where refugee women could unite in their
voice and link to other CBOs, as they enacted both individual and collective
agency. Much like the policy reform initiatives among domestic workers
discussed in Chapter 5 of this collection, the ability to align with other civil
society organisations to assert a collective and powerful voice is particularly
important when women are severely marginalised at the vector of several
forms of  inequality.
The legislative framework for public participation in South Africa – in
the form of  constitutional and local government provisions for the voices of
civil society – provides an important context for examining opportunities for
refugee populations to improve their day-to-day living conditions. Furthermore,
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the gender rights imperative of  South Africa’s democracy widens access for
women in these political processes. In this case, women are better positioned
to establish processes that meet the specific needs of  female refugees.
What is missing is the establishment of stronger links between state
institutions and civil society stakeholders such as the URW as a basis for
participatory policy making. For stakeholders such as refugee women to
participate with confidence and capability in policy processes, there is a need
to provide capacity building to enable them to engage with these processes
and build a sense of agency over time. Such capacity building would address
information needs and include programmes that deal with understanding policy
making, policy research and analysis; monitoring support; and advocacy
training and planning. Finally, the design ideas recommended on how best to
plan, conceptualise and facilitate new democratic spaces need to be taken
up, so that joint policy deliberation between government and civil society
representatives are accessible, equitable and transformative. With these
initiatives, South Africa’s democratic processes may be expanded such that
marginalised refugee women are able to take a central role in participatory
governance with a greater sense of  equity and alignment with the country’s
overarching commitment to gender rights through engagement with civil
society organisations.
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The Possibilities of Global Organisation
M. BAHATI KUUMBA
The transnational feminist challenge to global inequality
Feminist cross-border and transnational activism has been a particularly vibrant
and growing opposition to market-driven globalisation and its detrimental
impact on women’s lives over the last few decades. These transnational
movement networks and structures mirror the increasingly integrated and
coordinated system of global dominance and inequality against which they
struggle (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Kriesberg 1997; Moghadam 2000). They
are testimony to the fact that the borders of the nation state have become
just as permeable to social justice activism as they are to the flow of  deepening
inequalities and oppressions that characterise the current era of globalisation.
Contemporary scholars and activists recognise the proliferation of transnational
networks, organisations and strategies as a counter-hegemonic process of
‘globalisation from below’ that links the grassroots/local and the global/
international levels of  collective resistance in an emergent global civil society.
 At this moment, the overarching context within which the widening
disparities and social oppressions that differentially, yet globally, affect women
is the increasingly integrated and coordinated system of multiple hegemonies
generally referred to as ‘globalisation’ (Basu 2000; Moghadam 2000; Naples
and Desai 2002; Sassen 2000). With this growth of global interconnectedness
and restructuring, we see a simultaneous resistance movement that aligns
women from diverse social locations through civil society organisations.
However, in contrast to earlier attempts to forge international solidarity and
unity among women on the basis of  a presumed universalised women’s
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oppression or ‘global sisterhood’, today’s transnational activism is defined by
the recognition of  women’s particular experiences and social locations within
a common struggle increasingly shaped by systemic patterns of  global
inequalities. As Mohanty (2003) describes it:
What seems to constitute ‘women of  color’ or ‘Third World women’ as a
viable oppositional alliance is a common context of  struggle rather than color
or racial identifications. Similarly, it is Third World women’s oppositional
political relations to sexist, racist, and imperialist structures that constitutes
our potential commonality. This is the common context of  struggles against
specific exploitative structures and systems that determines our potential
political alliances. (49)
This ‘common context of  struggle’ posited by Mohanty is taken up in civil
society organisations where women both align and actively resist the dominant
patterns of  gender inequality central to global restructuring. Through data
collected within women’s civil society organisational research sites in both
the United States and South Africa, I illustrate how African women’s trans-
national activism engages Mohanty’s (2003) concept of  solidarity based on
African women’s diverse experiences of  related and common contexts of
struggle against global inequalities and hierarchies.
From many activist and scholarly perspectives, transnational social
movements and justice activism is linking grassroots/local and global/inter-
national opposition into a global civil society with immense potential for
challenging and transforming both local and global systems of  domination
and inequality. In the midst of  diverse experiences among African and African
diasporan women, their relational and commonly contextualised positioning
within the globalised system of multiple inequalities has provided particular
historical and contemporary opportunities for transnational feminist activism.
African women’s international mobilisation is just one form of  resistance
created in opposition to the global system of inequality and domination that
increases its expanse and concentration of  power. Yet within these processes
of resistance, civil society emerges as a particularly powerful space that holds
the potential for transnational African women’s/feminist organising to build
an international movement that contests the multiple layers of  global inequality.
Despite its dynamism, the transnational feminist activism that has
flourished in the last few decades has received insufficient attention in the
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dominant scholarly research and from contemporary activist strategists.
Sociologist and women’s studies scholar Moghadam (2000) recently observed
that ‘neither the globalisation literature nor the social movement literature
examines feminism as . . . transnational organisations linking women in
developing and developed regions and addressing social, economic and foreign
policy issues in supra-national terms’ (59). Within this broader area of  scholarly
and activist neglect, the transnational feminist alliances forged by African
and African diasporan women have been doubly, if  not triply, ignored and
marginalised.
This chapter, as well as the ongoing research on which it is based,
contributes to the literature on transnational women’s social justice activism
and civil society organisation by exploring two African/African diasporan
cases that have built critical linkages between the geographic contexts of
South Africa and the United States and within the African continent. I combine
the strengths of two theoretical paradigms in my methodological approach
and comparative analysis: global African feminisms and radical social
movement theories. Because of  the distinct geographical and political diversity
of African feminisms, I draw broadly from the liberatory themes that connect
African and African diasporan women’s diverse historical and contemporary
liberatory thought and action.
I apply these theoretical perspectives to the cases of the All African
Women’s Conference (AAWC) and the Women’s HIV/AIDS Resources Project
(WHARP), examples of historical and contemporary cases of transnational
African feminist organising, respectively. The AAWC was founded in 1962 in
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, as a coalition of  women’s organisations associated
with African national liberation struggles. The secondary analysis of  this
organisation was based on archival research conducted at the African Studies
Department Library at the University of  Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa in
2002. I relied mainly on primary AAWC organisational documents, tran-
scriptions of conference speeches and meetings, and reports from member
organisations. The contemporary example I examine is WHARP, a three-year
transnational partnership that linked two HIV/AIDS advocacy and education
organisations (SisterLove, Inc., and the National Center for Human Rights
Education (NCHRE)) founded by black women in the United States to three
similarly focused organisations in South Africa (Positive Women’s Network
(PWN), Township AIDS Project (TAP) and the Society for Women and AIDS in
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Africa (SWAA)). The partnership, which began in 1999 and ended in 2002,
engaged the organisations in mutual learning and information exchange,
collaborative organisational development, and joint HIV/AIDS education and
advocacy projects based on transnational commonalities with respect to the
impact of the pandemic.
The research methodologies employed for the WHARP analysis consisted
of the examination of official partnership and individual organisational
documents, face-to-face interviews with key partnership players and inter-
mittent periods of  participant observation over a two-year period (2000–
2002). As in the case of  the AAWC, my engagement in these research processes
was transnational in that it was conducted in multiple global locations: Cape
Town, South Africa; Johannesburg, South Africa; Witbank, South Africa; and
Atlanta, Georgia, United States. Throughout my analysis I employ feminist
reflexive practices that connect my own social location as an African feminist
activist scholar with my observer/participant position within these organisa-
tional sites. For example, my scholar-activist position affords additional insider
knowledge in my analysis of the US-based WHARP partners (SisterLove and
the NCHRE), on the basis of my engagement with these organisations and
their social justice work in a scholarly-activist capacity since my arrival in
Atlanta in 2000. As a result, my position as a feminist activist researcher is
integrally connected to my own participation within civil society organisations
in both Africa and the US. On an institutional level, the Women’s Research
and Resource Center at Spelman College, with which I am professionally
affiliated, has partnered with SisterLove and NCHRE in order to transcend the
pervasive historical divides that separate organisational activism from
hierarchical educational institutions centred on knowledge production. My
own relationship to this project therefore mirrors the transcending of
boundaries central to the development of  a strengthened global civil society.
Historical contexts for transnational activism
In order to situate African women’s activism within today’s growing global
civil society movement, we must first explore pivotal moments in the history
of international organising and transnational mobilisation. According to
Sperling, Ferree and Risman (2001), ‘women’s transnational advocacy networks
organized around the principles of challenging gender hierarchy and improving
the conditions of  women’s lives have been among the earliest and most
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influential of such global mobilizations’ (157). Early well-known examples
of  transnational women’s organising were directed towards women’s suffrage
and peace. For example, the International Women’s Suffrage Association,
founded in 1904, linked European and North American women and their
organisations across nation states through conferences and correspondence
towards the objective of citizenship and voting rights for women. Likewise,
the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, which was formed
in 1915 in The Hague, Netherlands, engaged women from around the world
in opposition to the First World War.
While oppositional to patriarchal inequality, these early expressions of
transnational women’s activism were inherently embedded with, and reflective
of, other systems of inequality and oppression characteristic of world societies
of that era. These movements, which reflected racial, national, class and
cultural exclusivity, lacked input and participation from the majority of  the
world’s women, who were largely subjected to patriarchies within the contexts
of  slavery, colonialism and fascism. Not only were the participants in these
international women’s social justice campaigns predominantly of  European
and European diasporan origin, they were also representative of relatively
privileged class origins. Additionally, they advocated rights for a narrow group
of  the world’s women – namely, those of  European descent – essentially
ignoring but reinforcing the relationship between a particular expression of
gender inequality and other systems of domination including colonialism,
racism and class exploitation. These embedded inequalities are reflective of
the racist, colonialist patriarchy that characterised the period.
Indeed, the legacy of internationalised gender activism among women of
African descent is equally tied to the enduring nature of globalised stratification
on multiple levels, such as gender/sexuality, race/ethnicity, national origin,
cultural background and class positioning. In other words, while ‘globalisation’
is relatively recent terminology, the inequitable distribution of  globalised
power, resources and opportunities to which it refers is not. According to
African feminist and scholar McFadden (2005), globalisation is not simply a
particular moment in time, but ‘an ongoing context made up of historically
recognizable forces that are once again attempting to restructure the world in
order to maintain hegemonic systems of exploitation and privilege’ (1). As
the global system of inequality has moved through particular historical
moments, or ‘strategic instantiations’, patriarchy and gendered power relations
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have consistently served as a crucial nexus in the constellation of  intersecting
systems of inequality (Sassen 1998, 2000).
Transnational activism among African women and other women from
previously colonised nations has its basis in the struggle against the gender,
race and class inequalities of European colonial domination and anti-colonial
resistance. While gendered divisions and inequalities certainly existed in pre-
colonial African societies to varying extents, the colonial superimposition of
Western patriarchy and capitalism widened the gender gaps and increasingly
oppressed indigenous women. According to Seidman (1994), in reference to
the indigenous and colonial patriarchies of the colonial era in southern Africa,
the competing gender ideologies intersected and consistently disadvantaged
women. African women, consistent with women in other colonised societies,
experienced the combined loss of traditional sources of economic and political
power, access to communal lands and resources and control over their
productive and reproductive labour. African-descendant women in the
Americas, Caribbean and United Kingdom were similarly positioned at the
apex of multiple marginalities within the nations through which they were
dispersed as property and forced into labour during the transatlantic slave
trade. Their marginalised and exploited positions within the global political
economy persist today.
Paradoxically, the male-dominated struggles for nation-state autonomy
that swept across Africa, Asia and Latin America during the mid- to late
twentieth century provided the early context for a more indigenous women’s
activism that transcended the nation state. In particular, African women’s
transnational feminist activism was incubated in the context of the gendered
opportunities and constraints embedded within national liberation and social
justices movements. Recent research into these movements consistently
validates the crucial nature of  women’s participation in these struggles as
well as the varying degrees of exclusion and marginalisation that they
experienced (Kuumba 2001).
The women’s wings and other ancillary bodies established within most
national liberation organisations in Africa, and through which women’s anti-
colonial activism was funnelled, were structural expressions of  this
marginalisation. According to Molyneux (2001), these bodies can be described
as ‘directed mobilizations’: that is, overarching and autonomous structures
directed at the mobilisation of  women’s organisations and movements that
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were ‘subjected to a higher (institutional) authority and [are] typically under
the control of political organisations and/or governments’ (149). Often, these
women’s organisations were so closely aligned with the national liberation
organisation or political party with which they were affiliated that they
essentially served as vehicles through which the politics of  the larger male-
dominated liberation organisations and parties were played out on women.
The tensions associated with these layered and multiple oppressions led
African women activists and their collectives to embark on more autonomous
actions through transnational networks of communication, support and action.
A significant expression of this autonomous and transnational impulse was
the formation of  the AAWC in July 1962 in Dar es Salaam. This coalition
linked the women’s wings and organisations associated with national liberation
struggles throughout the continent with the stated purpose of  ‘creat[ing] an
international African organisation to allow exchange of opinion and to
undertake common actions’ (AAWC 1968). Represented organisations included
the Women’s Brigade of  Zambia, the National Union of  Algerian Women,
the Organisation of  the Women of  Mali, the Sudanese Women’s Union, the
Union of  Women of  Tanzania, the Women’s National Movement of
Mauritania, the Uganda Women’s Organisation, the Union of  Moroccan
Women, the Front for the Liberation of  Mozambique (FRELIMO) Women’s
Section, the Union of  Burundian Women and the African National Congress
Women’s League. The AAWC unified African women and their organisations
of different national, ethnic, class and ideological origins and positions,
whether inside the country or in exile. This transnational activist network
linked individual women with women’s organisations on the basis of  broadly
defined principles and policies, which included the following collective desires
established in 1968:
1) to accelerate the movement of emancipation of African women and
promote their total rehabilitation so that they may take part in all the
creative activities in the social, political and economic fields in their
countries;
2) to support the great trend of political, economic and social liberation of
the African continent and contribute, through a conscious, real and
constant action, to the advancement of its peoples; and
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3) to set up relations of friendship and co-operation and effective unity
between the African women and the other women of the world with a
view to promoting progress, justice and peace in the world. (AAWC 1968)
As its stated policies indicate, the AAWC was both anti-patriarchal and
transnational, combining the objectives of gender and national liberation from
its inception. Importantly, the AAWC’s transnational bridge-building strategy
extended beyond the confines of the African continent through its global
outreach to other ‘colonised’ women and their activist structures. A 1972
speech delivered by the delegation of  the FRELIMO Women’s Section, for
example, paid ‘honour to the women from Indo-China to Tanzania, from Angola
to Cuba, from Guinea to Portugal, in the Arab countries and in all the world,
who are engaged in the same combat for their emancipation, for the liberation
of  their countries, and for the liquidation of  all forms of  oppression and
exploitation’ (AAWC 1972). While scholars generally situate transnational
activism within the contemporary era, the cross-border activism of  the AAWC
exemplifies an earlier precedent of  globalised struggle against multiple forms
of  inequality. As the AAWC developed in numbers and strength, it encapsulated
the early foundations of a transnational civil society movement built on the
central commitment to women’s rights across race, class and national bound-
aries. The contemporary expression of  African women’s transnational activism
represents a continuation of  this tradition. I suggest that the current context
of anti-globalisation activism among women is strengthened through the
material and ongoing ideological networks established within the pivotal
AAWC.
From global to transnational sisterhood and feminist activism
The existing configuration of global power relations, although an outgrowth
of the earlier relationships of dominance and exploitation, is characterised
by central dimensions of reinforced inequality that particularly impact African
women, in both their daily lived experiences and their collective activism
within civil society organisations. In the post-colonial global political economy,
African and other previously colonised woman around the world have
experienced increasing disadvantage and marginalisation. The process of
market-driven globalisation that has restructured and recolonised the world
through the imposition of neo-liberal economic policies and neocolonial
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politics has deepened world poverty, increased power differentials and
reinvigorated traditional and contemporary patriarchies. According to Sassen
(2000), the impact of globalisation on women in the ‘global south’ (or
‘underdeveloped’ world) is widespread and dominantly detrimental:
There is considerable research showing the detrimental effects of debt on
government programs for women and children, notably education and health
care, which clearly are investments necessary to ensure a better future. Further,
the increased unemployment typically associated with the austerity and
adjustment programs demanded by international agencies to address
government debt has also been found to have adverse effects on women.
(511)
As a result of  trends that include cutbacks in needed services, rising un-
employment and scarce resources, ‘households and whole communities are
increasingly dependent on women for their survival’ (Sassen 2000, 506).
The contemporary global civil society resistance movement is characterised
by a challenging of  the world’s neo-liberal ideologies that continually reproduce
structural inequalities. Predominant economic trends and political policies
of the post-colonial era have created challenges and hardships of a similar
type for communities around the world – thus imposing a disproportionate
burden on women’s lives. Throughout Africa, these trends have been met
with a groundswell of  women-led grassroots and indigenous structures, mostly
focused on meeting basic human and community needs. Simultaneously, the
infrastructure of  the contemporary global system allows for greater contact
and collaboration between these grassroots women’s movements without the
intermediating role of  indigenous elites or altruistic colonisers. Thus, con-
temporary transnational feminist networking and activism are driven more
by local and indigenous actors, as opposed to external and dominating catalysts,
than in the past.
This common context of gendered exploitation and oppression, expressed
differently in particular locations and sites, has created unique opportunities
for counter-hegemonic opposition through interaction on a global level.
In Moghadam’s (1999) view: ‘the emergence of  transnational feminism –
notwithstanding cultural, class, and ideological differences among the women
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of the world – is the logical result of the existence of a capitalist world-
economy in an era of globalisation, and the universal fact of gender inequality’
(381).
The growing consciousness among women of the interconnectedness of
their lives and struggles across national borders as a result of  the levelling
impact of  neo-liberal economic policy has been matched structurally by the
development of transnational civil society networks and movements that
have become major antagonists in the global struggle for power and resources.
The proliferation of  transnational feminist organisational structures has
been assisted by the adoption of the human rights framework outlined in the
UN Declaration of Human Rights, which articulates the rights that should be
guaranteed to all humans regardless of their societal location. Using this
framework, issues such as violence against women, sexual abuse, reproductive
rights and the feminisation of poverty can be understood as human rights
abuses on a par with torture and genocide. Not only is the human rights
framework useful in contextualising and validating women’s demands, it also
travels easily between geographic and situational sites. Through application
of the human rights framework, women from diverse backgrounds and
locations can forge collective alliances and strategies despite their ‘common
differences’.
Basu (2000) historicises the development of  women’s transnational
feminist/activist networks into two broad phases: (1) contested global
feminism (1975–1985) and (2) local–global connections (1985–1995).
The first phase, between 1975 and 1985, was marked by bitter contestation
over the meaning of feminism and over the relationship between the local
and the global. The second decade-long phase, which began with the Nairobi
conference in 1985 and culminated in the Beijing conference in 1995, was
marked by a growth of  networks linking women’s activism at the local and
global levels. (70)
In Basu’s view, the UN Decade on Women (1985–1995) and subsequent
international women’s meetings, gatherings and collective actions were
important catalysts in the development of global networks of communication
and transnational structures among women activists. At many of  the
international meetings and gatherings that took place during Basu’s first phase,
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women from the ‘global south’ challenged the narrow and restrictive notions
of  liberation and feminist struggle being promoted by their counterparts from
the ‘global north’. Many scholars cite the mid-1980s as a watershed period
for transnational networking and the emergence of a global civil society
movement centred on gender rights. The 1985 Nairobi conference in particular
has been identified as a turning point in international women’s organising
because of  the leadership of  local and grassroots women’s collectives and
NGOs.
This historical moment is also important to our understanding of
contemporary global civil society activism among women because it marked
a pivotal ideological shift that centralised the multiple diversities in women’s
experiences. As opposed to being grounded in a universalised notion of  gender
oppression as articulated in Morgan’s (1984) Sisterhood is Global, the relation-
ships and networks of  feminist struggle that characterise this era of  women’s
transnational activism were based on the dual appreciation of the particularities
of  women’s localised experiences within a common ‘context of  struggle’
(Mohanty 2003, 49). As we examine women’s roles in civil society within the
contemporary period, these intersecting components continue to strengthen
gender organisations within the AAWC and the continuation of  women’s
transnational networking through the UN conferences on women. To elucidate
the contemporary installations of similar models of global activism within
the context of neo-liberal globalisation, I now turn to a focused analysis of
diasporan African women’s civil society organisations that have successfully
mobilised for social change across multiple boundaries. My focus on women’s
HIV/AIDS activism within civil society organisations provides a contemporary
case that encapsulates the intersections of inequality central to this global
pandemic and its particular gender impact.
WHARP: The Women’s HIV/AIDS Resources Project
Although they have received scant attention in the chronology of  transnational
feminist activism, African and African diasporan women’s collectives and
organisations have also been active players in the development of cross-
cultural networks of activism. These networks are based on the historical
commonalities of African diasporan women as they confront the particular
placement of black women as cheap and exploited labour pools in the global
economy. This material reality connects African women to broader ideological
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struggles central to global feminism, which problematises the severe marginal-
isation of  women of  colour throughout processes of  global restructuring.
Similarly, within African feminism, one of  the most consistent and salient
themes is a repeated analysis of the multiple and intersecting nature of oppres-
sion and resistance for African diasporan women. According to anthropologist
Steady (1993), the spectrum of  African feminisms has been deeply connected
to mutual forms of  oppression, such as slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism,
racism, poverty, illiteracy and disease. Here again we see parallels to the issues
emerging in the AAWC beginning in 1962.
Opportunities for cross-border activism have developed even from the
most lethal manifestations of capitalist-driven globalisation. The impact of
the HIV/AIDS pandemic on African-descendant women globally is a case in
point. Throughout the world, women of African descent are disproportionately
infected with the virus. This enhanced vulnerability to the virus can be directly
linked to the compounded economic, sexual, health-care and political
disadvantages that African women experience in these locations. For instance,
according to the global report of the Joint United Nations Programme on
HIV/AIDS (UN 2006), sub-Saharan Africa is home to 64 per cent of all people
living with HIV/AIDS. When we analyse these data from a gender perspective,
we see that the pandemic impacts women most severely in this region, where
three women are infected with HIV/AIDS for every two men. In the United
States, although African American women make up less than 25 per cent of
all US women, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) reports that they account
for 79 per cent of  AIDS cases among women (NIH 2006). As these data suggest,
the interlocking systems of  poverty, race and gender structure this global
pandemic in ways that manifest a particular structural violence on women of
colour throughout the world. At the same time, these transnational commonal-
ities between women of African descent underlie their efforts to work across
borders within organisations connected by common goals and objectives.
WHARP is a transnational African feminist network that emerged out of
these common experiences and the political opportunities for cross-border
activism on macro-, meso- and micro-levels. It was initiated in 1999 by
SisterLove, Inc., an HIV/AIDS and reproductive rights education and advocacy
organisation founded by and focused on African American woman based in
Atlanta, Georgia. Initially an informal, unfunded relationship between like-
minded activists and organisations, the partnership became ‘official’ in 1999
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when SisterLove received a grant from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
to collaborate with three South African HIV/AIDS organisations that were
founded by, comprised primarily of  and focused on, women of  African
descent: PWN, SWAA and TAP.
These three South African NGOs were focused on HIV/AIDS education
and advocacy. The PWN, based in the province of  Gauteng, was established
in 1996 by women infected with HIV; the SWAA was founded in 1989,
representing 30 countries in efforts to raise consciousness about HIV/AIDS;
and TAP was established in 1989 by medical professionals concerned about
the lack of  HIV/AIDS education in Soweto and other areas in Gauteng. WHARP
is illustrative of the opportunities that currently exist for transnational
organising through the engagement of  civil society organisations. Not only is
it emergent from the underbelly of globalisation – the rise of HIV/AIDS among
African and African diasporan women – it is built on the opportunities
provided from the structural and ideological globalisation of  women’s activism
through the dissolving of national boundaries and building on the ‘common
context of  struggle’ (Mohanty 2003) through civil society organisations.
The foundation of these partnered civil society organisations emerges
from the history of activism shared by women throughout the African diaspora.
Like other transnational feminist networks and campaigns, WHARP is directly
linked to the international meetings of women that followed the UN Decade
on Women. By utilising the global infrastructure facilitated in international
meetings and communication technologies, women’s engagement with this
collective civil society initiative contributed to favourable political opportun-
ities for transnational HIV/AIDS activism and advocacy. Most of  the founders
and/or directors of the organisations involved in the partnerships were in
attendance at the UN-sponsored conference on women in 1995 in Nairobi,
Kenya. As an organisation, SisterLove began its international activities in
1993 at the International Women’s Health Meeting in Uganda. The organisation
continued to forge global linkages through participation in the preparatory
committee (Prep-Com) meeting that preceded the International Conference
on Population and Development in 1994; the Fourth World Conference on
Women (NGO forum) in Beijing, China, in 1995; and the 8th International
Women and Health meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1995.
These sites of transnational organisation strengthened the growth of a
global civil society, where women from the African diaspora collectively
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aligned in their shared experience of disproportionate HIV/AIDS infection.
Seseni Nu, director of international programmes for SisterLove, described
the common political opportunities for activism by drawing on the linkages
between women in South Africa and the United States:
We, in the US, one of  the ‘richest’ countries in terms of  material resources and
financial resources, we as a people do not have access to health care. I was a
student of public health and I didn’t even have access – I didn’t have health
care. And so, just dealing with those issues that our governments do not see
health care, they see health care in terms of  a commodity, you know. So we
don’t end up having access to health care, so we can’t deal with these issues
effectively. And in the same sense in South Africa, they have limited access to
health care because, although they have a government which may be, the face
may be all black or may be indigenous, the resources are controlled by other
people who are not investing in the human development of  the country.
Health care is a commodity. So just those kinds of  issues, those kinds of
similarities help to strengthen the connection and the ties and we have to keep
this partnership afloat. (Interview by the author, September 2001)
On the organisational level, the WHARP project was a major source of resource,
information and activist exchange, indicative of  the potential to draw from
civil society organisations in the promotion of  women’s rights across social
location divides. The project attempted to undermine the inherent power
and resource differentials of the partnership through strategic decisions and
communication processes. For example, in the case of  the WHARP project,
the fact that SisterLove received funding for the project from the CDC based
in the United States created the potential for unequal control and power with
respect to its partners. The question of  how to forge transnational alliances
without reinscribing power and resource differentials between partners
remained of  critical concern throughout the organisational alliance processes.
Nu alluded to this dilemma in the following statement:
In essence, the WHARP project is about sharing knowledge in a horizontal
manner rather than a vertical manner. You have to be careful when you are a
primary grantee, or you are the primary receiver of funds, that you don’t take
on the donor mentality of  dictating what the sub-grantees, or even that term
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‘sub-grantees’ . . . that’s a technical term, but it’s a partnership. So you have to
be careful and be mindful of  your own inherent contradictions. You have to
be mindful of your own tendencies to impose your American values that
you’re not even consciously aware of . . . or just assumptions that you may
make in terms of  what capacities or what capabilities our sisters have in
South Africa. And, so, that’s always a fine line. (Interview by the author,
September 2001)
As exemplified in Nu’s discussion of  funding resource allocation, the global
women’s movement at times manifests circumstances where institutions have
the potential to contravene important transnational alliances through creating
linkages that reinforce power asymmetries. Such inequalities burden the notion
of a global civil society because organisational relationships can mirror broader
circumstances of  inequality within women’s groups. In the WHARP project,
awareness of this potential divisive power relationship facilitated a series of
strategic operational standards to minimise this global north/global south
divide among women’s networking processes. For example, the use of
unilateral decision-making and consensus-building processes (rather than the
kind of  vertical format often seen in the donor–grantee relationship) mirrors
the ideological commitments of alignment among women with a common
struggle, while acknowledging power differences embedded in the global
system of skewed capital and social resource distribution.
However, as the literature across a number of  contexts suggests, with the
growth of  a global civil society, forging transnational identities can be a
complicated and power-laden process. This general difficulty is exacerbated
by the historical divisions among African and African diasporan women that
were strategically created and manipulated as part of the colonial/capitalist
‘divide and rule’ strategy. In the case of  WHARP, transnational African feminist
identities were complicated by differences in social location according to class,
nation, ethnicity and sexuality. SisterLove’s founding director, Dazon Dixon
Diallo, discussed the particularly fraught nature of  these multiple identities
and power differentials:
There’s this issue of  having to deal with perceptions of  who you are as an
American . . . that is, there’s a disconnect between my blackness and my
citizenship. I’m seen as a white person in the US because I bear that citizenship.
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We were the imperialist dictators, it was a natural perception because of
where we were coming from. No matter how good we are, we are carrying
the face of  the imperialist. (Interview by the author, March 2002)
As this narrative illustrates, individuals within civil society organisations
embody larger macro-inequalities as a result of their histories of colonial
imperialism and structural domination. Therefore, civil society organisations
must actively resist the tendency to become microcosms of the broader
structural inequalities that they confront within the process of  global
restructuring.
Since its inception, WHARP has directed its emphasis towards fostering
transnational linkages through the use of civil society organisations as sites
of  resistance to broader global inequalities. My research identified key
organisational processes that embodied broader ideologies committed both
to aligning women’s activism and redressing former structures of  social
location inequalities. For example, the project has engaged in cross-training
through ‘train the trainer’ workshops in South Africa and the United States
on grant writing, community programme development and care and support
for caregivers. The linkage has also resulted in increasing the resource base
and financial strength of the organisations by securing funds for local efforts
as well as international conference attendance. As a result, during the first
year of  the partnership, the PWN was able to open a new site in KwaZulu-
Natal. Three years after the initiation of  the partnership, SisterLove opened
its first office in Witbank to serve as a resource for the more than 50
organisations in the province doing HIV/AIDS work. In addition, SisterLove
partnered with SWAA and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) to pressure
the South African government to make antiretroviral drugs available to
pregnant women. These tangible organisational successes provide a perfect
example of the ‘boomerang effect’ of transnational advocacy in which global
linkages can strengthen the positioning of local organisations in pressuring
their own governmental policies.
Transnationality and the future of  the struggle
Today, women of  African descent globally occupy a particular point of
convergence for the socially constructed hierarchies and systems of  race,
nation, class, gender and sexuality. While African women’s experiences are
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varied and divergent on ethnic, cultural, geographic and class levels, there
are key aspects of their historical and contemporary realities that underlie
and facilitate transnational advocacy and networking. While the deleterious
effects of top-down, market-driven globalisation on African and African
diasporan women are well documented, the potential for transnational African
feminist networks are vastly underexplored. Despite their differences, the
activist and collective agency we see among women as a result of their ability
to build on connective historical and contemporary threads in African and
African diasporan women’s experiences illustrates the potential of  trans-
national activism. This creative and militant energy has the potential to become
a transformative force within resistance struggles on the African continent
and throughout the diaspora. Transnational linkages are complicated and
contested zones which offer fresh chances to navigate the opportunities and
constraints of the globalised system of relationships, organisational resources
and subjective and oppositional identities. Yet, even as we better understand
African women’s diasporan mobilisation, I suggest that we must continually
revisit the grounding forums, such as the AAWC, which built the foundation
for both strategic and ideological practices that continue to undergird the
strength of  the ongoing struggle to resist neocolonial practices in the context
of globalisation. Such historical frameworks illustrate that many of the
struggles in this current context are not new; rather, they are taking distinct
shape within the rapid changes central to global restructuring.
Although women have varied experiences in diverse locations, they
commonly experience the repercussions of market-driven globalisation, the
resurgence of fundamentalisms and traditional patriarchies and the rise of
militarisation and political destabilisation (Brenner 2003; Moghadam 1999).
Social movement, globalisation and women’s studies theorists have only just
begun to explore the increasingly coordinated global and transnational
challenges to hegemonic power relations. Social movement theory has been
criticised on the basis of  ‘(1) a Western bias and a tendency to focus research
on movements in Western countries; (2) a gender bias and a tendency to
ignore women’s participation in social movements or theorise the gender
dynamics of collective action; and (3) a national bias and a tendency to ignore
global or world-systemic developments’ (Moghadam 2000, 57). As a partial
response to Moghadam’s concerns, I contend that the political process model,
if  taken together with feminist thought and globalisation theory, can be
Transgressive African Feminism 279
stretched beyond its original theoretical contours in order to accommodate a
gendered and globalised analysis of  social movements. The most useful aspect
of the political process framework is its acknowledgement that the emergence
of  resistance movements is contingent on levels of  multiple structural and
subjective factors that must work in tandem: the larger political opportunity
structure, the organisational strength and resources of  the insurgents, and
participants’ consciousness and subjectivities (Costain 1992; McAdam 1982).
More recently, social movement scholars have been challenged to take into
account the global and gendered dimensions of political opportunities,
mobilising structures and collective identities (Abdulhadi 1998; McCarthy
1997).
Drawing from historical and contemporary examples, this chapter focused
on transnational African feminist networks, an emerging form of  collective
activism among and between women in different geographic locations that
are engaged in struggles for social justices and equality. I contend that the
current era of globalised capitalism has created particular opportunities and
imperatives for cross-border activism and transnational resistance through
civil society organisations. According to Wichterich (1998), this is the founda-
tion for new forms of  women’s international politics that both counter and
act within processes of globalisation.
These divergences and differential power and resource dynamics between
women based on all aspects of  their identities and structural relationships to
the state and economy have often made working across borders conflictual,
and in many instances have served to reproduce hierarchies of  power. Despite
these divergences, feminists and gender activists continue to create linkages
across geographic, ideological, sexual preference, class and race/ethnic
boundaries through their networking within civil society. While these alliances
have not been without conflicts and contestations, they have been a force for
social change and against the systemic inequalities that have the most
deleterious impact on women’s lives.
In this chapter, examples of  transnational African women’s activism were
explored on multiple levels through the lens of an African feminist and political
process model. Although African-descendant women’s experiences differ on
the basis of culture and custom, class and status, socio-economic level,
political and economic context and historical period, they are simultaneously
linked through commonalities in the source, expressions and persistence of
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multiple struggles against multiple oppressions (Collins 2000; Kuumba 2001).
My research suggests that transnational African women’s activism has been,
and continues to be, an intrinsic and significant site of resistance to worldwide
inequality that holds the potential for transformation on both local and global
levels. As women continue to take up struggles within organisations, a
simultaneous movement emerges through the enhanced burgeoning of a global
civil society, where transgressing boundaries reshapes central social power
differentials through new patterns of collective resistance and interconnected
campaigns for justice and equality. While the forms of  transnational activism
vary, the combined effect of  these African feminist global networks – working
simultaneously towards particular and universal forms of  social justice – has
remapped and broadened the terrain of  counter-hegemonic struggle and social
movements.
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